THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE PAPUAN PRO-INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

24 August 2015
IPAC Report No.21
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I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesia’s approach to the independence movement in Papua has been to try to crush it, repress it, persuade it, co-opt it, divide it, dilute it or smother it in a process called development. Nothing has worked, and it has proved impossible to eradicate. It is too powerful an idea, backed by too much history and too many differences with the rest of Indonesia. The best policy the Indonesian government could adopt now would be the equivalent of “do no harm”, taking measures that will avoid further radicalisation. The most urgent is to invest in better policing.

At the same time, the movement itself, generically known as the Free Papua Organisation (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) has been so resistant to unification, so riven by clan and personal interests, that to this day, it has never constituted a serious threat, militarily or politically, to the Indonesian state. It consists of three elements: a disparate group of armed units, each with limited territorial control, that does not answer to a single commander; several groups inside Papua that through demonstrations and protests give expression to a much more widespread sense of injustice and resentment; and a small group of leaders based abroad, in the Pacific, Europe and the U.S., who try to raise awareness of Papuan issues with a view toward generating international support for independence.

The political fronts have never been able to direct the armed units, and the armed units themselves have generally tended to work out a wary co-existence with local governments, headed by directly elected Papuans. The conflict is of such low intensity that the government can easily live with it. The guerrillas have never done enough damage for the government to seriously consider negotiations, and many parties have an interest in sustaining the low-level threat.

Faced with this situation, the political groups have adopted different tactics. The largest, most radical, and most dynamic, the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB) has consciously tried to follow what it sees as the lessons of East Timor: provoke violence on the part of security forces and hope that international outrage over human rights violations resulting will change international reluctance to intervene, much as a massacre in East Timor in 1991 changed the political dynamics there. Any repressive action by the Indonesian government thus plays directly into the KNPB’s hands. (As one KNPB leader said, “That’s exactly what we want, lots of police abuses against us.”)¹

Others would prefer to follow the Aceh model: press the Indonesian government for negotiations, mediated by an international third party. But the conditions in Aceh that produced a peace agreement in 2005, ending a three-decade insurgency, were vastly different to those in Papua, and Indonesian agreement to an outside mediator is unthinkable.

The diaspora elites have only rarely managed to overcome longstanding divisions that date back to the early 1970s, but determination to become a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, an association of Pacific nations, gave them a clear short-term goal, resulting in the formation of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) in December 2014 (and eventual observer status, not membership, in 2015). The unity may be temporary, but for the moment it has given a new confidence to the movement; whether it can set other equally practical short-term goals and deliver remains to be seen.

The same could be said of the Indonesian government. President Jokowi has made a point of trying to show he cares about Papua by making repeated visits, releasing a few political prisoners and promising to free more, and committing the central government to several major development projects. But the president and his advisers need to understand that these steps, however welcome, will not necessarily translate into support for the government. More roads, schools and houses, while desirable on their own terms, will not make pro-independence sentiment disappear.

¹ “Polres Dilarang Akomodir Kegiatan KNPB”, Cenderawasih Pos, 10 April 2015.
In the face of an emboldened and at least temporarily united political movement, the government also needs to understand some of the drivers of radicalisation and avoid exacerbating them. They include ineffective policing, where a frequent default response to any sign of trouble is to open fire; impunity for security forces, which fuels the sense of injustice; and a practice of undermining local customary institutions if they are suspected of pro-independence sympathies.

Ultimately, Jakarta needs to learn to live with an independence movement that may be best managed by not trying to destroy it.

II. WHAT IS THE OPM?

The Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) is an umbrella term for the pro-independence movement engaged since 1965 in a struggle for Papuan independence. While its name literally translates as the Free Papua Organisation, it is best understood as a highly decentralised movement, composed of factions working as much in competition with one another as in coordination. There is no single armed front that reports to a political wing nor any shared strategy. On pro-independence websites and in comments to the press, members present the familiar image of a guerrilla army, with a supreme commander presiding over regional commands that span the provinces of Papua and Papua Barat. But in practice, a combination of varied clan and ethnic loyalties, marked class differences, personal enmities, remote terrain and different agendas have made a single chain of command impossible. Units and commanders rise and fall without much communication with one another.

This report uses the term “armed OPM” to refer to combatants as opposed to political activists, discussed later in this report. Most armed OPM are based inside Papua, but a few take refuge across the border in Papua New Guinea. Factions go by different names but most use some variant of the name National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) or TPN/OPM.

The distinction between armed and political groups is not a perfect one. Some leading members of the armed OPM fled in the 1980s and now run political groups abroad; some of the political activists have used violence. Each of the three leading pro-independence coalitions—the West Papua National Authority (WPNA), the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) and the Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB)—has tried and failed to unify the armed OPM and place it under political leadership. The establishment in December 2014 of the ULMWP has brought an unprecedented and probably temporary degree of unity to the movement, but there is still no evidence that its leaders are inclined or have the capacity to direct the strategy of the armed factions.

Several factors make it difficult to come up with a reliable estimate of the size of the armed OPM. Membership is constantly shifting; for every actively engaged fighter, there are many more sympathisers. The authority and influence of individual commanders is a product of their status within existing clan and community structures. There are also frequent allegations of “fake” OPM units set up by the government to challenge or discredit the real ones. One leaked 2009 assessment reportedly prepared by the army special forces, Kopassus, estimated the total number of armed OPM as 1,532, “able to conduct a guerrilla war/survive in the forest, spread throughout almost every regency in Papua”. This estimate would likely be lower today, particularly if it were restricted to those pursuing violence against the state. The geographical range it suggests would also be far more limited: there is virtually no OPM violence anywhere in Papua Barat province.

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or in the southern districts of Papua.

This report looks at the role and activities of thirteen different factions conducting armed violence in three areas of Papua province: Mimika district; the eastern central highlands and the north coast. While it is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of active OPM, these are the only factions known to be actively engaged in violent attacks.

One of the primary obstacles to a coherent military structure has been the inability to agree on a single chief commander. Today, at least three men in different areas actively claim the title:

- Goliat Tabuni, based in Tingginambut, Puncak Jaya district, is probably the strongest with the most extensive territorial coverage. To varying degrees, other commanders based in neighbouring Puncak, Paniai and Mimika operate under his direction.
- Puron Wenda is a commander based in neighbouring Lanny Jaya who broke away from Goliat around 2010, hoping to make his name by launching more attacks. In May 2015, declaring a “total revolutionary war”, his men claimed to have brought Goliat and others under his command, but there is no evidence to support this.
- Richard Hans Yoweni, based in Papua New Guinea but with influence along the northern coast, is involved in almost no violence. He is titular head of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, a Vanuatu-based lobby group, whose supporters recognise him as the OPM’s overall leader. He replaced Mathias Wenda in that role in 2008.

Because the various commands retain different links to political groups in and outside Papua, different versions of a command structure have emerged on websites, in the media, and in government reports. Most feature a supreme commander (panglima tertinggi) with a chief of staff and other senior officials, sitting atop a structure of regional defence commands (komando daerah pertahanan, Kodap). The number of these Kodap varies, but their common feature is that unlike the territorial structure of the Indonesian military that they appear in some ways to mimic, they are based not on Indonesian administrative districts (kabupaten), but instead on Papua’s areas of shared traditional custom (wilayah adat) that once also formed the basis for the Dutch colonial administrative divisions. Many of the armed OPM factions have coalesced along ethnic lines, another factor that has hampered broader unity.

If the exact size of the OPM is difficult to estimate, it is nevertheless clear that it poses no serious military threat. The insurgency remains low-intensity, with relatively few fatalities from armed encounters that most often take the form of isolated hit-and-run attacks. With 144 reported fatalities between 2009 and 2014, separatist conflict in Papua is far less deadly than the Aceh insurgency was at its peak in the early 2000s, when annual deaths surpassed 2,500. In many areas, local officials appear to have worked out a means of largely peaceful coexistence with the local OPM that involves various forms of patronage.

Since the fall of Soeharto, the Indonesian government has shown no serious interest in capturing OPM leaders, although it would not be hard to do: they and their camps are for the most

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4 Netherlands New Guinea was divided into six divisions (afdeeling): Hollandia (now Jayapura), Geelvink Bay (now the islands of Biak and Serui), Central New Guinea (which covered the area from Paniai east to the mostly unadministered central highlands, now known as Puncak Jaya), South New Guinea (now Merauke and surrounding districts), Fak-Fak (which also covered Kaimana and Mimika) and West New Guinea (Sorong, Manokwari and Raja Ampat). These divisions loosely followed what Papuans call the wilayah adat.
5 These included 43 suspected OPM killed by security forces, 27 soldiers and 20 police killed by suspected OPM, and 39 civilians killed by suspected OPM. The “civilians” category is problematic because it includes a large number of non-Papuan motorcycle taxi (ojek) drivers widely suspected to be state intelligence agents. Figures based on data compiled from the National Violence Monitoring System (www.nvms-indonesia.com), whose data is in turn based on local media reporting—they should be seen as rough estimates. In particular, it is likely that figures on suspected OPM killed by security forces is significantly under-reported.
part well-known. Several factors explain this failure.

From the military’s point of view, there is no incentive to risk life and limb in difficult terrain to capture men who pose little danger to the state. Neither the police nor the military venture very far beyond established posts. Even at the height of the Aceh insurgency, the capture or killing of top GAM leaders was rare, but involvement in military operations in Aceh was at least seen as an important stepping stone to promotion in the officer corps. No such prestige has been attached to Papua operations since the 1970s.

A second reason is that since the mid-2000s, the police have gradually taken over from the military as the lead agency in counter-insurgency, but they have no capacity for jungle operations. Using a “persuasive” approach—trying to convince commanders to cooperate with the government through offers of cash and jobs—has become the only practical option, as well as being more palatable from a public relations point of view.

A third explanation is that many different interests benefit from the conflict. When local politicians were campaigning for the creation of Puncak district, to be carved out of Puncak Jaya, one of the arguments they used is that the new district would diminish support for the insurgency because it would bring government closer to the people. Without periodic violence, this argument would have no traction. The background threat of violence helps security forces obtain extra funding for “insecure areas” (daerah rawan); and they can use staged “surrenders” as proof that such funding produces results. Sporadic violence also helps justify extra funding for securing local and national elections.

Unscrupulous business contractors and the district governments that hire them can also benefit by citing force majeure—in the form of OPM threats or attacks—as a reason for not finishing government-funded projects. The money budgeted for the project can then be written off.

For all these reasons, the armed OPM has never been eliminated or, since the fall of Soeharto, even seriously engaged. At the same time, its own divisions prevent it from growing into a more serious threat, even with access to new arms and resources. Those divisions are in part a function of Papua’s difficult terrain and complex clan structure, but they are also rooted in history.

