UPDATE ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY’S INFLUENCE

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) in 2016 may intensify pressure for a broader remit in internal security affairs as its warm relationship with President Jokowi deepens and its credibility with the public soars. Several factors continue to drive the push for power: conviction that the country is facing many dangers that only the TNI can address; distrust of civilian politicians and political leaders; resentment of the police; and a sense of opportunity in the current political situation.

These factors were analysed in a May 2015 IPAC report, “The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military”, but several developments since that report was issued warrant a renewed look at how well the pressure for an increased role is progressing.

A new defence White Paper due out soon – its main points were conveyed to foreign defence attachés in January 2016 – highlights the danger from internal and non-traditional threats, including terrorism. In May 2015, counter-terrorism seemed to be the area where the military was making the greatest push to expand its role, including by playing up the police failure to arrest Santoso, the pro-ISIS commander of a small band of armed men in the hills of central Sulawesi. More than eight months and several joint police-military operations later, the military have fared no better than the police in capturing the elusive extremist. At the same time, effective police work in handling the 14 January 2016 terrorist attack in Jakarta has helped mute – temporarily – the TNI demand for more operational engagement.

The military acknowledges that there is no imminent conventional external threat. Nevertheless, TNI military commander General Gatot Nurmantyo, appointed in July 2015, continues to talk up the dangers of “proxy war”, a concept suggesting that unidentified hostile foreign states are trying to weaken Indonesia from within through non-military means that include everything from support for separatism to advocacy of gay rights. The fear that underlies the concept is shared by many in the officer corps and beyond and serves as an ideological justification for an increased role in internal security.

The TNI left significant unfinished business behind in 2015, much of it aimed at giving a legal basis for a broader mandate. A draft presidential decree on TNI structure, submitted by then commander General Moeldoko in June 2015, remained unsigned at the end of the year. It would highlight the role of the military in both defence and security; expand the kinds of “military operations other than war” that the TNI was authorised to conduct; and remove the need for parliamentary approval for these operations. While the decree seems to have been temporarily shelved, it could be revived at any time, especially if other legal efforts stall.

It will be important to watch how efforts proceed to push through a strengthened anti-terrorism law in the wake of the Jakarta attacks. While the government draft submitted to parliament in late February does not include any enhanced powers for the military, the TNI’s role could still be strengthened as a national counter-terrorism strategy, mandated by the draft, is worked out.

Meanwhile, force modernisation gathers pace as Jokowi promises defence budget increases that will replace obsolete combat systems and add new ones. The object is to gradually improve external maritime defence capacity without diminishing the TNI’s actual and potential political role through the priority it continues to accord internal security.

II. JOKOWI’S RELIANCE ON THE TNI

In mid-2015, Jokowi seemed dependent on the military as a steadfast ally when the fractiousness of his cabinet and the criticism of his own party was at its height. By early 2016, he seemed somewhat stronger but there was still a concern expressed by some parliamentarians and retired
officers that he was exerting insufficient control over a military that they saw as being in the strongest position it had been in since the New Order. One officer suggested that Jokowi’s close-ness to the TNI was at his initiative, not theirs:

Jokowi is clean and humble but he’s weak and he doesn’t have backup from elsewhere in the system – that’s why he turns to the army. We’ve never had a president who visited military units six times in his first year.¹

Jokowi made two appointments which arguably increased the army’s influence. The first was on 8 July 2015 when he broke with recent practice and promoted the army chief, General Gatot Nurmantyo, to replace the retiring TNI commander, General Moeldoko. The TNI Law allows the commander to be rotated between the services and it was the turn of the air force. However, the president decided on Gatot, despite his own maritime priorities, because he needed political support and because an army officer would be best able to maintain overall unity of command.²

The second appointment was the transfer of General (Ret.) Luhut Panjaitan from presidential chief of staff to Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs as part of a cabinet reshuffle in August 2015. General Luhut is one of Jokowi’s most accessible advisers and one of the more socially progressive; there is no suggestion that he shares the TNI’s view of proxy war, for example. But he does believe the military can get things done when the bureaucracy cannot and therefore supports the TNI’s role in some non-military tasks, simply in terms of efficiency. One example is intensified road-building in Papua, where the president and his minister both see ending the isolation of the central highlands as a key to improving welfare, even if many Papuans might see the military presence differently.³

Overall, Jokowi seems to have struck an implicit bargain with the TNI. In exchange for unconditional loyalty and support for his broader political agenda, the president will push for improvements in military personnel welfare, modernisation of TNI equipment, maintenance of the TNI’s separation from the Defence Ministry and retention of an ex-officio cabinet post for the TNI commander. He also remains open to expanding the internal security role of the army where he deems it necessary.

III. THE COUNTER-TERRORISM BATTLEGROUND

In mid-2015 the TNI had made counter-terrorism one of the main areas of contestation with the police, particularly in the effort to capture Santoso in Poso. Senior officers made every effort to insinuate that they should be allowed to do the job because the police had failed. A year after the military became involved in the hunt, however, Santoso was still at large, and police had become the heroes of an amateurish terrorist attack in Jakarta on 14 January 2016 that killed four civilians and four of the attackers. The police were able to press their temporary advantage, with Coordinating Minister Luhut dismissing concerns that other agencies would be granted arrest and detention powers as a strengthened anti-terrorism law was pushed through parliament. Nevertheless, the formulation of a national counter-terrorism strategy by the president could still see a recalibration of the TNI role.

