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I. INTRODUCTION

More terrorist attacks in Indonesia are likely as local ISIS leaders compete at home and abroad to establish their supremacy.

In particular, a trio of Indonesians based with ISIS in Syria – Bahrumsyah alias Abu Ibrahim, Salim Mubarok alias Abu Jandal and Bahrun Naim – are competing with each other to encourage their contacts in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to undertake attacks against enemies of the self-declared caliphate. In some cases, they are also providing funds. At the same time, some groups in Indonesia are acting on their own, without direction from Syria, to carry out jihad operations (amaliyat) as a way of demonstrating their commitment to ISIS.

The attacks in Jakarta on 14 January 2016 are now known to have been locally organised – not on the order of Bahrun Naim as originally reported – and carried out by an Indonesian group called Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Ansar Khilafah, JAK). This group has a small but nationwide following and is believed to be led from prison by Indonesia’s leading pro-ISIS cleric, Aman Abdurrahman. JAK is aligned with the Syria-based Katibah Masyaariq (Forces of the East), an Indonesian unit led Abu Jandal, but he is not thought to have played a role in the attacks. There are many unanswered questions, however, especially about the funding.

Katibah Masyaariq is a splinter of Katibah Nusantara (Forces of the Archipelago), the Indonesian-Malaysian unit under the command of Bahrumsyah – who was taken by surprise by the Jakarta attacks and immediately ordered one of his men in Indonesia to do something similar. Police arrested the would-be perpetrator before he could act, but there are others like him at large.

Bahrun Naim has tried to stay neutral between the two Katibahs even as he tries to position himself as the leader best able to inspire attacks in the name of ISIS. Though Naim was not behind the Jakarta attacks, he did attempt to instigate and fund at least two sets of bombings in Indonesia in August and December 2015. He also reportedly tried to encourage “lone wolf” attacks in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, and he organised bomb-making instruction through the mobile phone app Telegram.

All three factions in Syria as well as JAK support a small armed group in Poso, led by a man named Santoso alias Abu Wardah, who calls himself the head of the army of Islamic State in Indonesia. Santoso was one of the first Indonesians to declare allegiance to the caliphate in early July 2014, but his interest in ISIS is less ideological than instrumental. He reportedly believes the link to ISIS will get him more men and funds. His current armed strength is now believed to exceed what it was twelve months ago, perhaps reaching 40 combatants. Santoso in the past has ordered his supporters to mount attacks outside the Poso area, including in Jakarta, though none have been successful. He has new weapons, purchased in the southern Philippines with funding from Bahrumsyah, but in the end, Santoso does not take orders from anyone but himself.

Other pro-ISIS Indonesians have formed their own independent groups, committed to violence but not necessarily to the leadership of any Indonesian in Syria, let alone to that of Aman Abdurrahman. One is Abu Husna, a former Jemaah Islamiyah leader who formed Katibah al-Iman in August 2015, within weeks of his release from prison. The organisation began recruiting in Sumatra in late 2015, with the aid of contacts and funding from an Indonesian migrant worker in Hong Kong. While the police have now arrested several key members and uncovered its structure, it could be only one of several operating locally but thinking globally.

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) head who is currently imprisoned in the same penal complex as Aman Abdurrahman – but in a different prison – originally agreed to be an adviser to JAK when it was established in November 2015. He and Aman Abdurrahman have now fallen out over Ba’asyir’s decision to seek a judicial review of his terrorism conviction. In
Aman's view, any use of the Indonesian legal system is tantamount to acknowledging the legitimacy of a non-Islamic government. The apparent break between the two could lead to Ba’asyir pulling his organisation, Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) out of JAK, but it would not be a major loss. JAT’s influence and numbers have declined since Ba’asyir swore allegiance to ISIS in July 2014.

The pro-ISIS groups are still largely confined to single countries but trans-border contacts seem to be increasing. Bahrumsyah is believed to have transferred funds to both Indonesia and the Philippines; Bahrun Naim’s social media network reaches across borders. A handful of Malaysians and Indonesians are involved with AKP in Mindanao, which may be strengthening its contacts with ISIS in Syria, even though there is still no evidence of Philippine fighters there.

This raises the question of what the game-changer for Indonesia’s low-tech, low casualty jihadism could be. Some have suggested the key factor could be weapons: had the gunmen in Jakarta on 14 January been carrying assault rifles, for example, the death toll could have been larger. Others have said planning and organisation. Since the death of Noordin Top, architect of the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings, no terrorist has had the discipline or planning skills to successfully implement a big attack. Better planning could be as much of a game changer as better weapons. More systematic, face-to-face training also could probably produce a more professional job than that on display in Jakarta, where the would-be terrorists learned bomb-making skills over the Internet and for the most part had no previous combat experience. A few fighters coming back from Syria could enhance jihadi skills, and it now could be an element of the competition among the three Indonesians in Syria: who will be the first to send back an instructor?

All of the above suggests that the competition will produce an increase in terrorist plots that regional law enforcement agencies will be hard-pressed to contain. Target’s are also more diversified, with foreigners coming back to terrorist hit lists, in addition to police officers and Shi’a. In Indonesia, the burden of trying to stop these ISIS cells will fall almost entirely on the police and in particular on Detachment 88. As the Jokowi government debates about what to do next, an infusion of funds into Detachment 88 intelligence would certainly help. The government is committed to strengthening the 2003 anti-terrorism law, which has some gaping holes – it is not currently a crime to join a foreign terrorist organisation like ISIS – but many Indonesians remain wary of draconian security legislation reminiscent of the authoritarian past. Much more focus is needed on targeted prevention programmes, with urgent attention to the woefully lax Indonesian prison system. The problem is that while attacks like those on 14 January help rivet the attention of senior officials for a few weeks, other priorities inevitably take over and Indonesia slips back into taking for granted that the problem has been solved.

