

# CARVING UP PAPUA: MORE DISTRICTS, MORE TROUBLE

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The **Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict** (IPAC) is the name adopted in 2013 by Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional, an Indonesian foundation. Based in Jakarta, IPAC works on the principle that understanding conflict is the first step toward stopping it, and produces in-depth reports based on field research on six kinds of conflict: communal, insurgent, extremist, electoral, vigilante and land/resources. Indonesia is the main focus, with planned future expansion to Myanmar and Bangladesh. For more information email Sidney Jones, IPAC Director, at [sjones@understandingconflict.org](mailto:sjones@understandingconflict.org).

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## I. INTRODUCTION

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The carving up of Papua into smaller and smaller units, each with its own election, is strengthening the coastal-highland divide and breeding new conflicts at the clan and sub-clan level, some of them deadly.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, the issue of wholly unreliable voter rolls – a nationwide problem as Indonesia approaches general elections in 2014 – is so acute in Papua’s central highlands that population statistics have become a matter of negotiation, not fact. The proliferation of local governments and the conflicts created as a result have serious implications for Papua’s ability to formulate a new approach to relations with Jakarta. The solution is not to throw out direct local elections in Papua, as some top officials have suggested. Instead, the effort should be to reduce financial incentives that make administrative division so attractive and eliminate electoral practices peculiar to Papua that invite massive fraud.

Papua and Papua Barat together have undergone more administrative expansion (*pemekaran*) than any other area of Indonesia. What in 1999 was once a single province with ten sub-provincial districts or municipalities (*kabupaten/kota*) has become two provinces, with 42 *kabupaten/kota*. A further 33 proposals for new provinces and *kabupaten* are now before the national parliament. This growth has taken place without any clear strategy or development logic, other than the by now tired rhetoric of “bringing government closer to the people”.

The central government is no longer the main engine of fragmentation. In the early 2000s, in the immediate aftermath of East Timor’s independence, government security advisers in Jakarta were the major advocates of dividing Papua as an antidote to separatism. Today it is overwhelmingly local elites, motivated by a search for status and spoils that are driving the process. Ambitious local officials have an interest in creating more villages (*kampung*) to gain access to block grants for a village development program and more *distrik* (called *kecamatan* elsewhere in Indonesia) to reach the requisite number for a new *kabupaten*, where political and fiscal power is concentrated. More *kabupaten* raise the possibility of more provinces, and today at least three are under serious consideration.

Along the way, there is a strong incentive to inflate population statistics: more people can mean more central government subsidies, higher allocations of civil servants, and more seats in local legislatures. Unreliable population data leads to the drawing up of poor voter lists for direct elections. When these lists are combined with reliance on a supposedly traditional practice of voting by community consensus, the result can be unverifiable results and violent conflict. In the central highlands, where the proliferation of new *distrik* and *kabupaten* has been most pronounced, local candidates have even drawn relatives from the armed Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) into electoral disputes.

All this has meant that *pemekaran* in Papua, once seen as a useful divide-and-rule tactic, is now a gigantic headache for Jakarta. The Ministry of Home Affairs has been urging a moratorium on any further division of Papua, even as Commission II of the national parliament, responsible for overseeing regional autonomy, approves dozens of new units that almost certainly do not meet stated criteria for economic viability. The ministry would like to go backwards, rejoining some of the non-performing *kabupaten* with their “parent” units and ending direct local elections in favour of the old system in which *kabupaten* legislatures choose the executive. Instead of piecemeal dissection, it would like to see a “grand design” – not just for Papua but for the whole of Indonesia – reflected in amendments, now under discussion, to the 2004 local government law.

But *pemekaran* in Papua is going to be hard to stop, let alone reverse. In the meantime, it

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1 A version of this report was presented at the Indonesia Update Conference at Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, 21 September 2013. The research was made possible with support from the Open Society Foundations.

is going to affect any efforts to redirect policy on Papua, whether this in terms of expanded autonomy (called *otsus plus*), accelerated development or dialogue with Jakarta. *Pemekaran* is shifting the locus of political strength from the coast to the central highlands. It is producing a growing number of elected officials – now over 1,000 across Papua and Papua Barat, including local legislators – who want more power and are becoming more effective at lobbying in Jakarta, where many of them spend far too much of their time. But it is also producing heightened clan identities and competition among local elites that may hinder any effort to join forces in search of resolution to Papua's enormous political, social and economic problems.

## II. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF PEMEKARAN IN PAPUA

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If Home Affairs is now talking about the need for a “grand design”, it reflects the lack of any overriding strategy in the carving up of Papua over the last fifteen years. There have been several key steps along the way.

In October 1999, citing the need to improve government services and support further economic development, the Indonesian parliament passed Law 45/1999, which on paper divided the then province of Irian Jaya into three (Irian Jaya Barat, Tengah and Timur) along straight-line borders that made no sense geographically, culturally or politically. The bitter loss of East Timor in a referendum the previous August was a factor in the division.<sup>2</sup> Four new *kabupaten* (Puncak Jaya, Mimika, Paniai and Sorong city) were created at the same time, but the provincial division was never implemented because of opposition from Papuan leaders.<sup>3</sup>

In 2001, Law 21/2001 granting Papua special autonomy was passed, which explicitly stated that creation of any new province could only take place with the approval of a new body called the Papuan People's Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP), charged with upholding Papuan values.<sup>4</sup>

In 2002, fourteen new *kabupaten* were created: Asmat, Boven Digoel and Mappi (carved out of Merauke); Keerom and Sarmi (out of Jayapura); Yahukimo, Tolikara and Pegunungan Bintang (out of Jayawijaya); Waropen (out of Yapen Waropen); Kaimana (out of Fak-Fak); Teluk Bintuni and Teluk Wondama (out of Manokwari); and Raja Ampat and Sorong Selatan (out of Sorong).

In 2003, under pressure from Indonesian intelligence to block expansion of the separatist movement after a rise in pro-independence activity, President Megawati divided Papua into two by fiat in what was perhaps the single act of any post-Soeharto government that most convinced Papuans of Jakarta's continued bad faith. There was no consultation with the MRP which indeed did not yet exist because Jakarta had delayed its establishment. The decree was supposed to implement the 1999 law dividing the province into three but in the end, only Irian Jaya Barat, later named Papua Barat, was created. The damage the division did to Jakarta-Papua relations, let alone to the idea within the Papuan elite that autonomy was an acceptable alternative to independence, is incalculable.

In the same year, the island of Biak was cut in two to create Kabupaten Supiori out of Biak Numfor. Then, after a four-year lull, the divisions began coming thick and fast:

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2 One analysis of the law says that then President Habibie and the parliament pushed the law through “in anticipation” of problems similar to East Timor in Papua. “Inpres Itu Mengundang Emosi”, available at [www.unisosdem.org/article\\_detail.php?aid=1311&coid=3&caid=22&gid=2](http://www.unisosdem.org/article_detail.php?aid=1311&coid=3&caid=22&gid=2).

3 These four had been created as *kabupaten administratif* in 1996, meaning they began to develop local executive structures but had no local legislatures.

4 Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law states that any division of Papua into new provinces can only be done with the approval of the MRP and the provincial assembly (DPRP) after considering socio-cultural unity as well as the existing human and economic resources available.

- In 2007, the northern coast *kabupaten* of Sarmi was hived off to create Mamberamo Raya.
- In 2008, special autonomy was extended to Papua Barat, and Kabupaten Tambrauw was created, carved out of Sorong.<sup>5</sup> In the same year, eight more *kabupaten* were created in Papua province. Four were carved out of Jayawijaya: Nduga, Lanny Jaya, Yalimo and Mamberamo Tengah. Two, Deiyai and Intan Jaya, were carved out of Paniai, Dogiyai out of Nabire, and Puncak out of Puncak Jaya.
- In 2009, Maybrat became the fifth *kabupaten* to be created out of Sorong.
- In 2012, two new districts in Papua Barat were created out of Kabupaten Manokwari: Manokwari Selatan and Pegunungan Arfak.
- In August 2013, 22 more *kabupaten* and three provinces – Central Papua, South Papua and Southwest Papua – were given preliminary approval by Commission II of the Indonesian parliament, subject to verification that they meet regulatory requirements and approval by the full house. The central government says it has no intention of signing off on these, and it is unlikely that they will come into being before the 2014 elections.<sup>6</sup> Central and South Papua also face the opposition of Papua Governor Lukas Enembe, whose approval is a prerequisite.<sup>7</sup>

Amid confusion when and how further divisions of Papua will take place, it is the question of a Central Papua province that could pose the greatest risk of conflict if it becomes a serious prospect.<sup>8</sup> Created by law in 1999 and 2003 only to be rejected by Papuans, it has periodically come back as a possibility amid changing alliances and power struggles within the Papuan elite. In 2007-8, as the current governor, Lukas Enembe, was looking to build a political base, he supported the creation of new province in the central highlands, not only to ensure more attention to a neglected region but also to ensure the delivery of votes from the highland *kabupaten* when he made his bid for governor.

In 2011-2012, as the governor's election drew closer, he persuaded fellow highlander Klemen Tinal, an ethnic Damal, to join him on a ticket, reportedly by promising to support a Central Papua province with Timika as its capital. Tinal, as the former *bupati* of Mimika, would be the obvious choice for governor of the new province. After the Enembe-Tinal ticket won the election in January 2013, however, Enembe retracted his support, and it was not difficult to see why. Home to some of the most lucrative mining areas in the region, Central Papua would include not only the Freeport mine in Mimika, but also other emerging mining areas in Paniai and Nabire that would give it important revenue sources that a Jayapura-based governor would be loath to relinquish.<sup>9</sup>

5 Despite the protracted separation of Irian Jaya Barat from Papua province, there was no legal mechanism for clarifying whether or not the new province would be under the umbrella of Papua's special autonomy framework. The confusion was finally settled through the 2008 revision of Law 21/2001.