¹ IPAC interview with TNI officer, Jakarta, 10 December 2015.
² IPAC interview with Purnomo Yusgiantoro, Sentul, 11 December 2015. Jokowi also chose Gatot because he was the senior of the three chiefs, had served a year as army chief (the air force chief had only been in the job since January 2015), and the previous chiefs were at or beyond retirement age.
³ On a visit to Papua in December 2015, General Gatot met with community leaders and said President Jokowi had requested that the TNI give priority to building the section of the trans-Papua highway from Asmat to Wamena, and that he wanted it completed by August 2016. “TNI Siap Pampungkan Jalan tembus Pegunungan Tengah”, Cenderawasih Pos, 5 January 2016.
A. Poso

Not only did the TNI, working separately or together with the police between March 2015 and January 2016, fail to capture Santoso but it appeared that Santoso might have strengthened his small band of armed followers. In February 2015, police estimated that he was down to some 20 men; a military spokesman more specifically said he had nineteen men and five guns.\(^4\) By late January 2016, the deputy chief of the Central Sulawesi police estimated Santoso’s forces at 45.\(^5\)

One could argue that both figures were guesswork and the first figure was an underestimate, especially since a senior police officer said in early 2016 that 24 of Santoso’s men were arrested and seven killed during 2015 – although some of these were couriers and not combatants.\(^6\)

But information from some of those arrested suggested that as it became increasingly difficult to cross the Turkish border into Syria during 2015, some pro-ISIS members decided to join Santoso instead.\(^7\) It would be remarkable if after almost a year of operations involving thousands of troops, the number of Santoso’s combatants had actually risen. But the low figures in early 2015 could also reflect weak intelligence on the part of both the police and military, which could be another factor explaining why Santoso has been able to evade arrest for so long (he was first put on the wanted list in May 2011).

The stepped-up hunt for Santoso had begun with police operation Camar Maleo I on 26 January 2015, in response to a direct order from the president. It lasted for two months and resulted in fifteen arrests. Separately, just as Camar Maleo I was coming to an end, the military launched “exercises” for its Quick Reaction Strike Force in the same area with the same goal – to capture Santoso, although the official rationale was “to reduce the potential for terrorism”.\(^8\) The Strike Force claimed to have flushed Santoso and his top lieutenant, Daeng Koro, from their camp on Mount Biru, near Tamanjeka, Poso Pesisir. On 3 April, police killed Daeng Koro some 80 km away in Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi.

The Strike Force withdrew after twelve days, leaving a battalion to continue the hunt. Police conducted a second operation, Camar Maleo II from 20 May to 7 June 2015, with 600 Brimob from Jakarta and 154 personnel from the Central Sulawesi provincial police command. It had originally been scheduled to begin in late April but police said they had to wait for the conclusion of a territorial operation of the military resort (Korem) in Palu. The operation was not to search for Santoso; it was to rehabilitate 23 houses of the very poor – his suspected followers – on the slopes of Mount Biru.\(^9\)

Rehabilitating homes is a common counter-insurgency tactic but it revealed the confused nature of the military’s operations in Poso. As in Aceh and to some extent in Papua, the TNI has consciously tried to differentiate itself from the police by presenting itself as the kinder, gentler security force, more reliant on persuasive methods than the repressive tactics of police. Police were convinced that one reason why their efforts to cut off logistics to Santoso’s followers never worked was that the local TNI was arranging to let supplies get through. To delay a manhunt for a major fugitive so that the homes of his suspected followers can be fixed makes little sense. The house-building, while presumably designed as part of a campaign to win hearts and minds, also reveals a flaw that runs through the TNI’s approach to both terrorism and separatism: the

\(^4\) “TNI deployment in Poso for training not to chase terrorists”, Jakarta Post, 27 March 2015.
\(^5\) The 20 figure is cited in “Polda Sulteng rilis video latihan teroris Poso”, Antara, 25 February 2015; the 45 figure appears in “Elite troops enter forest to hunt Santoso”, Jakarta Post, 27 January 2016.
\(^6\) The Central Sulawesi police chief said in early January 2016 that 24 of Santoso’s followers had been captured alive while seven others had died in shoot-outs. “E. Indonesia Mujahidin members nabbed,” Jakarta Post, 2 January 2016. A few days later the national police chief, Badrodin Haiti, gave the figure arrested as 28.
\(^7\) Information from documents made available to IPAC, January 2015.
mistaken premise that a basic cause of rebellion is poverty.\textsuperscript{10} In fact many of the men with Santoso were from outside the area, including from Bima, Makassar and Java, not locals driven into his band by destitution. It became increasingly clear that if the police lacked the jungle warfare capacity to reach Santoso, the military lacked solid intelligence on his network, and the need to work together became too glaring to ignore.