In this report IPAC examines how the split in Syria emerged; how it has affected the different pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia; and how competition among them is fuelling violence.

II. THE EMERGENCE OF A SECOND KATIBAH

The split between Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal in mid-2015 is having ongoing reverberations in Indonesia and Syria. The first consequence was Abu Jandal’s decision to pull out of Katibah Nusantara, the Indonesian-Malaysian fighting unit commanded by Bahrumsyah, and create a rival unit, Katibah Masyaariq. Bahrumsyah responded by trying to strengthen his support base in Indonesia, helped by his access to central ISIS funding. He saw Aman Abdurrahman as too close to Abu Jandal and therefore viewed the creation of JAK in November 2015 with suspicion. When it became clear that JAK had carried out the January attacks, Bahrumsyah had a clear incentive for trying to outdo them.
A. Corruption Allegations and More

In mid-2015, rumours began swirling of a split among Indonesian ISIS fighters in Syria. It began with accusations of corruption against Bahrumsyah, the commander of Katibah Nusantara, a military unit set up in late 2014 for Malay-Indonesian speakers.¹ Abu Jandal, a prominent fighter from Malang, accused Bahrumsyah of failing to distribute the daily operational funds of some SYP700 or about Rp.50,000 ($3.20) per person that he was given by ISIS central for the troops.

In April 2015 Abu Jandal came to Shaddadi, a town in southern Hasakah province where Katibah Nusantara is based, and mobilised members from Surabaya, Lamongan, Malang, Solo and Bekasi to protest Bahrumsyah’s behaviour to the provincial Shari’a Committee and request that he be replaced as commander.² In addition to corruption, he was accused of branding anyone who disagreed with him a kafir or infidel – which under ISIS could be tantamount to a death sentence. The Shari’a Committee rejected the complaint. Instead, Abu Jandal was imprisoned for a month, accused of trying to divide Katibah Nusantara. The committee’s ruling disappointed the Indonesians who wanted justice. They decided to leave Shaddadi and move to Homs, where they formed Katibah Masyaariq. The split was bitter, producing suggestions in online discussion groups in August 2015 that the infighting had resulted in several deaths. This was never confirmed.³

B. The Abu Hamzah Factor

Some members believed that Bahrumsyah’s takfiri stance was the direct result of the influence of another Indonesian in Syria, Muhammad Agus Supriadi alias Abu Hamzah. Before he joined ISIS, Abu Hamzah, a former civil servant, had led a religious discussion group (pengajian) in Depok, outside Jakarta, known as Firqoh Abu Hamzah (FAH).⁴ It declared anyone outside the group to be a kafir and had its own interpretations of the Qur’an that differed from mainstream teachings. For example, Abu Hamzah taught that Friday prayers were not obligatory because a caliphate had not yet been established. He banned making the pilgrimage to Mecca on the grounds that the Saudi government was kafir. He encouraged children to declare their parents kafir and banned marriage to non-FAH members.

The group resembled a cult-like sect first known as Islam Jamaah and later as the Institute for Indonesian Islamic Outreach (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, LDII). LDII is widely seen by conservative Muslims as deviant, and Abu Hamzah was sometimes wrongly accused of being a member.⁵ He did not require FAH members to take an oath of allegiance (bai’at), however, as LDII members were obliged to do. He was nevertheless seen as authoritarian. Members could not challenge his orders and opinions and anyone who tried could be thrown out as an apostate (murtad). At its height, the group had some 3,000 members.⁶ But over time, members drifted away because they disliked Abu Hamzah or objected to his teachings; by 2014 only a few hun-

² Information made available to IPAC from a returnee from Syria, Jakarta, January 2016.
³ IPAC was shown a copy of a text message from August with information about deaths of several Indonesians in a training camp in Hasakah. The author suggested that those who died had not obeyed Barumsyah.
⁴ “Selamat Tinggal Firqoh Abu Hamzah,” http://cuappapcuap.blogspot.co.id/, December 2011. An employee of the Agriculture Ministry, Abu Hamzah got a scholarship to Australia in the 1980s where he studied with the Qur’an with one Pak Syafi’i. When he returned home, he left the civil service and for a period went to Kelantan, Malaysia, to continue his studies with Syafi’i who had moved there.
⁵ See “Ini Dia ‘ Abu Hamzah’ Imamnya LDII,” http://arriauny.blogspot.co.id/, August 2012. Islam Jamaah was founded by Nur Hasan Ubaidah Lubis in 1951. It was banned in 1971 for its cult-like practices. It then changed its name to Indonesian Islamic Employee Association (Lemkari), and from 1972 to 1988 enjoyed the patronage of the ruling party, Golkaran Karya (Golkar) in return for its political support. In 1988, the then governor of East Java banned it for applying takfiri to anyone outside the group. In 1990, the name was changed again to LDII.
⁶ IPAC interview with activist in Depok (outside Jakarta), September 2015.
When ISIS declared a caliphate in 2014, Abu Hamzah and his followers saw the realisation of their dreams and pledged loyalty to Abu Bakar Al-Baghdady. Sometime the same year, Abu Hamzah led a group to Syria, where they eventually joined Katibah Nusantara under Bahrumsyah. Relations between the two men became closer after Bahrumsyah took Abu Hamzah’s daughter as his fourth wife and reportedly began to take on the authoritarian characteristics of his father-in-law. He became increasingly intolerant of criticism; one source said he considered himself the embodiment of the State among the Indonesians in Syria and anyone who disagreed with him therefore disobeyed the State. Abu Hamzah encouraged this stance. He and his followers refused to pray behind or perform marriages for anyone who challenged Bahrumsyah, treating them as kafir. He also refused to greet them or accept their greetings.

