

SUPPORT FOR “ISLAMIC STATE” IN INDONESIAN PRISONS

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I. INTRODUCTION

A study of networks in Indonesian prisons that support the Islamic State (IS) suggests that relatively simple interventions by prison officials may be able to limit the influence of hardline ideologues. Only a minority of those convicted of terrorism in Indonesia support IS openly, and there is nothing to suggest that their numbers are increasing. If anything, they are declining. The need to understand the dynamics of prison networks is still urgent, however, because pro-IS inmates can constitute key nodes for encouraging or facilitating travel to Syria and because those who support IS generally support the use of violence at home.¹ Preventing the growth of IS influence in prisons is therefore a way of reducing the security threat more generally.

Indonesian officials are well aware of the problem, and there have been noticeable improvements in supervision of extremist inmates. The challenges are huge, however, and resources are limited. It may be time to take another look at donor assistance in a way that would avoid some of the problems that have plagued past efforts and see if there is a way to encourage local initiatives, locally developed. Indonesia also needs to adopt a law that would make it a crime to travel abroad to join or assist foreign terrorist organisations, although some makeshift solutions are planned that would draw on existing provisions of the Criminal Code. Without such a ban, however, the triangular link between prisons, extremist groups and groups like IS will persist.

After the announcement on 29 June 2014 that the organisation called Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) had changed its name to Islamic State and declared its leader to be the caliph of all Muslims, ceremonies to pledge loyalty took place in jihadi communities around Indonesia, including in several prisons. The most publicised of these ceremonies took place in Pasir Putih Prison, a “super maximum security” facility on the island of Nusakambangan off the southern coast of Java, where 24 prisoners, including Indonesia’s best known extremist cleric, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, swore allegiance on 2 July 2014.

This report examines the process by which inmates in two prisons in the Nusakambangan complex, Pasir Putih and Kembang Kuning, chose sides after IS was established. For some, choosing for or against was a question of principle, but for many, more personal and pragmatic interests came into the calculus, such as access to extra food. The most militant inmates often have the best supply networks, with donations and contributions coming in on a regular basis through visitors. If that supply dries up, a leader’s hold on his followers can weaken, as Ba’asyir found when his organisation, Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (JAT), splintered as a result of his oath to IS. When JAT members stopped sending extra provisions, the less ideologically inclined of Ba’asyir’s followers were willing to align with whoever could fill the gap.

For many of the extremists, separation from their families and particularly from their children is the hardest part of incarceration, and desire for contact can be a powerful incentive for cooperation. Personal feuds are also important. On the principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, some inmates joined the IS camp because they had a dispute with someone who was anti-IS. Again, it is critically important for prison officials to try to understand who is on the outs with whom over what, so they can assess the consequences and use it to their advantage.

Differences over points of theology and doctrine do of course take place—one of most heated is between *takfir mu’ayyan* and *takfir am*, basically whether one brands individuals as nonbelievers (*kafir*) by virtue of their membership in a group or on the basis of their own misdeeds. The IS supporters are proponents of *takfir mu’ayyan* and thus see all agents of state, including police and prison officials, as enemies. But while such ideological convictions are deeply held by a few, many in the pro-IS camp have only a weak grasp of doctrine and their decision to join was

1 Throughout this report, we use “IS” in reference to the entity that emerged after the declaration of the caliphate on 29 June 2014 and “ISIS” to the organisation that existed up to that point.

influenced by more mundane factors.

The Nusakambangan case studies show how alliances can change as the result of the arrival of new inmates, a fight, or a change in government policy. Prison officials need to understand the circumstances that can lead to solidarity among inmates in the face of a perceived threat or the break-up of once-solid friendships. And crucially, they need to realise that no matter how well they understand individuals and alliances in prison, everything can change once a prisoner is released.

II. INDONESIAN PRISONS AND “ISLAMIC STATE”

Across Indonesia, 26 prisons run by the Corrections Directorate of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights house some 270 convicted terrorists (See Appendix A); the number is constantly changing as new inmates come in and others are released.² As of January 2015, an additional 90 terrorist suspects, on trial or in pre-trial detention, were in police custody in the detention facility at the paramilitary police (Brigade Mobil, Brimob) command in Kelapa Dua, Depok, a Jakarta suburb. Since the conviction rate of suspected terrorists in Indonesia is almost 100 per cent, virtually all of these people will end up serving their sentences in one or several of the 26 prisons above; most will be transferred at least once before their terms are over. In addition, a handful of known jihadis have been charged under Emergency Law 12/1951, banning the possession or transfer of explosives and other weapons, rather than the terrorism law and so do not appear on any official lists.

IS supporters constitute a small minority among incarcerated extremists, and there is no evidence that their ranks are increasing.³ If anything, they are decreasing as a few of the less committed have second thoughts or are pulled away by interventions of friends, family or officials. But the hard core remains a serious problem, and as prison staff and police are well aware, most maintain links to groups outside, including those facilitating travel to Syria. Even a single pro-IS inmate can be a problem if he has the seniority and legitimacy to influence followers through communications by cell phone or discussions with visitors. While pro-IS inmates are all men, support among some of the wives may be no less strong, and the women continue to play a critical role as couriers and in some cases, propagandists via social media.

Even before IS was declared, the Syrian conflict had attracted great interest in the jihadi community.⁴ As the rift between ISIS and the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front deepened in late 2013, many extremist inmates took sides, with followers of Aman Abdurrahman generally supporting IS and those affiliated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) generally supporting al-Nusra. The former tend to also support violent jihad in Indonesia, while JI since 2007 has rejected violence at home as counterproductive. After the caliphate was announced, some of the more militant inmates pledged loyalty in ceremonies that largely went unnoticed until late July 2014 when the government became exercised by a IS recruiting video urging Indonesians to join. Until that point, there was little understanding in the prison system about what ISIS or IS was, let alone recognition that it might have implications for Indonesia. Only after 4 August, when the government banned IS activities, did prison authorities begin to look more closely at support among the inmates under their control.

As far as we know, actual oath-taking ceremonies took place at only two prisons—Pasir Putih

2 A list from July 2014 includes 27 prisons with convicted terrorists, for example, but the handful held in the West Sulawesi prison have all been since released.

3 IS supporters constitute only two out of 15 convicted terrorists in Porong prison, for example, who support IS and only four out of 28 in Cipinang.

4 See IPAC Report No. 13, *The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia*, 24 September 2014 and IPAC Report No. 6, *Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict*, 30 January 2014.

and Kembang Kuning on Nusakambangan—and at the Brimob detention facility in Kelapa Dua, but support for IS among inmates has surfaced elsewhere. Tangerang Prison, for example, has been a particular problem, and prison officials have tried to move some of the ringleaders out, but when certain individuals have shown an ability to recruit, finding a new location for them is not always easy: prison authorities need to consider whether they will strengthen hardline ranks in prisons with segregated terrorist blocks; radicalise inmates in places where extremists and ordinary criminal offenders share space; or outwit prison personnel in places lacking sufficient personnel for intensive monitoring.

On 5 August, the Corrections Directorate issued a detailed set of instructions for preventing IS influence in prisons, but except for a directive to confiscate ISIS paraphenelia, there were no clear guidelines on what to watch for. Later it transpired that some lower-ranking prison personnel had detailed knowledge of discussions among inmates and their visitors about going to Syria to fight, but none of their superiors had ever expressed interest in the subject and there were no established channels for reporting the information. There was also no mechanism for keeping prison authorities apprised of key developments, international and domestic, that might have ramifications for extremist inmates.

When a photo of the oath-taking ceremony at Pasir Putih involving Ba’asyir emerged, embarrassed prison officials said they had not known about it because they normally did not enter the prayer room where it was held.⁵ One would think that of all places, the prayer room of a terrorist block in a super maximum security prison would be one to monitor closely, but the extremists had basically declared it off-limits to prison personnel, and the intimidation worked. Supervision throughout the system has since improved somewhat, but lack of sufficient trained personnel is still a huge problem.

The two case studies below illustrate how IS support evolved and some of the dilemmas prison officials face in confronting it.

III. PASIR PUTIH PRISON

Pasir Putih is the “super maximum security” facility in the Nusakambangan complex.⁶ As plans have been put on hold to move convicted terrorists to a newly constructed prison in Sentul, outside Jakarta, Pasir Putih seems to be moving slowly toward becoming a terrorists-only facility, with some of the narcotics and other offenders being moved to other prisons in the complex.

It provides a particularly interesting case study of the dynamics among jihadi inmates for several reasons. One is the presence of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, serving a fifteen-year sentence for terrorism.⁷ While his influence has declined somewhat in jihadi circles, he is still very much the elder statesman of the movement. He is rarely the initiator of actions, but what he says and does carries weight, so every faction wants him on side, in the belief that he can pull more people in. A second reason is the sharp increase in the numbers of convicted terrorists held, from nine in early 2013 to 42 as of December 2014. A third is the way that refusal to cooperate in prison

5 “Menkumham Akui Baasyir Baiat Napi di Lapas untuk Ikut ISIS”, *Republika*, 4 August 2014.

6 Pasir Putih began operating in 2007. Initially it was mainly used for criminals sentenced to life imprisonment or death and for serious narcotics offenders, including foreigners. It only began taking convicted terrorists in January 2013 after the Central Java provincial office of Law and Human Rights Ministry made a decision to make it the showcase for terrorist rehabilitation. As of late October 2014, according to Corrections Directorate data, it housed 291 prisoners including 42 convicted terrorists. It is one of the few prisons that is not overcrowded, since its official capacity is 336.