Police chief Badrodin Haiti in fact had written to General Mulyono, on 15 July, soon after his appointment as army chief, requesting that army raiders and special forces train Brimob in jungle warfare. The request was passed to General Gatot who apparently agreed but then had second thoughts – perhaps not wanting to be accused of militarising the police and probably not wanting to weaken the case for military engagement in internal security.\textsuperscript{11} In August, after a series of firefightes took place between police and suspected supporters of Santoso’s Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT), including a raid by police counter-terrorist unit Detachment 88 on a safehouse that resulted in the deaths of one terrorist and one police officer, the police announced that they intended to seek specialist training abroad in jungle warfare, although it appeared that donors were only willing to consider training in non-lethal skills.\textsuperscript{12}

In the end, the police sought military backup for Camar Maleo III, which was launched on 9 September. The TNI responded by sending a 60-person Kopassus team and a 40-person combat intelligence platoon from the army strategic reserve command, Kostrad, for nineteen days from 25 September, along with drones and dogs to improve surveillance and targeting.\textsuperscript{13} When the operation finished on 9 November, however, Santoso and most of his group remained at large.\textsuperscript{14}

Days later, after the start of Operation Camar Maleo IV, five soldiers from the infantry battalion assigned to the operation were killed and fourteen others injured when a truck toppled off a mountain road in an accident.\textsuperscript{15} The improved spirit of cooperation was marked by the joint visit of the military and police commanders to the injured at the police hospital in Palu and their subsequent visit to the police and army units engaged in the hunt for Santoso.

A joint police–military command post was set up in Poso in late 2015, overseeing intelligence and operations (\textit{penindakan}). The latter is divided into teams for “blocking” and “chasing”. The blockers are divided into posts of fifteen men each, usually ten Brimob and five soldiers from the local infantry battalion. Some 40 of these posts have been established in a ring around the area where Santoso is believed to be hiding to prevent people and supplies from going in or out. The “chase” teams, with five Kopassus and five Brimob, are more skilled, going into the jungle for up to two weeks at a time. A soldier in one of these teams was killed in a shootout with Santoso’s men on 29 November.\textsuperscript{16}

No one is pretending the coordination of the TNI and police is easy, especially on intelligence sharing and joint operational arrangements but despite the fact that neither side is particularly happy about it, the forced marriage has been working better than many expected, according to

\begin{itemize}
\item[10] The same approach was apparent in East Timor and to some extent in Papua. It was also evident in the TNI’s approach to a former rebel-turned-criminal Din Minimi who eventually turned himself in to authorities in December 2015 after more than a year of being on the police wanted list. The army also rehabilitated homes in Din Minimi’s village and provided assistance to his wife, then took credit for his surrender, but it was a far murkier case than met the eye.
\item[14] “Kapolri nyatakan Poso aman pilkada”,\textit{ Antara}, 20 November 2015.
\item[16] “Jaringan teroris Santoso tembak mati prajurit TNI”,\textit{ Antara}, 29 November 2015.
\end{itemize}
one police officer.\textsuperscript{17}

The final operation in the series, Camar Maleo IV, took place from 9 November 2015 to 9 January 2016. All those involved were under extreme pressure from Jakarta to make this one successful and bring Santoso in.\textsuperscript{18} It was mystifying to many how so many soldiers and police could be scouring the area for so long without finding him. But it did not happen, and a new two-month operation, since extended, code-named Tinombala followed directly on 10 January, this time with 2,400 police, army and marines. The soldiers were to concentrate on searching the interior while the police focused more on controlling the movement into and around the province and the security of towns and villages to deny community support to the group.\textsuperscript{19}

The day after the Jakarta attacks, a combined police-TNI operation police killed another member of Santoso’s group after a three-hour battle involving fifteen men apparently trying to establish a new base close to a remote hamlet.\textsuperscript{20} Arrests following the Jakarta attacks also revealed that Santoso was in direct contact with Bahrumsyah, the leader of Indonesian ISIS forces in Syria, and that Bahrumsyah had provided substantial funding to MIT, including for the purchase of arms from the southern Philippines.

\section*{B. A Strengthened Anti-Terror Law}

The Jokowi government formally submitted a draft of an amended anti-terrorism law to the parliament in late February 2016, just over a month after the January attacks.\textsuperscript{21} It plugs many of the holes in the existing law, for example, by punishing participation in military or paramilitary training at home or abroad. It was initially feared that the TNI and the State Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) would see the revision of the law as an opportunity to push for expanded powers. The government draft, however, makes it clear that the lead role remains with the police and no additional powers of arrest and detention are foreseen for other bodies.

Still, the role of the TNI is left somewhat ambiguous. Article 43A notes that the president will set policy and national strategy for addressing terrorism, and both will be implemented by the police, the TNI “and other agencies “in accordance with their authority”. The TNI’s function, the article further states, will be to assist the police, but the boundaries of TNI assistance to the police have never been fully defined, and the president could still formulate a strategy in which the military is given a more active role. (The division of labour between military and police in various “grey areas”, including counter-terrorism, was supposed to be defined in a new National Security Law, but that bill is not going to see the light of day anytime soon.)