This change in Bahrumsyah turned many Indonesians, especially the students of Aman Abdurrahman, against him. They thought he had gone too far: a difference of opinion was not grounds for declaring someone an apostate. There were many cases they could cite where companions of the Prophet had challenged their commanders without being expelled from Islam; one had even challenged the caliph Abu Bakar, who succeeded Mohammed, without serious consequences. Their anger grew when they discovered that Bahrumsyah had been hoarding funds meant for Katibah members. They complained to Abu Jandal, and he led the protest to the Shari’a Committee.

Some Indonesians stayed neutral between the two parties. One was Bahrun Naim, who had good relations with both. He was particularly close to one of Abu Jandal’s top associates, Heri Kustyanto, who had defended him against accusations that he had sided with Katibah Nusantara. After the split, Naim first decided to stay in Raqqa. He eventually moved to Manbij, near Aleppo, a town known as “Little London” because many mujahidin from Europe live there.

III. BAHRUMSYAH’S COMPLAINTS ABOUT AMAN ABDURRAHMAN

After the revolt of Katibah Masyaariq, Bahrumsyah in May 2015 wrote to Aman Abdurrahman, complaining that Abu Jandal and his friends had caused Katibah Nusantara to fracture. Instead of sympathising, Aman, who had already heard accounts of the split from his students in Katibah Masyaariq, gave Bahrumsyah some unwanted advice. He urged him not to be influenced by his father-in-law. He also urged Abu Hamzah to repent and publicly announce the errors in his religious understanding, and urged all of Abu Hamzah’s remaining followers in Indonesia to leave for Syria.

Bahrumsyah, unhappy with this response, sent a letter to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. He complained that Aman’s followers were rebelling against him and were more inclined to obey Aman, who was in prison, than himself, who was in the middle of a war. He implicitly questioned the credibility of Aman, who he said was totally unknown among the ISIS ulama. Bahrumsyah did not get the response he was hoping for. Sometime during Ramadhan 2015, Ba’asyir, together with his close friend and fellow prisoner Abu Husna, wrote back to Bahrumsyah deploring his tendency to treat those who differed with him as enemies. They also warned him to be careful about Abu Hamzah, whose teachings verged on heresy and who, they insinuated, might be a spy for the Indonesian government who had infiltrated Indonesian mujahidin ranks to divide them.

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7 IPAC interview with a former Aman Abdurrahman follower, Depok, August 2015.
8 Heri Kustyanto’s name came up in connection with his Facebook communications with two Indonesian pilots suspected of ISIS sympathies. See Jana Winter, “Pro-ISIS Airlines Pilots Tracked By Law Enforcement in Southeast Asia,” https://theintercept.com, 8 July 2015.
9 IPAC interview with a former convicted terrorist, Jakarta, September 2015.
As commander of the Caliphate State’s army who is aware of all infidels, apostates and hypocrites whose rebellion is directed against you, you are no doubt also aware of the slipperiness of enemies who always allow any means of destroying their opponents, both with sophisticated as well as unsophisticated methods, overtly and covertly, from outside the armed forces as well as through the intelligence units within, through interception, infiltration, obstruction and destruction, or other means that they may plan. One form of silent operation that we are on alert for now is intelligence operations in the form of infiltration by agents of BIN, Densus 88, PAM Polri, BIA, and others who enter the Caliphate State in disguise, not only to create disruptions among the Caliphate State’s fighters, but also to record who and what has been assigned by the Caliphate State to Indonesians who are with you now, with different missions, of course, for the future – including to kill whoever necessary, God forbid. Because of this possibility, it is only appropriate for us to advise you to be very careful and look into the organisational background of everyone who joins you, not to be overly suspicious but to be vigilant, especially about those individuals from movements whose doctrine [manhaj] is unclear. For example, sorry, Abu Hamzah, who when he was in Indonesia was the leader of a group whose teachings were strange and deviated from those of Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah.

Among other things, the split had consequences for the channels sending Indonesians to Syria. It meant that those loyal to Aman preferred to go via channels that were not controlled by Bahrumsyah. By late 2015 each contender for leadership in Syria had his own sending channel, one controlled by Bahrumsyah, another by Aman/Abu Jandal and a third by Bahrum Naim. Sometimes the representatives in Indonesia of the two Katibahs competed for the same people. Yanto Muslim, for example, who left for Syria in November 2015 was approached by two groups but eventually chose to join the Katibah Nusantara stream because he had been friends since childhood with Bahrumsyah. He arrived with his wife and child in Turkey with two other families, only to be caught and deported by Turkish authorities before he could cross over to Syria.