III. A FRACTURED HISTORY

The pro-independence movement, armed and unarmed, has its roots in the belief that Papuan independence was promised by the Dutch colonial administration in 1961, but that this goal was then thwarted by Indonesia through fraud and violence, with the tacit approval of the U.S. and other western powers. Earlier, Indonesia’s successful war of independence against the Netherlands (1945-49) had not secured the last remaining territory of the Dutch East Indies for the new republic. Western New Guinea remained a colony and the Dutch began preparing it for self-government, including with the establishment in 1961 of the Nieuw-Guinea Raad (New Guinea Council), a proto-legislature in which several men later to be prominent in the OPM participated. In less than a year, however, American pressure and Indonesian military actions had succeeded in persuading the Netherlands to cede the territory, now called West Irian, to a period of United

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6 Cornelis Lay and Purwo Santioso (Eds.), Perjuangan Menuju Puncak: Kajian Akademik Rencana Pembentukan Kabupaten Puncak Pemekaran Kabupaten Puncak Jaya Propinsi Papua (Yogyakarta, 2006).
7 Providing security for elections in Papua means big money. In 2014, the Papua police command (until December 2014, there was one command for both provinces) received roughly Rp. 90 billion (then worth roughly $8 million) from the central government and Rp. 20 billion ($1.7 million) from the provincial government’s budget for elections security, “Berbagai Antisipasi Kramanan Papua Jelang Pemilu 2014”, KBR68H, 18 February 2014. “Pemprov Papua Curah Rp.10 Miliar APBD untuk Pengamanan Pilpres”, Tabloid Jubi, 10 June 2014. Some of this money was officially shared with the local military command, to fund security and to strengthen relations between the two institutions.
The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement ©2015 IPAC

Nations and then Indonesian administration until an act of self-determination could be held. 8

The highly contentious Act of Free Choice, a referendum in which 1,026 Papuans handpicked by the Indonesian authorities were asked to choose independence or integration with Indonesia, was held on 1 May 1969. The vote was unanimous in support of integration, and West Irian became an Indonesian province, soon renamed Irian Jaya. Sporadic resistance to Indonesian rule, which had begun in 1965, soon picked up.

The first effort to turn isolated acts of rebellion into a more coherent armed struggle took place in 1970, when one group of rebels established a camp at Markas Victoria (Victory Base) in Waris, in the foothills of what is now Keerom district. Four would later go on to play important roles in the diaspora:

- Seth Rumkorem, the group’s founder. From Biak, he had initially welcomed the Indonesian takeover in 1963 and entered the military, graduating from the Bandung Officers’ School in 1964 and joining the intelligence service, but he grew disillusioned and became sympathetic to the independence cause. 9
- Jacob Prai, from the Keerom area along the Papua New Guinea border. He was one of the first from this remote area to enter Cenderawasih University in Jayapura, where he studied law and founded a Papuan youth movement.
- John Otto Ondawame, an ethnic Amungme from Mimika, who had come to Jayapura in the early 1970s for university and became a protégé of Prai.
- Rex Rumakiek, a young Biak student who had been studying in Java and who returned to emerge as the group’s chief political officer.

On 1 July 1971, the members of Markas Victoria issued a proclamation of Papuan independence, with Rumkorem as president of a West Papuan provisional government. This remains the day many Papuan independence supporters mark as the birth of the OPM. 10

The group remained plagued by leadership struggles and in 1976 it split in two, a division that from which it never recovered. Prai in particular had never fully accepted Rumkorem as his commander, viewing him as power-hungry and his Indonesian military background as suspicious. Prai and Ondawame left to establish a separate base, known as the Restoration of Justice (Pemulihan Keadilan or Pemka) command. The split was partly along ethnic lines, with many Biaks remaining loyal to Rumkorem while the Pemka contingent consisted mostly of those from Keerom and further south. Today, some factions continue to invoke the names of Pemka or Markas Victoria to indicate where their loyalties lie.

As the military stepped up operations across Papua in the late 1970s and early 80s, many of the original members of Markas Victoria fled abroad, looking for political asylum in the Pacific or in Europe, and trying, unsuccessfully, to direct OPM actions from a distance.

The story of the OPM ever since has been one of local commands with limited territorial control, operating independently of one another, with periodic and largely unsuccessful efforts at unification. The next sections examine how the OPM operates in three areas: Timika, the eastern central highlands, and the north coast.

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8 The August 1962 New York Agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands stipulated that a United Nations Temporary Executive Authority would take over administration of the former Dutch colony for seven months. The territory was then transferred to Indonesian administration on 1 May 1963 for six years, with a UN-supervised referendum—the so-called Act of Free Choice—held in 1969.

9 Before Indonesian administration, Rumkorem had worked for eight years as a clerk in the offices of the Dutch airline, KLM. His father, like a significant proportion of elite Biaks at the time, was an ardent supporter of integration with Indonesia.

10 The timing of the announcement was motivated in part by their awareness that a rival group based in the Netherlands, led by Nicolaas Jouwe, was planning its own independence declaration at the same time. See Robin Osborne, Indonesia’s Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya (Sydney, 1987) pp. 55-56.
IV. OPM IN AND AROUND TIMIKA

The area around the Grasberg gold and copper mine in Mimika district, operated by U.S. company Freeport McMoran, has been a lightning rod for attacks by the pro-independence movement since the company began operations in 1973. Several factors make the mine a focus, including its status as a foreign multinational operating on indigenous land, the huge revenues it generates, and the support it has provided to state security forces. A large contingent of police and military here has not eliminated local OPM groups—some argue it has helped sustain them.

The fact that the OPM has thrived in a situation of rapid economic and population growth suggests that the standard government formula of rapid development as a solution to separatism needs serious rethinking. The inequities created by Freeport operations; the influx of migrants, both from outside Papua and from non-local Papuan ethnic groups; and the availability of new sources of revenue have combined to make the Mimika area particularly prone to attack.

A. Mimika, Kelly Kwalik and the Freeport mine

Mimika is a vast district in western Papua province that spans the area between the southern fringe of the highland mountain chain and the coastal plains to the south. The Freeport mine sits near its northern border, just west of Indonesia's highest peak. The upland ranges are home to the Amungme people, the swampy lowlands south of the city of Timika home to the Kamoro. A 120-kilometre road connects the mine to the city and a port further south. A slurry pipe runs the length of the road to carry ore for export, and the OPM factions maintain camps at different positions along the road.

The start of mining operations in 1973 provided both the trigger and the target for the first armed OPM activity in the Mimika area, a May 1977 attack by some 200 OPM fighters on the slurry pipe. In the military operations that followed, whole settlements were razed. Amungme villages in particular were targets of military suspicion for many years, and a large portion of the population fled to the lowlands, with a small core of militants heading overland to Papua New Guinea.

By the mid-1980s, Kelly Kwalik had made a name for himself as leader of the local OPM unit. In 1986, he was behind the kidnapping and killing of eight Javanese hikers. Ten years later, in January 1996 he kidnapped a 26-person team of wildlife researchers, including six foreigners, at Mapenduma in what is today Nduga district, making their release conditional on immediate independence for Papua. On 9 May, after negotiations broke down, Kopassus forces led by Prabowo Subianto launched an operation to rescue the eleven hostages still in captivity, which led to the deaths of two Indonesians and to reprisals that helped further radicalise the highlands. (They also helped ensure Prabowo's decisive electoral defeat in the province in the 2014 elections.)

11 Freeport obtained a Contract of Work from the Indonesian government in 1967, before the territory had even been formally integrated into Indonesia, but production at the mine did not begin until 1973. A preliminary agreement on compensation for the Amungme, acknowledged as the holders of customary rights to the mine, was reached in 1974 (usually called the January Agreement). The mine is operated by PT Freeport Indonesia, a company owned by Freeport McMoran (90.64 per cent) and the Indonesian government (9.36 per cent).
13 Five other neighbouring clans are also acknowledged to have some customary claim (hak ulayat) to the area around the mine: the Mee, Dani, Nduga, Damal and Moni.
15 Born in the mid-1950s, Kwalik is said to have spent time in Jayapura in the 1970s and established links to Markas Victoria there. While he was active in OPM operations at the time of the 1977 Mimika attacks, he does not appear to have been involved in leading them.
16 For more, see IPAC, Open to Manipulation: The 2014 Elections in Papua, Report No. 15, 10 December 2014.
Kelly’s men were also linked to a 31 August 2002 attack that killed three civilians along the Freeport road, including two American schoolteachers, and injured nine others. Several sources pointed to the involvement of military figures in supplying weapons and otherwise facilitating the attack, but such involvement would not be inconsistent with an OPM role. Many acts of violence attributed by the government to the OPM and by Papuan activists to the security forces in fact involve both. Corrupt police and military can sell arms and ammunition to the OPM; Papuan members of the security forces can include independence sympathisers; and individual police and military can encourage OPM hits as a way of increasing protection fees.

It is possible that this murky intersection of security and insurgency was at work in the last attacks to involve Kelly Kwalik before his death—a series of shootings that began in July 2009 along the road linking the mine to the city of Timika including the killing of an Australian engineer named Drew Grant. The provincial police chief at the time said publicly that he believed that Kelly’s men were not responsible for the killings, and many Papuan commentators suggested that the military was using the killings to persuade Freeport to bolster security. The elite counter-terrorism police unit, Detachment 88, was brought in to pursue the investigation and secured clear evidence that the gunmen were OPM, whether or not they were acting on Kelly’s orders and whether or not others were involved as well. In December 2009 a Detachment 88 team tracked Kelly Kwalik to a house in Timika where they shot and killed him, under circumstances that remain unclear. He was given a hero’s funeral, with eulogies from across Papua.

B. Kelly Kwalik’s Successors

After Kelly’s death, three different factions emerged, each vying for primacy in the area around the mine. The first is led by Ayub Waker, who served under Kelly. Ayub developed a base in Utekini (also seen as Uini) at Mile 69 on the Freeport road, in an area that was home to thousands of illegal miners—with whom Ayub seems to have a symbiotic relationship. By 2012, he was in communication with OPM factions from Paniai and Puncak Jaya about a possible joint attack against Freeport. The plans were discovered long before there was any serious prospect of follow-through. He also claimed responsibility for the shooting of two Brimob officers and a Freeport security officer on 1 January 2015, which prompted a massive security response, involving over 1,500 police and soldiers. Police set up 51 security posts in the area, allegedly both to prevent the return of Ayub’s men and to expel all illegal miners from the area.

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17 Many Papuans are most commonly known by their first names, particularly those with common clan last names like Wenda or Tabuni. References in this report follow common practice.
18 See Eben S. Kirksey and Andreas Harsono, “Murder at Mile 63”, op.cit.; and International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, op. cit., and International Crisis Group, “Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions”, Asia Briefing No.53, 5 September 2006. Antonius Wamang admitted to carrying out the shooting; he was sentenced to life imprisonment in November 2006. Wamang claimed in his deposition that he believed he was targeting a military convoy.
19 For more on Kwalik’s death, see International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue in Papua”, op. cit. Under the terms of a 2004 presidential decree (Keputusan Presiden No 63/2004), responsibility for guarding national vital assets (objek vital) had shifted from the police to the military, a policy change that was made operational around Freeport in 2006.
20 Ibid. Detachment 88 said the shooting was an act of self-defence after Kwalik had raised a gun at them while fleeing arrest.
21 Announcements at the time by sources linked to Ondawame’s WPNC said that a man called Jack Kemong had taken over leadership of the OPM in the Timika area but if he did, it was very short-lived. The WPNC has often overstated its degree of control over and coordination with OPM factions, particularly in online forums. Jack Kemong (sometimes seen as Yek) continues to be quoted as the OPM commander for the Timika region in some blogs linked to WPNC and others. See, for example, “TPNPB-OPM KODAP Kali Kopi, Bertanggungjawab atas Penembakan di Areal PT. Freeport Indonesia”, 23 December 2013, available at suarakolaitaga.blogspot.com/2013/12/tpnpb-opm-kodap-kali-kopi.html.
22 “KKB Pimpinan Ayub Waker Tantang Polisi”, Cenderawasih Pos, 9 January 2015. On 6 January, police announced they had broken up Ayub’s basecamp and burned it down. Two days later, Ayub’s men fired an arrow with a letter attached into a police post nearby, saying they would set up a new base elsewhere in Mimika. “KKB Pimpinan Ayub Waker Tantang Polisi”, Cenderawasih Pos, 9 January 2015.
23 Police said they had expelled 12,000 illegal miners during the operation, although by July 2015, it appeared the miners had begun to return.
A second faction is led by Kelly’s nephew, Teny Kwalik. Inexperienced, uneducated, and only in his late twenties, he gained influence largely on the back of his family name. His men are based near Mile 46 on the Freeport road in the Kali Kopi area, where his uncle was once based.