7 Ba’asyir was arrested in August 2010 for raising funds for the Aceh training camp that police broke up in February 2010. He had been arrested before in October 2002 in connection with the Bali bombing but prosecutors could not make the major charges against him stick and he was finally sentenced to 18 months for minor immigration violations. On the day he was to be released in April 2004, he was rearrested and sentenced to 30 months on terrorism charges. He was released in June 2006.

activities became a necessary but not sufficient condition for moving on to IS support. The "un-cooperative" prisoners were unquestionably hardliners but many initially stayed neutral on IS. This "undecided" group became the sought-after prize by both the pro- and anti-ISIS factions.

A. *The First Inmates*

Pasir Putih's first set of terrorist inmates have played a key role in the subsequent development of the factions, in part because in prisons as in other institutions, seniority counts.⁸ They also had a chance to bond before they were swamped with new arrivals in November 2013. From the beginning, these inmates were isolated in Block D, one of four blocks in the prison, and had limited interaction with ordinary criminal offenders. They included the following:

Abdurrahim bin Thoyib alias Abu Husna. One of the original JI members, Abu Husna had been arrested in Malaysia in January 2008, trying to get to Damascus on a false passport, long before the Syrian conflict erupted. He was trying to flee the country after arrests of other top JI leaders in 2007. Abu Husna has a classic JI profile: he studied at Ba'asyir's pesantren in Ngruki, Solo, taught there for years, and took a four-month training course at JI's Camp Hudaibiyah in central Mindanao in 1999. He was never himself directly involved in violence. He was moved to Nusakambangan after being tried and sentenced to nine years in 2009 – and if standard remissions policies were followed (which they will not be, given his behavior), this would make him eligible for conditional release this year. When Ba'asyir was moved to Pasir Putih in 2013, Abu Husna became his de facto personal adviser. If Abu Husna fit the profile of fellow JI leaders arrested around the same time, one would have expected him to be relatively cooperative with prison authorities and initially, he seemed to be heading in that direction. A series of incidents turned him instead into one of IS's strongest supporters.

Qomarudin alias Mustaqim alias Abu Yusuf. Abu Yusuf was another longtime JI member from Lampung who broke with JI in 2009 over what he saw as its abandonment of jihad and helped plan the terrorist training camp in Aceh under the leadership of Bali bomber Dulmatin that was broken up in early 2010. He had served briefly as head of Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao in 1998 and before that had taught at the school that until 2001 served as JI's nerve center in Malaysia, Pesantren Lukman al-Hakim. For his role in the Aceh camp, he was sentenced to ten years in early 2011. He became a strong IS supporter.

Dzul kifli Lubis alias Abu Irhab. A dealer in airsoft guns, Abu Irhab was arrested in 2011 for selling a pistol to the man responsible for the suicide bombing of the Cirebon police mosque. He also was friends with Sofyan Tsauri, one of the key figures responsible for the Aceh training camp, though played no role in the camp itself. More importantly, he had been a follower of Aman Abdurrahman since 2009. He was sentenced to eight years and transferred to Pasir Putih in January 2013 where he became a strong IS supporter.

Aryanto Haluto. A JAT member, he was arrested for the 25 May 2011 shooting of two policemen in Palu, the first major operation of the group led by Santoso that later came to be known as the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT). He was arrested the same day and later sentenced to eleven years. He became one of the committed members of the pro-IS group.

Hari Kuncoro alias Uceng. Married to Dulmatin's sister, Hari Kuncoro was a member of KOMPAK going back to the early days of the Ambon conflict. He had a long record of involvement in terrorist activities and six years (2003-2009) in Mindanao, first with the MILF, then with Abu Sayyaf; he returned to Indonesia with Umar Patek, the Bali bomber, in 2009.

⁸ Five arrived in late 2012, but one, Abdullah Sunata, was transferred to Batu Prison on Nusakambangan when Ba'asyir arrived on 15 January 2013. (He and Ba'asyir effectively switched places.) The others arrived a week later on 22 January.

With that background, he might have been predicted to be one of the early IS supporters. In fact, he stayed neutral for a long time and eventually came out against it.

Ahmad Izmi alias Adam. A Darul Islam (DI) veteran, he was arrested in July 2011 in connection with trying to smuggle a few firearms purchased in Mindanao for the DI faction led by Abu Umar. He was sentenced to six years, meaning if standard remissions apply—and they may in his case—he could be released this year. He became one of the most vocal critics of IS in Pasir Putih.

Amri Firmansyah alias Ali Miftah. Amri, released in December 2014, was another strong IS opponent. Married to Dulmatin’s wife’s younger sister, he had been active in the JI community in Solo ever since his enrollment in Darusyahada, the JI school in Boyolali, Solo. He became involved in the Aceh training camp largely through his closeness to a Darusyahada classmate who was active in JAT. He was arrested in 2011 and later sentenced to five years.

All of the above were reasonably cooperative at first, polite to prison officials and willing to participate in programs. This situation changed in June 2013 when a regulation issued in late 2012 by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights began to be implemented. Regulation 99/2012 was designed to tighten remission and release procedures for serious offenders, including terrorists.⁹ If they wished to receive sentence reductions, convicted terrorists would have to express remorse for crimes committed, take part in a deradicalisation program, become “justice collaborators” and assist the police in solving outstanding terrorism cases, and sign an oath of loyalty to Pancasila and the Unitary State of Indonesia (NKRI).

On 29 June 2013, Ba’asyir released a statement from prison, castigating Regulation 99 and saying anyone willing to accept the conditions should be considered apostate.¹⁰ Aman Abdu-rahman did the same from Kembang Kuning Prison.

As anger over Regulation 99 grew, several of the extremists in Pasir Putih became hostile toward the prison staff and stopped attending programs. These included Ba’asyir, Abu Husna, Abu Yusuf and Abu Irhab. Abu Husna was already irritated at the staff for other reasons. In 2012, he had secured the desirable position of *tamping mesjid*, where he was employed by the prison mosque and held Arabic language classes on the side, including for ordinary criminal offenders.¹¹ He was fired after prison authorities found that he was not just teaching language but indoctrinating some of his students with radical ideology. To then be told that he would have to become a “justice collaborator” to receive remissions, in his view, was adding insult to injury.¹² Had prison authorities dealt with Abu Husna differently from the outset, he might not have joined the hardliners so quickly and also might have been able to keep Ba’asyir neutral on IS. He never should have been given a *tamping* job in the first place, but there may have been other ways his status could have been acknowledged and his skills as a scholar and linguist put to constructive—and tightly supervised—use.

B. New Arrivals

In August 2013, six convicted terrorists were among a group of 22 prisoners sent to Nusakambangan from Tanjung Gusta, the major prison in Medan, North Sumatra that was burned down

9 See IPAC Report No.2, *Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Release of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia*, 2 September 2013, Section IV.

10 Ibid, p.9.

11 A *tamping* is an inmate chosen as an assistant to a *pemuka*, another inmate given a supervisory role in prison. A *tamping mesjid* generally escorts prisoners from their cells to the mosque for Friday prayers, among other duties. An inmate in a *tamping* role can often employ up to five other prisoners. Inmates in these jobs have access to cash and to additional privileges, including sentence reductions.

12 IPAC interviews, Pasir Putih, October 2014.

by rioting inmates a month earlier. The grievances that led to the riot included unhappiness over Regulation 99. Four of the six, including the inmates' spokesman, Wak Geng, were moved into Pasir Putih. Wak Geng had emerged as a leader during the riot and managed to bring the rioters under control in exchange for discussions with senior government officials, after which they agreed the regulation would not be applied retroactively. The whole country had been watching as the incident unfolded, and Wak Geng came to Pasir Putih with real authority among the extremists, despite the lack of any deep commitment to jihadism.¹³ He subsequently became a leader of the anti-IS group, while the other three transferred from Medan strongly supported the new caliphate.

By the end of 2013, Abu Husna, Abu Yusuf and Abu Irhab were completely in the hardline, uncooperative camp. They got reinforcement from some of the 30 new inmates who arrived in October and November 2013. Among them were several who had been influenced by Aman Abdurrahman, including Ahmad Widodo alias Abu Hanifah, who had developed his own small group of would-be bombers in the Solo area; Awalludin Nasir, from a DI faction in Makassar that in 2012 tried to bomb the convoy of the candidate for governor of South Sulawesi (later elected); and Ismet Hakiki alias Sapta Syailendra from Ring Banten, another DI faction.¹⁴ Sapta, who had taken part in the Aceh camp, had been known as an intractable hardliner while detained in a prison in Tangerang, so Pasir Putih authorities knew he would likely be trouble.

The militancy of the uncooperative prisoners increased with their new allies, and they began to influence others. Most of the new inmates refused to pray in the prison mosque, accusing it of being a *masjid dhirar*, or a mosque used for unIslamic purposes. They refused to greet prison personnel on the grounds that they were *kafir*. Every afternoon they had a show of force, practicing martial arts in the soccer field, with Sapta from Ring Banten as their trainer.

They became even more united on 12 December 2013 after a fight broke out in the course of a soccer match between the terrorists from Block D and a team of criminal offenders. A fight broke out between Beben Khairul Rizal, one of the August arrivals, with Chandra Murti Prabowo, a criminal inmate.¹⁵ Inmates supporting the respective teams began trading insults, then one of the criminal convicts named Merianto went on to the field and accused Beben of fouling. Without warning, Abu Irhab knocked Merianto down with a blow to the head and another on the terrorist team kicked him after he had fallen. The criminals then went after the terrorists. Prison officials managed to separate the two sides, but suddenly Sapta shouted "Allahu Akbar!" One of the criminals shouted back an obscenity. The fight led to a tightening of ranks among the extremists.