Bahrum Naim developed his own channel, separate from those of Aman’s followers. Even before he left in January 2015, he had been helping people who wanted to leave through online contacts with ISIS in Syria that he had been developing since 2013. Most of those he sent were from the Solo area and included activists of Tim Hisbah, a group that started out as an anti-vice campaign but crossed into terrorism in 2010.

IV. JAMAAH ANSHARUL KHILAFAH AND ITS COMPETITORS

Since mid-2014, ISIS supporters in Indonesia have tried to build a united organisation but they have been thwarted by personal rivalries and power struggles. If it has been difficult to create a single organisation in Indonesia, the likelihood of a genuinely united regional structure emerging is low. But the disunity may produce a higher risk of violence because each group now would like to prove its credentials by carrying out attacks.

Until 2015, most Indonesian ISIS supporters were too busy trying to get to Syria to think

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10 "Surat Jawaban Abu Bakar Baasyir dan Abu Husna serta Ikhwan Ansharud Daulah Masjumun di Lapas Pasir Putih Nusa Kambangan kepada Abu Ibrahim Al Indunisy (Bahrumsyah),” 20 Ramadhan 1436 H, copy reviewed by IPAC.
11 Information confirmed with friend of Yanto Muslim, Jakarta, December 2015.
about waging war at home (the exception was Santoso in Poso who continued to try and attack police). They had largely ignored the 22 September 2014 appeal from ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani to all ISIS members to carry out attacks in their own countries against citizens of countries who had joined the American-led coalition conducting airstrikes in Syria. It was only in 2015, after Turkey tightened border controls and more and more Indonesians were caught, that Indonesian-based groups and their Syria-based mentors became more serious about continuing the jihad at home.

A. JAD to ADI to JAK

The idea for a united structure in Indonesia seems to have first appeared with the effort to organize oath-taking ceremonies to ISIS in the immediate aftermath of the declaration of a caliphate on 29 June 2014. Indonesian intelligence sources claimed in mid-March 2015 that all ISIS groups were now part of a new organisation, Partisans of the State Group (Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, JAD) but there was never any evidence of such a structure.13 “Jamaah Ansharud Daulah” was in fact a generic term used for any supporter of ISIS – it did not signify a new organisation. If anything linked Indonesian supporters together, it was the website www.al-mustaqbal.net and its founder, M. Fachry (currently on trial in Jakarta) – who was arrested on 21 March 2015, just days after news of the purported new structure emerged.

In August 2015 the name of a new coalition, Partisans of the Islamic State (Ansharud Daulah Islamiyah, ADI), appeared for the first time.14 While ADI was an alliance of sorts, most of its members were students of Aman Abdurrahman, and its leader, Hari Budiman alias Abu Musa, a former prisoner, was one of Aman’s trusted associates.15 It tried to lobby organisations that had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State – such as Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT) in Poso; JAT; and the faction of Darul Islam known as Ring Banten – to disband and join the new group. The idea was that ADI would become the Indonesian ISIS branch and eventually, the Indonesian province of Islamic State.

The unification process went on for almost a year, and only on 20 November 2015 did the leaders of many of the pro-ISIS groups including ADI come together for a meeting at a hotel in Batu, Malang. Almost 100 people attended from all over Indonesia including notables such as Abu Gar from Ambon, Muhammad Zaidon from Bima and Eko Wahid from Solo.16 The new organisation was given the name Partisans of the Caliphate (Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah, JAK). Those present also chose an amir, but it remains unclear whether it is Aman Abdurrahman, although he is clearly the group’s dominant figure. Aman’s lack of jihad experience was a possible disqualifier. Several senior pro-ISIS clerics, such as Sholeh Ibrahim, caretaker amir of JAT, and Abu Bakar Baasyir became advisers to JAK.

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15 Hari Budiman, born in Jakarta on 20 September 1972, was arrested on 19 March 2010 in Jakarta and accused of delivering money from Aman Abdurrahman to Dulmatin for the ill-fated Aceh training camp in Jantho, Aceh that police broke up in early 2010. He was sentenced to five years in prison, the last year of which he spent in Nusakambangan, and was released in 2014.
16 Eko Wahid was former operational commander of Tim Hisbah in Solo. Abu Gar’s real name is Nazaruddin Muchtar bin Marzuki; he also is known as Harun. Born in Cilacap, Central Java on 24 April 1973, he served as a bomb-making instructor for Aman Abdurrahman’s followers in 2004, when they accidentally set off an explosion in Cimanggis, outside Jakarta, and many including Aman himself were arrested. He worked closely with Ring Banten and helped radicalise Heri Golun, the man who became the suicide bomber in the 2004 Australian embassy attack, although Abu Gar had no involvement in that attack himself. He fled to central Maluku in June 2004 and was arrested there in May 2005 for involvement in the planning of several jihad operations. He was sentenced to nine years, most of which he served in Surabaya, and was released in April 2011.
B. Katibah al-Iman (Kataib al-Iman)

Not all ISIS supporters welcomed the new organisation, however. Several former JI leaders refused to take part, even though they had long ago broken with the JI leadership and were committed to the Islamic State. One of these was Abdur Rohim bin Thoyib alias Abu Husna, who had been very close to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir when they were both imprisoned in Nusakambangan. JAK sent Sholeh Ibrahim to meet Abu Husna to persuade him to join, but Abu Husna politely declined. He said that after he was released from prison in August 2015, he had set up a new organisation for supporters of the caliphate called Katibah al-Iman.