The third faction, led by Germanus Elobo, was the most active in 2012-2013. Of 27 shootings along the Freeport road during the period, twenty were reportedly by Germanus’ men. Once a follower of Ayub Waker, he struck out on his own and is known to dislike Teny, whose men receive credit for most of the violence in the area because of the Kwalik name, even though they carry out few attacks. The Germanus group is highly mobile, moving between the Kali Kopi base and Ayub Waker’s territory, closer to the mine.

While police have known the locations of the three factions since 2009, they were reluctant, until the January 2015 shooting, to take any armed action against them. The public explanation was that they feared causing civilian casualties, because women and children live alongside the OPM fighters. The Yudhoyono government reportedly banned any police operations here on these grounds, fearing the international outcry that would result if Papuans were killed. No such restriction seems to have been imposed by the Jokowi government.

C. “Development” and the OPM

Mimika provides an object lesson in how development can fuel pro-independence sentiment rather than eliminate it. The district was home to explosive growth in the 1990s, as migrants from across Papua and Indonesia were drawn to the area and its population tripled. Employment at Freeport increased as production shifted at the end of the 1980s from the Ertsberg mine to the Grasberg mine, home to larger reserves; and economic activity in the city of Timika grew. Mimika was made a separate kabupaten in 1996, carved out of Fak-Fak, over 300 miles to the west, and government offices were built for the first time. In response to large-scale protests in 1995-1996, Freeport began making payments equal to 1 per cent of its revenues to local communities, providing a further stimulus to local economic activity. And as OPM activity increased in the 1990s, and rioting in and around Timika in 1994 and 1996 targeted the Freeport company, so too did the presence of state security forces, from just 100 police and soldiers in the 1970s to 1,800 in the mid-1990s.

At the same time, another factor came into play: the money to be earned from illegal gold panning. The start of operations at Grasberg brought a major increase in the production of run-off waste (tailings) and people from other tribes in the highlands, especially Damal and Dani, realised there were riches to be gleaned from panning, and they poured into the area, as did entrepreneurs from Sulawesi and Java. Police and army controlled access to the site and marketing of the gold, earning a share of the proceeds. Gold prices soared in the mid-2000s, increasing the influx and the tensions. Occasional and half-hearted efforts to remove panners from the area inside the Freeport concession became new opportunities for student groups and others to mobilise anti-Freeport sentiment.

Far from dampening pro-independence sentiment, the rapid social and economic change

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only increased it, suggesting government efforts to accelerate development in Papua are not on their own an effective antidote to insurgency.28

V. THE OPM IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS

Following Kelly Kwalik’s death, the centre of OPM armed activity shifted northwards to the area around Puncak Jaya, where one of Kelly’s former fighters, Goliat Tabuni, had moved a decade earlier. Since arriving in 2004, Goliat and his followers have made Puncak Jaya the most violent district in Papua. That record has helped Goliat extend his sway over operations beyond Puncak Jaya to the neighbouring districts of Puncak and Tolikara, as well as further west in Paniai. It has also made him the target of competition from a challenger in neighbouring Lanny Jaya district, Puron Wenda.

The central highlands have seen a more rapid expansion in the number of districts (kabupaten) since 2000 than any other part of Papua. One reason is the strength of the armed OPM here—proponents of new districts argue they offer an opportunity to counter the appeal of separatism, by bringing government “closer to the people” and improving services. But in fact, new local executives are often weighed down by clan obligations, unskilled and often absentee bureaucracies and their own inexperience, and receive little or no supervision from Jakarta. They often have a parasitic relationship with the OPM: the creation of new districts has made more money available for buying off local commanders, while continued low-level violence provides a justification for increased budgets, as districts must account for increased security costs.

A. Goliat Tabuni and Puncak Jaya politics

Originally from Gurage in Puncak Jaya, Goliat is said to have joined the OPM in the 1980s after being beaten up by soldiers over a wrongful rape accusation.29 In the 1990s, drawn to the area by the legend of Kelly Kwalik, he settled in Kali Kopi near the Freeport mine, before returning to Puncak Jaya in 2004.

Goliat has actively intervened in local elections without being able to determine the results.30 Shortly after his return, he and his followers began to clash with police and military in Tingginambut subdistrict. Unrest continued in advance of the district’s first local election, originally scheduled for 2006. The incumbent bupati, appointed by the central government, was a Kei islander named Elieser Renmar from neighbouring Maluku province. Lukas Enembe, from nearby Tolikara, was his deputy, and both announced their intention to run. To shore up support for his candidacy despite his non-Papuan status, Elieser reached out to Goliat and his followers for support, presumably believing that the OPM leader, as a respected Dani elder, could help deliver a victory.31

28 A major source of deaths in the Mimika area has nothing to do with the separatist struggle—the recurrent fighting between Dani and Moni settlers in the areas around Kwamki Lama. They first moved in after the original Amungme occupants fled military operations in 1977.  
30 Richard Chauvel has written about the division between two “distinct realms of politics” in Papua, in which Papuan nationalist politics is sealed off from electoral politics. See “Electoral Politics and Democratic Freedoms in Papua”, in Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner (Eds.), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore, 2010).  
31 See Richard Chauvel, “Refuge, displacement and dispossession: responses to Indonesian rule and conflict in Papua”, Oxford University Refugee Studies Centre Working Paper 42, September 2007. Whether or not non-Papuans can run for local office remains a recurrent tension in local politics in Papua. Law 21/2001 only placed restrictions on the post of governor and deputy governor, who must be indigenous Papuans, but there have been efforts by bodies such as the Papuan People’s Council (Majelis Rakyat Papua) to extend the restriction to all local government posts, including in a resolution on 16 June 2015 that the elections commission said it would ignore. See “KPU Tolak Resolusi MRP Soal Bupati Harus Orang Asli Papua”, Kompas.com, 30 June 2015. In practice, many non-Papuans will only run for the office of deputy bupati, alongside an indigenous bupati candidate.
But Enembe—who would later be elected governor of Papua in January 2013—nevertheless managed to secure nearly 75 per cent of the vote.

In 2009, Tabuni lent his support to the Golkar party on the condition that his cousin, Deerd Tabuni, would be elected to the provincial parliament. One Papuan political leader told of visiting Tingginambut with Deerd during campaigning for the 2009 parliamentary elections and being led to an empty field. After Deerd whistled a few times, Goliat emerged from the woods along with hundreds of fighters and followers. 32 Deerd was elected, but Enembe, who by now was provincial chair of President Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party, ensured that over 80 per cent of the votes in the district still went to his party. 33 One factor in Enembe’s success may have been his decision to declare an emergency in Tingginambut just before the election and evacuate the population. 34 Enembe and Goliat have reportedly had poor relations ever since.

If Goliat has failed to control access to local political office, he has nevertheless cemented his role as the most influential OPM commander since Kelly Kwalik’s death. His rise is in part a reflection of his ability to conduct high-profile ambushes of police and military—at least 29 have been killed in Puncak Jaya and neighbouring Puncak since 2009. 35 But another factor has been the increased role of highlanders, and particularly ethnic Dani and Lani—in the pro-independence movement as a whole, a change that has been brought about in part by the success of the West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), a pro-independence activist group, in mobilising grassroots support. 36 In May 2012, two of Goliat’s long-time associates, Dinus “Rambo” Wakerkwa and Anton Tabuni, worked with KNPB to organise a congress in Biak that brought Goliat’s supporters together with some OPM factions in Biak and along the north coast. Although he did not attend, Goliat was appointed supreme commander (panglima tertinggi) of the OPM, and a ceremony was held in Tingginambut in December 2012 to mark his new rank.

Goliat’s prominence has made him the most sought-after figure of government persuasion efforts—if local government positions are not available for direct capture, he nevertheless enjoys benefits from the state. 37 Throughout the Yudhoyono government, police, intelligence and the military made various attempts to reach out to him, on the theory that if he could be persuaded to lay down his arms and embrace the Indonesian state, others would follow. Behind the persuasion usually lay money and offers of perks, which had worked in the past with some OPM leaders and had brought several founding figures like Nicolaas Jouwe back to Papua. Local officials, including the local police chief, preferred to work out a mutual accommodation strategy, in which whatever payments were made were far less than the cost of undertaking counter-insurgency operations deep into the mountains where Goliat and his men would always have the advantage.

Officials in the Jokowi government also seem to have made Goliat the main object of persua-

32 IPAC interview, Jakarta, 31 March 2015.
33 Golkar continued to hold the most seats in the provincial legislature, and John Ibo, a Golkar member from Sentani, Jayapura was elected chairman. When he was removed from the position during a corruption trial in 2013, Deerd took over the position. In 2014, Deerd was re-elected to the provincial assembly but from the neighbouring legislative district of Lanny Jaya and Jayawijaya. Deerd continues to serve as a kind of spokesperson for Goliat—in March 2015, he was one of the first to announce that reports of a surrender were false. “Goliat Tabuni: 23 Orang yang Menyerahkan Diri Bukan OPM”, VivaNews, 27 March 2015.
34 “Sering Diteror GPK, 33,000 Warga Tingginambut Diungsikan”, Sinar Harapan, 3 March 2009.
35 Tabulated from data in the National Violence Monitoring System, which is based on local media reporting. See www. nvms-indonesia.com.
36 For more on the KNPB see Section VII.B.
37 Elsewhere in the highlands, local officials have offered jobs to ex-OPM fighters as a kind of reintegration effort, only to see them return to fighting when those jobs are taken away. According to former regional police chief Karnavian, this was one factor a June 2013 arson attack on the police headquarters in Pegunungan Bintang. The leaders of the attack were ex-OPM who had for a time benefited from civil service positions but grew angry when district government assistance dried up and looked for other sources of income. See Karnavian, Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih, op. cit., chapter 3.
sion efforts. In late March 2015, the provincial military chief announced that Goliat had agreed to surrender in exchange for government-provided housing.\(^{38}\) Within 48 hours, there was a correction: only twelve men with no fighting role had accepted offers to join the local municipal security force.\(^{39}\) The government does not have much to offer Goliat in the way of true incentives—he suffers little in the way of harassment from security forces (he is in regular touch with the local police commander) and he has shown little inclination over the past decade to expand territorial control beyond Tingginambut.

**B. Puncak district**

When Puncak was carved out of Puncak Jaya in 2008, it was in the hopes that a new kabupaten would provide greater security, a higher standard of living and a greater “feeling of Indonesianness” for its residents that would stem the appeal of separatism.\(^{40}\) But the reverse may be true: the new district has become a theatre for new security battles and the advent of local political competitions has been both bloody and expensive.