6 IPAC telephone interview with Director General of Regional Autonomy, Ministry of Home Affairs, 16 September 2013.

7 "Gubernur Papua Tolak Usulan DOB", *Tabloid Jubi*, 3 October 2013.

8 For an account of the violence that accompanied the 2003 attempt to establish the proposed province (then called Irian Jaya Tengah), see Muridan S. Widjojo, "Membaca Kekerasan di Timika", *Kompas*, 1 September 2003.

9 A Central Papua province, depending on how it was drawn, could unite the traditionally dominant Biak and Serui ethnic groups from the coast with highlanders from Paniai, Deiyai, Dogiyai and Intan Jaya, as well as a significant non-Papuan population—both Mimika and Nabire are over 50 per cent non-Papuan. This latter factor might be another source of opposition in Jayapura, where the creation of another province with only a slim majority of indigenous Papuans might be seen as further weakening their political strength. There would also be little consensus on where to establish its capital—local elites in Timika, Nabire and Biak each believe their city makes the most sense, although Timika would probably have the edge given its status as an economic hub.

For the moment, then, Central Papua is on hold, but the situation could change again as alliances shift in preparation for the 2014 national elections or the next elections for governor in 2018. In the meantime, there are proposals to carve up the *kabupaten* of Mimika into three – likely to be headed by an ethnic Amungme, an ethnic Kamoro and an ethnic Damal respectively – in a way could produce three new allies for Klemen Tinal in future political battles.

### III. WHAT IS DRIVING THE DIVISION OF PAPUA?

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There are different interests driving the push for new divisions of Papua, particularly at the *kabupaten* level. Bringing government closer to the people is a smokescreen. *Pemekaran* appears to be largely about gaining access to resources—especially central government revenue streams—but also about the promotion of clans (*suku*) and sub-clans.

#### A. Fiscal transfers

One factor driving the proliferation of new *kabupaten* in Papua is that the fiscal transfers local governments receive from Jakarta – already higher in per capita terms than elsewhere in Indonesia – increase significantly as a consequence of splitting. Local governments across the country have limited authority to raise funds locally; they are dependent on fiscal transfers from the central government.<sup>10</sup> Those transfers include a confusing range of different allocations but the largest of these in Papua is the General Funds Allocation (*dana alokasi umum*, DAU), which alone constitutes over 70 per cent of local government revenues in much of Papua.<sup>11</sup> The DAU is calculated annually and is a function of population, area, the local human development index and level of construction prices and its per capita economic output.<sup>12</sup> Confusingly, the allocation rewards areas with smaller populations, which creates a strong incentive for splitting.<sup>13</sup>

Local governments in both Papua and Papua Barat do exceedingly well out of the DAU because they have low population densities and low scores on the human development index. Since 2003, the share of the national DAU allocated to Papua and Papua Barat has grown from 4.6 per cent to 7.4 per cent, while its combined population remains just over 1 per cent of the national total.<sup>14</sup> In individual areas, the growth in the DAU has been even higher: in the two years that followed the 2008 splitting of Jayawijaya into five *kabupaten*, their combined DAU

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10 The dependence on fiscal transfers from Jakarta seems particularly high in Papua, where collection rates for ancillary taxes are low and other local revenues limited (with the exception of a few areas where mining (Nabire, Mimika) or natural gas revenues (Teluk Bintuni) are high. In some of the more recently formed *kabupaten*, local revenue is negligible, such as Puncak, where own source revenue (*pendapatan asli daerah*, PAD) in 2012 of Rp. 1.3 billion (roughly U.S.\$130,000) accounted for just 0.13 per cent of local government spending.

11 The DAU is part of the untied block transfer, along with the Shared Revenue Funds (*dana bagi hasil*, DBH), which come from income tax and natural resource revenues. DBH values are ten per cent or less of *kabupaten* revenues across Papua province, with the exception of Mimika, home to the Grasberg mine, where they are 42 per cent of revenues.

12 These fiscal transfers are governed by Law 33/2004. The total DAU is set at just over a quarter of net domestic revenues, and 90 per cent of this amount is given to *kabupaten*-level governments, while provinces receive the balance. See “Undang-Undang nomor 33 tahun 2004 tentang perimbangan keuangan antara pemerintah pusat dan pemerintahan daerah”, 15 October 2004.

13 The per capita value of a local government’s DAU allocation has been shown to decrease with increases in population (for no obvious policy reason). See Fadliya and Ross H. McLeod, “Fiscal Transfers to Regional Governments in Indonesia”, Australian National University Crawford School of Economics and Government Working Paper No. 2010/14.

14 The allocation for Papua province, Irian Jaya Barat province and all of their *kabupaten* in 2003 was 3.55 trillion rupiah. In 2012, it was nearly six times that amount, or 20 trillion rupiah.

increased fourfold (compared to a 7 per cent growth in the total national allocation).<sup>15</sup> While not all areas where *pemekaran* took place saw such an increase in income, the DAU does appear to provide perverse incentives for splitting.

Both provinces also benefit from further allocations under Papua's 2001 special autonomy framework. This funding does not vary with population – it is instead a flat 2 per cent of the national DAU, and 60 per cent of this amount is directed towards the *kabupaten* governments.<sup>16</sup> New *kabupaten* thus receive a direct share of these additional funds, which totalled Rp. 5.476 trillion (or roughly U.S. \$550 million) for Papua and Papua Barat together in the 2012 national budget.<sup>17</sup>

Jobs provide another incentive – often the public campaigns for *pemekaran* come with the promise of new civil service positions. The rise in the number of new local governments in Papua has seen the size of the local civil service triple – from 37,000 in 2000 to 114,419 just over a decade later.<sup>18</sup> Each *kabupaten* in Papua employs an average of 2,744 staff, an important source of stable employment in an area where there are very limited private sector opportunities, indeed very limited opportunities for employment at all.

As a result, the *kabupaten* created since 1999 include those with some of the lowest populations anywhere in Indonesia and the highest per capita fiscal transfers.<sup>19</sup> This is even more pronounced in Papua Barat, whose 760,000 residents receive the highest per capita DAU allocation of any Indonesian province.

There are also additional incentives for *pemekaran* at the village (*kampung*) level.<sup>20</sup> In 2006, Barnabas Suebu, then governor of Papua province, introduced a scheme to ensure that these special autonomy funds did not all get stuck in ineffective *kabupaten* administrations where they either were never spent or disappeared. Called the Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung (RESPEK) program, it provided block grants of Rp. 100 million (roughly \$10,000) to villages, largely for community infrastructure spending.<sup>21</sup> The grants became a significant source of funds, and the number of new villages wanting their share skyrocketed. Between January 2011 and December 2012 alone, 860 new *kampung* or *kelurahan* (an increase of 21 per cent) were created. The RESPEK program is under review by the new Enembe government and the annual grant amount is expected to increase, so the push for new villages is likely to continue.

## B. Clan divisions

As Papua continues to be divided into smaller and smaller units, it is increasingly fracturing

15 DAU amounts are published annually in a presidential regulation (*perpres*). See Peraturan Presiden 110/2007 Tentang Dana Alokasi Umum Daerah Provinsi dan Kabupaten/Kota Tahun 2008; Peraturan Presiden 78/2008 Tentang Dana Alokasi Umum Daerah Provinsi, Kabupaten, dan Kota Tahun 2009; and Peraturan Presiden 53/2009 Tentang Dana Alokasi Umum Daerah Provinsi, Kabupaten, dan Kota Tahun 2010.

16 Since a 2008 decision to extend the special autonomy framework to Papua Barat province, the latter receives 0.6 per cent and the rump province 1.4 per cent. Papua province governor Lukas Enembe has announced plans to increase the share of this provided to *kabupaten* governments to 80 per cent.

17 Indonesian Ministry of Finance, Laporan Keuangan Transfer ke Daerah (Audited), Tahun Anggaran 2012, 15 May 2013, available at [www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/attachments/article/342/LKTD%202012.pdf](http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/attachments/article/342/LKTD%202012.pdf).

18 See “Daftar Nominatif PNS Prop. Papua Barat per golongan per 30 Agustus 2013” and “Daftar Nominatif PNS per golongan per 30 Agustus 2013”, Badan Kepegawaian Negara, available at [www.bkn.go.id/kanreg09](http://www.bkn.go.id/kanreg09).

19 In the 2010 census, for example, Supiori had just 15,874 residents; Mamberamo Raya 18,365; Tambrauw 6,144 and Teluk Wondama 26,321.

20 Under Papua's 2001 Special Autonomy law, some units of local government have different names in Papua: villages, called *desa* elsewhere in Indonesia, are known as *kampung*, while sub-districts, known as *kecamatan* elsewhere in Indonesia, are called *distrik*.