There are various theories for Abu Husna’s refusal to join JAK. One was that he was offended that no one offered him the position of amir despite his long experience in the world of jihad. Another was that JAK was dominated by supporters of Aman Abdurrahman who differed with Abu Husna on the fine points of takfir (declaring individuals to be non-Muslim). A third version suggested that Abu Husna feared that the new organisation had been infiltrated by intelligence. Whatever the reason, he agreed to serve as a mentor as needed for JAK members, and he promised peaceful co-existence between his organisation and JAK.

Besides Abu Husna, other ISIS supporters were also reluctant to join the new group. Supporters of Bahrumsyah and Abu Hamzah elected to stay outside both JAK and Katibah al-Iman because they saw both as dominated by supporters of Katibah Masyaariq – who by definition were anti-Bahrumsyah. Others, including Bahrun Naim and his followers elected to stay neutral; they too felt uncomfortable with Aman’s approach to takfir, which they saw as too extreme.

JAK and Abu Husna separately courted senior figures who were still non-aligned. Abu Husna, for example, succeeded in bringing on board Abdul Karim alias Abu Jundi, a JAT sympathiser, and gave him the task of recruiting new members in Sumatra.

C. Bahrun Naim’s Foiled Plots

The desirability of carrying out attacks at home if emigration was not possible began to be discussed more widely in mid-2015 on Telegram, an encrypted messaging app for mobile phones, and other social media. During Ramadhan 2015, for example, an Indonesian using the alias Abu Karimah, a supporter of Katibah Masyaariq, recirculated the 2014 ISIS order from Al-Adnani. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir around the same time urged those who could not leave for Syria to join the MIT struggle in Poso. Because MIT had pledged allegiance to ISIS, he argued, fighting there was the same as fighting with the Islamic State. Almost no one heeded the call. The goal was still to get to Syria, even though it was getting harder.

Santoso reportedly felt abandoned, when in fact one of the reasons that he was so quick to...
declare MIT’s support for ISIS was to facilitate recruitment into his forces. In November 2015, Forum Al Busyro, one of the main pro-ISIS websites whose webmaster was working directly with Santoso, posted a statement headlined “MIT Forgotten: Evaluation and Appeal to Daulah Partisans (Ansharud Daulah),”21 It asked why ISIS supporters were more eager to go to Syria than to join MIT, whose fighters were under siege from the police and military. Its logistic support was weakening, not to mention its fighting strength, given the number of members arrested or killed. This was the army of the caliphate in Indonesia: why was there not greater support?22

But the focus of those committed to violence was Java. Bahrun Naim, a student and admirer of Bali bomber Imam Samudera, had gone to Syria in January 2015. He was determined to carry out attacks in Indonesia, and in July, recruited a number of young men from Tim Hisbah. They joined a discussion forum called Army of the Caliphate State (Jaisyul Daulah Khilafah, JDK), led by Ibadurrahman or Ibad, a former protégé of Naim’s in Solo. Naim had created a virtual jihad organisation on Telegram with different committees. He assigned Ibad and a man named Arif Hidayatollah to the “Explosives and Electro-chemical Division” where Naim tried to instruct them over Telegram how to make bombs.

The idea was for them to use their new skills to carry out attacks. Naim wanted a massive car bomb attack, but no one had the skills to bring it off. They settled on a more mundane programme of bombing three targets in Solo: a police post, a church (as revenge for a Christian attack on a mosque in Tolikara, Papua in July 2015) and a Chinese temple, (as revenge for attacks of Buddhists on Muslims in Myanmar). In addition to trying to enhance the Solo group’s skills, Naim sent funds for purchasing materials. He also set the date for the attacks, ordering that they take place on 17 August 2015, Indonesia’s independence day. But police discovered the plot, and Ibad and his friends were arrested in August 2015.

The arrests did not discourage ISIS supporters from new plots. In September 2015, Arif Hidayatollah, one of Naim’s men who escaped the arrests in August, began to communicate again with his mentor in Syria. They decided on another attempt, and Naim sent more money, both for raw materials and training. By October, Naim was pressing them to act. He was thinking big, including the assassination of the governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahya Purnama, better known as Ahok. But Arif and his friends were not ready. Later the same month, Naim ordered Arif to make arrangements to meet a Uighur man using the name “Ali” who would be coming in to Batam from Malaysia. Arif’s friends brought “Ali” to Bekasi to take part in planning for an as-yet undetermined operation. Though initially reluctant, he eventually agreed to be a suicide bomber, deciding it was better to die in Indonesia than in China.23 By November, Naim had shifted the focus of his planned attacks from Ahok to senior police commanders, such as the National Police Commander Badrodin Haiti and the Jakarta commander, Tito Karnavian. He and Arif also reportedly discussed targeting foreigners; salafist teachers who had criticised ISIS; and Shi’a leaders, hoping to time the attacks to coincide with Christmas and New Year’s Eve celebrations. But again, police discovered their plans before they could act. Arif, “Ali” and a minor named Andika were all arrested in late December.

Around the same time, police also arrested members of two other groups, unrelated to Naim, that were also plotting violence. One group, led by Abu Jundi, belonged to Abu Husna’s Katibah al-Iman. Its efforts to recruit followers in Sumatra were facilitated by an Indonesian domestic worker in Hong Kong who had become a strong ISIS supporter. She married another ISIS sup-

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22 Ibid.
23 Information made available to IPAC, January 2016.
porter in Tasikmalaya named Zaenal by phone. Both put Abu Jundi in touch with ISIS enthusiasts in Sumatra, all of whom had become active on Telegram.