\textsuperscript{17} The TNI are reportedly not happy working under police command, and the police are worried that the joint operations help support the larger agenda of TNI to regain an internal security role. IPAC interview, Jakarta, 10 February 2016. One advantage of joint police-military teams is that they obviate the need for the military to exercise police powers – e.g. arrest suspects – without the legal cover to do so. In the past such arrests were justified as “citizen’s arrest”. See “The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military”, op.cit., p.7.

\textsuperscript{18} “Police seek more help from military to catch Santoso”, Jakarta Post, 9 November 2015.

\textsuperscript{19} 9 bombs found in Poso, Santoso still at large”, Jakarta Post, 18 January 2016 and ‘Polisi jaga aktivitas warga Poso pasca kontak senjata’, Antara, 19 January 2016 and ‘2400 TNI-Polri buru jaringan Santoso’, Antara, 19 January 2016. 1500 police are deployed and the recent addition of marines might add to TNI numbers at least temporarily. “Hundreds of elite TNI members deployed to hunt Santoso”, Jakarta Post, 24 January 2016.


\textsuperscript{21} “Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor … Tahun … Tentang Perubahan Atas Uudang-Undang Nomor 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2002 tentang Pemberantasan Tindakan Pidana Terorisme Menjadi Undang-Undang”, photocopy of draft.
IV. ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

The TNI’s efforts to expand its authority are illustrated by its ongoing involvement in non-military tasks; the drafting of a decree for the president’s signature that would significantly enhance its status; and the continuing reinforcement of the territorial command structure.

A. Non-Military Tasks

The change of command from Moeldoko to Gatot saw no reduction in the TNI’s commitment to non-military tasking. Some of these tasks were a response to particular needs, for example, fighting forest fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan or assisting with security for local elections; some were very clearly part of a public relations campaign; and some seemed to be more of a make-work effort for soldiers who would otherwise be idle.

At the TNI annual leadership conference in December 2015, Agriculture Minister Dr Andi Amran Sulaiman thanked the army for the contribution of its 50,000 village non-commissioned officers (babinsa) for assisting with agricultural extension services and by implication their continuing assistance with the program of food self-sufficiency. And in early February 2016 at the installation ceremony for the new commander of the Korem based in Merauke, Papua, the commander noted that one of the Korem’s main tasks was to open more land in the Merauke area for rice cultivation.

The venture into agriculture has been controversial. Extension agents employed by the agriculture ministry reportedly complained that soldiers were taking over their jobs, and some soldiers were said to complain that they were being asked to do agricultural labour when they had not joined the army to be farmers. One senior officer said:

The mission of the TNI is to be an army of the people (tentara rakyat), that’s the key to defence. If working with the agriculture ministry brings us closer to the people, that’s absolutely in line with our objectives. The military is always being accused of wanting more power, but it’s not true. We were helping deliver subsidised fertiliser to farmers, it was deeply appreciated but then we were accused of going beyond our mandate. But who’s accusing us? The businessmen who used to take a cut out of delivering it.

The military also continued to be engaged in law enforcement. In August 2015, Jakarta Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (known as Ahok) allocated funds for the TNI to help the police with “rampant crime”. In another typical operation, the TNI was called out to back up police and public order officials clearing 117 business premises that had been built illegally on a greenbelt.

22 More than 5,000 troops were deployed to fight fires between September and November 2015 in Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, South and Central Kalimantan and Papua. Some 21,000 troops were deployed to assist 80,000 police and 50,000 public order officials secure the simultaneous regional elections on 9 December 2015.
25 IPAC interviews, TB Hasanuddin, Jakarta, 24 November 2015 and with a journalist, Palu, 11 February 2016.
26 IPAC interview, Jakarta, 10 December 2015.
27 Ahok allocated US$3.82 million from the city budget to buy 326 motor cycles, 2,950 sets of riot equipment and four cars for the military. “Greater Jakarta: City gives 50b grant to Kodam Jaya”, Jakarta Post, 8 August 2015.
All of these tasks seem to give a sense of “mission creep” to a military that claims to face no major military threat and looks increasingly inward, fearful that the combination of a fractured polity and violent extremism could undermine the integrity and unity of the state.

B. The Draft Decree

At the same time the military was taking on an increasing number of new tasks, it was also exploring ways to enhance its status through a draft decree ostensibly focused on organisational changes. The decree was first submitted to President Jokowi by General Moeldoko a month before he retired. It would make the TNI the equivalent of a ministry, add two non-military functions to those already enumerated in the 2004 TNI Law, and remove the requirement for political oversight of its operations other than war. While the president has other priorities for the moment and the TNI is not pressing the issue, the draft remains an important indication of the TNI’s institutional objectives.

The impetus for the draft was General Moeldoko’s desire to keep the army in an influential role while the position of military commander rotated to the air force. This would be accomplished by creating a new position of deputy commander, which an army officer would then fill. Under the 2004 TNI Law, any amendment to the TNI structure requires a presidential decree, hence the draft. But when Jokowi appointed General Gatot, an army officer, as commander, the creation of the deputy post was deferred.