21 Since 2008, it has been implemented through cooperation with the PNPM-Mandiri program, which helps technically administer it. See Yulia Indrawati Sari, Harmein Rahman, Dewi Ratna Sjari Manaf, “Evaluation of PNPM RESPEK: Village Infrastructure and Institutional Capacity”, Akatiga Centre for Social Analysis, October 2011. The program only operates in Papua province.

along clan lines.<sup>22</sup> The case of Jayawijaya is instructive – in 1999, it covered most of the central highlands, an area of 67,448 km<sup>2</sup> (half the size of Java), but it has since been carved into ten different *kabupaten*. Four of these were created in one wave in 2008: Lanny Jaya (home primarily to ethnic Lani), Yalimo (Yali), Nduga (Nduga) and Mamberamo Tengah (home to five smaller clans). Yahukimo, one of the largest new districts to be carved out of Jayawijaya, was created in 2002. Its name is an acronym for the four major clans represented: Yali, Hubla, Kimyal and Momuna. Now smaller clans are pushing for further division so they can have greater influence and control over jobs.<sup>23</sup>

In Papua Barat, Pegunungan Arfak was carved out of Manokwari after an ethnic Arfak, Dominggus Mandacan, was defeated in the 2012 governor's election. Seeing themselves as shut out of economic opportunities in Manokwari, where many people, including the governor, are ethnic Biak or Serui, Arfak communities demanded their own *kabupaten*. Similar motives drove the creation of Maybrat *kabupaten* in 2009, home to both the Aifat clan and the traditionally more dominant Aymaru clan.

A dispute then arose over where to locate the capital, a key decision because for the town chosen, it can be an important source of economic stimulus and lead to a sharp rise in land values, largely through the surge in demand for construction and services. In 2013, the *bupati* successfully petitioned the Constitutional Court to move the capital from the small and isolated town of Kumurke to Aymaru.<sup>24</sup> The Aifat community refused to accept the court's ruling; after it was announced, crowds gathered to burn down the *bupati*'s home and blocked the roads in front of the nearest police station in Sorong district. The police, the army and a handful of local leaders then worked out a deal in which they agreed to ignore the court's decision.<sup>25</sup> A few days later, a Home Affairs official suggested the best solution would be to speed up the establishment of Maybrat Sau, a proposed *kabupaten* whose capital would be Aymaru.<sup>26</sup>

Similar demands for new *kabupaten* based on perception of neglect or marginalisation of one clan by a more dominant one are being made across both provinces.<sup>27</sup>

Elections are often a trigger for further division, as support for the creation of new *kabupaten* becomes a form of patronage. Proposals for new *kabupaten* require the support of both the *kabupaten* that is being divided as well as approval from the national parliament. Parliamentary support for 2008 wave of *pemekaran* in Papua in 2008 was driven in part by national political parties hungry to shore up their electoral support in advance of the 2009 general election: parties that pledged support for *pemekaran* did well in the central highlands while others foundered.<sup>28</sup> In Jayawijaya district in 2011 and 2012, the *bupati* Jhon Wetipo repeatedly made clear his opposition to any further division. That changed once the September 2013 local election approached, and Wetipo, running for a second term, announced he would support the proposals for new *kabupaten*.<sup>29</sup>

22 For detail on some of the elite divisions at play in *pemekaran* in Papua between 1999 and 2004, see Jaap Timmer, "Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua", Australian National University, SSGM Discussion Paper 2005/6.

23 Two of these, Yahukimo Utara and Yalimek, were approved in August 2013 by the Indonesian parliament's Commission II.

24 See the Constitutional Court's decision in case 66/PUU-XI/2013, delivered on 19 September 2013. The question of where to establish the capital of Maybrat had been before the Court before in 2009, when a group of residents argued that making Kumurke the capital ignored the true aspirations of the community. Much of their argument centered on the assertion that the Aymaru and Aifat clans together formed one *suku*. The Court threw out the case after determining that the complainants had no legal standing. See case 18/PUU-VII/2009, decided on 24 November 2009.

25 "Rumah Bupati Maybrat Dibakar Massa", *Cenderawasih Pos*, 21 September 2013.

26 "Minimalisir Konflik, Percepat Pemekaran Maybrat Sau", *Cenderawasih Pos*, 27 September 2013.

27 Most recently, for example, there is discord between the Yali and Mek clans over two of the *kabupaten* proposed to be carved out of Yahukimo and who stands to benefit most. "Masyarakat Yali dan Mek Diminta Tetap Tenang", *Cenderawasih Pos*, 14 September 2013. Other *kabupaten* proposals before the DPR include the further division of Boven Digoel and Mappi along clan lines, including Muyu Mandobo, Muara Digoel and Admi Korbai. For more on Boven Digoel, see International Crisis Group, "Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict", Asia Briefing No.66, 19 July 2007.

28 IPAC interview, Papuan member of the DPR, Jakarta, 6 September 2013.

29 "Masyarakat Sampaikan Aspirasi ke Bupati", *Tabloid Jubi*, 4 June 2013.

### C. *Lax administrative controls*

A series of administrative controls govern the process of *pemekaran*, but these are largely subverted by the political pressures of a process that by law is supposed to be grounded in “aspirations of the people” for better and closer government.<sup>30</sup>

Under a 2007 regulation, proposals for new units of government across Indonesia must meet two broad requirements. The first is the development of a feasibility study that argues the case for the new region. These studies were initially supposed to be undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs, but many are instead put together by paid teams of academics and other professional *pemekaran* consultants who have an incentive to portray the prospects of the proposed unit in glowing terms.<sup>31</sup> There is no specific minimum population requirement above the village level, only the provision that a new province must comprise at least five *kabupaten* and a new *kabupaten* must comprise five *kecamatan*.<sup>32</sup> The home affairs ministry makes its recommendation for *pemekaran* on the basis of this study.

The second requirement is the formal approval of several stakeholders: the *bupati* and legislature of the unit to be divided and the governor and the provincial assembly.<sup>33</sup> Any creation of new provinces in Papua also requires the approval of the Majelis Rakyat Papua.<sup>34</sup> These approvals are intended to provide the basis for the drafting of a parliamentary law approving the establishment of a new local government, which is then signed into law by the President.

In reality, there are many shortcuts. Often the *tim pemekaran* (the team campaigning for division) tries to secure political support at the national level before trying to satisfy any of the technical provisions. Members of parliament then claim that they have no power to block the will of local communities. Cash payments are also widely alleged to facilitate approval at different levels.

In September 2013, one member of the Commission II, the parliamentary committee responsible for regional autonomy, acknowledged that very few of 22 proposals for new *kabupaten* in Papua that the committee had provisionally approved a month earlier included sufficient supporting evidence of their viability. When news of their approval became public, he said he and other members of Commission II came under such pressure from proponents of a number of unsuccessful proposals that they approved eleven more.<sup>35</sup>

At *kampung* level, the controls over *pemekaran* appear weaker still. The primary criterion for the creation of new villages is a minimum population figure that varies by region: in eastern

30 The phrase “aspirasi masyarakat” appears repeatedly in the key regulation governing *pemekaran*, Peraturan Pemerintah 78/2007.

31 The process and reasoning behind the development of one such study, prepared for the case of Puncak *kabupaten* in 2007, is explained in Cornelis Lay and Purwo Santoso (eds.), *Perjuangan Menuju Puncak: Kajian Akademik Rencana Pembentukan Kabupaten Puncak Pemekaran Kabupaten Puncak Jaya Propinsi Papua*, November 2006, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

32 Peraturan Pemerintah 78/2007, Article 8. There is also a guideline that the population of a new *kabupaten* should exceed five times the average of all *kecamatan* in the province (and similarly a new province’s population should exceed five times the average of *kabupaten* in neighbouring provinces).

33 See “Peraturan Pemerintah No.78 Tahun 2007 Tentang Tata Cara Pembentukan, Penghapusan dan Penggabungan Daerah”, 10 December 2007, available at [www.setneg.go.id/components/com\\_perundangan/docviewer.php?id=1944&filename=PP\\_No\\_78\\_th\\_2007.pdf](http://www.setneg.go.id/components/com_perundangan/docviewer.php?id=1944&filename=PP_No_78_th_2007.pdf).

34 This provision was written into the 2001 special autonomy framework following anger at the 1999 effort to carve up the province into three without local consultation. The 2003 creation of Irian Jaya Barat never met this condition; the reasoning in Jakarta appeared to be that because Law 45/1999 preceded the special autonomy framework, it was not necessary to gain MRP approval.

35 IPAC interview, Paskalis Kossay, Member of Commission II of the Indonesian parliament, Jakarta, 9 September 2013.

Indonesia it is set at 750 people or 75 households.<sup>36</sup> But the dramatic growth of villages in Papua suggests that this threshold is not being rigorously applied.<sup>37</sup> In one of the more striking examples of rapid administrative division, in early 2013 the *bupati* of Yalimo announced a tenfold increase in the number of villages -- from 27 to 300 in just over a year.<sup>38</sup> The entire population of the *kabupaten*, according to Ministry of Home Affairs figures, is 83,693, which would suggest less than 300 people per village.

Provincial officials insist they send oversight missions to physically inspect all proposed villages and ensure they meet legal requirements but that many local authorities bypass them by seeking approval directly from the Home Affairs.<sup>39</sup> As a result, the provincial government and the ministry often have different records of how many villages actually exist.<sup>40</sup>

All of this confusion is driven in part by what appears to be rampant inflation in population figures and voter rolls across Papua without any commitment to either trying to broadly synchronize the census, Home Affairs records and voter rolls. This is a national problem, as shown by recent concerns raised over a discrepancy of 65 million people between the list of potential voters identified by Home Affairs and the provisional voter rolls, but it receives less attention in Papua.<sup>41</sup>

Official records kept by Home Affairs show a population in Papua province that is one and a half times the 2010 census figure. The voter rolls used in the January 2013 elections show different figures again; some of these have risen even further in the past nine months such as in Mimika, where the elections commission has insisted on fixing a voter roll of over 220,000 when the 2010 census recorded only 182,001 residents.<sup>42</sup> The proliferation of *kabupaten* administrations has likely contributed to poor record keeping, but the incentive to drive up fiscal transfers and inflate voter rolls (discussed below) has also been a factor.