Zaenal’s wife also contributed Rp 8 million ($585) toward the costs of Abu Jundi’s operations. They planned to target Shi’a in Pekanbaru, Bandung and Pekalongan. Again, police detected the plot before anything could happen, and three of the plotters, including Abu Jundi himself, were arrested. One member of the Katibah al-Iman, Abdullah Azzam, and some associates in Bandung temporarily evaded arrest and managed to set off a low explosive bomb on New Year’s Eve in front of the residence of the mayor of Bandung, but no one was injured. They were arrested in early January. It turned out that they had also been planning to attack Habib Rizieq, the founder of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) because he refused to condemn Shi’ism as un-Islamic.

D. Bahrumsyah’s Plans

Bahrumsyah stepped up his plans for terrorism in Indonesia after the break with Abu Jandal, apparently deciding that one way to show his superiority was through waging a war at home. This became clear from the arrest of Hendro Fernando alias Edo Aliando in Bekasi in January 2016. Hendro received over Rp.1 billion (about $73,000) in funds from Bahrumsyah in several instalments throughout 2015 to support jihadi activities.

Hendro had been a fellow member with Bahrumsyah in FAKSI, one of the first pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia. He had originally planned to follow Bahrumsyah to Syria in 2014, but for reasons that are still unclear, he decided to stay in Indonesia. Around June 2015 Bahrumsyah contacted Hendro and began sending him money for onward transfer to MIT and Partisans of the Caliphate in the Philippines (Ansharul Khilafah Philippines, AKP). The funds to the latter were transferred into the bank account of Raida Alsree, the wife of an Indonesian leader of AKP, Sucipto Ibrahim Ali. The size of the transfers suggested that Bahrumsyah had access to central ISIS funding, and that he had contacts across Southeast Asia, not just in Indonesia.

Bahrumsyah also asked Hendro to look for guns and ammunition and provided funds accordingly. Hendro turned to five convicted terrorists in Tangerang Prison, all ISIS supporters, for help. In late December 2015 and early January 2016, working with a convicted robber named Woro alias Toro, they secured the guns in an extraordinarily brazen operation. Woro, as a trusted inmate, had been given a sought-after job (tamping) as part of the cleaning staff. As such he

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24 Zaenal was arrested on 20 December 2015 in Tasikmalaya. For more on online marriages of Indonesian extremists, see IPAC, “Online Activism and Social Media Usage among Indonesian Extremists”, Report No. 24, 30 October 2015, p. 22.
25 Information made available to IPAC, January 2016.
26 Hendro Fernando is an activist with GASIBU (Gerakan Sehari Seribu), an organisation that raises funds for detained extremists and their families as well as for the families of “martyrs”, those killed by police in anti-terrorist operations. He was previously sentenced to five months in prison in 2014 after leading a mob of about 50 youths to throw rocks at the public prosecutor’s office in Bekasi over the detention of an Islamic teacher named Adam Amrullah. Adam was a preacher at an extremist-controlled mosque in Bekasi, who had accused a thug group that works closely with police of being an extension of LDII. The group then reported him to the police for criminal defamation and he was detained on 17 February 2014. The next day, Hendro led a mob that attacked the prosecutor’s office with rocks. (For more on the case see IPAC, “Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink”, Report No.11, 30 June 2014, pp.10-11.) Hendro is the son-in-law of Hasyim Abdullah, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s personal assistant. He became close to Bahrumsyah when he joined Islamic Law Activists Forum (Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam, FAKSI) under the latter’s leadership. FAKSI was one of the first organisations to come out in support of ISIS and organised a pro-ISIS demonstration in central Jakarta on 16 March 2014; Hendro did not take part because he was still in prison, but he became an active promoter as soon as he got out.
28 Sucipto was a former JI member originally from Kendal who had been in Mindanao for years. He was killed in Sultan Kudarat in late November 2015 in a Philippine military operation against AKP.
29 The five are Agung Prasetyo alias Ayas and Qoribul Mujib, both arrested in 2012 for trying to assist Santoso in Poso, and three members of the Abu Hanifah group (Winduro, Zaenudin/Zainudin and Emirat Berlian Nusantara), all of whom were due for release later this year.
had access to the keys to the prison’s weapons storeroom and was able to make a duplicate. He then began stealing guns, a few at a time, and selling them to the five terrorists. In December, he turned over five guns in exchange for Rp10 million (about $730). The five smuggled them out to Hendro in a suitcase on 23 December 2015. After this success, Woro went back in January and stole four more guns. He also raised his price: this time the terrorists had to pay Rp.12 million ($875). They smuggled them out on 13 January 2015, the same day that Woro was released.

The Jakarta attacks took place the next day. Bahrumsyah immediately called Hendro to ask who was involved. Hendro had no idea. Not wanting to be outdone, Bahrumsyah reportedly then asked him to undertake a similar action immediately. But police must have been following Hendro, because he was arrested on 15 January and the five Tangerang prisoners were taken from their cells for interrogation shortly afterward.

V. THE JAKARTA ATTACKS

The investigation into the Jakarta attacks was ongoing as this report went to print, but some information has become clear, including that the perpetrators were linked to JAK, not Bahrun Naim.