Four days later, in a completely unrelated incident, prison staff confiscated some boxing gloves that someone had sent prisoners in Block D. Dozens of angry inmates surrounded the head of prison security and demanded that the gloves be turned over, threatening to disrupt the prison if they were not. Eventually Ba'asyir was called to bring them under control, which he did by scolding them for getting so upset over something as worldly as a pair of gloves.

The series of incidents turned sent many of the once-cooperative prisoners into non-cooperators who rejected prison programs. Again, it is worth underscoring that none of these trigger-

13 Wak Geng had been involved in the August 2010 robbery of the CIMB Niaga bank in Medan, in which some fugitives from the Aceh training camp also took part. He said he took part primarily to get a share of the proceeds. He had no real jihadi past but had served as part of the security detail for Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) when Abu Bakar Ba'asyir visited Medan earlier in 2010.

14 All these DI factions have a common ancestry and occasionally intersected during the conflicts in Ambon and Poso and in a Mindanao training camp, especially in the period 1999-2001, but they developed as distinct groups with independent leadership structures. See Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia*, Singapore, 2013.

15 Beben Khairul Reza, born in Majalengka but long resident in Lampung and a graduate of a JI school there, had served as deputy to Ali Miftah in recruiting participants for the Aceh camp. He subsequently took part in the robbery of the CIMB Niaga bank with Wak Geng and others.

ing incidents were religious or ideological in nature, and some of the inmates became hostile to the prison staff because of their own feelings of being ill-used, not because of recruitment efforts by the hardliners. Nonetheless, the hardliners were happy to get the support.

Among the few who remained willing to work with prison authorities were Adam and Ali Miftah, who shared a cell. It was not that they suddenly saw the light and decided to disengage. Rather, they considered imprisonment to be an emergency situation in which cooperation with oppressors was legitimate as a form of self-protection.¹⁶ Their stance, however, irritated the hardliners who accused them of working for intelligence and falling victim to deradicalisation. At one point in 2013, a paper was taped to the door of their cell with the message, "Beware, Spies". The two were mostly ostracised, though not by all; Wak Geng, for example, stayed friends with them. Adam had been the cook for Block D, a highly sought after position because of the ability to allocate special portions. He was removed from the job. The two were no longer given shares of donated food. At the time, the hardliners were relatively well off, with donations from JAT, GASHIBU (a charity that became pro-IS) and other sympathisers, giving them a stock of food supplies that was the envy of other prisoners.

C. Syria Becomes an Issue

By late 2013, the issue of ISIS vs. al-Nusra in Syria had become a hot topic in Pasir Putih. The Block D inmates who had been influenced by Aman Abdurrahman, including Abu Irhab, Beben Khairul Rizal, Abu Yusuf and Sapta, became committed ISIS supporters. They tried to influence other prisoners by distributing Aman's translations of pro-ISIS materials. Abu Yusuf and his friends then made a kind of "wall magazine", pasting the tracts on the walls of the block. Prison authorities made no effort to remove it.

These inmates made a special effort to influence the senior figures such as Abu Umar, Abu Husna and especially Ba'asyir so that there would be a follow-on effect outside prison. If they could bring Ba'asyir over to the pro-ISIS side, then maybe all JAT members and other admirers would follow. Interestingly, Abu Umar, the leader of a Darul Islam faction with links to Sabah, Malaysia and the southern Philippines, who might have been predicted to be among the most militant, was not ready to commit himself.

It was a more pressing issue within JAT. In early 2014 JAT was struggling with the rifts among jihadi groups in Syria. Some JAT leaders such as Afif Abdul Madjid and Abu Fida clearly supported ISIS. Afif Abdul Madjid himself had gone to Syria for a month, from mid-December 2013 to mid-January 2014 and on 3 January had sworn an oath of loyalty to ISIS leader al-Baghdadi after taking part in a military training course. Others, like Fuad al-Hazimi, and Ba'asyir's own son, Abdurrahim, supported al-Nusra.

On March 2014 Abu Bakar Ba'asyir released a letter in Arabic to Indonesian *mujahidin* in Syria, urging them to stay united and saying "I do not want to become trapped defending one side and attacking the other, as some leaders and activists are doing. Because I am not there with you, I cannot evaluate who is right. Therefore I urge you to carry out jihad as a united body under a single command; do not go off and wage war on your own."¹⁷

Even if he felt he could not choose between the two jihadi sides, the ISIS supporters in Pasir Putih lost no opportunity to try and win him over. Their strategy was to attach themselves to Ba'asyir and follow him wherever he went. They bombarded him with pro-ISIS articles and tried to engage him in intensive discussion. They argued, for example, that ISIS was not just a state in

16 This was a common argument among jihadi prisoners who believed deception was a useful tactic to ensure early release so they could return to jihad. They cited the example of Amar bin Yasir, a Companion of the Prophet, who pretended he was a *kafir* when his own life was threatened.

17 "Seruan Ust. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir Kepada Mujahidin di Bumi Syam", ansharuttauhid.com, 10 March 2014.

name only but also had the attributes of one because it controlled territory and strictly applied Islamic law. They also tried to convince Ba'asyir that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was a legitimate commander because he held a doctorate in Islamic law, and was both experienced in war and a descendant of the Prophet.

Aman Abdurrahman also frequently telephoned Ba'asyir on his mobile phone—in the super maximum security prison that was supposed to have jammers for cell phone communications—to engage him in discussion and explain why the criticism of ISIS from respected ulama was wrong. The same methods were used on Abu Husna, because he was so close to Ba'asyir.

These tactics worried JAT leaders and Ba'asyir's family because the ISIS group stuck to him like leeches even when he had family visits, so that whenever the subject of ISIS came up, someone was always there to defend it. They asked the help of Hari Kuncoro to stay Ba'asyir and help get him away from the Aman crowd. But Hari's religious knowledge was not up to the task, and he always lost debates with the pro-ISIS inmates. JAT eventually gave up—they could not arrange to have someone accompany Ba'asyir around the clock from inside and they themselves could only visit every two weeks.

By the end of May 2014, the efforts of the ISIS supporters were beginning to pay off. First they persuaded Abu Husna to join, and those who studied with him in Block D followed suit. (He was no longer allowed to teach in the mosque but prison officials believed they could not intervene as long as he held classes only within the terrorist block itself.) His students included four prisoners from Aceh from the former rebel group, GAM, who had no previous jihadi affiliation but were rather arrested for carrying out political murders on behalf of the GAM-linked Aceh Party (Partai Aceh) before the 2012 election for governor—and also plotting to kill the then incumbent governor, Irwandi Yusuf.¹⁸

With Abu Husna's acceptance, Ba'asyir's capitulation was a matter of time because the two were so close. By early June, the pro-ISIS group were convinced they had succeeded. On 3 June, a journalist from the pro-ISIS website, www.al-mustaqbal.net, went to Pasir Putih to interview Ba'asyir, planning to post an announcement of his allegiance on the website when they were through.¹⁹

The Ba'asyir family and JAT got wind of the plan, however, so on the same day, JAT leaders M. Achwan and Fuad al-Hazimi rushed to Pasir Putih and met Ba'asyir for almost an hour, urging him not to rush into any decision. As a result, Ba'asyir changed his mind again and told the journalist that he was still studying whether ISIS met the requirements under Islamic law to form a state.²⁰

Ba'asyir's hesitation disappointed the hardliners who tried to point out that several provinces in Iraq, including Fallujah and Ramadi, were already applying Islamic law. It took the fall of Mosul, quickly followed by other cities in June 2014, to finally persuade the elderly cleric. Ba'asyir was caught up in the euphoria that these victories produced among the Block D inmates. On 16 June, all the ISIS supporters including Ba'asyir held special prayers to give thanks in the Block D prayer room, with Abu Husna acting as imam. Ba'asyir circulated a statement in prison, urging any Indonesians who could to "leave for the battlefields of Iraq and Sham to help your brothers there, with the help of Allah, to strengthen the forces of the Islamic State and be victorious in

18 These four and others involved in the same plot now detained in other prisons are the only insurgents or former insurgents currently serving time in prison on terrorism charges.

19 For a discussion of [al-mustaqbal.net](http://www.al-mustaqbal.net)'s involvement in dissemination of ISIS propaganda, see IPAC, "The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia", op. cit.

20 "Wawancara Eksklusif Dengan Ustadz ABB; Tetapi Kita Tetap Mendukung ISIS", www.al-mustaqbal.net, 4 June 2014. Ba'asyir said the conditions for a true Islamic state were whether it applied Islamic law purely and fully and he was still unable to say for sure. "The news is confusing about the extent of ISIS control in Syria and Iraq," he said. "So we're still studying whether the state is really a state. If it is, we are obliged to support it."

battles against the international *kafir* alliance.”²¹

The euphoria grew with the announcement on 29 June 2014 (1 Ramadan) by al-Baghdadi declaring himself caliph of a new Islamic State. Three days later, on 2 July, Ba'asyir and 23 other ISIS supporters took an oath of allegiance to the IS and the caliph in the Block D prayer room.²² An ISIS flag was smuggled in for the occasion by the wives of one of the inmates, wearing it inside out as a headscarf.