#### D. *The outcomes: poor governance, corruption and conflict*

Three outcomes of *pemekaran* in Papua have been poor governance, corruption and conflict. If the idea was to bring government closer to the people, then it may have done so in a physical sense, with palatial new government buildings in areas where there was no such impressive government presence before, but many of these are half empty and absenteeism of local officials is a chronic problem.<sup>43</sup> There is also undoubtedly pride in having officials of one's own ethnicity.

In terms of delivery of social services, many of the new *kabupaten* are at the very bottom of the government's own rankings for effective governance. In 2011, Home Affairs published a performance review of 205 new local government units. Papua Barat was the worst-performing province, while seven of the ten worst-performing *kabupaten* were in either Papua or Papua

36 See "Peraturan Kementerian Dalam Negeri No.28 Tahun 2006 tentang Pembentukan, Penghapusan, Penggabungan Desa dan Perubahan Status Desa Menjadi Kelurahan", 10 October 2006, available at [www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum/2006/10/10/peraturan-mendagri-no-28-tahun-2006](http://www.kemendagri.go.id/produk-hukum/2006/10/10/peraturan-mendagri-no-28-tahun-2006). Article 9 sets the conditions under which new *desa* (known in Papua as *kampung*) can be created. In Java and Bali the minimum is 1500 people (or 300 households); in Sumatera and Sulawesi it is 1000 people (or 200 households); and in other areas it is 750 people (or 75 households).

37 At a recent government workshop in Jayapura, the head of the provincial bureau of *kampung* governance explained that the Ministry regularly allowed the creation of new *kampung* with just sixty households, in apparent contravention of the regulations. "Daerah Diminta Tahan Diri Untuk Pemekaran Kampung", *Cenderawasih Pos*, 19 September 2013.

38 See "Buku Induk Kode dan data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan per Provinsi, Kabupaten/Kota dan Kecamatan Seluruh Indonesia", Kementerian Dalam Negeri, attachment to Permendagri No. 18/2013, 13 February 2013. The document is based on ministry figures from December 2012.

39 IPAC interview, deputy head of village government office in the Papua provincial government, Jayapura, 14 June 2013.

40 Ibid.

41 "KPU Sebut 65 Juta Pemilih Masih Bermasalah", *MetroTVNews.com*, 20 September 2013.

42 "KPU Papua: Pemilukada Mimika Tetap Gunakan DPT 223,409", *Tabloid Jubi*, 25 September 2013.

43 For a description of absentee government in Puncak Jaya in 2011, see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Hope and Hard Reality in Papua", *Asia Briefing No.126*, 22 August 2011.

**Figure 1: Population Statistics for Selected Central Highland Districts and Eligible Voters in 2013**

Area	Home Affairs 2007 <sup>1</sup>	BPS Census 2010 <sup>2</sup>	Home Affairs Dec 2012 <sup>3</sup>	KPU voter list Jan 2013 <sup>4</sup>
Yahukimo	142,003	164,512	341,596	258,522
Jayawijaya	315,147	196,085	214,835	185,548
Nduga	n/a <sup>5</sup>	79,053	194,142	54,836
Puncak Jaya	110,964	101,148	255,224	141,657
Puncak	n/a	93,218	181,171	117,453
Mimika	158,822	182,001	305,138	175,987
Papua province	2,152,823	2,833,381	4,224,232	2,712,215

- 1 Figures taken from “Kode dan Data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan: Provinsi Papua”, 29 January 2010, available at [www.kemendagri.go.id/media/filemanager/2010/01/29/3/2/32\\_\\_papua.pdf](http://www.kemendagri.go.id/media/filemanager/2010/01/29/3/2/32__papua.pdf). The official figures then in use were still based on data from September 2007 and, in some cases where provinces and *kabupaten* had not sent updated data, from 2005.
- 2 2010 Census figures are available online from the Central Statistics Agency (Badan Pusat Statistik) at [sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site?id=94&wilayah=Papua](http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site?id=94&wilayah=Papua).
- 3 These figures are taken from *Buku Induk Kode dan data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan per Provinsi, Kabupaten/Kota dan Kecamatan Seluruh Indonesia*, 13 February 2013, op. cit. These are the figures that were used in March 2013 to finalize voting districts and assign the number of DPRD *kabupaten* members to be elected in the 2014 general elections (the size of the *kabupaten*-level assemblies varies with population). This may be one reason why Home Affairs is reluctant to see any further revision to the figures, as in the Nduga case below (see Section V.B).
- 4 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Papua, “Catatan Pelaksanaan Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Umum Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Provinsi Papua”, 13 February 2013.
- 5 Nduga and Puncak *kabupaten* were not created until 2008.

Barat. In September 2013, Home Affairs Minister Gamawan Fauzi threatened four new *kabupaten* with cancellation (or “return” to their former status); three of these were in Papua or Papua Barat (Nduga, Deiyai and Maybrat).<sup>44</sup> Papua and Papua Barat have the highest poverty rates in Indonesia, and these rates are generally worst in some of the newest *kabupaten*.<sup>45</sup> They also have some of the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) levels.<sup>46</sup>

The new governments have faced repeated problems with allegations of corruption. Auditing standards remain poor in both the provincial and *kabupaten* administrations; the State Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksaan Keuangan, BPK) has given the Papua provincial administration a “disclaimer” rating for the last three years in a row, noting unsound financial accounting standards.<sup>47</sup> The entire provincial assembly of Papua Barat was recently investigated for its role in the alleged misuse of Rp. 22 billion in unspent funds that were “loaned” out to help members build or renovate their private homes.<sup>48</sup> All 44 members were named as suspects, but only three people have been arrested, including the head of the parliament and the former provincial secretary (*sekretaris daerah*).

44 “Pemekaran 4 Daerah Terancam Dibatalkan”, *Tempo*, 13 September 2013.

45 Papua has a poverty rate of 36.8 per cent and Papua Barat 34.9 per cent, compared to a national average of 13.3 per cent. Of the ten *kabupaten* established in Papua since 2008, eight have poverty levels that exceed 40 per cent. In Papua Barat, the four *kabupaten* where rates exceed 40 per cent are Maybrat, Tambrau and Teluk Wondama and Teluk Bintuni, all the results of pemekaran. See “Indikator Kesejahteraan Daerah Provinsi Papua” and “Indikator Kesejahteraan Daerah Provinsi Papua Barat”, Tim Nasional Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K), November 2011.

46 Papua province has the lowest HDI by province in Indonesia, while Papua Barat does somewhat better, with the fifth-lowest HDI, primarily due to higher literacy rates and a higher number of average years in school. Within Papua province, HDI levels are lowest in the highlands, where literacy rates and years in school are far lower than elsewhere in Papua. In Intan Jaya, with the lowest-rated HDI in Papua, the recorded average number of years in school in 2010 was just 2.07. See Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K), “Indikator Kesejahteraan Daerah Provinsi Papua”, November 2011.

47 “Tiga Tahun, Laporan Keuangan Papua Buruk”, *Bintang Papua*, 29 August 2013.

48 “Seluruh Anggota DPR Papua Barat Jadi Tersangka Korupsi”, JPNN.com, 20 July 2013.

#### IV. PEMEKARAN AND THE COASTAL-HIGHLAND DIVIDE

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*Pemekaran* in Papua has heightened tensions at three levels, reflected in local election campaigns. At the provincial level it has highlighted the long-standing divide between coastal people and highlanders. The creation of so many new *kabupaten* in the highlands helped Lukas Enembe become the first-ever highland governor in January 2013, but coastal politicians, irritated by his victory, responded with a proposal for a new coastal province, to be called Tabi. In Kabupaten Puncak, the lead-up to the race for *bupati* produced Indonesia's deadliest election violence, building on an old feud between two clans, the Dani and the Damal. Some 50 people died, even though in the end, both of the feuding candidates lost. And in Kabupaten Nduga, the first post-*pemekaran* election in February 2011 generated tensions between two sub-clans of the Nduga that erupted into violence in March 2013 as local politicians met to prepare for the country's general elections in 2014.

In all cases, inflated voter rolls, unreliable population statistics and a supposedly traditional practice of consensus voting called the *noken* system contributed to the tensions.

##### A. Rise of Lukas Enembe and the Race for Governor

The political divide between coast and highlands in Papua, going back to the way in which the Dutch government ran its farthest-flung colony, continues to color Papuan politics today: Lukas Enembe's campaign slogan was "Time for a Highlander to Lead Papua".<sup>49</sup> Throughout the New Order and until the advent of direct elections, most of the top members of the Papuan elite were from the coast, including all indigenous Papua governors. Coastal peoples had greater access to education and opportunities; highlanders lost out economically and politically.<sup>50</sup>

*Pemekaran* offered an opportunity to redress the balance, and with the division of the large central highland *kabupaten* of Jayawijaya into ten in 1999, 2002 and 2008, the political influence of highlanders took a major step forward. Enembe argued that for heavily Christian Papua, the transformation was Biblically foretold: just as the waters of Mount Hermon flowed down to the Jordan and not upwards from the river, so the Lord had ordained that blessings for Papua would flow from the highlands to the coast.<sup>51</sup>

Enembe had been building his base in the highlands for years. In 2006, he had narrowly lost the governor's race to Barnabas Suebu, a leading coastal politician who had held the job before. Shortly thereafter, President Yudhoyono met with him to commiserate, offering to make him provincial chairman of Partai Demokrat and pledging the party's support for next time.<sup>52</sup> Enembe went on to be elected *bupati* of his native Puncak Jaya in 2007 and became active in supporting the campaigns of a number of other highlander *bupatis* and legislators.