Two key factions here are led by Goliat’s subordinates: Militer Murib and Lekaka Telenggen. Murib played a key role in the lead-up to Puncak’s first direct election, which was originally planned for 2011. Two leading candidates were from rival clans: Elvis Tabuni was an ethnic Dani while Simon Alom was Damal. Fighting between the two camps broke out when both candidates tried to register as the Gerindra party candidate; at least 23 were killed in the first week of fighting.\(^{41}\) Elvis Tabuni reportedly reached out to Goliat Tabuni, who called in the help of Militer Murib’s men.\(^{42}\) By early 2013, at least 30 had been killed in election-related violence, and the kabupaten government had paid out Rp.17 billion (roughly $1.5 million) to victims’ families, making it one of the most expensive local elections in Indonesia.

The violence continued after the election was finally held in February 2013. Militer Murib’s men, acting on Goliat’s command, shot and killed seven soldiers in Sinak, Puncak district on 21 February 2013 in what appears to have been an attempt to create security conditions that would force a delay in the announcement of the winner.\(^{43}\)

Lekaka Telenggen, less prominent, heads a small OPM unit in Kampung Yambi in Mulia sub-district, along with another man identified as Tenga Mati Telenggen. Lekaka’s men have played an active role in recent years in reaching out to other highland commanders.

**C. Lanny Jaya and Puron Wenda**

The creation of another kabupaten, Lanny Jaya, in 2008 along Puncak Jaya’s eastern border, helped create the space for a competing faction to emerge, led by Goliat’s most serious challenger to date, Puron Wenda. Puron (also seen as Purom) was originally based in Puncak Jaya, where he operated under the command of both Goliat and another commander, Marunggen Wonda. But some time around 2010, as Marunggen grew increasingly drawn into supporting the bid of bupati Lukas Enembe for governor and less interested in launching attacks, Puron broke out on his own

\(^{38}\) See, for example, “Goliat Tabuni, Jenderal OPM Menyerahkan Diri ke TNI”, VivaNews, 24 March 2015.


\(^{40}\) Cornelis Lay and Purwo Santoso (Eds.), *Perjuangan Menjana Puncak*, op.cit.

\(^{41}\) Candidates for local elections require the support of parties holding a total of fifteen per cent of seats in the local legislature (or the signatures of between 6.5 and 10 per cent of registered voters in a given district for independents). Many of these party recommendations are effectively sold to candidates willing to pay the most money. In Papua, a recurrent source of electoral violence is dual recommendations by a single party—this happens either when the party decides to issue a recommendation but then later accepts a higher bid and issues a new one, or when vying factions of the party produce conflicting recommendations. None has proved so deadly as the dispute in Puncak.


\(^{43}\) An eighth soldier was killed in a separate attack the next day in Tingginambut. See IPAC, *Carving Up Papua*, op.cit.
to challenge Goliat’s leadership. He allied himself with Enden Wanimbo, a former middle school teacher who had played a key role in advocating the creation of Lanny Jaya but joined the OPM after he was passed over for an expected promotion to head the district’s education department.\(^{44}\)

One of Puron’s first actions was an attack on the Pirime district police station in November 2012, when his men shot dead three officers and burned down the station with their bodies inside.\(^{45}\) The attack appeared to be a show of strength, a way of making a name for the new faction. It also came just days before a planned OPM ceremony near Tingginambut organised to formally install Goliat as Supreme Commander, in accordance with the results of the meeting in Biak six months earlier; Goliat’s supporters claimed the attack was planned to block the ceremony from going ahead.\(^{46}\)

Despite the violence, the district government kept providing funds to Puron. In August 2014, Lanny Jaya \textit{bupati} Befa Jigibalom admitted to reporters he routinely gave his group amounts “between Rp.5 million ([$400]) and Rp.25 million ($2,000)” and that he had also given them Rp.100 million (roughly $8,000) to travel to Vanimo in PNG to attend meetings.\(^{47}\) One local anti-OPM group, the Komite Pemuda Pancasila Anti-Korupsi Papua (Kompak), claims that the sums given to Puron from the district budget were in fact far higher—as much as Rp. 17 billion—the \textit{bupati} denies this.\(^{48}\)

Puron’s group was responsible for four separate shooting incidents between the end of May and early August 2014 in subdistricts Makki, Pirime and Tiom that resulted in five police killed and eleven injured, as well as the death of one motorcycle taxi (\textit{ojek}) driver.\(^{49}\) The group also reportedly twice traded fire with soldiers in the same period and lost six men. The police deaths led the provincial police commander in August 2014 to announce stepped-up efforts to arrest Puron, Enden and their followers, but as of July 2015, the two principals remained at large.\(^{50}\)

\textit{D. Paniai and Nabire}

OPM factions have not systematically imposed “war taxes” typically demanded by other guerrilla groups, but in some areas they have sought funds in exchange for providing security in remote

\(^{44}\) Enden has refuted the idea that he was drawn to the OPM because of career disappointment in statements to the press. See, for example, “Enden Wanimbo: Kami Tak Akan Berhenti Berjuang”, Tabloid Jubi online, 8 August 2014.

\(^{45}\) Two of the officers slain were Papuans from Biak. The incident is described by then-provincial police commander (Kapol-da) Tito Karnavian in \textit{Guardian over the Land of Cenderawasih} (Jakarta, 2014), pp.1-7.

\(^{46}\) The ceremony took place two weeks later on 11 December 2012. Video of the swearing-in, conducted in front of some 150 followers, is available on the YouTube account named “Sekretariat Pusat TPNOPM” at www.youtube.com/watch?4GxM8Vt4Q7s. The account appears to be affiliated with a website that calls itself the national committee of the TPN Papua Barat, www.komnas-tpnpb.net, which appears to be linked to the WPNC.


\(^{48}\) “Konpak Klaim APBD Ikut Dinikmati OPM”, \textit{Bintang Papua}, 16 June 2015.

\(^{49}\) The violence reportedly led to large number of civilians temporarily fleeing the area. From one shooting in July 2014, members of the group stole four weapons: a Mauser, a revolver and two Pindan assault rifles (SS1-V2 Sabara, and V5). “Masyarakat Tiga Distrik di Lanny Jaya Ngungsi: Dua Polisi Tewas, Empat Senpi Dirampas KKB”, \textit{Cenderawasih Pos}, 29 July 2014.

\(^{50}\) “Tiga Anggota OPM Dibekuk Polisi, Tujuh Orang Lagi Masuk DPO”, \textit{Suluh Papua}, 27 January 2015.

\(^{51}\) One detailed account of the Dani, focused on Baliem Valley area around Wamena to the east of Puncak Jaya, is found in Karl Heider’s \textit{Grand Valley Dani: Peaceful Warriors} (Belmont, 1997).
locations. Paniai and Nabire in the western highlands, site of limited armed uprisings by OPM groups in the 1970s and 80s and now home to an array of legal and illegal mining activities, are cases in point.\textsuperscript{52} Again, a surge in economic activity here has not weakened the main OPM faction, which—at least until earlier this year—had survived several leadership transitions. The western highlands around Paniai and Nabire are home predominantly to the Mee and Moni peoples, culturally distinct from the Dani.

The leading OPM faction here was first established by Thadeus Yogi, an ethnic Mee, in Eduda, near the district capital, Enarotali, in the late 1970s and command has stayed in the family ever since. Thadeus first became active in the wave of violence across the highlands that preceded the 1977 election, when his group killed four Papuans campaigning for office.\textsuperscript{53} His reputation grew in the mid-1990s when his men kidnapped seventeen logging employees from neighbouring Mimika district. His brother, Titus Orop, was killed in a skirmish with the military following the kidnapping but Thadeus somehow escaped capture.

In the 2000s, rumours began to surface that the group was collaborating with security forces and the local government. In 2009, a leaked military intelligence document suggested it was receiving fuel and basic goods (sembako) from the provincial government and that it had received Rp.8 billion (roughly $800,000 at prevailing exchange rates) from the district government as compensation for use of customary land (hak ulayat).\textsuperscript{54} While OPM fighters in the highlands live in camps hidden in the forests, Thadeus was said to live down the street from the local police commander. By 2010, Thadeus had fallen fatally ill and his two sons, Salmon and John Yogi took over command of the group, known as Pemka Kodap IV Eduda. It was increasingly involved in extortion from the booming illegal mining business but proclamations of its independence credentials were available on YouTube for anyone who wanted to look.\textsuperscript{55} In late 2011, it was the target of a large police operation which likely killed Salmon.\textsuperscript{56} By 2012, members of the group were discussing the possibility of joint operations around Freeport with Lekaka Telenggen from Puncak, but the planning never got very far. Police in early 2015 were still referring to the group as the "John Yogi group", but John died in 2013 and at some point another relation, Leo Magai Yogi, took over command.

On 30 April 2015, Leo was killed by security forces at a roadside checkpoint in Nabire, even as intelligence authorities were reportedly reaching out to him with the same package being offered Goliat—housing, jobs, money. Both the substance and style of the offer were reportedly offensive, and Leo rejected the offer. As with Kelly Kwalik's death, the circumstances of Leo's are murky but however it happened, his death will heighten distrust and anger on the part of pro-independence forces and ensure that further offers are treated with suspicion.

\textit{E. Arms Sales}

Across the highlands, OPM access to cash from pay-offs and protection fees seems to be opening up more opportunities for the movement to purchase weapons and ammunition. The question is what impact this will have on the OPM's low fighting capacity.

OPM members in the highlands have purchased weapons from gun dealers from Ambon,
Papua New Guinea and indirectly from the Philippines, via the Sangihe islands off the coast of north Sulawesi, an important source of migrant workers in Papua.\(^{57}\) In the past, the OPM has relied as much on bows and arrows as firearms and the guns it had were obtained through raids on police and army posts or through purchase from corrupt officers. One of the most successful of these raids was the 2003 attack on a post in Wamena by the five men who in May 2015 were granted clemency by President Jokowi.\(^{58}\)

Using new sources of funds to purchase from gun mafias could increase the quantity and quality of weapons at the OPM’s disposal, although the only sign of increased military capacity has been the occasional sniper-like shooting along the Freeport road.

Ammunition, like many of the guns, continues to come almost exclusively from corrupt soldiers and police. In 2014, both services began to take action against such sales. In October 2014, police arrested one of their own and a group of five alleged OPM members in Wamena as part of a sting operation targeting police-run ammunition sales. Among the five was at least one man linked to Puron's group—Rambo Wenda (also seen as Wonda) alias Enggangranggo Wenerenga—as well as others active in the neighbouring district of Tolikara. In late February 2015, the case was handed over to prosecutors for trial.\(^{59}\) In a separate case, in January 2015, five military officers were arrested on charges of providing ammunition to OPM fighters. In June 2015, a military court sentenced them to between ten and twelve years in prison.\(^{60}\)

VI. THE OPM ON THE NORTHERN COAST

The OPM factions along the north coast are far less active than their highland counterparts, and the line between armed and unarmed pro-independence activism here is more blurred. The area around Jayapura city and the districts (kabupaten) of Jayapura and Keerom, stretching eastwards to the border with Papua New Guinea, see the most deadly violence outside the highlands. To the west, including Serui, Biak and Sorong, OPM units are less active; some claim hundreds of sympathisers and possess rudimentary weapons but almost never engage in violence beyond occasional flag-waving or extortion rackets. However, local security forces still stage raids or surrenders, making the situation seem more serious than it is, perhaps to secure greater funding from Jakarta.