The draft, however, turned out to contain far more than just the creation of a post or two. It asserted that the TNI is the equivalent of a ministry instead of simply “an instrument of the state”, as in the 2004 TNI Law. This has two potential implications. It would downgrade the role of the Defence Ministry in controlling the purse strings and therefore the policies for military deployment and perhaps procurement to a more consultative role. The TNI would merely have to “coordinate” with the ministry on budgetary matters.

Secondly, the TNI commander would be able to undertake his principal duties for operations other than war as though they were a portfolio of responsibilities as in any other ministry, without further specific authorisation by the president or endorsement by parliament. It would still have to coordinate with relevant agencies but it could act on its own, for example, to send troops to Poso or Papua when it deemed conditions warranted.

The draft decree also adds two new non-military tasks – or “military operations other than war” – to those listed in the TNI Law: rescuing Indonesian nationals overseas and countering narcotics. Both add to the expansion of the military’s functions. The narcotics interdiction in particular overlaps with police functions, adding to the “grey areas” where division of labour between the two forces remains blurred.

The decree is written in such a way to suggest that the non-military tasks would not be subject to any political oversight other than the president’s. This differs from the TNI Law that stipulates that operations other than war are subject to national policy and government political decisions. Article 14 of the Defence Law also stipulates that any time the president authorises the use of armed force, for military or non-military tasks, the DPR must approve. There is no such

30 The draft was an update of the decree currently in force, Perpres No.10 Tahun 2010 tentang Susunan Organisasi TNI, available at publikasi.kominfo.go.id/handle/54323613/99/.
32 Article 4 (1) of draft decree
33 Under Article 16 (6) of the Defence Law and Article 3 (2) of the TNI Law, the TNI is subordinate to the ministry on budgetary matters.
34 Article 7 (2) b of draft decree.
language in the decree, suggesting that were it to be adopted, the TNI would have the authority
to undertake these tasks on its own. In narcotics interdiction, for example, it could potentially
assume the same powers as the police to stop, question, search and detain, thus legitimising
what frequently already happens in practice under the cover of citizen arrest.35

Once the proposed decree became public in mid-October, human rights groups, police and
some parliamentarians raised concerns. One of the most outspoken opponents was Major Gen-
eral (Retired) T.B. Hasanuddin, a member of the foreign affairs and defence commission (Com-
mision I) of parliament, who said it contravened the TNI Law by adding to the operations
other than war that the TNI was allowed to conduct and giving it the ability to engage in such
operations without specific presidential authorisation. Commission I Chairman Mahfudz Sid-
diq raised questions about the decree’s definition of security and its seeming encroachment into
police functions.36

A decree – but not this sweeping a decree – is needed to authorise the organisational changes
that the TNI is undertaking, but General Gatot has asserted that no effort to expand TNI au-
thority via decree will take place on his watch.37 At the moment there seems to be little pressure
to proceed with the fundamental changes envisaged in the Moeldoko proposal.

C. Joint Commands And New Posts

As of February 2016 there was no sign of the planned three joint commands (komando gabungan
wilayah pertahanan, Kogabwilhan) that Yudhoyono had authorised and Jokowi agreed to. Addi-
tions to the TNI’s territorial structure, however, were proceeding apace. The planned KODAM
XVIII Kasuari, based in Sorong, Papua Barat was said to be nearly complete, with the commander’s house, soldiers’ barracks, and staff housing finished and offices almost done. Phase I, in
which 30 per cent of the planned allotment of 5,000 troops will be moved in, is expected to take
place in mid-2016.38 The new KODAM will oversee the military resort commands (KOREM) in
Biak and Sorong, together covering Manokwari, Teluk Wondama, Bintuni, Biak, Sorong Selatan,
Fakfak, and Kaimana. A new district command is to be established in Bintuni Bay, and other
district and sub-district commands added as needed.

Another new KODAM based in Manado, North Sulawesi, KODAM XIII Merdeka, was said
to be 60 per cent complete as of December 2015. It would cover North and Central Sulawesi and
Gorontalo.

The Army Strategic Command will also locate a proposed new division at Sorong, strengthen-
ing the land forces available in eastern Indonesia.

The navy was well along in plans for expansion. Currently Indonesia has two fleets, the West-
ern Fleet, based in Jakarta, and the Eastern Fleet based in Surabaya. The new arrangement in-
cludes a National Sea Command, based in Surabaya, the Western Fleet in Jakarta, a Central
Fleet in Makassar and the Eastern Fleet in Sorong. One rationale for the latter was to protect
the growing number of offshore oil and gas projects in the area around Maluku and Papua.39 In
the west, the defences of the Natuna Islands were to be significantly strengthened, given the gas
reserves there and the tensions in the South China Sea.