Ba'asyir's oath led to the splintering of JAT, with Ba'asyir refusing to have anyone question his authority and sacking M. Achwan and Fuad al-Hazimi because they did. The dissidents in JAT, which by one estimate included 90 per cent of the organization, left and set up a new group, Jamaah Anshorul Syariah (JAS).²³

In the end, Ba'asyir's decision to take the oath did not bring in as many others as the hardcore IS group had hoped. Several key figures among the undecided were not swayed by Ba'asyir's action, Abu Umar among them. Those who stayed adamantly opposed to IS included Wak Geng, Hari Kuncoro and others. Many were alienated by the aggressive tactics of the IS supporters and their criticism of leading IS critics such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abu Qatadah al-Filistini. "Who are they to suggest someone of Ayman al-Zawahiri's experience is deviant?" said one who declined to join.²⁴ The IS doubters began to show their unhappiness with the hardliners by resuming participation in prison programs.

Some among the hardliners, such as the Cirebon prisoner Nang Ndut, had actually wanted to cooperate because they wanted early release, but they were afraid to do so because they did not want to be ostracised like Adam and Ali Miftah. They also did not want to lose access to their share of the extra food. But as the "cooperative" group grew in number, they gathered up their courage and decided to break with their mentor, Aman Abdurrahman.²⁵

They were delighted when Amri, Wak Geng and the anti-IS crowd received a package of books that criticised ISIS.²⁶ Armed with the arguments in these books, they began to try and influence the fence-sitters who were still debating about whether or not to join IS. They convinced Agus Anton Figian, who had joined the oath-taking on 2 July, to pull away. Their group got a boost in September 2014 when Abu Umar openly joined the anti-IS group. His decision stemmed from a dispute with Abu Husna, who criticised him for staying neutral and for being willing to pray in the prison mosque. The best way to show disdain for Abu Husna was to formally join the opposition.

The bad blood between the two groups reached a climax in September 2014, when the 21 inmates who had not taken the oath to IS and al-Baghdadi issued an anti-ISIS declaration. Abu Umar took part in the drafting.

After the declaration, the anti-IS group grew stronger, not only in terms of numbers, but also in terms of supplies. Abu Umar was key to logistics, and after he joined, the extra food he received could be distributed to the others to make up for what the non-cooperatives had received

21 "Ustadz ABB: Kerahkan SENjata Do'a Agar ISIS Menang di Baghdad", www.al-mustaqbal.net, 20 June 2014.

22 The 23 were Abu Husna, Abu Irbah, Abu Yusuf, Aryanto Haluta, Beben Khairul Rizal, Jajah Miharja, Anton Sujarwo alias Supriyadi, Syailendra Saptia, Rahmat Hizbullah (Bima), Muhammad Natsirudin alias Cecep (Bima), Awaludin Nasir, Agus Anton Figian, David Kurniawan alias Kalishnakov, Muhammad Yusuf alias Yusuf Rizaldi, Achmad Widodo alias Abu Hanifah, Jamaludin alias Dugok (Aceh), Kamarudin alias Mayor (Aceh), Fikram alias Ayah Banta (Aceh); Mansur Saridin alias Mancuk (Aceh); Rian Adi Wijaya alias Andre Anggara (since released); Roki Aprisdiyanto and Helmy Priwardhani.

23 For a full description of the sequence of events, see "The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia", *op.cit.*

24 IPAC interviews, Pasir Putih, November 2014.

25 These included Chamidi, from the Badri Hartono group (sometimes called Al Qaeda Indonesia, AQI); Thoriq and Jodi from the Achmad Sofian group involved in the unplanned bomb explosion in Beji, Depok; Nang Ndut (released in December 2014) from the Cirebon group and others.

26 The books, included *Jubah Sang Khilafah* by Abu Qatadah al-Filistini, an ISIS critic and *Fakta-fakta Gelap ISIS* by Abu Ahmad, which was posted on the site dakwahmuqowamah.blogspot.com. An adviser to the prison would compile the titles, then have the prison reproduce and distribute the articles.

through the pro-IS network. They also got extra help from prison officials, including a supply of cigarettes, which the stricter Muslims shunned. At the same time, after JAT split, donations to Ba’asyir and his friends declined sharply and the little that was left had to be divided among 21 members. Some of the pro-ISIS began to have economic difficulties in prison and tried to build up their own businesses inside prison. For example Jaja Miharja, one of the ISIS supporters, began to make a sweet drink (*cendol*) to sell because he could no longer depend on handouts from Ba’asyir.

The IS issue drew the cooperative prisoners closer to officials. It was partly because both were vilified by the pro-IS group and because of the extra supplies the officials provided, but it was also because these officials helped with family visits or with money to make calls, and they more they had contact with their families, the more they missed them, particularly their children. The non-cooperative prisoners had a much harder time seeing family.

D. Analysis of Networks

As noted at the outset, many of the decisions taken by inmates in the lead-up to the oath-taking on 2 July seem to have had nothing to do with ideological principle.

Grievances and feelings of being ill-used, including unhappiness with Regulation 99, moved six of the original nine to reject cooperation with prison authorities—and then find religious arguments to justify it). Abu Husna had his own grievances over losing the *tamping mesjid* job. His shift from cooperative to uncooperative was crucial, and one question is whether anything could have been done differently. The decision to stop unauthorised religious lessons for criminal offenders was clearly the right one, but there might have been a way by which Abu Husna could have been encouraged to offer some better-supervised language instruction in a way that would have recognised his expertise but kept the risk of radicalisation down.

Likewise, authorities were right to tighten conditions on remission and release; the idea of “justice collaborator” was perhaps a bit crude.

On the other side, Abu Umar moved decisively to the anti-IS side because he resented being the target of Abu Husna’s criticism.

Some of the fence-sitters made their choice on the basis of where they could get extra food, so they may have been tempted to join the militants because of the extra supplies but several could be tempted back. This suggests that if the prison—especially a supposedly super maximum security prison—could better manage gifts and donations to the inmates, they might also better manage the alliances. Initially Pasir Putih was supposed to be a place with no cash, extra-tight inspections and no cell phone service but these goals seem to have lapsed.

The Pasir Putih inmates seem to have passed through intermediate stages of cooperation or non-cooperation on the way to deciding for or against IS. No extremist inmate at Pasir Putih who swore allegiance to IS has been cooperative at the same time; supporting IS by definition entailed rejecting participation in government programs.²⁷ Likewise, but perhaps less obviously, no one in the anti-ISIS camp is uncooperative. It would be a mistake to equate cooperation with disengagement, however, as many inmates participate in prison programs simply to ensure that they are eligible for remissions and early release. Nevertheless, if the immediate goals are to prevent the pro-ISIS group from growing and to strengthen the anti-ISIS camp, then prison officials

27 There have been examples in other prisons of inmates hiding their support for ISIS and being fully cooperative, only to try to leave for Syria as soon as they got out. Moh. Sibghotullah is one, but he was released in May 2014, before the Islamic State was declared. It is not clear whether he would have felt compelled to openly declare allegiance if he had still been in prison on 29 June. Also, he had been in a prison where few inmates shared his pro-ISIS views. If he had been detained in Pasir Putih, Kembang Kuning or Tangerang, where there was a critical mass of supporters, he might have joined the openly hardline, non-cooperative camp.

need to focus on the inmates in the “undecided” (*tawaquf*) group, especially the uncooperative ones who have had some exposure to hardline *takfiri* influence, because these are the individuals whom it is possible to pull back.²⁸

Once inmates have formally declared themselves one way or another, defections are rare but they do occur: Agus Anton Figian took part in the 2 July allegiance ceremony but then had second thoughts.

A few declared IS supporters have also been released. Rian alias Andre Anggara, for example, was released in late 2014. Because of his strong ties to Aman Abdurrahman, he would be one candidate for careful post-release monitoring to see whether or how his enthusiasm for IS manifests itself now that he is free.

IV. SUPPORT FOR IS IN KEMBANG KUNING

The dynamics in Kembang Kuning prison are somewhat different because there are many fewer convicted terrorists—only thirteen—and terrorists and criminal offenders mix freely. The thirteen include some of the most high-profile in the jihadi movement: Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, one of Indonesia’s most militant clerics; Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois and Achmad Hasan, sentenced to death for their role in the 2004 bombing of the Australian Embassy; Subur Sugiarto, sentenced to life for the 2005 Bali bombing; and Indrawarman alias Toni Togar, a Jemaah Islamiyah leader who masterminded several bank robberies designed to raise funds for jihad operations.

The prison, built in 1950, was never designed to hold high-risk prisoners, and there are no special facilities. It has a capacity of 273 prisoners but as of late 2014 housed only 165. It is small enough so that even though terrorists and ordinary offenders are housed together, prison staff can easily observe any gatherings.

When the first batch of terrorist inmates arrived in 2010, they all seemed to be model prisoners, taking part in religious discussions for “spiritual guidance” and skill training programs. The situation changed dramatically, however, after Aman Abdurrahman was transferred there in November 2012.²⁹ If in Pasir Putih, the hardline community grew through a series of grievances with prison authorities, in Kembang Kuning, Aman’s influence was the main factor.

A. Aman Abdurrahman vs Toni Togar

Aman began to spread the ideology of *takfir mu’ayyan*, branding all prison employees as *kafir* because they worked in the security apparatus of what he deemed to be an idolatrous government.³⁰ He forbade cooperation with any prison programs on the grounds that this violated the principle *al wala wal baro* (loyalty to Islam and hostility to the enemy), including praying in the prison mosque.

The first of the inmates to adopt Aman’s teachings was Rois, who began refusing to take part in Friday prayers at the prison mosque. The others agreed that the Indonesian government itself was idolatrous (*thaghut*) but did not believe that this made everyone who worked for it a *kafir*. They remained open to participating in prison programs.