A. Competing Commands: Mathias Wenda and Richard Hans Yoweni

It was on the north coast that the original Markas Victoria was established and there are echoes of its 1976 split in the rivalry between Mathias Wenda and Richard Hans Yoweni. Neither is believed to play an active role in commanding attacks (although Yoweni is still often cited as a leading commander); both are reported to be in failing health. The failure of any strong successor to emerge is a further reflection of how the influence of OPM units in the coastal areas has faded.

Wenda is originally from Piramid in what is now Lanny Jaya. By the mid-1970s he had joined the Pemka faction and became one highlander who played an important role in building a link between the coastal factions and the highlands, beginning with a wave of attacks in 1977. He is

\(^{57}\) Police say three men arrested on 19 May 2014 were carrying three guns and the equivalent of roughly $8,000 (Rp. 87.6 million) in cash. “Polisi Ungkap Penyelundupan Senjata dari Filipina”, Cenderawasih Pos, 20 May 2015. In an interesting parallel, Jemaah Islamiyah and some other extremist groups used a route through the Sangihe islands to get to Mindanao for training and weapons purchases in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

\(^{58}\) The five were freed in May 2015 by presidential decree. They had been serving sentences to terms of between 19 years and life imprisonment for their role in raiding the Wamena district military command (Kodim) arsenal in April 2003 and seizing weapons. Two soldiers were killed during the raid.


\(^{60}\) “Jual Amunisi ke OPM, 5 Anggota TNI AD Dipecat dan Divonis Penjara”, detikNews, 18 June 2015.
said to have fled to Papua New Guinea during the military operations that followed.\footnote{He was arrested there in 2001 and held for one month in a Vanimo prison, but Indonesia’s request for extradition was never granted.} Yoweni is an ethnic Serui who was once based between Sarmi and western Jayapura and established his greatest influence on the north coast.\footnote{Testimony in case dossier of Isak Demotouw (alias Alex Makabory) et al. 2 April 2013, Nomor BP/01/IV/2013/RESKRIM.}

Wenda’s appointment as supreme commander in 2006 had created unhappiness among coastal OPM members who remained loyal to Yoweni and who were not prepared to acknowledge Wenda as their leader. They saw his flight to Papua New Guinea as a mark against him, and viewed Yoweni as the more capable commander. In 2008, perhaps in response to these concerns, Ondawame and other members of the WPNC appointed Yoweni as their chairperson and as chief commander of the OPM as well.

Wenda’s influence fell as a result. In recent years he has rarely been involved in violence, although in 2014, police named him as a suspect in a series of shooting attacks on markets and border posts in the area around Skouw in which one person died.\footnote{“Mathias Wenda Diduga Dalangi Aksi Penembakan Papua”, Republika Online, 18 April 2014.} Some pro-independence websites still carry statements in his name, usually disparaging the efforts of the WPNC or others.\footnote{The most active such site is papuapos.com} But Yoweni has also remained largely quiet.\footnote{In March 2013, the Indonesian district military command in Sarmi arrested four of Yoweni’s men, saying they were wanted in connection with an attack in Betaf, Sarmi that had killed four Kopassus members in 2001. Ultimately they were charged instead with rebellion and possession of explosives. See “Terkait Penangkapan 4 Anggota OPM di Sarmi”, Cenderawasih Pos, 6 March 2015. See also Case Dossier of Isak Demotouw (alias Alex Makabory) et al., op.cit.}

B. Violence around Jayapura

The area around Jayapura, capital of Papua province with over 350,000 people, is home to the deadliest separatist violence outside the central highlands, but it is far less clear who is responsible. Little violence here appears to be reliably attributable to the OPM, although there are some factions active in the area. Some deaths have instead been linked to the activist group KNPB, either a result of direct violence by KNPB members or arising during demonstrations by the group that have turned deadly.

In 2010 and 2011, police alleged that Danny Kogoya, whom they called the Jayapura OPM commander, and the Jayapura TPN-OPM faction was responsible for two murders of migrants in Kampung Nafri, a village that sits on the only road between Jayapura and Keerom.\footnote{In March 2013, the Indonesian district military command in Sarmi arrested four of Yoweni’s men, saying they were wanted in connection with an attack in Betaf, Sarmi that had killed four Kopassus members in 2001. Ultimately they were charged instead with rebellion and possession of explosives. See “Terkait Penangkapan 4 Anggota OPM di Sarmi”, Cenderawasih Pos, 6 March 2015. See also Case Dossier of Isak Demotouw (alias Alex Makabory) et al., op.cit.}

Kogoya was only formally made a suspect in the Nafri killings in 2012, following a separate outbreak of violence in Jayapura, which saw a string of eight killings of non-Papuans from May to July 2012. Police claimed several of these murders (others were never formally solved) were carried out by members of the KNPB and that they came after a shift towards a more violent strategy by KNPB leader Mako Tabuni (see below).\footnote{Pengadilan Tinggi Jayapura, Decision Number 07/PID/2013/PTJPR, 21 March 2013.} The link, if any, between Kogoya and these murders was not made clear, but on 2 September 2012, he was arrested along with 22 followers in relation to the Nafri murders.\footnote{“Polisi Tangkap 22 Anggota OPM Jayapura”, VivaNews, 3 September 2012.} Police shot him in the leg during the arrest. In testimony provided to the police, he said he had been invited to join the OPM in 2009 by Lambertus Pekikir, who claimed to be “TPN-OPM Coordinator” and who made him spokesperson.\footnote{Testimony of Pendius Kogoya alias Danny Kogoya, 5 November 2012, provided to Jayapura police.} This would be surprising if true—while most of the OPM factions are relatively ethnically homogenous, all
of the men operating with Kogoya were ethnic Dani and Lani from the highlands; none of the other OPM figures named in the testimony are known to have links to highland factions.

Kogoya was sentenced to twelve years in prison but the judge never ordered his imprisonment and he fled to Papua New Guinea. He died there in December 2013 under mysterious circumstances; one version was that he died of an infection in the leg wound. There have been no murders in Jayapura city linked to separatist violence since.

South of Jayapura, in Keerom district, a government policy to clear large parts of the northern part of the district for palm oil plantations in the 1980s and 1990s, worked largely by transmigrants, was motivated in part by security concerns: clearing the land of sago groves made it easier to secure. While the area provided safe haven for the Pemka faction in the late 1970s, most of the OPM presence here seems to have been driven over the border into Papua New Guinea or southwards into the highlands.

The remaining OPM presence does not have a fixed base. Lambertus Pekikir’s faction moves between Keerom and camps in Papua New Guinea. It has also been far less active in recent years—while Pekikir may have told Danny Kogoya he was coordinator for all of Papua, he is frequently in the news more because of his fondness for media attention than for any insurgent activity. Pekikir, long a staunch opponent of any negotiated solution with the central government, changed his stance in 2014 and began publicly calling for dialogue. The shift in tone deepened suspicions among many in Papua that he is playing both sides, using connections to the military.

C. Serui, Sorong and Biak

Although the armed factions further east on the islands of Biak and Serui and in Sorong have very rarely launched attacks, they remain important for their capacity to mobilise pro-independence sentiment.

The OPM in Biak owes its influence more to historical legacy and ability to serve as a link between alumni of the armed factions in the diaspora and active groups inside Papua. It played a key role in May 2012, when Kabor Awom’s Perwomi command centre in West Biak played host to the OPM meeting in May 2012 at which Goliat Tabuni was appointed Supreme Commander, in a direct challenge to Yoweni and Wenda. A video posted on Youtube claiming to have been shot during the meeting shows a military-style roll-call before a raised Morning Star flag flanked by two United Nations flags and a crowd of roughly eighty people in combat fatigues and twenty in dress whites. There is also footage of what appear to be the results of a leadership election, which Goliat won with 87 out of 140 votes. It is not clear from the video or from other sources exactly who attended the meeting, or the relative representation of active armed fighters and others with more distant links to the OPM. But it was the Biak faction of the OPM, working in collaboration with Goliat’s associates from the KNPB that made the meeting happen. There is little evidence, however, that collaboration between KNPB and Goliat continued after the meeting.

73 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=oTE3D7vpsYM.
74 The other votes listed are for Gabriel Melkisedek Awom (21), Jhon Magai Yogi (17), Terianus Satto (9) and Dani Tani Tabuni (6). Awom is Biak and likely another member of the Kabor Awom faction; Jhon Yogi’s inclusion suggests that at least some of his supporters from the Paniai faction were in attendance.
In Serui (also known as Yapen), an island in the Cenderawasih Bay just south of Biak, a small number of OPM fighters have shown how difficult it can be to uproot even a poorly armed faction. Security forces launched deadly raids on two linked groups of fighters in 2014, both of which appear to have been involved in extortion rackets and in periodic shootouts with police. In July 2014, police shot dead Rudi Oreri, the man who claimed to be the OPM commander for Yapen and Mamberamo, who may have controlled roughly 30 men. Police believe Mikael Marany has replaced Oreri as commander.

Papua Barat province, despite being home to the first OPM armed action in July 1965—has seen very little separatist violence since Soeharto fell. The last major incident took place in Waisor, in what is now Teluk Wondama district, south of Manokwari, in 2001. If violence is rare, the vestiges of an OPM structure remain in some areas. On 30 April 2013, police in Aimas, south of Sorong city, arrested a man named Isak Kalaibin, who they said was the TPN/OPM commander for the area and was planning a ceremony to raise the Morning Star flag the next day. Violence erupted, and three people were killed, even though police say they fired only warning shots. Several of the victims and others later at the meeting were found to be carrying OPM membership cards. In December 2013, Isak was sentenced to three and a half years on rebellion charges. There has been no other violence in the area.

The resilience of these groups along the coast shows that even factions that are militarily weak or irrelevant to the armed struggle continue to play a significant role in the broader independence movement. Cells like those in Biak, Sorong and Sarmi are likely to continue to provide a vehicle for organising anti-Jakarta sentiment even if they lack access to arms.

VII. BEYOND THE ARMED OPM: THE PRO-INDEPENDENCE POLITICAL FRONTS

While the armed factions constitute an important symbolic core for the independence movement, a vast web of political pressure groups, both inside and outside Papua, make up a far larger and far more active presence. Relations between these groups have often been characterised by the same enmity and disarray as those of the armed factions, but two factors came together in 2014 to generate a new—if tenuous—strategic unity that is changing dynamics both at home and abroad. Advances in communications technologies and the popularity of social media have made it easier for figures in the diaspora to play a coordinating role from abroad, while the desire to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group provided a practical short-term goal.

The pro-independence groups that came together in December 2014 in Vanuatu to forge the United Liberation Movement for West Papua with this goal in mind had particularly rocky relations in the past. The West Papua National Authority (WPNA), the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL) and the Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB) are each comprised

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75 In February 2014, a joint police-military team went to Sasawa in western Yapen, where an OPM meeting was said to be taking place. In the clash that followed, one OPM fighter was killed and two police, one soldier and one civilian were slightly injured. Seven men were arrested and charged with rebellion and weapons possession; they were sentenced to three and a half years in prison. “Kontak Senjata di Yapen, Seorang Tewas”, Tabloid Jubi online, 2 February 2014.


77 Security forces claimed an OPM group led by Daniel Awom killed nine people, including five paramilitary police in March and June 2001 as part of attacks on local logging. The attacks prompted a major security operation and the imprisonment of 27 people, but it was never clear who the attackers were. Amnesty International reported that no OPM groups claimed responsibility for the attacks and that “well informed local observers believe that if they were involved it was not members of the TPN command local to Waisor. There is some evidence that the attack may have been carried out by an armed group, possibly with links to the OPM/TPN from another district, but with military backing.” See Amnesty International, “Grave Human Rights Violations in Wasior, Papua’, AI Index 21/032/2002, September 2002.