35 The National Narcotics Agency (BNN) and the TNI currently have a Memorandum of Understanding under which the
TNI will deal with narcotics trafficking and abuse within its own ranks.
36 “Kewenangan TNI tidak perlu diperluas”, Antara, 27 October 2015; “Ketua Komisi I: Perpres Kewenangan TNI tidak bisa
melanggar UU”, Liputan6.com, 30 October 2015; and IPAC interview with T.B. Hasanuddin, 24 November 2015. If the
president decides at some future date to sign it as is, it could well face challenge in the Supreme Court.
37 “Gatot: Selama Saya Panglima, Perpres TNI Tak Akan Pernah Ada”, Tempo, 28 October 2015
38 “Kodam XVIII Kasuari murni untuk kepentingan pertahanan”, Kompasiana.com, 13 October 2015.
The air force was also planning to build a third operations command (komando operasi angkatan udara, koopsau) in Biak, Papua, but plans were still on the drawing board as of January 2016. In the meantime, several air bases were upgraded from “C” to “B” status, meaning they would be headed by a colonel rather than a lieutenant colonel and provide high levels of support to air operations.

In addition, the TNI was planning to add more posts in eastern Indonesia and border areas around the country that currently lack adequate infrastructure. One example cited by General Gatot is Saumlaki on the island of Yamdena, southeastern Maluku:

This island has one radar. However if the radar detects foreign planes entering Indonesian territory, the personnel just pray the plane will leave soon, because it is impossible to inform the National Air Defense Command to deploy fighter jets from Makassar, South Sulawesi.

All of these changes would be undertaken by reallocating existing personnel, potentially involving the redeployment of some 25,000 to 30,000 people. The current uniform strength is about 435,000, including 341,000 army, 65,000 navy and 29,000 air force.

Most of these changes are attributable to force modernisation and long-term plans to give more emphasis to covering maritime approaches. They will be accompanied by modest increases in the defence budget that President Jokowi announced in February 2016. The defence budget has been less than 1 per cent of GDP for many years but is forecast to rise 1.1 per cent this year and if economic growth of 6 per cent is attained in future years will rise to 1.5 per cent.

D. National Security Law and National Security Council

The moribund National Security bill, initiated in 2005 and a source of controversy ever since, has been temporarily shelved but the idea of a National Security Council (NSC) that it contained is very much alive. In December 2015, Coordinating Minister Luhut explained to the annual TNI Leadership Meeting in Jakarta that the bill was unlikely to be on the legislative agenda in the near future. The government reportedly has prepared a decree, however, that would transform the existing National Resilience Council (Dewan Ketahanan Nasional, DKN) into an NSC. A council has no executive authority in its own right but it can provide the information and analysis of events that will allow the president, ministers and agencies to make decisions, develop policy, deploy appropriate assets, and act in a unified fashion. Luhut has given the project a boost by putting a shadow staff from the DKN in place and revamping the situation room within his ministry. These developments have already helped improve policy and coordination in the operations around Poso and in response to incidents and disasters such as the 2015 forest fires.

Establishing an NSC might be helpful but it is not a substitute for revising and revamping relevant laws and regulations governing the military and its employment in operations other than war. The police are wary of an NSC because it will be yet another military-dominated agency whose prime purpose in practice will be to facilitate policy-making on matters of direct interest to both forces.

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41 “Army to deploy to eastern outer islands”, Jakarta Post, 12 January 2016.
42 “Jokowi urges TNI to engage with civilians”, Jakarta Post, 6 October 2015.
44 The draft law was a major source of contention between the military and police. See IPAC, “The Expanding Role of the Indonesian Military”, op.cit. p.6.
45 “Panglima TNI tutup Rapim TNI 2016”, Indonesian Military Information Center (Puspen TNI), 18 December 2015.
46 IPAC conversation with army staff member of the DKN, Jakarta, 25 November 2015.
47 IPAC conversation with staff member of Kemenkopolhukam, Jakarta, 8 December 2015.
V. PROXY WAR REVISITED

In the 2014 Defence White Paper (never officially released), the TNI acknowledges the possibility that tensions in the South and East China Seas could erupt into conflict that could affect Indonesia. Nevertheless, it sees the major threat as coming from outside powers using proxies inside the country to weaken it or gain access to resources. The nature of “proxy war” is explained as follows:

The pattern of divide and rule from within is an effective way to destroy a country from the inside, as happened with the Arab Spring. The political chaos in Egypt and the civil wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Syria all show that there has been a change in the pattern of conflict.

The conflict develops through several stages: first, rumors are spread of human rights violations, then demands appear for democratisation and political reform, the removal of tyrannical leaders and rumors of weapons of mass destruction. Second, the population shows different forms of dissatisfaction through mass demonstrations. Third, the demonstrations turn anarchic and transform into wider social unrest and conflict among different groups. Fourth, the rise in communal conflict turns into civil war. Fifth, there is a request for a resolution from the United Nations for an embargo or economic or political sanctions. Sixth, the Security Council gives a mandate for the use of military force to intervene in the name of peace enforcement or peace-making.48

While he was still army chief, General Gatot was the primary proponent of the “proxy war” thesis and as TNI commander, he can reach many more people. He has also refined and expanded the concept over time. Now the basic premise is that future conflict will be driven by population growth and scarcity of food, water, and energy. Indonesia, with an abundance of all three, has become a target for other nations that lack them. Instead of a direct, frontal attack, they are resorting to the use of proxies -- NGOs, multinationals, academics, the media or other tools. “For a long time, they have used the media to create tensions between the police and military, for social engineering, cultural change, to divide political parties and smuggle in narcotics,” he said.49