Over time, however, Kembang Kuning inmates split in two, with Aman leading the hardline *takfiris* and Toni Togar the rest. The split destroyed at least one friendship: Rois and Achmad

28 In this context, where virtually everyone is committed to jihad, the hardliners stand out by their *takfiri* stand, that is, their willingness to declare as *kafir* or non-believer any Muslim who takes a less puritan and literal interpretation of Islamic law.

29 He was serving a nine-year sentence in connection with the Aceh training camp.

30 For a discussion of the debate over *takfir mu’ayyan* vs *takfir am*, see IPAC Report, *The Evolution of ISIS*, p.6.

Hasan, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombers, had once been close but now fell out on opposite sides. New arrivals were pressed to choose. In early 2013, two new inmates, Mushala and Arif Budiman, convicted for their role in the 2011 Cirebon police mosque bombing, joined Aman, whom they had long admired. Two other new inmates, however, took Toni Togar's side: Priyatmo, from the Abu Umar group, and Arifin Nur Haryanto, arrested in connection with the Cirebon bombing.³¹

In March 2013 two more new inmates joined Aman: Ali Umar Yusuf alias Baro and Ali Azhari, from Lampung and Aceh respectively who were arrested in connection with the 2010 Aceh training camp.³² The same month, a bitter dispute broke out between the two factions after a donation came in for the jihadis. Rois received it on behalf of the inmates, but he removed Toni Togar's name from the list of recipients and said the donor did not want his funds being used to support those who took part in *thaghut* programs. Several inmates objected, because they knew that the donor had set no conditions. In the end, Rois capitulated and gave Toni his share.

From that point on, tensions between the two groups rose, reaching a peak when the anger over Regulation 99 erupted. Aman Abdurrahman, like Ba'asyir, issued a fatwa that to abide by its terms was forbidden; Toni Togar argued that emergency conditions, of which imprisonment was one, warranted measures that would otherwise be impermissible, including complying with the regulation.

Aman's fatwa had little impact beyond his immediate circle; the inmates close to Toni Togar continued to submit applications for release and do what was needed to secure it. Aman then declared Toni an apostate and *kafir* and refused to respond to his greetings or attend prayers with him. He also stopped inviting Toni's cellmates, Subur Sugiarto and Achmad Hasan, to pray together, as if they were guilty by association. Aman's extremism in so branding Toni Togar shocked some of the other prisoners. "How can Aman Abdurrahman, who only knows jihad through the internet, call Toni a *kafir* when Toni has waged jihad in Afghanistan and Ambon and carried out many jihadi operations?" one said.³³ Toni himself responded in an article criticising Aman, though not by name, in an article that appeared on radical websites in November 2013.³⁴

What had started as an ideological conflict between *takfir mu'ayyan* and *takfir am* (the counter-doctrine that rejects collective punishment and requires the examination of individual sins) turned into a deeply bitter personal feud. If Aman declared a particular practice *haram*, Toni and his friends made a point of flouting him. After he forbade inmates to take part in religious guidance sessions led by NU clerics because he considered NU to be deviant, Toni's faction became active participants. When he declared that honouring the Indonesian flag was idolatrous, Toni and his friends made a point of attending flag-raising ceremonies. When Aman refused to meet visiting ulama from the Middle East, Toni Togar welcomed them.

Toni and his friends were not the only ones that Aman declared *kafir*; he extended his condemnation to other prisoners and officials. He refused, for example to receive food from prison officials on Idul Adha, Islam's second most important holy day during which animals are sacrificed and the meat distributed to the poor, arguing that it was forbidden to eat from an animal that had been slain by a *kafir*.³⁵

Aman's attitude limited his influence among the other Kembang Kuning prisoners. When Aman declared his support for ISIS, no one outside his group followed suit; certainly no one on the Toni Togar side showed any interest.

31 Arifin had been a member of the anti-vice group, Tim Hisbah, in Solo, which turned to terrorism in late 2010.

32 Baro was a student of Mustaqim alias Abu Yusuf, while Ali Azhari was a student of Agam Fitriadi and Yudi Zulfahri. Abu Yusuf, Agam and Yudi were themselves all Aman's students.

33 IPAC interviews with ex-prisoner, Jakarta, November 2014.

34 "Terperosok di Kembangkuning", thoriquna.wordpress.com, 29 November 2013.

35 IPAC interviews in Kembang Kuning, October 2014.

Aman's own support for ISIS, which he declared in November 2013, may have arisen from his personal quarrel with the radical website *arrahmah.com* which has become known for its anti-ISIS, pro al-Nusra stance. The quarrel began after Arrahmah posted a translation of a piece by Abu Qatadah al-Filistini entitled "Message From Prison to the Mujahidin of Sham."³⁶ It urged jihadi groups in Syria to end their differences, without suggesting who was right or wrong. Aman accused Arrahmah of deliberately translating the piece in a tendentious way in order to discredit ISIS. He then posted his translation of a refutation, and said that while initially he had not wanted to take sides, he felt obliged to defend ISIS in the face of Arrahmah's distortions. Aman and Arrahmah had had several other disputes.³⁷

Even if Aman initially defended ISIS because he was annoyed with Arrahmah, he became convinced it was worthy of support, especially after it declared itself to be a government (*daulah*) and not merely an organisation. ISIS then declared that all other jihadi groups must submit to it and said it would wage war on anyone who refused. Aman's support was not lessened by evidence of ISIS brutality. In his view, it was correct that anyone refusing to take an oath of loyalty to ISIS should be seen as the enemy and thus a legitimate target of war. He approved of ISIS's strict policy in upholding *takfir mu'ayyan*.

Even though Aman's influence was limited in Kembang Kuning, it was much more extensive in jihadi circles outside. Since November 2013 Aman had been translating pro-ISIS material and challenging any criticism of the organisation. He would download this material via his hand-phone, then give the translations to one of his many visitors who would then upload the material on various jihadi sites such *millahibrahim.wordpress.com*, *shoututssalam.com*, *al-mustaqbal.net* and various social media such as Facebook and Twitter. Between November 2013 and November 2014, he translated some 115 articles. In addition to the online campaign, he ordered his followers to undertake other pro-ISIS activities such as discussions and demonstrations.

Aman also ordered his followers to prevent religious outreach (*dakwah*) from groups that he considered deliberately blurred the distinction between right and wrong. The chief characteristic of these groups, including JAT, was their rejection of the concept of *takfir mu'ayyan* and of ISIS. In November 2013 Aman and Rois had a discussion with JAT leader Fuad al-Hazimi who came to Kembang Kuning about democracy and the status of legislators as members of *thaghut* forces. For Aman, it was clear they were all *kafir*. But al-Hazimi saw democracy and by extension parliamentarians as murky in legal terms, not clearly forbidden.

After this discussion, Aman ordered his followers to prevent JAT activities. For example, in Bima, he told one of his trusted students, Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah, to restrict the space for JAT teachings. Iskandar obeyed by removing JAT members from the schedule of Friday preachers in the mosque in his neighborhood; he was arrested a month later, in December 2013.

Fuad al-Hazimi had a moderating influence on JAT, to the disgust of more militant members. As noted above, Aman also asked his followers in Pasir Putih to ensure that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was protected from the influence of al-Hazimi and his friends, tasking Abu Irbah, Abu Yusuf and others to stay with him at all times.

On 16 April 2014 Aman swore an oath of allegiance to ISIS and to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi, which he renewed on 30 June, a day after ISIS declared a caliphate. His followers inside and

36 For text, see "Syaikh Abu Qatada al-Filistini: Pesan dari Penjara Untuk Mujahidin Syam", *al-mustaqbal.net*, 1 November 2013.

37 Aman's anger toward Arrahmah dated back to 2012 when he debated the issue of *takfir mu'ayyan* versus *takfir am* with an Arrahmah writer named Muhib Al Majdi. It was Muhib who also translated the Abu Qatadah piece. But this was not Aman's only problem with Arrahmah. In 2013 Aman had had a debate with Irfan Awwas, who happened to be the uncle of Muhammad Jibriel, publisher of Arrahmah. Aman criticised Irfan Awwas for believing that Indonesian politicians like Taufiq Kiemas and Megawati Sukarnoputri could be Muslims. In his view, any Muslim who supporting the application of Islamic law in full is by definition apostate. Two months before Aman declared his support for ISIS, he had also debated Irfan on democracy.

outside prison did likewise. In Kelapa Dua on 5 July, for example, Iskandar led several terrorists there to swear allegiance.³⁸

In June, a new inmate arrived who proved to be another of Aman's students, giving the Aman faction a slight edge.³⁹ But in July, in a rare case of an ISIS defection, Abu Baro suddenly approached a Kembang Kuning prison official and asked that he be moved out of Aman's cell because he could no longer endure all the regulations that Aman imposed, including the ban on applying for remissions. Abu Baro missed his family and wanted to go home. Eventually he was moved to another cell and since then has become cooperative, taking part in religious guidance programs in expectation of receiving remissions. Aman's supporters were thus reduced to Ali Azhari, Rois, Mushala, Arief Budiman and M.Iqbal alias Kiki.

After the Ba'asyir's loyalty oath in Pasir Putih became an issue in the media, officials began to watch Aman and his friends in Kembang Kuning more closely. In late September 2014, security forces conducted a search of Aman's cell and confiscated ten handphones that his group was using. For a while this limited their ability to campaign on the outside and for almost a month, no pro-IS material appeared on radical sites. But by the end of October, Aman was able to buy a new phone from one of the criminal inmates, and on 3 November, Aman emerged on line again with a translation of an IS treatise on "Slavery According to the Teachings of Islam."