78 A review of the incident by the serving provincial police commander concluded that police had only fired three warning shots into the air. “3 OPM Tewas, Polri Tingkatkan Pengamanan di Papua”, Okezone.com, 8 May 2013. See also Tito Karnavian, Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih, op. cit.
of different generational, class and ethnic strands of Papuan society. While the first two believed they had more legitimacy because of their roots in older movements, including the armed OPM, the KNPB since 2008 has shown a far greater ability to mobilise protests in Papua.

On 26 June 2015, the MSG heads of state announced that they had accepted Indonesia as an associate member “representing the five Melanesian provinces in Indonesia” and the ULMWP as an observer, “representing Melanesians living abroad”. The decision is a diplomatic victory for Indonesia, and a product of intensive lobbying by the foreign affairs ministry in the months before the summit. It prevented recognition of the ULMWP as a representative of Papuans living in Indonesia, which the ministry feared would amount to a tacit challenge to Indonesian sovereignty. While future MSG meetings will likely provide an opportunity for the ULMWP to challenge Jakarta’s Papua policy, upgrading Indonesia’s status has given Jakarta greater influence on the stance taken by the MSG as an organisation. The upgrade comes with assurances from Indonesia that it will continue to strengthen bilateral cooperation with and aid to the Melanesian countries.

A. **Legacy of the Papuan Spring**

The groups that now make up the ULMWP emerged in the mid-2000s, disillusioned with the prospects of political change in post-Soeharto Indonesia. All had shared in the euphoria of the “Papuan Spring”, a brief period of openness in 2000 during which many Papuans became convinced that independence following the example of East Timor was possible or at least that the relationship with Jakarta was on the verge of major change.81

The Papuan Spring gave rise to a series of dramatic events. In February 1999, only a month after President Habibie announced that East Timorese would be allowed to vote whether or not to stay part of Indonesia, a delegation of 100 Papuans presented Habibie with a list of demands that began with independence. Pro-independence activities increased throughout 2000, as did raisings of the Morning Star flag, which Habibie’s successor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, allowed as a cultural symbol until the military forced him to back down.

In May and June 2000, with some funding provided by President Wahid, thousands of Papuans gathered in Jayapura for the Second Papuan Congress—the first having been held in October 1961 under the Dutch colonial administration as the formal beginning of a short-lived process toward self-government. The Congress, which did not include any representatives of the armed factions, elected a 32-member Papua Presidium Council (Presidium Dewan Papua, PDP) that conservative elements in the government came to see as the driver of the independence movement. It was headed by Theys Eluay, a leader who once had been close to the Indonesian military.

In August 2000, unnerved by the prospect of increased separatism and still imbued with a commitment to reform, Indonesia’s highest legislative body, the People’s Consultative Assembly, decreed that both Aceh and Papua should be given special autonomy. Initially, much of the Papuan elite held back, not wanting to compromise on independence. But after the Papuan Spring effectively ended in October 2000 with an outbreak of violence in Wamena, a few leaders saw special autonomy as a possible transition phase.

A team from Cenderwasih University (Uncen) in Jayapura, produced a draft in April 2001

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79 See the communiqué of the 20th MSG Leaders’ Summit, Honiara, 26 June 2015, available at www.msgsec.info. The five are Papua, Papua Barat, Maluku, Maluku Utara and Nusa Tenggara Timur. Together they are home to just under 11 million people (2010 census figures).
80 There has never before been an associate member at the MSG so the exact terms of Indonesia’s future participation remain unclear but it is expected it will have a greater voice it has an observer.
that included a provision for a Timor-like referendum after three years. As one scholar observed:

The drafting team made admirable efforts to conduct wide-ranging community consultations, but these efforts were undermined by Papuans’ deep-seated suspicion of autonomy. In attempting to elicit public input, the Uncen team met stiff opposition from key sectors of the community, particularly students, adat leaders, and the Presidium, who rejected any form of autonomy in favor of independence and maintained calls for a direct dialogue with Jakarta and the international community.\(^{83}\)

The DPR passed a much watered-down version in November 2001, giving Papuans 25 years of special autonomy but without any mention of a referendum. Most lawmakers saw it as an important but final concession, but many Papuans viewed the 25 years as a trial period, after which they could reassess the benefits of Indonesian integration.\(^{84}\)

In the midst of the debate over the law, President Wahid was impeached in July 2001 and a new administration headed by Megawati Soekarnoputri saw hardline nationalists and military figures in power once more in Jakarta. The 10 November 2001 killing of Theys Eluay by Kopassus special forces overshadowed the passage of the special autonomy law twelve days later. By the end of 2001, the independence movement inside Papua was in disarray, without a clear leader or strategy.


Four groups eventually emerged to try and reunite the movement. Each has tried to create a representative structure that would bring it broader political legitimacy, and each has tried but largely failed to improve coordination with the armed factions as a way of increasing leverage with Jakarta.

1. The West Papua National Authority (WPNA) and the NRFPB

The establishment of a West Papua National Authority (WPNA) in 2004 was the first major effort to create a new umbrella political organisation following the collapse of the Papuan Spring. Founded by Edison Waromi, Jacob Rumbiak and Herman Wanggai—all ethnic Biak or Serui—its membership is skewed heavily towards the northern coastal elite and its claims to broad representativeness are dubious.\(^{85}\) At its inception in 2004, the WPNA named Richard Hans Yoweni as the head of its military wing, but he left the group in 2008, and the WPNA has had very little influence on any armed OPM operations since.

From the outset the WPNA has focused on achieving international recognition for what it claims is an existing “sovereign” nation of West Papua.\(^{86}\) In October 2011, it was one of several organisations that decided to convene a Third Papuan Congress to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the first in 1961, hoping to recreate the sense of unity that had marked the second, at the height of the Papuan Spring. But the WPNA proved so opposed to the idea of others

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84 IPAC interview, member of the Tim 100, Jakarta, 21 February 2014.
85 Waromi and Wanggai are both ethnic Serui from the northern coast; Rumbiak is Biak. Wanggai and Rumbiak are now based in Australia. The WPNA is a successor to the Bintang 14 (Fourteen Stars) founded by American-educated Thomas Wanggai—Herman’s uncle—in the mid-1980s, from which it draws a large part of its membership. Wanggai’s movement, which aimed to establish the independent state of West Melanesia, sought to further distance the Papuan independence movement from its colonial roots by replacing the Morning Star flag, which uses the colours of the Dutch flag, with a Melanesian one. Thomas died in prison in 1996, but the Bintang-14 movement remains influential in some northern coastal areas.
86 Members often refer to nineteen days of sovereignty that they say followed a 1 December 1961 declaration of nationhood and ended with Soekarno’s 19 December 1961 declaration of the Trikora military operations aimed at securing Indonesian control over the territory. See, for example, “AMP: 19 Desember 1961, Awal Operasi Militer Indonesia di Papua”, Majalah Selangkah, 19 December 2014.
playing a leadership role that ultimately most other groups dropped out, deepening divisions. On 19 October, the Congress appointed WPNA head Forkorus Yaboisembut from Sentani president of the "Federal Republic of West Papua" (Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat, NRPFB). The Congress was broken up violently by security forces. Hundreds of plainclothes police and army swarmed the field in Abepura where Congress participants had gathered and made some 300 arrests; video footage shows them kicking and bashing participants. Three men fleeing the Congress were found dead the next morning from gunshot wounds. Forkorus and four others were arrested and sentenced to three years' imprisonment for rebellion. They were all released in July 2014.

The WPNA now insists that the leadership that it “inaugurated” at the Third Congress is the only official government of Papua and view themselves as the only legitimate Papuan representatives in any dialogue with Jakarta.

The WPNA would be so small and eccentric as to be almost irrelevant, were it not for its link through Forkorus to the Papuan Adat Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP), a vast grassroots organisation with chapters across Papua at district level that play a role in regulating adat affairs. Forkorus’s role as DAP chair gives the WPNA greater reach and legitimacy. It has also reinforced Jakarta’s perception of the DAP as a pro-independence institution.

2. The West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL)

The West Papua National Council for Liberation (WPNCL) emerged as a competing umbrella group for the independence movement after a 2005 meeting in Vanuatu organised by John Otto Ondawame, the former OPM Pemka fighter. Driven largely by the efforts of former OPM fighters living in exile, it gave a high priority to uniting the political and military wings of the independence movement. At the 2005 meeting, Mathias Wenda was appointed supreme commander and it was agreed that the WPNCL would serve as a political wing of the OPM. None of the armed factions from the central highlands agreed, however; Goliat Tabuni’s men were apparently not invited, while representatives of Kelly Kwalik’s group refused to join.

In 2008, the WPNCL unilaterally replaced Wenda with northern coast-based Richard Hans Yoweni. Yoweni, believed to be the oldest active serving member of the OPM, was never seen as playing an active role in organisational affairs—that was left to Ondawame, the vice-chair, until his death from natural causes in November 2014.

As Yoweni’s influence has faded, the WPNCL’s focus has turned to mobilising international support for Papuan independence, particularly among Pacific island states. It has used Vanuatu, home to Ondawame and fellow WPNCL leader Rex Rumakiek for many years, as a base for launching its appeal to join the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), hoping to join one other non-state group, the New Caledonian Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (Front Libération National Kanak et Socialiste, FLNKS) as a member. An application by the WPNCL in 2013 failed when the organisation was deemed by MSG leaders to be insufficiently representative.87

3. Benny Wenda, the Free West Papua Campaign and its offshoots

The Free West Papua Campaign was established in the UK in the mid-2000s by Benny Wenda.

87 In June 2013, MSG leaders voted to defer a decision on the WPNCL’s application and in January 2014, MSG foreign ministers made a one-day visit to Jayapura on a fact-finding mission. The Vanuatu foreign minister objected to the mission and did not attend. At their June 2014 summit, MSG leaders rejected the membership bid but “agreed to invite all groups to form an inclusive and united umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on submitting a fresh application.” See MSG Secretariat, “Communiqué—Special MSG Leaders’ Summit”, 26 June 2014.
a Wamena-born activist from the highlander student movement.\textsuperscript{88} He was arrested in 2002 and accused of masterminding an attack on the Abepura police station that killed two police and one guard in December 2000—charges he has always denied. After an unusually speedy trial in Jayapura District Court, he was sentenced to 25 years in prison but on 27 October 2002, he escaped and fled to Papua New Guinea, where friends helped him get to the UK. There he received political asylum, and has been a thorn in the side of the Indonesian government ever since.

Wenda is the most visible representative of the pro-independence campaign outside Indonesia. The Free West Papua Campaign has become a significant fundraising channel with campaigns at British shops such as the Lush soap products company. Wenda has toured the world giving speeches in support of independence, and in 2008 co-founded the International Parliamentarians for West Papua (IPWP). A second group, International Lawyers for West Papua, was formed the following year. Both have small but steadily growing memberships, and their activities routinely bring protests from Indonesian embassies in the countries concerned. Groups in Papua, notably the KNPB, have arranged demonstrations at home to coincide with ILWP/IPWP events abroad, suggesting a level of coordination that Wenda and others publicly deny.