A TNI officer who strongly believes the proxy war thesis gave this example:

During the haze crisis, Singapore was accusing us of burning our plantations. But why would we have any interest in damaging our own assets? On the other hand, if Indonesian palm oil plantations are seen as damaging the environment, who benefits? Companies owned by Singapore, Malaysia and the US. The whole idea of a proxy war is to weaken your enemies and competitors. It’s like the VOC under the Dutch, economic interests come first, military occupation follows.50

Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu took the issue to more ludicrous heights when he suggested that gay rights advocacy was also part of a proxy war of values designed to brainwash citizens and take over the country:

With proxy war, before you know it, the enemy controls the country. If a nuclear

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49 ‘Panglima TNI: 70 Persen Konflik di Dunia Berlatar Belakang Energi,’ Puspen TNI, 12 December 2015. The army chief, General Mulyono, had said at a conference at the University of Indonesia on strengthening territorial management (Binter) that Indonesia was already engaged in asymmetric, hybrid and proxy war. ‘Bela negara tak selalu angkat senjata,’ Antara, 15 October 2015.
50 IPAC interview, Jakarta, 10 December 2015.
bomb were dropped on Jakarta, Jakarta would be destroyed but not Semarang. But with modern war, everything is destroyed. That’s the danger.\textsuperscript{51}

For the TNI, the great value of the proxy war thesis is that it fuses international and domestic threats and suggests that to deal with an external threat, the military must strengthen its internal security role.

ISIS-linked terrorism has the same characteristics: an international phenomenon with serious domestic implications. The establishment of a caliphate whose leaders instruct all Muslims to join and the use of Indonesian-language social media to exhort Indonesians to emigrate (berhijrah) are seen as undermining the loyalty of citizens to their country, quite apart from the threat of terrorism attacks. In his opening address to the TNI leadership meeting in December 2015, the president urged the TNI to improve its professional competence and take an extra role combating terrorism, especially against ISIS. However, he stressed that priority should be given to the soft approach of deradicalisation rather than the hard approach adopted by the West.\textsuperscript{52}

\textbf{VI. “DEFEND THE NATION” (BELA NEGARA) PROGRAM}

The same sense of Indonesia besieged by enemies and therefore needing to strengthen a sense of patriotism prompted Defence Minister General (Ret.) Ryamizard Ryacudu to launch a “Defend the Nation” (Bela Negara) program in October 2015. The Ministry initially announced that the voluntary program, which seemed to combine citizenship education with basic military training, would reach 100 million people under 50 years of age over the next ten years. When the scale and cost of the program were questioned, however, it was quickly scaled back.\textsuperscript{53}

The origins of the program are murky. According to one account, Jokowi had originally suggested the idea because he wanted the military to help absorb the unemployed – another non-military task – and give some direction and discipline to urban gang members. When turned over to Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu, however, the concept turned much darker, a response to unseen threats.

The minister linked the program to the emergence of eight threats: terrorism, natural disasters, violation of borders, separatism, disease, cyber attacks, narcotics, and the infiltration of foreign culture and values. He warned that the last in particular “enters slowly, systematically, and is programmed to spread after entry. The target is clear - to destroy the nation or at least weaken it.”\textsuperscript{54} Bela Negara could thus be seen as the answer to proxy war.

Article 9 of the Defence Law explains that the constitutional right and obligation of citizens to take part in the defence of the nation can be fulfilled through participation in citizenship education, compulsory military training, voluntary or compulsory service in the armed forces, or through provision of professional services. It also stipulates that this will be regulated by legislation. Before the Bela Negara program was announced, one critic said, there should have been a law outlining the concept and responsibilities for implementation, the nature and scope of the curriculum and budgetary provisions.\textsuperscript{55} Others wondered why money was being squandered on such programs when the military could not afford the hardware it wanted or provide for the

\textsuperscript{51} "Menteri Pertahanan: LGBT Itu Bagian dari Proxy War" , Tempo, 23 February 2016.
\textsuperscript{52} "Jokowi urges TNI to focus on terrorism, IS" , Jakarta Post, 16 December 2015.
\textsuperscript{53} "Bela Negara butuh payung hukum" , Antara, 13 October 2015 and reiterated in IPAC interview, 24 October 2015.
welfare of its members, and some analysts warned of the remilitarisation of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{56}

Nevertheless, a training center for the program was built on the campus of the military’s Center for Peace and Security in Sentul, West Java, with barracks for men and women, sports facilities and outward bound challenge courses. The first class of 183 entered for the month-long course in October 2015, with all participants given camouflage uniforms and caps. It remained unclear how the program would evolve, but Minister Ryacudu said in January 2016 that he saw it as one defence against terrorism. He also cited Israel as a model to emulate for the willingness to defend the nation that it inculcated in its citizens.\textsuperscript{57}

The idea of the Defend the Nation campaign is consistent with overall defence policy but its hasty launch without considered legal and budgetary processes is both symptomatic of a paranoia that pervades much military thinking and an authoritarian impulse that is alive and well within the TNI.