The creation of so many new *kabupaten* strengthened the lobbying capacity of local elites, leading to the formation of the ten-member Association of Central Highland Bupatis in 2008.<sup>53</sup>

49 The highlands generally refers to the central mountainous area of Papua province that stretches from the Papua New Guinea border in the east to Dogiyai *kabupaten* in the west (see map in Appendix A). This area, now home to fourteen *kabupaten*, also largely corresponds to the area covered by La Pago and Me Pago, two of the seven *wilayah adat* recognised in existing provincial level regulations as sharing similar cultural and customary practices.

50 As one scholar writes, colonial policies "produced a broad dichotomy within the Papuan community: on the one hand were coastal peoples advantaged from the new educational opportunities; on the other were those in the highlands and the south who remained largely untouched by either colonial administration or modern education." See Rodd McGibbon, "Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papuan Conflict", East-West Center Policy Studies No.13, Washington 2004, p.13.

51 "Saatnya Anak Gunung Pimpin Papua", article on Enembe's campaign website, dated 18 May 2011 and available at [www.lukasenembe.com/2011/05/saatnya-anak-gunung-pimpin-papua.html](http://www.lukasenembe.com/2011/05/saatnya-anak-gunung-pimpin-papua.html).

52 IPAC interview, Lukas Enembe, Jayapura, 23 March 2012.

53 It consists of the *bupatis* of Jayawijaya, Puncak Jaya, Pegunungan Bintang, Tolikara, Yahukimo, Nduga, Yalimo, Lanny Jaya, Mamberamo Tengah and Puncak.

It took off as an advocacy group after Enembe was chosen by acclamation as the head for the 2010–2012 period; it also helped that in the 2009 general elections, Papuan voters gave highlanders a plurality in the provincial parliament.

The *bupatis* association focused initially on how to divert more resources to development in the highlands, where it claimed only 5 per cent of provincial infrastructure funds were being spent.<sup>54</sup> Members also talked about pressing for the creation of a Central Highlands Province, especially since legally, there were now enough *kabupaten* to do so.

It soon became clear, however, that being governor of an undissected Papua would give Enembe more influence than running a much smaller and poorer new province, and in retrospect, his advocacy on behalf of the highlands seems to have been a stepping stone on his way to building support for another run at Papua's top job. The election should have taken place in mid-2011, timed to roughly coincide with the end of then Governor Suebu's term in July, but it became mired in a series of legal battles that largely centred on efforts by Lukas's allies to prevent Suebu from running again.<sup>55</sup>

By early 2012, Enembe was confident of victory—he explained that he had used the intervening years to build up control over “all the infrastructure”, including the provincial elections commission, the provincial parliament and the Papuan People's Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP).<sup>56</sup>

In September 2012, when the Constitutional Court finally ordered the election to proceed, there was pressure to organise it as soon as possible. The provincial elections commission, however, had done very little to prepare the voter rolls or organise logistical support.<sup>57</sup> It announced in early December that its cleaned up list of voters (*daftar pemilih tetap*, DPT) totalled just over 2.7 million names. That figure was nearly equal to the entire population of the province according to the 2010 census, and it represented over 30 per cent more than the total used in the 2009 parliamentary polls.<sup>58</sup> The greatest increases were recorded in highland areas; the largest discrepancy was in Yahukimo, where the number of registered voters exceeded the total 2010 census population by 57 per cent (see Appendix C).<sup>59</sup>

But pressure from nearly all sides to get the poll underway meant that there was little space for objection. One Papuan member of the national parliament explained he raised concerns over the apparently inflated figures with the Jayapura representatives of several political parties but found they all believed the padding in the rolls would work in their favour.<sup>60</sup> For the highlanders, an ostensibly traditional practice called the *noken* system was an added advantage.

## B. The Noken System

The *noken* system is named for the traditional bag woven from bark that highlanders use as a carry-all. The term encompasses a diverse range of largely unregulated voting practices, all of which apparently share two features: voting by consensus, in which communities (or community leaders) come to an agreement before the poll on how everyone will vote, and an absence of any marking of ballots. Some Papuans, including Enembe, have argued the practice has a rich history, that it preserves a fragile harmony at village level, and that it is the most practical way of

54 “Pembentukan Provinsi Pegunungan Tengah Dideklarasikan”, *Cenderawasih Pos*, 23 February 2013.

55 Perdasus No. 6/2011. For more on the dispute over the governor's election, see International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua”, *op. cit.*

56 *Ibid.*

57 IPAC interview, KPU Papua chairman Benny Sweny, Jayapura, 26 September 2012.

58 “Pemilih di Papua Bertambah 100 Ribu Orang Lebih”, *detiknews*, 31 May 2009.

59 Comparison of 2010 census figures with Komisi Pemilihan Umum Papua, “Catatan Pelaksanaan Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Umum Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Provinsi Papua”, 13 February 2013.

60 IPAC interview, Jakarta, 6 March 2013.

facilitating voting in remote areas.<sup>61</sup> The Constitutional Court has upheld the practice in three separate cases since 2009 in decisions that were probably well-meaning efforts to defend local customs but in fact reinforces the notion that Papuans can be treated differently and need fewer constitutional guarantees than other Indonesian voters.

Supporters of the system claim it has been used since the 1991 general elections, but it seems to have expanded dramatically in the 2009 elections, prompting a challenge in the Constitutional Court. The specific case concerned voting for the Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), in the highland *kabupaten* of Yahukimo. In its decision, the Court defended the practice of collective voting, which it termed voting by community consensus (*kesepakatan warga*), because it formed part of a local tradition that if disrupted would lead to conflict.<sup>62</sup> The effect was to say that open electoral competition was alien to highland culture and posed so great a risk of sparking violence that it trumped the individual's right to a secret ballot.

The court refined its reasoning in a February 2012 decision on a dispute over results in the election for *bupati* in Dogiyai.<sup>63</sup> A challenge filed by one of the losing candidates argued that under national electoral law, ballots that had never been punched were inadmissible. The court ignored the technical question and returned to its 2009 ruling, adding that recognition of votes cast using the *noken* system was important as a means of upholding constitutional protections for customary practice, even though that practice had never been written into formal law.<sup>64</sup> While it is true that highlanders traditionally choose leaders by consensus, it does not follow that the system for choosing customary leaders can or should be transferred into a modern electoral process.

A third case in the May 2012 Puncak Jaya election focused more closely on the use of agreements at community level on how the votes of all registered voters would be divvied up on election day. The case concerned a December 2011 agreement by the community in Mewoluk *distrik* to support Agus Kogoya with 13,000 of their 14,194 registered voters.<sup>65</sup> The agreement appeared to mean that no one but polling officials needed to be present on voting day (all the votes would be tallied in accordance with the agreement), and in fact no polling stations were set up. One polling official went against the agreement and awarded the votes to Henock Ibo, who had previously served as Lukas Enembe's deputy. Kogoya filed the complaint and the poll was re-held in Mewoluk *distrik* a few months later.

The issue with the diverse range of voting practices justified as part of the *noken* system is not just that it leaves the system open to fraud but also that, in broad swathes of the highlands, it eliminates any semblance of individual choice. There were some calls from the KPUD for the practice to be addressed in a 2011 revision of the parliamentary elections law in 2011-12 – one member of the commission estimated that 47 per cent of polling stations in Papua were violating national law by not using standard polling systems.<sup>66</sup> But the provincial legislature, busy preparing a separate regulation on the arrangements for the gubernatorial elections, left the issue alone.

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61 "Enembe: Tak Ada Manipulasi dalam Sistem Noken," *Tabloidjubi.com*, 16 November 2012.

62 See Mahkamah Konstitusi, putusan Nomor 47-81/PHPU.A-VII/2009, delivered 9 June 2009, paragraph 3.24-3.25.

63 For more detail, see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Dynamics of Violence in Papua," Asia Report No. 232, 9 August 2012.

64 Mahkamah Konstitusi, putusan Nomor 3/PHPU.D-X/2012, delivered 17 February 2012, paragraph 3.25-3.26.

65 As evidence of the agreement, Kogoya's team explained during the trial that the community at that point began calling him *bupati*.

66 "KPU Papua Minta RUU Pemilu Bahas Noken," *Tribunnews*, 20 October 2011.

### C. The January 2013 Election

The election for governor was finally held on 29 January 2013. Two weeks before voting day, the elections commission agreed on technical guidelines (*petunjuk teknis*) for the *noken* system.<sup>67</sup> They created a basic legal framework for the acceptance of unpunched ballots but provided no guidance on minimal standards.<sup>68</sup> Instead they stressed that electoral officials would *not* be involved in supplying *noken* as a replacement for ballot boxes (*kotak suara*), but that “if there exist groups of voters that use *noken*”, they would be permitted to use these “in keeping with existing and evolving local custom”.<sup>69</sup> Polling officials would then punch all the ballots in each *noken* in accordance with the voters’ wishes and subject to supervision by community representatives.