B. Analysis of Networks

The expansion of Aman's network inside Kembang Kuning has come not so much from recruitment of other inmates inside, but from the transfer of new inmates to the prison who were already his students or predisposed to be his followers. Because Aman's followers tend to be the most militant and the most supportive of IS, it may make sense to keep them in a few places where supervision is tightest, but any transfers to Kembang Kuning need to be carefully thought through.

Also, the fact that Aman does not seem to have recruited many other prisoners in the last year should not be cause for complacency. His track record in other prisons, especially Sukamiskin Prison in Bandung where he was detained in 2006-2007 and Jakarta police headquarters where he was held after his 2010 arrest, suggests that his capacity to win over other inmates is high.

Prison authorities also need to be wary of trusting Toni Togar. He may be a constructive force for the moment because he is taking an anti-IS stance and has strong leadership credentials. But he has a history of directing jihadi operations from prison and recruiting criminal offenders in the process; it would be a huge mistake to regard him as disengaged.

V. PRISON NETWORKS AND TRAVEL TO SYRIA

It has been clear from late 2013 onwards that some of the networks for getting to Syria run through prisons.⁴⁰ (As of January 2015, according to figures compiled by the police counter-terrorism unit,

38 These included Sigit Indrajit of the Myanmar Embassy plot, and Willem Maksum and Agus Widharto alias Agus Nangka of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat.

39 Kiki alias Muhammad Iqbal was part of a group with Yuli Harsono and Fahrul Rozi Tanjung operating out of Bandung that was responsible for the killing of three police in central Java in March and April 2010, not long after the Aceh camp was broken up. He received a six-year sentence in June 2011.

40 See "The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia", IPAC Report No. 13, and "Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict, IPAC Report No. 6, both *op. cit.*

Detachment 88, 123 Indonesians had been identified as having joined the fighting in Syria.)⁴¹ IS requires recommendations for fighters, much like getting references to go to university; sometimes prisoners can help obtain them. Sometimes they have relatives or friends who facilitate travel. There seem to be at least five channels in Indonesia for getting to Syria, and not all are to IS. Two are to al-Nusra, one of them run by JI. It is reportedly so tightly controlled that it is difficult for anyone other than formally inducted JI members to get approved. Getting accepted by the IS channels is reportedly easier. One of these is run by Aman through Pamulang and Bekasi; another appears to be run by former Laskar Jundullah members out of Malang and Makassar. Enterprising Indonesians rejected by the any of the above can sometimes find their way in separately.

A. *Getting Approved by IS*

IS normally requires that would-be foreign fighters obtain a recommendation from someone already with its forces in Syria or Iraq. Two Indonesians trusted by IS in this regard are Bagus Maskuron and Salim Mubarak. Bagus left Indonesia in May 2013. Salim has gone twice, first from mid-2013 to early 2014, then again in March 2014 when he left with his family in a group of about twenty. They have both appeared in IS propaganda videos, and their recommendations are said to be immediately accepted.⁴² Abu Fida, an avid promoter of IS in Indonesia, was one of those who left for Syria on Salim Mubarak's endorsement. He only got as far as Turkey, when he was quarantined for health reasons, then deported. (Because Indonesia has no law banning efforts to join foreign extremist organisations, police eventually arrested him for a crime committed four years earlier.)

There are a few individuals in Indonesia who are so trusted by IS that their recommendation is sufficient, without additional references from the front. Aman Abdurrahman is one; he earned IS's trust through his writings, which his students, including Bahrum Syah, brought to Syria. Until September 2014, Aman had set up selection committees in Pamulang and Bekasi from among his students and was running them from prison. The committees would assess possible candidates, then Aman would give a recommendation accordingly.

But in September 2014, the committees were disbanded, at least temporarily, after the arrest of Agus Priyatno and his wife, Eka Lestari, on the Turkish border. Agus, who came from Sumedang, West Java, and Eka, who was from Bekasi, had left with their children as part of a larger group that had been selected by the Bekasi committee. When they got to the border, Agus and his wife left the group to go off and meet with a friend who had joined IS. After the meeting, as they were on their way back to rejoin the group, they were arrested by Turkish authorities and eventually deported to Indonesia. The children stayed with the group and are now in Syria. The Bekasi committee was held responsible for the incident for failing to give sufficiently clear instructions that it any meeting outside the group was absolutely forbidden.

On 2 December 2014, a recently released prisoner, Mohammed Sibghotullah, was arrested in Malaysia en route to Syria with his wife, Rachmawati; Bagus Maskuron's family; and a few others. Sibghotullah, who served most of a three-year sentence in Porong Prison, Surabaya, for

41 Detachment 88 figures have steadily risen from 86 in June 2014 to 96 in October to 110 in December to 123 in January 2015. This total includes men and women identified by name, including wives who have accompanied their *mujahidin* husbands, but it does not include individuals going back and forth to Syria as members of humanitarian missions, even when the missions are linked to extremist groups. The true figure of fighters is higher, because not all fighters have been identified, but there is no reason to believe it has reached "264" or "350" or some of the other numbers bandied about in the media.

42 Salim Mubarak Attamimi, also known as Abu Jandal, appeared in a video posted on YouTube on 25 December 2014, warning the Indonesian police and military that he and others would come back to Indonesia to "massacre you one by one" for refusing to apply Islamic law. He also says in the video that he would welcome Indonesia's participation in the US-led coalition against IS, so that he and other fighters can confront the security forces directly. See www.youtube.com/watch?v=GOsfcFXLKE0.

his role in the Aceh training camp, had been one of the model prisoners: fully cooperative with prison staff and willing to participate in all programs aimed at rehabilitation. In retrospect, his aim seems to have been to get out as quickly as possible, and his plans for going to Syria appear to have been well-developed before his release; his brother-in-law, Siswanto, was already active in helping people leave. When Sibghotullah was released in early 2014, he continued to plan his departure from his home in Magetan, East Java; Siswanto left sometime in mid-2014.

B. Finding A Separate Path to Syria

Individuals determined to get to Syria can find their own way there, even without recommendations. Afif Abdul Madjid's experience is a case in point. One of the original JI members who joined when the organisation broke away from Darul Islam in 1993, Ustad (Teacher) Afif has always followed Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. He left JI to join MMI in 2002, then left to join JAT in 2008, but continued working at a JI-affiliated pesantren in Solo. He had wanted to go to Syria since 2012 and had tried to join delegations first from a Palestinian solidarity group, then from the humanitarian organisation HASI as an Arabic language interpreter, but both had long waiting lists from their own members. In November 2013, he contacted an acquaintance at the radical website Shoutussalam.com and asked him if he could help, knowing that he had excellent connections in Syria. The Shoutussalam contact refused, on the grounds that JAT members could not be trusted. Ustad Afif continued to search for a way in until he found a doctor outside Solo who gave him the name of a Syrian doctor working on the Turkish-Syrian border.

Together with a pesantren colleague from Lombok, they left for Istanbul via Malaysia in December 2013 and contacted the doctor when they arrived. He told them to take a plane to Hattai, a town on the Turkish side of the border, and after they arrived, helped them cross over into Syria, where an IS fighter took them to his headquarters. There they met several Indonesians from Ngruki. They were instructed to join a military training camp where in early January, they both swore an oath of loyalty to al-Baghdadi. Ustad Afif returned to Indonesia later that month; his colleague stayed on.

Ustad Afif became a major promoter of IS when he got back and was a speaker at an event in Solo in mid-July 2014 that concluded with a pledge of loyalty to IS on the part of all participants.⁴³ He was arrested on 9 August 2014, but again, because it is not a crime under Indonesian law to go to Syria, he was therefore accused of helping to fund the Aceh training camp in 2010 and will be tried accordingly.

C. Organisational Affiliation Not A Reliable Guide

In analysing support for IS among prisoners, it becomes clear that organisational affiliation is not a reliable guide. JI is mostly anti-IS and supportive of al-Nusra, but at least two JI members are with IS and there is likely to be more pro-IS sentiment in the younger generation. JAT is split, as are several other smaller groups.

One interesting example is Ring Banten, the Darul Islam faction whose members took part both in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2004 Australian Embassy attack. Its leaders include Rois from Pasir Putih, who as noted above, is one of Aman Abdurrahman's staunchest allies. His fellow Ring Banten member in Pasir Putih, Sapta Syailendra, is also among the pro-IS, pro-Aman hard core. But his nephew, Zainal Mutaqin alias Zaki Rachmatullah, released in 2014 after serving time for his role in the Aceh camp, was cooperative while in prison even though he was in

43 See www.al-mustaqbal.net/deklarasi-forum-pendukung-daulah-islamiyah-sambut-khilafah-untuk-ketentraman-ibadah. The other speakers were Abu Fida, the man who had tried unsuccessfully to get to Syria some months earlier, and Amir Mahmud, whose son was one of the first Indonesians to join ISIS and remained in Syria as of January 2015.

the same prison as Rois, and has shown no pro-IS inclinations since his release. Several other Ring Banten prisoners are cooperative and have not joined either side of the IS debate.

Another Ring Banten member, Indera Enjen alias Hamzah alias Boim, was arrested in August 2014 and charged with assisting the Aceh training camp in 2010. He is currently awaiting trial in Kelapa Dua but has already developed a reputation as a hardliner. It will be interesting to see where prison authorities place him after trial: with other hardliners in Nusakambangan or with the more moderate in Cipinang or Porong where he would be ideologically more isolated. Nur Ikhwan Robbik, a Ring Banten in Tangerang Prison, is fervently pro-IS.