4. Komite Nasional Papua Barat (KNPB)

The Komite Nasional Papua Barat (West Papua National Committee, KNPB), is the political movement’s radical fringe. Founded in late 2008 as an extension of the same highlander student movement of which Benny Wenda was once part, its primary strategy is to lobby for an independence referendum through frequent demonstrations in Papuan cities. Its members have occasionally used or advocated violence, despite its claims to being a non-violent movement.\textsuperscript{89}

KNPB’s leaders are largely highlander, urban, educated men and women—but mostly men—and it has worked to build a large network of grassroots supporters across Papua, drawing in part on the migration of highlanders to coastal centres such as Jayapura, Nabire, Biak and Manokwari. Since 2012, it has been led by Victor Yeimo, a Nabire native.\textsuperscript{90}

In an effort to support its grassroots organising, and as a response to the “state” structures announced by the WPNA, the KNPB in late 2011 began establishing what it called people’s parliaments at district level (parlemen rakyat daerah, PRD). The first of these was formally declared in Biak in July 2011; thirteen others had been created by January 2012.\textsuperscript{91} In April 2012, the group inaugurated a West Papua National Parliament (Parlemen Nasional West Papua, PNWP), which today consists of 23 local PRDs under the overall leadership of Buchtar Tabuni, who was until 2012 the KNPB chairman.

Like the WNPA and WPNCL, KNPB has tried to build ties to armed OPM units, as evidenced by its role in organising of the May 2012 OPM summit in Biak that appointed Goliat Tabuni supreme commander. It has been no more successful, however: Goliat, believed to be over sixty, is said not to be interested in taking orders from younger men (most KNPB members are in their twenties, thirties and forties). There is no recent evidence of coordination between the two groups and Goliat has publicly refused to support the ULMWP.\textsuperscript{92} The KNPB has also

\textsuperscript{88} Wenda had helped found the Dewan Musyawarah Masyarakat Koteka (Koteka Tribal Council, Demmak) in 2000, a highlander pro-independence group that is now largely defunct as the KNPB has garnered broader influence. See International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, Section 2, op.cit.

\textsuperscript{89} For more on the KNPB’s founding, see International Crisis Group, “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{90} Yeimo, born in Nabire, emerged as a leader of a series of different highlander student groups after studying in Surabaya in the early 2000s, including the Front Pepera and the Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua (AMP). He became one of the leading proponents within the KNPB for a more violent approach, including an April 2009 attack on the Abepura police station. See “Radicalisation and Dialogue”, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{91} In first establishing a council in Biak, the KNPB was following the model of the Dutch in establishing the New Guinea Council; the first local council had been established in Biak in 1959.

\textsuperscript{92} See for example indonesiatimurvoice.blogspot.com/2015/03/papua-panglima-lpom-tidak-dukung-ulmwp/.
tried to move into and radicalise areas like Biak where the WPNA and WPNCL had historic ties, again taking advantage of the steady migration of highlanders to the coast.

The KNPB’s links to violence distinguish it from most other political groups. KNPB’s leaders have spoken of the need to create an “emergency zone” (zona darurat) in Papua in which high levels of violence and human rights violations by state security forces would hasten international intervention. They have thereby consciously adopting the strategy that in their view worked for East Timor. KNPB protests have sometimes included incitement to violence, particularly against migrant businesses. In mid-2012, police linked a series of shootings that began in May and killed six migrants and one German tourist in the Jayapura area to Mako Tabuni, then deputy chairman of the KNPB. They alleged that the murders followed a shift in strategy by Mako, who they say held a meeting on 8 May 2012 of some KNPB followers and announced a “civilian militant” strategy in which KNPB members would start burning down government and private buildings, and killing non-Papuans. Mako was shot during his attempted arrest on 12 June 2012 and later died, reportedly for lack of treatment.

Police have since repeatedly accused KNPB of planning a bombing campaign, but while members have been convicted of explosives possession, no evidence of the campaign, allegedly planned at the May 2012 summit in Biak, has been forthcoming. Then in September 2012, two small explosions occurred in Wamena, Jayawijaya district. Nineteen men linked to the KNPB were arrested in the weeks that followed for possession of bomb-making materials—two in Biak, ten in Wamena and seven in Timika. In April 2013, the Timika men were convicted of weapons possession but acquitted of rebellion. The Wamena case appears not to have gone to trial. Allegations of bomb-making plots returned in July 2014, following the arrest of a group of eighteen activists who police say were organising a boycott of the presidential elections. Thirteen were released, but the remaining five were charged with conspiracy to disrupt the presidential poll with Molotov cocktails. A trial began in November 2014 and was still ongoing in August 2015.

Police have routinely denied the KNPB permission to demonstrate, and KNPB demonstrations that do go ahead have often resulted in arrests. Under a 1998 Law on the Freedom to Demonstrate, anyone planning a demonstration must register with the police 72 hours in advance. In a section on responsibilities of those demonstrating, the law says they must uphold national unity and integrity. Police say that this disqualifies most protests by the KNPB because, by expressing support for independence, they are challenging the unity of the state.

Responding in 2013 to complaints from the KNPB and others that this policy was limiting the freedom of expression, then provincial police commander Tito Karnavian tried to engage with the KNPB to explain what was and was not allowed, for example by hosting a “coffee morning” at the police headquarters in Jayapura in May 2013, which Buchtar Tabuni and others attended. Karnavian explained that a number of practices common to KNPB demonstrations—shutting down the main Jayapura-Abepura road, upon which almost all the city’s traffic relies;
forcibly gathering money from local shopkeepers and residents; inciting violence or slandering others—were also illegal. Demonstrations were tolerated if confined to specific areas, but the KNPB is not an organisation that looks for ways to adhere to the law and Karnavian’s successor, Yotje Mende, was less permissive. In March 2015, Mende claimed that all meetings held by members of the organisation, whether public or private, were illegal at because the KNPB was not registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights.

In addition to Mako Tabuni, several KNPB leaders have been killed in unclear circumstances. In December 2012, a local KNPB leader in Wamena, Hubertus Mabel, was shot dead while allegedly resisting arrest. A police account later tied Hubertus to the Pirime police station attack by Puron Wenda’s group; but he had also been named on a list of five other suspects wanted in connection to the alleged bomb-making plot since October of that year. On 26 August 2014, the body of a KNPB leader in Sorong was found floating at sea with his arms and legs bound and tied up in a sack. He had gone missing a week earlier just before a visit to Sorong by then President Yudhoyono. There appears to have been no investigation into his death—had one gone ahead, it might have put paid to allegations by KNPB members that he was killed by intelligence, or provided the basis for the prosecution of his killers.

In spite of these deaths and continued arrests, KNPB has displayed striking staying power. Far more than any other political organisation in Papua, it has the ability to mobilise large numbers of supporters—over 1,000 at some urban demonstrations, and sometimes in several cities at once—often on short notice. This makes it a formidable partner in any broader movement.

C. The Formation of the ULMWP: A United Agenda?

On 6 December 2014, the WPNA, the WPNCL and the KNPB put aside their differences to establish the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). The immediate impetus for the reconciliation was provided by the potential for a second bid for MSG membership following the 2013 deferral of the WPNCL’s application. The Vanuatu political leadership, which has taken an active interest in the Papuan separatist movement since the 1990s, also expended considerable political effort. Former Vanuatu PM Barak Sopé took a personal interest along with the Vanuatu Council of Chiefs, which communicated to the Papuan side that only if the three groups came together would MSG membership be considered.

The ULMWP has its roots in an older process, the Papua Peace Network (Jaringan Damai Papua, JDP) which it may now eclipse. JDP is a civil society network that emerged in 2009 with the aim of sponsoring a dialogue within Indonesia about what a peaceful Papua (Papua Tanah Damai) might look like. It included Papuans and activists from Jakarta and other parts of Indonesia, and while it started from the premise that any dialogue would take part within the framework of autonomy and recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, it was formed without prejudice to where anyone stood on the independence issue.

A key turning point in JDP’s development was a July 2011 Peace Conference in Jayapura, held to set an agenda for dialogue between Jakarta and Papua in the interests of resolving grievances.
and ending violence.\textsuperscript{107} In a surprise move at the end of the conference, it named five people who would serve as JDP’s “negotiators” if and when dialogue commenced. All five were staunchly pro-independence Papuans from the diaspora: Benny Wenda; Octovianus Mote, a former journalist who received asylum in the U.S. in 2000; Leonie Tanggahma, the daughter of an OPM envoy who lived in Senegal in the 1970s and is now based in the Netherlands; Jacob Rumbiak, from the WPNA; and John Ondawame. Their appointment seemed to suggest that JDP itself was pro-independence. The government of President Yudhoyono, which had sent a senior official from Jakarta to open the conference, was furious.

The five negotiators now form the secretariat of the ULMWP.\textsuperscript{108} The chair of the secretariat, Octovianus Mote, was instrumental in making the ULMWP happen.\textsuperscript{109} He is not formally aligned with any of the three groups, something that has probably made him more acceptable to all of them; he has also kept in close contact with representatives of all groups through Facebook and Skype. Benny Wenda has been appointed the group’s spokesman.

D. Impact of the ULMWP

The advent of the ULMWP has taken the agenda for dialogue on independence outside the framework of the JDP and gifted it onto a movement with strong grassroots appeal and the ability to mobilise across large parts of Papua. Its short-term mission of full MSG membership has failed, but securing observer status has given a new confidence and coherence to the pro-independence movement within Papua.

The announcement of the ULMWP quickly led to both a dramatic uptick in the number of demonstrations and protests by the KNPB and its partners, as well as an aggressive escalation in the police response. While the survival of a united front remains tenuous, the three groups are already presenting a more coordinated strategy at home.\textsuperscript{110} They have agreed, for example that the KNPB now plays the coordinating role in organising public protest. One focus of these demonstrations has been fundraising, both to support the MSG bid and to send relief to Vanuatu following a deadly typhoon there. Police have forcibly broken up many of these fundraising activities, presumably suspecting that the money raised is not going just to humanitarian causes.\textsuperscript{111}

Protests around 1 May 2015—an annual focus for pro-independence actions—saw an unprecedented number of arrests across Papua.\textsuperscript{112} Nearly 240 demonstrators who turned out in support of the KNPB and to support the ULMWP bid were briefly detained in Manokwari, with 44 more arrested in Jayapura and Merauke.\textsuperscript{113} Arrests continued in advance of the MSG Summit and an informal leaders’ meeting due to take place around 20 May. According to Amnesty International, over 100 KNPB activists were arrested on 20-21 May in Manokwari, Biak and Jayapura; at least 90 were arrested in further protests between 26 May and 3 June in and around Jayapura and in the central highlands.\textsuperscript{114} Most were quickly released, but at least six were charged with

\textsuperscript{108} Ondawame died in November 2014 and was replaced by Jacob Rumbiak.
\textsuperscript{109} A former Kompas correspondent in Jayapura, he played a key role in setting up the platform of the Team 100 sent to meet with President Habibie in 1999. After facing death threats, Mote fled the country not long after and sought asylum in the U.S., where he has continued to lobby for Papuan independence.
\textsuperscript{110} See for example “PNWP, NRFPB dan WPNCL Resmi Sosialisasikan Hasil ULMWP”, Tabloid Jubi, 2 March 2015. There have been some notable dissenters, such as NRFPB “President” Forkorus Yaboisembut, who has refused to recognise the front, even though his own group is a member.
\textsuperscript{111} See, for example, reporting on a series of incidents in Yahukimo in March 2015 where KNPB sources say one activist was killed and five injured as a result of police gunfire. “KNPB: Polda Papua Bertanggungjawab Terhadap Enam Warga Sipil yang Ditembak di Yahukimo”, Tabloid Jubi, 24 March 2015.
\textsuperscript{112} The day commemorates the 1 May 1963 handover of administrative control of Papua from the UN transitional administration to the Indonesian government.
\textsuperscript{113} “Puluhan Anggota KNPB Diamankan di Sejumlah Daerah”, Cenderawasih Pos, 2 May 2015.
incitement for their role in the demonstrations.