The results show the irregularities that resulted. Even with clearly bloated voter rolls, turnout exceeded 99 per cent in thirteen highland *kabupaten*.<sup>70</sup> Lukas Enembe performed best in many of these *kabupaten*, winning more than two-thirds of the vote in eight of them, including 99.5 per cent in Puncak Jaya. Turnout was far lower in other areas where the *noken* system was not applied, such as Jayapura city (62.3 per cent), Merauke (59.5 per cent) and Biak Numfor (58.4 per cent).<sup>71</sup>

Reports by a handful of NGO observers and reporters noted the lack of any uniform standards in how voting was conducted in the highlands and few controls on who was allowed to vote or how many times.<sup>72</sup> In some areas, community members wore *noken* bags around their necks while in others they were hung on stakes – bags were not always available for every candidate.<sup>73</sup> In some voting stations, unused votes were later punched by polling station officials in what they called the *sistem perwakilan*, whereby those who had not voted let local leaders choose for them.<sup>74</sup>

The results were a landslide victory for Enembe and his running mate Klemen Tinal, with 52 per cent of the vote against 18 per cent for their strongest challenger, Habel Suwae – former *bupati* of Jayapura, who won a plurality of the coastal vote. Voting was sharply divided along regional lines (see Appendix B): Enembe won a large bloc of the highland districts, with the exception of Pegunungan Bintang (home to candidate Wellington Wenda and Weynand Watory) and Nduga (won by Golkar candidate Suwae). When the vote counts were assembled at provincial level in Jayapura on 13 February, only Enembe’s team signed the record of votes; all the other teams walked out.

All of Enembe’s opponents filed challenges against his victory in the Constitutional Court, alleging widespread irregularities and abuse of the *noken* system. Suwae claimed that in some areas, voters had been forbidden to vote for candidates other than Enembe and that in many

67 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Provinsi Papua, “Keputusan No. 01/Kpts/KPU Prov. 030/2013, tentang Petunjuk teknis tata cara pemungutan suara dengan menggunakan noken sebagai pengganti kotak suara”, 12 January 2013.

68 An adviser to the electoral commission later explained that the apparent diversity of practice in the highlands was an obstacle to creating clear guidelines: each area wanted their own way of conducting polling. IPAC interview, Budi Setianto, Jakarta, 20 June 2013.

69 Komisi Pemilihan Umum Papua, op. cit., Article 2(3). The Indonesian phrase is *sejalan dengan kebiasaan yang masih hidup dan berkembang di daerah tersebut*.

70 In nine of these thirteen (Tolikara, Puncak Jaya, Yalimo, Nduga, Mamberamo Tengah, Lanny Jaya, Puncak, Paniai, Dogiyai and Deiyai), turnout was exactly 100 per cent. The other four were Jayawijaya, Yahukimo, Pegunungan Bintang and Yalimo. The combined effect of voter inflation and near-perfect turnout in the highlands meant that 65 per cent of votes cast were from the highland districts, whereas the 2010 census recorded only half of the province’s population as living in the highlands. See Komisi Pemilihan Umum Papua, “Catatan Pelaksanaan Rekapitulasi Hasil Penghitungan Suara Pemilihan Umum Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Provinsi Papua”, 13 February 2013.

71 The provincial turnout rate remained high at 86.6 per cent. Ibid.

72 IPAC interviews with poll observers, Jayapura, 15 March 2013 and Asian Network for Free Elections, “Papua gubernatorial Elections 2013: Study Mission Report”.

73 IPAC interview with poll observers, Jayapura, 15 March 2013.

74 Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua (AIDP), “Kemana Surat Suara Sisa Pilgub Papua?”, 7 February 2013 and “Aneka Model TPS, Aneka Aturan Main Pilgub di Wamena”, 30 January 2013.

communities, only village heads and clan leaders were actually showing up at the polls. He also cited the case of the member of the Tolikara legislature, Husia Karoba, who was beaten to death by a mob on election day for urging a vote for Suwae. It was the only reported death in an otherwise peaceful, if not entirely fair, election.<sup>75</sup>

If the challenges at the Constitutional Court had alleged that in some cases, no one was even showing up to vote, this was difficult to prove when the record of ballots counted was so high. In the end, the court decided that the evidence presented failed to meet the required threshold of “structured, systematic and massive” violations that would have led it to throw out results.<sup>76</sup> Enembe was eventually inaugurated on 9 April 2013.

Suwae’s court challenge was only one manifestation, however, of the coastal elite’s unhappiness with the election results. In late February, a group of coastal politicians announced their intention to campaign for a new province called Tabi along the northern coast, consisting of Keerom, Sarmi, Mamberamo Raya and both Jayapura and Jayapura *kota*. They said they had been working on the idea since February 2011 and would formally open the campaign on 30 March.<sup>77</sup> On 26 March, Timotius Murib, head of the MRP and a political ally of Enembe’s, said the MRP would reject the Tabi proposal, as further divisions would not make Papuans more prosperous; the solution was rather more equitable distribution of special autonomy funds.<sup>78</sup> Gov. Enembe has made it clear that he will not approve the creation of any new provinces, but the desire of coastal politicians to return to power ensures that the idea of Tabi will not disappear.

#### D. Following the election

Highlanders now have control over the two major party bases in Papua, with Enembe having led Partai Demokrat to 19.6 per cent of the 2009 legislative vote from nearly nothing in 2004, and his running mate Klemen Tinal taking over the regional chairmanship of Golkar, which narrowly outperformed Partai Demokrat in the 2009 polls.<sup>79</sup>

Enembe also has strong allies in the provincial legislature, where Yunus Wonda, fellow Partai Demokrat member from Puncak, became *de facto* head of the provincial legislature after the forced departure of coastal politician John Ibo in a case of alleged corruption. In September 2013, the local leadership of the Golkar party announced that Dert Tabuni, a DPRP member from Lanny Jaya in the highlands, would take over the position in mid-October.<sup>80</sup> While Tabuni’s loyalties may be more to vice-governor Klemen Tinal than to Enembe, his selection ensures the continued promotion of highland interests.

The legitimization of *noken* voting has strengthened the political power of highlander politicians in a way that appears irreversible. Because the system offers the potential for ensuring huge turnout in an area with ever-expanding voter rolls, highlanders are likely to play an increasingly dominant role in the provincial legislature. The turnout rates will also make for more intense competition for Papua’s ten seats in the national parliament.<sup>81</sup> As the 2014 elections approach,

75 Press reports suggested he was killed for going against a community agreement to vote for Enembe. “Anggota DPRD Tolikara Dikeroyok Hingga Tewas,” *Bintang Papua*, 30 January 2013.

76 The relevant cases at the Constitutional Court are 14/PHPU.D-XI/2013, 15/PHPU.D-XI/2013, 16/PHPU.D-XI/2013 and 17/PHPU.D-XI/2013; all were issued on 11 March 2013.

77 “Pemekaran Provinsi Tabi Siap Dideklarasikan,” *Papua Pos*, 28 February 2013.

78 “MRP Menolak Semua Aspirasi Pemekaran Provinsi,” *Tabloid Jubi*, 22 March 2013.

79 Tinal took over the post from Habel Suwae, the Sentani-born former *bupati* of Jayapura, after his disappointing performance in the governor’s election.

80 “Dert Tabuni Akan Pimpin DPR Papua,” *Bintang Papua*, 27 September 2013. Ibo was sentenced to a 22 months in prison by a Jayapura court in January 2013. “John Ibo Divonis 22 Bulan,” *Bintang Papua*, 10 January 2013. He is appealing the conviction and is expected to remain serving as a member of the DPRP.

81 Papua province comprises just one constituency at national level, as does Papua Barat, which elects just three representatives to the DPR.

*pemekaran*, and in particular the increased population figures in the highlands, have led to the addition of a seventh voting district (*daerah pemilihan, dapil*) in the highlands. The KPU at the same time redrew the borders of all the *dapil*, closely concentrating the population of highland areas into four constituencies that together comprise 34 of the 55 seats in the DPRP. The *noken* system is used in all four.

## V. VIOLENCE IN KABUPATEN ELECTIONS

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If the race for governor highlighted the coastal-highland divide, election conflicts at the *kabupaten* level showed how *pemekaran* can produce deadly conflict at much lower levels. In Puncak, disputes over who was to be the candidate for the Gerindra party produced a war between the Dani and Damal clans; in Nduga, the fighting between the executive and legislative branches of the *kabupaten* government fell out along sub-clan lines.

### A. Inter-clan Violence in Puncak

The dispute that led to Indonesia's deadliest election conflict ever took place in Puncak, beginning in July 2011. Now with a population of some 90,000, Puncak was carved out of Puncak Jaya in 2008. Its first election was scheduled for November 2011. On 29 July 2011, a local notable, Elvis Tabuni, registered at the local election commission (KPUD) as the Gerindra party's candidate for *bupati*. The next day, Simon Alom, another candidate, tried to register, also claiming backing from Gerindra and three other parties. The commission rejected his application, saying two candidates could not be backed by the same party.

Elvis was from a prominent Dani clan. Simon was from the Alom sub-clan of the Damal, originally from around Ilaga, now the capital of Puncak. Many Damal moved to the Timika area in the 1970s looking for work following the opening of the gigantic Freeport mine, some of them settling in the Kwamki Lama area, where periodic eruptions of ethnic warfare between Dani and Damal have become a staple of the political environment ever since.<sup>82</sup>

In the aftermath of the KPUD's decision, Simon's supporters attacked Elvis's supporters in Ilaga with stones and arrows. Four were killed when police fired live ammunition to try and break up the fighting. Then Simon's supporters attacked the local Gerindra head who was a member of Elvis's clan, leading to thirteen deaths on the party chief's side and four on Simon's. More deaths followed, bringing the total to 23 by the end of the first week, and the election was postponed.

The KPUD and Gerindra traded barbs about who was responsible for the double endorsement. The provincial Gerindra office said that from the beginning it had only supported Simon and accused the KPUD of bias in allowing Elvis Tabuni to register at the recommendation of his clansman.<sup>83</sup>

At this point, allegations of OPM involvement began to emerge. Goliat Tabuni, the OPM commander based in Puncak Jaya, reportedly sent a group of his men, led by a commander named Militer Murib, to help out the Elvis faction. Simon had allies from among Damal men in Kwamki Lama who were reportedly former members of the Satgas Rajawali, a secret militia established by Kopassus to fight the OPM in the mid-1990s.<sup>84</sup> Goliat Tabuni had fought against this group in the past.