Two Ring Banten members, Abdul Rauf and Rosikin Nur, sometimes written Rosikhien Noor, are known to have fought with ISIS but both reportedly left for Syria more because they were committed to fighting on behalf of fellow Muslims than because they believed deeply in IS ideology. If they had been accepted by the JI channel, they might have chosen that route, but it was easier to get to Syria via the IS channel, and that seems to be why the two men chose it.

Abdul Rauf, released in 2011 after serving more than eight years for his role in the Bali bombing, was a model prisoner and by all accounts remorseful and convinced that violence against civilians in Indonesia was wrong. When he was brought into the Bali bombing by Imam Samudra, he believed he was going to be sent to Ambon to fight. When he was released, he was a regular visitor to Nusakambangan to visit Rois and on one occasion expressed a desire to fight in Myanmar to avenge violence against Muslims there. Rois told him how he could get to Syria instead. Abdul Rauf left in early 2014 and was killed in May 2014 in Ramadi, Iraq.

Rosikin Nur was never imprisoned though he was briefly detained twice, once after the Australian Embassy bombing and once in connection with the Aceh training camp, but in both cases, he was released after questioning. He left with Bahrum Syah at the end of May 2014 and appears with him in the "Joining the Ranks" video.

The message getting back to other Ring Banten members may thus well be a mixed one.

D. Prisoner Releases and Possible Departures to Syria

Given the presence of ex-prisoners among the Indonesian IS fighters, there has been much concern expressed internationally about the imates due for release this year and next. The number released in 2013-14 was about 88 (see Appendix A); the figure for expected releases in 2015-16 is well over 130. Most are likely concerned primarily in trying to restart their lives, but there will be a small subset interested in Syria, and the economic inducements offered by IS means that those who do have difficulty finding jobs or making ends meet could be tempted.

It is not just the recently released who may be interested however. Abdul Rauf, as noted, left for Syria some three years after his release and there are some potentially dangerous jihadis who have been out of prison for even longer. Indonesia continues to lack an effective post-release monitoring system for convicted terrorists, let alone for ordinary criminals who might be recruited in prison. On this point, it is worth noting that the danger of such recruitment, at least in the Nusakambangan prisons, seems to come less from the most militant but rather from the ranks of what might be called the "deceptively cooperative" like Toni Togar, who though currently the leader of the anti-IS faction in Pasir Putih, nevertheless has a history of recruiting common criminals while in prison. The *takfir mu'ayyan* supporters, on the other hand, may be too strict to appeal to many ordinary offenders.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ That said, it is worth remembering the case of Helmi Priwardhani. He was a criminal offender whom Aman Abdurrahman recruited while in Sukamiskin Prison in 2006-7. On his release, he joined a jihadi group of Aman supporters that killed three policemen. He was rearrested and is currently detained in Pasir Putih where he took part in the 2 July 2014 oath-taking to IS. Even if he receives no remissions, he is due for release in 2016.

VI. WHAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN DO

The burden of curbing the influence of IS in prisons falls heavily on the Corrections Directorate and the police, and both are concerned about the problem. Indonesia needs a better legal deterrent as well, however, and the parliament needs to do its part by adopting a law that would ban participation in foreign extremist organisations—without at the same time turning the existing ant-terrorism law into a draconian Internal Security Act.

A. *The Prisons*

For the first time, there is some good news on the prisons front. The growth in the number of anti-IS prisoners in Pasir Putih from two to 21 is the direct result of increased capacity of prison staff. Several have become interested in trying to pull individual inmates out of the hardline ranks through a variety of different approaches.

Few, if any, have the religious training that would enable them to engage the prisoners in serious doctrinal debate, but in some cases they have allowed the circulation of hard copies of anti-IS arguments posted on sites such as Arrahmah, even if these tracts also contain arguments in favor of jihad. This helps challenge the ideological supremacy of the IS supporters. Prison authorities have also developed a list of printed material to look for and confiscate from visitors. For example in October 2014, officials in one of the Nusakambangan prisons confiscated pro-IS material that had been brought in by one of the wives. The official knew to confiscate it, because of the title: Lessons from the Murder of Ahrar al-Syam Leaders (*Pelajaran dan Renungan Atas Terbunuhnya Petinggi Ahrar Al Syam*), Ahrar al-Syam being a jihadi militia in Syria that IS has attacked. Only regular training workshops for officials can keep them updated about what to look for, and while extremist material will always get through, it is at least a start.

Prison staff are more comfortable talking about family issues. Most inmates, as noted, miss their families and know their incarceration has caused economic hardship for those left behind. It also not infrequently has caused the family to be ostracised, either by the community or by former friends in the radical network who believe the inmate is cooperating with authorities. Some prison staff have reached out to inmates by offering them more opportunities to call home. This only works as an incentive if communications are strictly regulated in the first place; when one prisoner can have ten handphones in his cell, offers of family calls are not likely to have much effect.

Officials can also try and reduce dependence on the extra food that terrorist prisoners get from donors, but thus far, it is more by looking for alternative sources, including providing it themselves, than by trying and curb the donations; it is unclear why gifts that empower the most militant inmates cannot be more strictly controlled, particularly in a super maximum security facility.

In some cases, prison personnel have made concessions in standard procedures in exchange for cooperation—for example by agreeing not to do body searches of women visitors, even though these are always carried out by women police officers, on the promise that the women will not bring in anything problematic. Whether this is supremely naïve or an effective reward for good behavior in a few carefully selected cases remains to be seen. Some wives can be more militant than their husbands.

Some prison authorities have tried to ensure that guards hired be religiously observant and pious, to confound the stereotype the militants try to propagate of prison personnel as *anshar thaghut*, or partisans of the oppressors. The men they brand as *kafir* turn out to be good Muslims who regularly pray and fast, and this can be an asset. The trick is to ensure that piety is not transformed into sympathy and then into recruitment, as has happened with a few prison guards in the past.

Some prisons are providing increased religious guidance. In Kembang Kuning, inmates are

expected to attend a program run by the local branch of Indonesia’s largest Muslim social organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama called Pondok Pesantren Hikmatul Musibah, as if it were an Islamic school based inside the prison. The result of an initiative of a prison official who happens to be an active NU member, the pesantren conducts classes four times a week, and both criminas and terrorism offenders take part. Aman Abdurrahman’s followers stay away. The program is popular, not so much because it changes mindsets or interpretations about jihad but because it gives the inmates a forum to discuss various problems thrown up by imprisonment, including family issues. Four times a week is about as much religious instruction as many inmates—especially the criminal offenders but sometimes the convicted terrorists as well—can take, and they are not interested in hearing more from the hardliners.

The need to manage inmate relations, and relations between prison personnel and inmates, goes beyond the effort to develop an instrument for assessing high-risk offenders, as is currently being undertaken by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI). That effort is valuable but it cannot be at the expense of other initiatives designed to help prison officials understand the inmates they are dealing with and encourage a sense of professional pride in their ability to do so.

It also is not a substitute for a broader strategy of managing inmates that has genuine buy-in from prison staff. Nusakambangan is receiving assistance from the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the U.S. government. One part of the program is aimed at implementing international “Terrorist Management Guidelines” but it is something of an uphill struggle. Prison authorities are often resistant to international templates that they believe are not always suitable for application in the Indonesian context.

B. Police

The police have their own work cut out for them in managing the men arrested and placed in the Kelapa Dua police facility. Until late 2012, most newly detained suspected terrorists were held in a lock-up at Jakarta police headquarters. After the highly publicised escape of one of the inmates in November 2012, who subsequently wrote a scathing article on the lax security there, police gradually started moving detainees to Kelapa Dua.

Suspected terrorists are held in four blocks, in cells that hold up to seven inmates each. Block A is reserved for those considered hardcore or particularly dangerous, and it was in this block that the pro-IS ceremony took place on 5 July 2014. As of January 2015, Block A had 29 inmates, with Sigit Indrajit of the foiled Myanmar Embassy bomb plot one of the most intractable.

Coordination between Corrections on the one hand, and Detachment 88 and BNPT on the other, could be better, particularly in terms of information-sharing. Data-gathering in prisons is improving, but the channels for forwarding key information remain undeveloped—especially to the police who are actively investigating violent networks. Part of the problem is trust. The police have tended to look on their corrections colleagues with disdain, providing little encouragement to develop a healthy working relationship. For their part, prison staff, particularly lower echelons of the bureaucracy, frequently resent the fact that the police get all the glory—and the extra perks. It should be remembered that after the 2002 Bali bombing, Deatchment 88 developed into a top unit not just because of skills training, but because its members derived real professional pride from their accomplishments. The prison system needs an incentive structure for working with convicted terrorists that will give its staff the same sense of achievement.

It is particularly important that there be intensive consultation with prison authorities before inmates are moved from Kelapa Dua to the regular prison system, which often but not always happens after trial. One convicted terrorist now working closely with prison officials has suggested that it before an imate is transferred, it would be helpful for the police to assess family

support for his activities. If his wife or other family members are strongly supportive of jihadi actions, police should ensure that he is transferred to a prison as far away from them as possible. If they are not militant themselves, the transfer should be to a prison close by where they can easily visit and persuade him to disengage.