In the days before it took place, Aman issued a fatwa widely circulated in extremist circles, urging war at home:

Emigrate [hijrah] to the Islamic State and if you cannot emigrate, then wage jihad with spirit wherever you are, and if you cannot wage war or you lack the courage to do so, then contribute your wealth to those who are willing to do so. And if you cannot contribute, then urge others to undertake jihad. And if you cannot do that, then what is the meaning of your loyalty oath [bai’at]?20

Around 10:40 a.m. on 14 January, a man named Ahmad Muhazan blew himself up at the Starbucks café across from one of central Jakarta’s best-known landmarks, the Sarinah department store. Ahmad Muhazan had been a day student at a pesantren in Subang, West Java, best known for having hosted Noordin Top before the 2004 Australian embassy bombing. He was also the protégé of Ali Hamka, the head of JAK for Indramayu.31

Ten seconds later, Dian Juni Kurniadi detonated a bomb at a police post only a few dozen meters from Starbucks. Dian, aged 26, was close to Ali Mahmudin, the leader of JAK in Tegal. He was a 2008 graduate of a state vocational high school, specialising in electrical machinery; police believe he had links to some of those involved in the 2011 bombing of the police mosque in Cirebon.32

Ten minutes later, as people who wanted to see the crime scene were flocking to the site, two other men approached and began shooting. Several civilians and police were shot, including a Canadian Muslim, Amel Quali Taher, who died. The shooters, Sunakim alias Afif, a former prisoner, and Muhammad Ali, ran to the car park near Starbucks and there engaged in a shootout with police. Both were killed, Afif by police gunfire, Muhammad Ali by a bomb that exploded as he was about to throw it at police.

31 Ali Hamka had been a Darul Islam leader in Hauregulis, Indramayu. He joined MMI but in 2008 when MMI split and JAT was born, he joined the latter. He swore allegiance to ISIS in 2014 and sometime in late 2015 became the head of JAK for Indramayu and Cirebon. Both of his sons went to a pesantren in Magetan and both joined Santosos in Poso in 2015.
Sunakim and Muhammad Ali were also JAK members. Sunakim had been arrested in 2010 for his involvement in a terrorist training camp in Aceh and only released on 18 August 2015. A former member of the security unit of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) and a student of Aman Abdurrahman, he had pledged allegiance to ISIS while in the same prison as Aman.

The background of Muhammad Ali, born 17 March 1976, is still unclear, and reports linking him to the Mujahidin of Western Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Barat, MIB) appear to be unfounded. All four perpetrators – Muhammad Ali, Sunakim, Ahmad Muhazan – had visited Nusakambangan between May and October 2015 to meet pro-ISIS leaders there and seek their advice. The group then carried out a training exercise in West Java from 14 to 16 December.

The Thamrin attack was amateurish. The attackers may have wanted to imitate the November 2015 Paris attacks, but their capacity and the quality of their weapons were low. They carried two pistols, one of them homemade, and several homemade grenades. The bombs they used had a digital firing device but were crudely constructed, of easily available materials such as potassium nitrate. Their lack of training could be seen in their difficulty hitting targets even at close range. Quick police work against the shooters prevented further casualties.

The targets were clearly foreigners and police. There had been no attacks on foreigners since the Jakarta hotel bombings in 2009, but this time the attackers appear to have deliberately chosen Starbucks, perhaps as an icon of the West, and once inside, aimed at the foreigners sitting there. Police have been the main target of Indonesian jihadists since 2010, primarily to avenge the arrests and deaths of extremists at police hands but also to try and secure additional weapons. The main methods used against police have been drive-by shootings and targeted assassinations, so contrary to some news reports on the Jakarta attacks, the use of guns was not a new development.

The attack did not create the sense of fear that the perpetrators may have hoped. One sign of this was the popularity of the hashtag #KamiTidakTakut (We Aren’t Afraid) that became a trending topic on Twitter. Other social media sites mocked the attackers, with one cartoon showing Al-Baghdady calling the bombers to tell them to go to Syria and the bombers mishearing and going instead to Sarinah. The number of deaths (four, not counting the terrorists themselves) must have been far below what the plotters had hoped, and all of the victims were Muslim. Even some in the jihadi community were critical. Muhammad Jibril, owner of the radical but anti-ISIS website arrahmah.com, said the attack violated Islamic law. Several former terrorists also condemned it and criticised the ISIS release claiming that the attack had killed fifteen police and foreigners. As one critic said, “These ISIS supporters are not only lying to the Muslim community, they’re lying to Abu Bakar Al-Baghdady.”

Police immediately announced that the mastermind was Bahrun Naim, only to move back from that position after a week when it became clear that none of those arrested in the attack’s aftermath had any link to Naim. Naim himself strongly denied any involvement in a video state-

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33 The discovery by police of the terrorist training camp in Jantho, Aceh in early 2010 was a watershed in the fight against local extremists. The camp helped solidify alliances among different groups of jihadists and its breakup dispersed fugitives to different parts of the country. The large number of arrests that followed turned police into the top target of subsequent terrorist operations, frequently in the form of targeted assassinations. As more police began getting killed, the police were more quick to open fire on suspects in the course of operations, raising the death toll and intensifying the motive of revenge. For background on the Aceh camp, see International Crisis Group, “Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh”, Asia Report No. 189, 20 April 2010.
34 Some reports confuse him with another man with a similar name, Muhammad Ali Nasifudin alias Andika, a member of Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), who is currently serving a six-year sentence for taking part in a bank robbery in Lampung.
37 IPAC interview with anti-ISIS friend of Sunakim alias Afif, January 2016.
The enormous publicity generated increased the pressure on Aman's rivals to undertake operations in Indonesia as soon as possible.