82 See for example, "Perang Warga Terjadi Lagi di Kwamki Lama", *Koran Tempo*, 3 October 2012.

83 See Rois Leonard Arios, "Tindak Kekerasan pada Konflik Pilkada: Sebuah Analisis Teori Konstruksi Sosial", *Kompasiana*, 18 March 2012.

84 Satgas Rajawali was reportedly involved in the infamous rescue operation of Western hostages in Mapenduma in 1996. See [patriapropublik.blogspot.com/2012/02/pesawat-tanpa-awak-uav-dalam-operasi.html](http://patriapropublik.blogspot.com/2012/02/pesawat-tanpa-awak-uav-dalam-operasi.html).

Simon's men began looking for weapons in Timika after learning that Militer Murib was helping Elvis Tabuni. In October 2011 they contacted John Lokbere, an ethnic Nduga from Mapenduma, who dealt in arms on the side. Lokbere in turn got his weapons from a gun dealer from Maluku with access to homemade (*rakitan*) weapons left over from the Ambon conflict. On 3 December 2011 fighting erupted again, and on 24 December, Lokbere and the Maluku dealer were arrested in Timika with the weapons Simon had ordered.<sup>85</sup>

More fighting took place on 4 January 2012, with six more fatalities, including the head of the district clinic (Puskesmas), who was killed by gunfire. Police suggested the gun used had been stolen by the OPM in an earlier raid on a police post.<sup>86</sup>

In early January 2013, in an effort at reconciliation, the Puncak government paid out compensation that totaled an astounding Rp.17 billion (roughly \$1.7 million) to the victims: Rp.300 million for each person killed and Rp.1 million for each person wounded.<sup>87</sup> If ever there was an incentive to engage in deadly conflict, these blood payments reinforced it.

The election finally went ahead on 14 February. Five candidate slates took part: Elvis Tabuni-Hery Dosinaen, Petrus Tabuni-Yansen Ferdinan Tinal, Ruben Wakerwa-Septinus Poahabol, Yopi Murib-Marten Uamang, Simon Alom-Yosia Tembak and Wellem Wandik-Repinus Telengen. The actual voting proceeded without incident, but tensions began to rise about a week later.

On 20 February, it became clear that Wellem Wandik, a candidate backed by a coalition of eleven parties led by Partai Demokrat, had won.<sup>88</sup> Elvis Tabuni claimed he had been cheated of victory and that 8,000 votes for him had gone missing from Sinak *distrik*.

There are three versions of what happened next. Police believe that Elvis contacted Goliat Tabuni again to ask for help in blocking the KPUD from holding a meeting, scheduled for 23 February, at which the victors would be officially announced. On 21 February, Goliat Tabuni's troops attacked Indonesian military troops in Sinak, Puncak and in Tingginambut in Puncak Jaya. Eight soldiers and four civilians were killed.

Elvis maintained in a petition to the Constitutional Court that it was Willem Wandik who called in the OPM. He said that OPM leader Lakagak Telenggan, linked to Goliat Tabuni, was angry because Wandik failed to deliver on a promise to pay him Rp.150 billion if his men helped intimidate voters in Sinak.<sup>89</sup> They therefore attacked to try and prevent the election results from being announced. The Court dismissed his petition. For its part, the OPM claimed responsibility for the attack but explicitly denied any link to the vote.<sup>90</sup>

In the end, Willem Wandik was announced as the winner and installed as *bupati* in April 2013, with no further violence.

85 Arms trading is a very profitable business in Papua. A *rakitan* weapon bought in Ambon for a few million rupiah can be sold in Timika for ten times that. Udin had earlier sold three *rakitan* weapons to John Lokbere for a price of 100m rupiah (U.S. \$10,280). He pledged to look for the needed weapons and at the end of December 2011, he had brought two long-barreled *rakitan* and one homemade pistol with two magazines and 61 bullets from Maluku to Timika.

86 "Senjata di Puncak Jaya Diduga Hasil Rampasan", *Tempo.co*, 8 January 2012. The article confuses the districts of Puncak and Puncak Jaya as did much of the reporting in the national press.

87 "17 Milyar Untuk Satuan Korban Konflik Pilkada Kab. Puncak", *Bintang Papua*, 3 January 2013, reproduced at [zonadamai.com/2013/01/03/17-milyar-untuk-santunan-korban-konflik-pilkada-kab-puncak/](http://zonadamai.com/2013/01/03/17-milyar-untuk-santunan-korban-konflik-pilkada-kab-puncak/).

88 Wandik had helped lead the *tim pemekaran* that helped propose and drive forward the 2008 division of Puncak from Puncak Jaya.

89 "MK Tolak Seluruh Gugatan Pemilukada Puncak", *Radar Sorong*, 27 March 2013.

90 See the letter entitled "TPNPB-OPM Bertanggung Jawab atas Semua Aksi Penembakan Terhadap TNI & Polri: Indonesia Hentikan Penggunaan Stigma Sipil Bersenjata, GPK & OTK", 23 February 2013, signed by TPNPB chief of general staff Mayjen. Terianus Sato.

## B. Sub-clan Violence in Nduga

Another case of election violence involved Kabupaten Nduga, one of five new units carved out of Jayawijaya province in 2008. If the parties to the Puncak conflict were from different clans, in Nduga the rivals divided along sub-clan and even family lines.

Nduga's first election for *bupati* in February 2011 was bitterly contested, and while the winner, Yairus Gwijangge, far outstripped his rivals, one of the losing candidates submitted a petition to the Constitutional Court, alleging fraud.<sup>91</sup>

The challenger, Yakoba Lokbere, a DPRD member who was also the wife of *bupati* of Jayawijaya, argued that the number of registered voters had increased suspiciously from 35,134 at the time of the presidential election in 2009 to 53,701 for the *kabupaten* election two years later. The actual number of votes cast as announced by KPUD was 53,689, meaning that only twelve eligible voters did not vote.

She claimed that only 36,000 ballots had been distributed and that no counting had taken place at the polling places, so it was not clear where the other votes were coming from. The court ruled that she had not produced enough evidence to justify overturning the results. From then on, she reportedly used her power and wealth to get other DPRD members to oppose the *bupati*. Other members had their own grudges: one, Paulus Ubruangge, wanted revenge because he believed the *bupati* had put a spell on his older sister, causing her death.<sup>92</sup> Relations between the DPRD and the *bupati* were thus already poor but they worsened dramatically in early 2013.

On 23 March 2013, in anticipation of the coming general elections in April 2014, the *kabupaten* government held a coordination meeting at a hotel in Wamena, attended by the *bupati* and other senior officials, the heads of political party factions in the DPRD and the local election commission (KPUD). Based on new population data from Home Affairs showing that the population of Nduga as of December 2012 was 194,142, the KPUD, with the *bupati's* support, decided to increase the number of *distrik* from eight to 32 and the number of villages from 32 to 211. In the process, they added one electoral district, arbitrarily raised the number of eligible voters from 53,701 to 119,964, and increased the number of seats in the Nduga district council from 20 to 25, based on the alleged increase in population.<sup>93</sup>

The DPRD members present opposed the creation of the new sub-districts, saying they had not been consulted, the changes had no basis in law, and the data on which the increases were based was completely fictitious.<sup>94</sup>

A fight broke out between the *bupati's* men and the DPRD members, in the course of which one of the former, the head of administration for Kabupaten Nduga, Yustinus Gwijangge, was stabbed to death. The victim's relatives combed the streets of Wamena looking for the attacker, and fighting also broke out among the two sides in the village of Elekma (also seen as Ilekma and Yilekma), in Distrik Napua, Jayawijaya.

On 29 May, an Nduga DPRD member, Eka Tabuni was hacked to death with machetes in Sentani, Jayapura by three men, one of them a high school student in Wamena, who later said they were acting on orders from a senior official in the *kabupaten* government.<sup>95</sup> Police said the attackers believed that Eka was one of those involved in the death of Yustinus Gwijangge

91 For the Constitutional Court's decision in the case, see Putusan nomor 74/PHPU.D-IX/2011, 5 July 2011. Lokbere argued that only 36,000 ballots were distributed and it was not clear what happened.

92 The Gwijangge, the Ubruangge and the Lokbere are all sub-clans of the Nduga.

93 Home Affairs data for 2011 showed a population for Nduga of only 15,763, but a zero may have dropped off in the recording. See "Buku Induk Kode dan Data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan per Provinsi, Kabupaten/Kota dan Kecamatan Seluruh Indonesia", attachment to Permendagri 66/2011, 28 December 2011. This version of the population and government figures is based on data from January 2011.

94 "Masyarakat Nduga Terancam Tidak Punya DPRD", Kompas.com, 20 August 2013.

95 "Dua Suku Nduga Bentrok, Dua Tewas, 22 Luka", Sindonews.com, 30 May 2013.

in March. The next morning, fighting broke out again in Elekma, with the *bupati*'s supporters massed in Elekma Bawah while the DPRD side gathered in Elekma Atas. They fought for two days, leaving two dead and 21 wounded. The police and military then carried out a search for arms in the two hamlets, and their joint operation temporarily stopped the fighting.