Procedures under Regulation 99 now require Detachment 88 to sign off on sentence reductions or releases of convicted terrorists. Prison officials complain that the unit's assessment of an individual prisoner is often derived from the period immediately after arrest or during trial, whereas individuals can change after several years in prison. If police information is not up to date, there may be delays in approving releases for men who are in fact entitled to them. This can create frustration, not just for the prisoner who expected to get out, but for other inmates who see that participation in programs is not bringing the expected results. Communication between police and prison officials thus needs to take place on a systematic, ongoing basis. To aid in this effort, the Operations Division of BNPT in 2014 set up the "Team of Seven" (Tim Tujuh), composed of prison officials, police, prosecutors and judges and others to facilitate communication. It seems to be helping but a formal evaluation would be useful.

C. The Need for Legislation

Police frequently complain that they lack adequate legal tools for dealing with homegrown terrorism, and in the case of the Syria issue, they are right. They can be as vigilant as possible in trying to detect planned travel to or from Syria, and they can coordinate with authorities in neighboring countries such as Singapore and Malaysia or even with Turkey. But as long as joining foreign military or terrorist organisations is not a crime, it is difficult to prosecute.

In early 2015, Indonesian authorities decided to try and use Article 139A of the Criminal Code against individuals joining or trying to join IS. The article is part of a section of the code punishing crimes against "friendly states", and states that "rebellion with the intention of separating a region in whole or in part from the control of the government in power there" can be punished with up to five years in prison. A test case is reportedly in preparation as this report went to press. President Jokowi also was reportedly planning to issue a regulation that would enable the government to revoke passports of individuals known to have left for Syria.

A full-fledged law banning assistance to or involvement in foreign terrorist organisations would still be desirable, but there are political tactics to consider. Any effort to embed some clauses to this effect in a strengthened anti-terrorist law that also included, for example, provisions lengthening the allowable period of pre-trial detention, would likely run afoul of both conservative Muslims and civil liberties advocates. A separate bill, put on the legislative agenda while concern about IS remains high, might have more success.

VII. CONCLUSION

Indonesian authorities had a hard enough time coping with terrorism offenders before the Syrian conflict erupted, but the emergence of IS and its rivals has added a new dimension to their difficulties. For the last year, the Corrections Directorate has been making a concerted effort to learn more about the convicted terrorists under its authority and experiment with different techniques for managing them. It is critically important that these efforts be well documented and evaluated on a regular basis so that interventions that work in one prison can be replicated elsewhere and ineffective or counterproductive measures can be dropped. If certain interventions work, it is also important to understand why. If some useful Indonesian models for handling extremist inmates can be developed, it may be time for donor organisations, discouraged in the past by a combination of bureaucratic obstacles and rejection of international models, to look again at how they can help.

Appendix A

Distribution of Convicted Terrorists in Indonesian Prisons As of November 2014

Regional Office (Kanwil)	Prison/Detention Centre	Number of Inmates
Aceh	1. Banda Aceh	13 Persons
	2. Bireuen Detention Centre	1 Person
North Sumatra	1. Medan	6 Persons
South Sumatra	1. Palembang	7 Persons
Banten	1. Tangerang	20 Persons
DKI Jakarta	1. Cipinang	28 Persons
	2. Cipinang Detention Centre	2 Persons
	3. Salemba	2 Persons
West Java	1. Cibinong	20 Persons
	2. Cirebon	9 Persons
	3. Karawang	2 Persons
	4. Ciamis	1 Person
Central Java	1. Semarang	22 Persons
	2. Permisan	12 Persons
	3. Batu, Nusakambangan (NK)	22 Persons
	4. Pasir Putih, NK	42 Persons
	5. Kembang Kuning, NK	13 Persons
	6. Besi, NK	5 Persons
	7. Magelang	3 Persons
East Java	1. Surabaya Porong	15 Persons
	2. Malang	7 Persons
	3. Pamekasan	3 Persons
	4. Kediri	2 Persons
Central Sulawesi	1. Palu	5 Persons
	2. Luwuk	3 Persons
	3. Ampana	4 Persons
Total :		269 Persons

Appendix B

Extremist Prisoners Released in 2013-2014

The following list of 88 people is based on Corrections Directorate information that covers releases through the end of November 2014. A few additional releases that took place in December 2014 are included. The original list includes non-jihadis convicted of terrorism; we list only those involved in extremist organisations here.⁴⁵

A. Released since June 2014

1. Ade Guntur (book bombs)
2. Agus Mahmudi (Sunata, ex-JI)
3. Amir Abdillah (Noordin)
4. Amri Firmansyah alias Ali Miftah
5. Andre Anggara (Abu Umar, Aman Abdurrahman)
6. Asmuni alias Munir (Abu Umar)
7. Bintang Juliardhi (Sunata)
8. Darwoto (Abu Umar)
9. Eko Prasetyo alias Zubeir (Aceh camp)
10. Fajar Dwi Setyo (book bombs)
11. Febri Hermawan (book bombs)
12. Hari Budiman (Aceh camp, Aman Abdurrahman assistant)
13. Hasanuddin (schoolgirl beheadings, JI)
14. JokoWibowo (KOMPAK, hid Noordin)
15. Khairul Ghazali (CIMB robbery)
16. Mugianto (book bombs)
17. Nanang Irawan alias Nang Ndut (Cirebon mosque, Klaten)
18. Parmin alias Yasir Abdul Barr (JI, Noordin)
19. Rahmat alias Rahmat Ibnu Umar (Bima)
20. Riki Riyanto (book bombs)
21. Sudarno (Cirebon group)
22. Sugiharto (Abu Umar)
23. Suhanto alias Borju (Cirebon group)
24. Taufik Abdul Halim (Atrium bombing, deported to Malaysia)
25. Yahya bin Syafi'i/Sapiih (Taliban Melayu)
26. Zein Efendi (Sunata friend, arrested with BintangJuliardhi, above)

B. Released January-May 2014

27. Abdul Ghofur (Bandung group, arms sales, hid Sunata)

⁴⁵ There were three non-jihadis released in 2014, all belonged to the group of Christians who killed two Muslim fish traders in Poso in 2006 in revenge for the judicial execution of three Christians accused of masterminding a massacre in a Muslim school in May 2000. In 2013, there were 20 non-jihadi releases, including 12 Christians from the same group; five individuals accused of sending bomb threats by SMS, including one mentally ill woman; and three members of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) accused of trying to blow up the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 2000.

28. Abdul HarisMunandar (CIMB robbery)
29. Agam Fitriadi
30. Agung Jati Santoso (Klaten)
31. Anwar Effendi (Aceh camp)
32. Budi Supriyadi (police poison plot)
33. Fajar Novianto (Badri Hartono group, AQI)
34. Furqan (Bima)
35. Heri Kuswanto (CIMB robbery)
36. Joko Lelono (Klaten)
37. Joko Purwanto (Aceh camp)
38. Juhanda (book bombs)
39. Juni Kurniawan (book bombs)
40. Kurnia Widodo (Bandung group)
41. Mahmud Irsyad (Abu Umar)
42. Mansur Samin
43. Muhammad Maulana Sani alias MatunMaulana (book bombs)
44. Muchamad Syarif (book bombs)
45. Mujahidul Haq (Bima, raised funds for Aceh camp) [wants to join ISIS in Syria]
46. Nugroho Budi Santoso (Klaten)
47. Paimin alias Joni alias Gondrong (police poison plot)
48. Rachmat Hidayat (Bima)
49. Ridwan Lestaluhu (Ambon violence)
50. Moh. Sibghotullah (Aceh camp and more) **REARRESTED en route to Syria**
51. Sudirman alias Yasir (helped Dulmatin) [wants to join ISIS in Syria]
52. Sugeng Setiaji (friend of Hari Kuncoro)
53. Taufik bin Marzuki (Aceh camp)
54. Taufik Hidayat Rizal (Abu Umar)
55. Tri Budi Santoso (Klaten)
56. Tongji alias Warsito (Aceh camp)
57. Wardi alias Edi Jabal (hiding guns for Abu Tholut)
58. Yudha Anggoro (Klaten)
59. Zainal Mutaqim bin Mahfud (Aceh camp)

C. Released in 2013

1. Afham Ramadhan (hiding Syaifudin Zuhri after 2009 bombs)
2. Dr Agus Purwantoro (Poso)
3. Ali Muhamad Akbar (Abu Umar)
4. Anif Solchanudin (Bali II)
5. Arif Syaifuddin (Abu Dujana)
6. Aris Widodo (Abu Dujana)
7. Arman alias Galaxi (Makassar)
8. Deni Carmelita (book bombs)
9. Eman Suherman (Aceh camp)
10. Hamid AgungWibowo (Aceh camp)

11. Haris Amir Falah (JAT)
12. Hariyadi Usman (JAT)
13. Joko Daryono (Aceh camp)
14. Imam Mukhammad Firdaus (journalist who wanted scoop on book bombs)
15. Lilik Purnomo alias Haris (Poso beheading)
16. Mu'arifin
17. Muh. Fadil (book bombs)
18. Muthalib Patty (Ambon)
19. Nachrum Wali Sahalong (Ambon)
20. Nur Afifudin (helped hide Abu Dujana)
21. Rahmadi NowoKuncoro (Aceh camp)
22. Rahmadi Suheb (JI, Ambon)
23. Reza Sungkar alias Rizal Hasan (Aceh camp)
24. Saefudin Zuhri alias Tsabit (assisted Noordin, links to Palembang group)
25. Santhanam (police poisoning plot)
26. Sonny Jayadi (helped hide Syaifudin Zuhri after 2009 bombs)
27. Supono alias Kedu (2009 hotel bombs)
28. Syarif Usman (JAT)
29. Umar bin Martini (police poisoning plot)

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