As for the dialogue process that JDP began, it could go one of two ways. The rise of the ULMWP may further cool any interest in Jakarta in anything that suggests a formal discussion. On the other hand, the clear pro-independence platform of ULMWP might position JDP as a more attractive interlocutor, but only if it can distance itself from the former.

Some in the Papuan elite are hopeful that the ULMWP’s observer status means that MSG meetings will provide a useful forum for exchange between the group and Indonesia. This seems unlikely. Indonesia is expected to be represented by five governors and the foreign affairs ministry. Neither Papua province Governor Lukas Enembe nor Papua Barat Governor Abraham Atururi has shown any interest in engaging with the ULMWP; representatives of the three other provinces—Maluku, North Maluku and Nusa Tenggara Timur—will have little to discuss as there is no pan-Melanesian movement or identity within Indonesia. Meanwhile, Mote and Wenda have been clear that they are interested only in discussing Papuans’ right to self-determination, which is a non-starter for Jakarta.

VIII. SOLUTIONS

If the OPM is not going away and indeed has access to new weapons and income, while the political movement despite all efforts to suppress or co-opt it appears to have grown stronger, what are the Jokowi government’s options?

The first is to address the factors that exacerbate anti-Jakarta sentiment, to ensure that policies or practices do not inadvertently strengthen the movement. The second is to work out a containment strategy that would avoid crackdowns on non-violent political groups without doing anything to encourage their growth.

Four practices stand out as contributing to radicalisation: ineffective policing, impunity for security forces, administrative fragmentation and undermining local institutions. There are many others, related to land, in-migration and development, but these four can serve as examples.

1. Ineffective policing. Every time a Papuan is shot by police—in a demonstration, an operation or in the course of arrest—the political temperature rises. The latest example comes from Karubaga, Tolikara where police shooting on 17 July 2015 exacerbated violence between Christians and Muslims, when a little preventive work could have defused communal tensions days earlier. Security forces everywhere in Indonesia need to move away from opening fire as the stock response to crowd control, but nowhere is the need greater than in Papua. Former provincial police chief Tito Karnavian understood the problem and wrote a book on the need to maintain intensive communication with community leaders, anticipate problems and rotate out

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115 JDP-government meetings are continuing, and JDP members saw the attendance of former Coordinating Minister for Security, Political and Legal Affairs Tedjo Edy Purdijatno at a February exploratory meeting as an encouraging sign. President Jokowi himself seems unclear about its utility. A series of new internal dialogues are planned in Papua with the aim of generating more support. But on his 9 May 2015 visit to Jayapura, Jokowi told reporters: “There is no longer any issue in Papua. What’s dialogue for? I have already come here repeatedly, spoken with adat and religious leaders, bupati, mayors—I’ve talked to them all. So what is that if not dialogue?” See “Jokowi: Di Papua Sudah Tidak Ada Masalah, Dialog Untuk Apa?”, Tabloid Jubi, 12 May 2015 (IPAC translation).

116 See also Budi Hernawan, “Contesting Melanesia: The summit and dialogue”, Jakarta Post, 8 July 2015.

117 One man was killed and eleven adults injured when security forces shot at a crowd of Papuans in Karubaga, where predominantly non-Papuan migrant Muslims had gathered in front of the district military command (Koramil) to hold prayers marking the end of Ramadan, the fasting month. Angered by the shooting, local residents set fire to small kiosks nearby, most, but not all, owned by migrants. The fire spread, burning down 58 kiosks as well as the small local mosque. Police appear to have taken very little action following the circulation of a letter one month earlier by the local GIDI church leadership that forbade local Muslims from worshipping outside or using loudspeakers, which the church argued would interfere with a major gathering they were holding on the same dates.
under-performing personnel.\textsuperscript{118} He also stressed the need for changing the incentive structure so the best police officers, not the worst, are assigned to Papua. The book’s “lessons learned” section does not seem to have had much impact, however. Improving the performance of the police in Papua may be one of the best investments the Jokowi government could make toward ensuring that unnecessary use of force does not further fuel the independence movement.

2. \textit{Impunity for security forces}. Papuan casualties at the hands of security forces are only occasionally investigated and punished, and the more senior the officer involved, the less the chance there seems to be of serious prosecution. Deaths of members of the OPM or KNPB are often explained as resulting from the victim pulling a gun or knife, resisting arrest or trying to flee—the default responses that no longer have any credibility, even if in a few cases they may be true. When multiple unarmed civilians are involved, the political cost of failing to resolve killings is even higher, particularly if the government promises action and then does not deliver. The Paniai killings in December 2014 are a case in point. Four people were killed when security forces were called in to stop a protest that arose after local teenagers grew angry at a military car speeding through their village at night. At least two separate investigations have been opened into the shootings, but no results have been made public, despite repeated pledges by the president. The failure to fully investigate and prosecute security personnel suspected of crimes or excessive or negligent use of force fuels resentment and adds to the pro-independence narrative of oppression.

3. \textit{Fragmented local government}. The division of Papua into smaller and smaller local government units—called pemekaran in Indonesia—is increasing the likelihood of electoral or ethnic conflict that the OPM can exploit as well as providing new sources of protection fees for local OPM units. Nowhere has pemekaran been more pronounced than in Papua: between 1999 and 2014, one province became two and the number of districts grew from ten to 43.\textsuperscript{119} The impact of this uncontrolled division is weaker, indeed frequently absentee local governments, with little capacity to provide services. Pemekaran thus manages to benefit three constituencies: conservative nationalists, especially in the intelligence agencies, who aim to weaken the independence movement through divide-and-rule tactics; local elites and their extended clans who can secure major spoils through access to government resources; and, in some areas of the highlands, the independence movement itself. Halting pemekaran would simultaneously improve governance, lower the risk of conflict and stop new flows of cash to local guerrilla leaders.

4. \textit{Undermining local institutions}. One policy that has also fuelled resentment has been the creation of institutions designed to compete with or undermine institutions seen as sympathetic to independence. This is particularly true of adat institutions. Adat, or customary law, remains an important organising principle in Papuan cultural, political and economic life. In some areas, there has been overlap between membership of the OPM, pro-independence groups and adat bodies, as the case of Forkorus Y aboisembut illustrates. To counter the influence of the organisation he leads, the Papua Adat Council (Dewan Adat Papua, DAP), the government has since 2000 supported the growth of a parallel institution, the Lembaga Masyarakat Adat (LMA).\textsuperscript{120} Its members wear government uniforms and its composition is subject to the review of home affairs officials. Official government processes that by law require adat consultation, such as verifying which candidates for governor are considered indigenous Papuan, are referred to the LMA and not the DAP. The effect of this is to render legal recognition of adat, once considered an important political and cultural concession, meaningless. Instead of helping to counter pro-independence sentiment, the LMA has stoked it.

\textsuperscript{118} M. Tito Karnavian, \textit{Guardian Over the Land of the Cenderawasih}, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{120} In May 2015, the chairman of the Papua province LMA, Lenis Kogoya, was appointed a special adviser on Papua in the president’s office.
The Current Status of the Papuan Pro-Independence Movement ©2015 IPAC

If the Jokowi government was willing to apply the principle of “do no harm” to confronting its separatist problem, it could work to identify policies such as those above whose impact is the opposite of what was intended, and then take steps to address them. Development policies are beyond the scope of this paper, but it should just be noted that while progress towards improving development standards in Papua is undoubtedly a good thing, it is not necessarily going to win Jakarta greater sympathy, let alone reduce support for independence. As East Timor showed, development does not necessarily bring gratitude. This raises the question of whether a limited modus vivendi with the non-violent political movement is possible. (If there is any such coexistence in operation at the moment, it is ironically between local officials and the armed movement.) Jakarta would have no interest in a policy that gave these groups more space, but it might have in a policy that did not gratuitously antagonise them.

It could take several forms:

- Talking, but not negotiating, on the principle that developing personal relationships is almost always constructive. The MSG decision offers an interesting format here, through which diaspora pro-independence leaders of the ULMWP will have a chance to interact with the governors of Papua and West Papua. That exchange should be encouraged.

- Ending the use of makar as a charge for non-violent crime. If members of pro-independence groups commit vandalism, assault, fraud, incitement to violence or any other non-political crime listed in the Criminal Code, they should be open to prosecution, but makar—a crime that only elevates the status of those arrested to political prisoners—would be reserved for armed fighters. Stopping the use of makar as a charge would go some way toward addressing a concern of politically active Papuans that they are always under attack for being separatists, even for mobilising around political issues that have nothing to do with advocating independence but are about improving Papuans’ welfare.

- Eliminating institutional incentives for military commanders and others to arrange the “surrender” of self-identified OPM fighters. These staged surrenders may be intended to produce public relations wins for the government and financial bonuses for the commanders in question, but they have never made a serious dent in the movement and serve mostly to breed cynicism and resentment. The publicly-feted embrace of the Indonesian state by OPM founder Nicolaas Jouwe is a case in point. He returned from the Netherlands at the age of 87, after living abroad for almost half a century, and though he has no relevance at all to the current political movement, he is produced to meet almost all official foreign visitors to Papua as proof that top independence leaders can be persuaded to change their minds.

- Proceeding with amnesties for non-violent political prisoners. The benefit to the Indonesian government is from the message of good will such an action sends, not necessarily from the gratitude or loyalty of the individuals involved. Swearing loyalty oaths should not be a condition of release, especially since those committed to returning to the movement will do so whether or not they swear an oath.

IX. CONCLUSION

Fifty years after the birth of the independence movement in Papua, it is time for the Indonesian government to acknowledge that while managing the pro-independence movement is going to be a long-term challenge, trying to eliminate it may only be counterproductive.

While OPM may have new income sources, there are no signs that it is getting any stronger. It remains a motley collection of different groups that mostly come together along ethnic lines,
with the political context in which they operate differing greatly from district to district. The political movement has overcome these divisions only to a limited extent with the creation of the UMLWP, and almost certainly temporarily, if past history is any indication. The KNPB remains dominated by young highlanders. It does not speak for all of Papua, even if it manages to mobilise large numbers onto the streets.

Papua badly needs sustained attention from Jakarta, in a way that looks at all the needs and problems of both provinces as a whole. Many issues that seem to have no link to politics—road-building, election administration, investment projects—if poorly implemented can have serious political consequences, while policies designed explicitly to weaken separatism can inadvertently fuel it.

President Jokowi has made Papua a particular focus of his presidency. If he can work toward some form of peaceful co-existence with groups that are not going to go away, he might succeed where his predecessors have failed in reorienting the relationship between Papua and the central government.
Appendix A: Map of Papua and Papua Barat Provinces

*In November 2012, two new kabupaten (not pictured) were carved out of Manokwari: Pegunungan Arfak and Manokwari Selatan
Appendix B: Glossary

KNPB  Komite Nasional Papua Barat
MSG  Melanesian Spearhead Group
NRFPB  Negara Republik Federal Papua Barat (Federal Republic of West Papua)
ULMWP  United Liberation Movement for West Papua
WPNA  West Papua National Authority
WPNCL  West Papua National Coalition for Liberation
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

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