VI. AMAN ABDURRAHMAN VS ABU BAKAR BA'ASYIR

In the meantime, in late January, a simmering rift between Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir erupted into the open that could potentially signify JAT's departure from JAK – and yet another organisation entering the competition to undertake attacks. A similar rift was papered over in the past, however, so it remains to be seen how this will develop.

In mid-November, Ba'asyir submitted a petition for judicial review of his terrorism conviction. At the time, his lawyers argued that he had not known that the Rp.50 million he raised was for a terrorist camp; they claimed he thought it was to be used for humanitarian assistance. They also implied that Ba'asyir no longer agreed with ISIS, even though it was around the same time that he apparently agreed to be a JAK adviser. The court agreed to hear the case, and then his lawyers successfully petitioned to have it moved to the district court in Cilacap, closer to their client's prison. The review began on 12 January 2016.

Aman and his followers were critical of the review from the outset. They objected to anyone who voluntarily sought to use institutions that relied on man-made rather than God-given law, especially when they were serving an oppressor/infidel (thaghut) state. They had earlier criticised Ba'asyir when he appealed the 2011 conviction.

They were particularly irritated this time when Ba'asyir's lawyers in the Muslim Defence Team (Tim Pembela Muslim, TPM) seemed to be trying to discredit Aman. For example, after the 14 January attacks, the TPM said that Ba'asyir deplored the attacks, which could disrupt his review hearing, and suggested that one motive of the perpetrators could have been to deliberately sabotage their client. They returned to this theme with more vigour a week later, this time explicitly mentioning Aman. “Let's hope there's not a party who hates Ustadz Abu and sees him as a rival and therefore wants to make him a scapegoat.”

On 28 January, Aman released an opinion, castigating the process of judicial review, saying that nothing could justify such idolatry. He concluded, “To brothers who are partisans of the Islamic State, be warned that the State has removed itself from any understanding which allows idolatry or non-Islamic actions with the justification that the benefits outweigh the costs or that there is an emergency need.”

The Ba'asyir camp denied that their leader was showing loyalty toward the thaghut and pointed out that Ba'asyir had asked the court that his case be decided by Islamic law. But the response did not satisfy Aman's followers who said all anyone had to do was look at the court and who the judges were to see that Ba'asyir was using thaghut law.
While it remains unclear whether JAT members will remain in JAK, the tension almost certainly means that Ba'asyir’s influence there will continue to decline.

VII. LOOKING AHEAD

The competition and disunity among Indonesian ISIS supporters portends more violence. Bahrumsyah, Bahrun Naim and Abu Jandal will all be vying to encourage operations, and the saturation news coverage of the Jakarta attacks will encourage local cells to try as well.

The fact that it has become much more difficult to cross into Syria from Turkey means that there will be more potential fighters willing to take on the war at home than in 2014 or 2015. More than 215 Indonesians had been deported by Turkey as of December 2015 – after trying but failing to cross into Syria. While some families are still leaving, the message that it has become harder is getting through.

In the aftermath of the attacks, the Indonesian government has focused all of its efforts on trying to promote a new and strengthened anti-terrorism law giving the police broader powers of arrest and detention of terrorism suspects. It needs to concentrate more on prisons. Inmates like Aman continue to expand their influence through regular meetings with friends and followers. Plots are hatched in prisons and materials – and sometimes people -- smuggled in and out with ease. The answer may not be a single prison for terrorism convicts because that would reduce the likelihood that individuals on the fringes of the movement could be successfully disengaged; if everyone is housed together, extremism is likely to be reinforced. But it might be worth considering giving special training to prison officials charged with supervising extremist inmates and only housing the latter in prisons where those officials can be deployed. Visitors need to be much more closely supervised and their conversations monitored, and post-release monitoring of prisoners like Abu Husna and Sunakim needs to be stepped up. All this requires resources but it may also require some restructuring of the prison administration, which is a much larger undertaking.

If the government is interested in experimenting with targeted deradicalisation programmes, they could usefully develop activities for the deportees from Turkey – some 60 per cent of whom are women and children. These people are not “returnees”; they never got to Syria, never had military training or combat experience. But they wanted to join ISIS, and the government needs to understand why and help them find alternative networks. The key to understanding why these families wanted to leave and why they were attracted to ISIS is in-depth interviewing by skilled researchers; that research can then form the basis of targeted programmes. The fact that most of them sold everything they had to finance their travel to Turkey gives an opening to the government to provide economic assistance, possibly through local NGOs with experience in community development. Civil society organisations, particularly those like Muhammadiyah’s Aisyiah that focus on education and income-generating for women, could be particularly helpful. Any lessons learned from working with this relatively small population could then be applied to broader prevention policies.

The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has not been effective in its prevention and deradicalisation work, in part because its programmes have been too broad and not sufficiently grounded in detailed knowledge of how and where radicalisation takes place. Before augmenting BNPT’s budget as a response to the January attacks, the government should undertake a thorough, independent evaluation of its work to date, seeking detailed recommendations on how to make it more useful in countering violent extremism.
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

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