But the fighting, which went on for four months with a total of eight killed and hundreds wounded, only truly stopped after a peace agreement between the Nduga *bupati* and the DPRD in a meeting in Jayapura that Governor Lukas Enembe facilitated on 7 June 2013. They agreed that the creation of the sub-districts would be halted, that the agreed on population of the district would be 79,000, not 194,000 and that therefore the original number of eligible voters – 53,701 – would be used. It was as though population statistics were a negotiable commodity, not an established fact.

They also agreed on compensation for the victims, with the Nduga government turning over a total of Rp.18.5 billion (about \$1.85 million) to the victims on both sides.<sup>96</sup> The family of each person killed received Rp.1 billion; the rest went to compensate families who sustained injuries or loss of property. The *bupati* noted at the peace ceremony that spending large amounts of money on blood payments for victims of clan fighting was not an appropriate use of the district budget.<sup>97</sup>

The story did not end with the agreement, however. Minister Gamawan Fauzi in July rejected much of the substance in July, saying that Papuans had no authority to reject ministry data.<sup>98</sup> The KPU office was forcibly closed by the community in March and has not yet reopened, delaying registration of candidates and clean-up of the voter list.<sup>99</sup>

The Puncak and Nduga cases highlight how local elections in relatively new *kabupaten* can exacerbate existing social fault lines, cause deadly conflict and put a strain on local budgets. Many of these new units covering huge swathes of difficult terrain have a single police post with seven to ten personnel and no capacity to enforce the law, let alone prevent violence.

### C. Possible Conflict in Mimika?

The last in the current round of local elections in Papua is scheduled for 10 October in Mimika and it looks set to feature all the risk factors outlined above.

The social fault lines in Mimika are many: it is home to both the indigenous Amungme and Kamoro clans and migrant communities from other parts of the province and beyond. These include Damal and Mee populations from the highlands to the north, as well as migrants from Kee in Maluku, Sulawesi (largely Bugis) and Java. Much of the migration has been driven by economic activity around the Grasberg mine and includes those who work directly for Freeport, those engaged in illegal panning activity among the tailings expelled by the mine, as well as the broader urban area of Timika, the *kabupaten*'s capital.

The eleven candidates running for *bupati* seek to appeal to different parts of this population. Among those with leading party support is the current *bupati* Abdul Moeis (PDI-P, Hanura), who is ethnic Bugis and served as Klemen Tinal's deputy when he was *bupati*. He is running with Amungme activist Hans Magal as his deputy; together, the pair go by the acronym AMAN, meaning safe. Another candidate with strong party backing is Trifena Tinal (Golkar, Gerindra), Klemen's sister, whose running mate is a Mee woman, Anastasia Tekege; the two are seeking to appeal to female voters across ethnic lines (they use the acronym MAMA, a word used to refer

96 "Pemkab Nduga Alokasikan Rp 18,5 Miliar", *Harianpagipapua.com*, 16 July 2013.

97 "APBD Bukan untuk Bayar Kepala: Rp. 18 miliar untuk Kompensasi Perang Suku", *Kompasiana*, 15 July 2013.

98 "Mendagri Minta Bupati, DPRD Nduga Patuhi KPU", *Papua Pos*, 10 July 2013.

99 "KPU: Kabupaten Nduga Papua Dapat Dispensasi", *Liputan6.com*, 9 September 2013; "Belum Ada Caleg DPRD Kabupaten Nduga Papua yang Mendaftar", *Tribunnews.com*, 20 August 2013.

to Papuan women). Several Amungme are also running, including Yopi Kilangin, who came second in the last election; Agustinus Anggaibak, who enjoys the formal support of the two local Amungme and Kamoro *adat* councils; Pieter Magal, Partai Demokrat's candidate; as well as Agapitus Mairimau and Eltinus Omaleng. A number of these candidates and their supporters have stressed the importance of electing a *putra daerah* (native son), meaning someone from the Amungme or Kamoro.<sup>100</sup>

As the formal campaign period was due to open in late September, a number of candidates pushed to delay the poll after what looked like serious irregularities in the voter rolls: in the eight months since the January governor's election, the number of voters had increased by nearly 50,000, or 26 per cent.<sup>101</sup> But one problem was time: no local elections are to be held in 2014 in order to make time for the parliamentary and presidential polls, and with eleven candidates, the Mimika election is almost certain to see a second round.<sup>102</sup> The poll now looks set to go ahead with the new voter list. The *noken* system may be used in some polling stations, particularly in the northern areas of the *kabupaten*, which straddles the divide between the highlands and coast areas.

The area around the Grasberg mine is also home to several sometimes competing factions of the OPM; it is not impossible that as happened in Puncak, a disgruntled candidate could seek to pull in an armed clansman, heightening the possibility of deadly violence.

## VI. NO END IN SIGHT

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At the end of August 2013, 22 proposed new *kabupaten* (fourteen in Papua and eight in Papua Barat) and three new provinces (Papua Tengah, Papua Selatan and Papua Barat Daya) obtained preliminary approval from the parliament's Commission II.<sup>103</sup> By September, the number had grown to 33, after Commission II yielded to pressure from supporters of a number of previously unsuccessful bids.<sup>104</sup> Their proposals have been sent to the legislative review board, which is tasked with confirming that they meet the conditions set forth in a 2007 government regulation on *pemekaran*. After review, there will be further discussion in Commission II, with the participation of both governors. Only if there is further approval will the proposals go to the full parliament for endorsement.<sup>105</sup>

That approval may not be forthcoming any time soon for two reasons. Home Affairs has said that it will seek to block any further divisions until after the 2014 elections. It also hopes to first secure passage of a new draft law on local government (RUU *Pemerintahan Daerah*). Proposals for new provinces also face opposition from Enembe and Bram Atururi, the governor of Papua Barat, neither of whom wants to see any reduction in the areas they control.

Proposals to divide the provinces further are nonetheless likely to continue to surface, without any consensus on what the optimal number of local government structures should be or why. Some Papuans have suggested that the Dutch colonial authorities had the only logical design when they divided it into six *afdeling*, loosely based on cultural divisions. Some of the suggestions for new provinces come fairly close to these old lines, including a push for a new

100 For example, "Calon Bupati Mimika Harus Putra Daerah Setempat", *Tabloid Jubi*, 11 April 2013.

101 175,987 voters were listed in the rolls used for the January 2013 election; the new figure from the Ministry of Home Affairs is 223,409. The 2010 census figure for Mimika was 182,001. "Warga Mimika Sesalkan Perubahan DPT Pemilikada", *Tabloid Jubi*, 20 September 2013.

102 A second round is held in local elections when no candidate for *bupati* gains more than 30 per cent of the vote.

103 These twenty-two were filtered down from as many seventy new *kabupaten* proposals that were circulating earlier in the year. "70 Usulan Pemekaran Kabupaten di Papua Masuk DPR RI", *Tabloid Jubi*, 28 July 2013.

104 "Pemekaran 33 Daerah Otonom Tunggu Harmonisasi Baleg DPR RI", *Cenderawasih Pos*, 27 September 2013 and IPAC interview with Paskalis Kossay, DPR-RI member, Jakarta, 9 September 2013.

105 IPAC interview with Paskalis Kossay, DPR-RI member, Jakarta, 9 September 2013.

Cenderawasih Bay province covering Biak and Serui, a Southwest Papua province that would resemble the old Fak-Fak *afdeling* and a province covering the area of Jayapura and the northern coast (then called Hollandia, now called Tabi).<sup>106</sup> For now, however, both provinces are continuing to be carved into smaller and smaller units in a way that is aiding neither economic development nor political unity.

## VII. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF PEMEKARAN

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On the positive side, *pemekaran* has furthered the “Papuanisation” of local government, at least at senior executive and legislative levels. It has permitted unrepresented clans to have a stake in the political process. The proliferation of new *kabupaten* in the central highlands has helped focus attention on the lack of development there, although not all elected leaders from these areas have always had the best interests of their constituencies at heart.

But serious problems of conflict and corruption have also arisen in many of the new districts that are not helpful to either development or peace. When Nduga, one of the poorest *kabupaten* in Indonesia, spends Rp.18 billion (approximately \$1.8 million) of its annual budget on blood payments for deaths in election-linked clan conflicts, something is seriously wrong.

Stopping direct elections in Papua will not solve the problem; indeed, having an electoral system for Papua that is less democratic than for the rest of Indonesia will only reinforce perceptions of discrimination and inequity. There are things Home Affairs could do other than roll back political rights. They could more rigorously enforce the criteria for *pemekaran*; put more resources into trying to gather accurate census data; make a major effort to clean up voter rolls; eliminate the *noken* system; provide more oversight over local election commissions; and change the incentive structure that makes the creation of new administrative units so financially rewarding.

On the broader issue of what *pemekaran* means for the long-term political process in Papua, it does not seem to have made relations with Jakarta any easier. If divide-and-rule policies in the early 2000s were based on the premise that smaller units would help defeat separatism, it is difficult to see any clear correlation between number of administrative units and support or lack thereof for independence. If anything, the Puncak case shows the opposite, how election feuds can draw in the OPM. At the very least, however, as a dialogue process – or “constructive communication” to use Jakarta’s preferred term – evolves between Papuans and the central government, then the officials who owe their jobs to *pemekaran* represent an increasingly important constituency whose views need to be heard.

As discussion continues in both Jakarta and Jayapura about possible revisions to Papua’s special autonomy framework, it is clear that any effort to improve local governance must include greater attention to the impact – and social, political and economic costs – of *pemekaran*.


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<sup>106</sup> The six former *afdeling* were Hollandia, Geelvinkbaai (Cenderawasih Bay), Centraal-Nieuw-Guinea, Zuid-Nieuw-Guinea, Fak-Fak and Manokwari.

### Appendix A



## Appendix B



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### Appendix C