\textbf{VII. CONDITIONS OF SERVICE}

Mahfudz Siddiq, chair of parliamentary Commission I, believes that the root cause of the police-TNI clashes is competition for additional income from the various “grey areas” that a new National Security Law, now shelved, was supposed to clarify. The question is whether this is valid. Historically the official salaries of most public servants, police and military have been far below a living wage. This has been one of the drivers of systemic corruption, inefficiency and involvement in secondary employment, sometimes illegal.\textsuperscript{58}

Article 25 of the 2002 Defence Law mandates that the military be fully funded from the national budget and the 2004 TNI Law mandated the closure of TNI businesses except for those legitimately part of military cooperatives.\textsuperscript{59} Since then official salaries have risen steadily, and Jokowi implemented a large increase in allowances in 2015. Take-home pay, however, is still quite modest although the previous minister claimed it was sufficient to meet all needs.\textsuperscript{60} Combined salaries and allowances range from $200 per month for a base grade private to $410 for a first-year major to $2,940 per month for the chiefs of staff.\textsuperscript{61}

By comparison the official minimum wage for Jakarta is about $130 a month and a taxi driver or hotel worker with a non-working spouse and two children can live on about $325 per month. Military personnel have other benefits like free medical and housing assistance. Nevertheless, the lower ranks are still living on the margin and many must supplement their incomes from other means or seek assistance from superiors to meet special needs. Some officers also seek secondary incomes to satisfy status demands.\textsuperscript{62}

Pension provisions are even more meagre because they are calculated on base salaries that are less than half of take home pay. Naval, air force and army personnel with specialist skills can often find meaningful employment upon retirement but arms officers of the army and marines


\textsuperscript{57} “Menhan: Soal Ketahanan Negara, Israel Bagus untuk Ditiru”, kompasiana.com, 18 February 2016.

\textsuperscript{58} The chief of police recently differentiated systemic corruption from greed, raising a host of questions about how they differ, who defines the difference, and how they should be tackled. ’Korupsi karena serakah adalah yang paling berbahaya’ , Antara, 4 December 2015.

\textsuperscript{59} For a critique of how the closure was implemented, see Jacqui Baker, “Professionalism without Reform: the Security Sector under Yudhoyono”, in Edward Aspinall, Marcus Mietzner and Dirk Tomsa, The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015).

\textsuperscript{60} Indonesian Defence Ministry, Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2014, Jakarta: 2014, p.144.

\textsuperscript{61} See Government Regulation 31/2015 on Raising TNI Salaries and Presidential Regulation 87/2015 on Allowances of Civil Servants working with the TNI.

\textsuperscript{62} “Gaji dan Fakta yang Harus Diketahui Sebelum Berkarir Menjadi Tentara”, Okezone, 1 January 2016.
find it more difficult. All this highlights the personnel management problems that the army in particular has yet to address.

When the TNI withdrew from politics after Soeharto fell, it could no longer channel surplus officers into civilian leadership positions, state enterprises, and the civil service. This development, combined with a time-in-rank promotion system and no avenue for shedding surplus individuals, leaves a pool of disgruntled officers that is a push factor for rank creep and organisational growth. It is an incentive to retain and expand the territorial command structure and to take on more and more non-military tasks. It also breeds inefficiency. The army, for example, is said to have about 450 surplus colonels/lieutenant colonels.

All the foregoing highlights the need for wholesale structural reform along the lines advocated by retired General Agus Widjojo in his 2015 book, The Transformation of the TNI (Transformasi TNI), a 700-page tome outlining a reform agenda. His proposals include revising the constitution and the Defence and TNI Laws to provide consistency and clarity, including the deletion of specific non-military tasks; putting the TNI commander under the defence ministry and the police under either the ministry of home affairs or a new ministry of internal security that would also include other relevant agencies such as customs and immigration; and disbanding territorial commands below the Korem level. There is little support for Widjojo’s approach within the active duty military, and strong support instead across all three services for a greater internal security role. As one officer said, “From the beginning of independence, the threat has always been from inside, and frankly, the police are not up to the challenge.”

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The success of the TNI in achieving its goal of a greater role in internal security will depend on many factors: domestic political dynamics; the outcome of the hunt for Santoso; and the functioning of a National Security Council, if it ever gets established.

In the meantime, the recommendations that IPAC made in May 2015 still hold:

- An independent review of defence policy, strategy and TNI force structure is still needed, as are similar reviews of the police and intelligence agencies.
- The “mission creep” of the TNI into more and more non-military tasks should cease until such a review is conducted. The government should ensure that there is a clear legal basis for these tasks.
- The division of labour between the military and police should be clarified, if not in a law, then in a presidential instruction or government regulation. Such a clarification has become more urgent than ever as the TNI steps up its counter-terrorism activities.

Almost eighteen years after Indonesian democracy was re-established, Indonesia still needs to institute safeguards that will ensure that there are clearly understood limits to the military expansion now underway.
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

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