THE FAILED SOLO SUICIDE BOMBING
AND BAHRUN NAIM’S NETWORK

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I. INTRODUCTION

On the morning of 5 July 2016, one day before the end of Ramadan, a suicide bomber named Nur Rohman blew himself up at the Solo police compound in Central Java. No one else was killed. Nur Rohman’s journey from anti-vice activist to would-be terrorist took place through the efforts of Bahrun Naim, an Indonesian with ISIS in Syria. The story of his radicalisation provides insights into how ISIS has been able to tap into old networks for new purposes.

Nur Rohman’s story is also an example of an anti-vice organisation crossing over from vigilantism -- attacking bars and nightclubs in the name of protecting Islamic values -- to terrorism. This has happened often enough in Indonesia to be a source of concern, especially when it is clear that an important factor in the process is the outsourcing of religious instruction by vigilante leaders to radical clerics. Where the vigilantes themselves are seen as ustadz (Islamic teachers), the crossover is much less likely to take place.

Nur Rohman’s ignominious death underscores the low capacity of Indonesian terrorists. Far from being glorified as a martyr, he was ridiculed even on radical social media. One person wrote, “Couldn’t even fast for 30 days, worse than an elementary school child.” At some point, the failure of one plot after another will push an enterprising extremist leader to try and fix the problem through more sophisticated training. It is clear than instruction via encrypted messaging sites does not produce the desired skills, and Indonesians in Syria have to be asking themselves about what options they can pursue for better results.

II. NUR ROHMAN AND LASKAR ARAFAH

Nur Rohman was born on 1 November 1985 in Sangkrah, one of the most densely populated neighborhoods of Solo where each family has a living space of about 20 square meters. Most of the residents are migrants from elsewhere on Java; some 50 per cent are unskilled or semi-skilled workers. The neighborhood is known for its thugs, petty criminals and high level of social ills from gambling to drinking.

In 2007 Nur Rohman, then 22, and a few activist friends from the local mosque who were determined to fight the gangs and vice that they saw around them decided to join the Arafah militia (Laskar Arafah), an anti-vice group led by Sigit Qardhawi that had been in operation for about a year. It was named after the Arafah Mosque in Semanggi, Solo where Sigit led religious discussions (pengajian). The Sangkrah youths took part with other militia members in raids on gambling dens and brothels and broke up groups of men getting drunk together. Nur Rohman never stood out. There were two qualities valued in Laskar Arafah: courage and religious credentials, and Nur Rohman had neither. When Arafah men got into fights, he was never at the front, and because he had never gone to Islamic schools, his religious knowledge was low. Most of his friends were more respected than he was.

2 Sigit Qardhawi was born Sigit Hermawan Wijayanto in May 1975. His father was a descendant of Solo royalty; his mother came from a military family. He went to state schools through high school, then continued to Slamet Riyadi University, a private school, to study law. As a student, he was also a guitarist in a rock band that played gigs around Solo. He began to change around 1996 after joining a religious discussion group at the ar-Riyadh mosque, known for its salafi preachers. He gradually became more militant, particularly after the outbreak of conflict in Ambon in early 1999. Later that year he joined Laskar Hizbullah, the security arm of the Islamist political party, Partai Bulan Bintang, and became increasingly committed to upholding Islamic values and eradicating vice. He became known for leading raids on bars and nightclubs and was arrested for the first time in 2005 after a raid on a cafe in Grogol, Sukoharjo. After three months in prison, he was released and shortly thereafter left Laskar Hizbullah. He founded Laskar Arafah in 2006. See Muzayyin Ahyar, Gerakan Islam Radikal dan Pertumbuhan Demokrasi di Indonesia, master’s thesis, Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University, 2015.
Laskar Arafah’s anti-vice activities brought it into frequent clashes with gangs. One of the biggest took place on 17 March 2008 when Arafah joined other Islamist groups in Solo in a fight against the Gondes gang, led by a thug named Heru Yulianto, better known as Kipli. The fight reportedly began when Islamists tried to stop Kipli’s men from drinking. Some members of the gang carrying sharp weapons then reportedly approached the Muslimin Mosque, where some of the Islamists were based, and threatened to kill several activists; a rumor also went around that the mosque itself was attacked which proved to be untrue. The Islamist organisations, including Sigit Qardhawi and friends, marshaled their members to retaliate against the gang, and in the ensuing fight, Kipli was killed. Police arrested 119 of the vigilantes and four were eventually named as suspects in Kipli’s death, including Joko Samiyono, one of Sigit’s closest associates.

A. Laskar Arafah Becomes Tim Hisbah

After Kipli’s death, police pressed officials of the Arafah Mosque to evict Sigit and friends, so Sigit moved his base to the Al-Anshor Mosque. He also changed the militia name to Laskar Hisbah Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Mungkar or Team (Tim) Hisbah for short. The clash with the Gondes gang made Tim Hisbah famous, and many aspiring militants sought to join, including gang members. Some wanted to clean up their neighbourhoods but others saw a chance for profit, either from extorting money from entertainment venues or lifting phones, jewelry and other goods during anti-vice raids. Still others joined to seek protection from debt collectors, usually linked to falling behind in payments for motorcycles, because the collectors were generally afraid of Islamist militants. Jihadi groups also sent some of their cadres to join so that they could test their mettle in the raids and get some training before undertaking terrorist operations.

As Hisbah’s prestige rose, so did the number of participants in its religious study groups (pengajian), especially at the al-Basyir mosque near Nur Rohman’s home, where his friend, Iwan, was a leader. Iwan became known as “Iwan al-Basyir” as a result.

B. Aman Abdurrahman’s influence on Hisbah

The swelling of Hisbah ranks led Sigit Qardhawi to rethink procedures for recruitment and training. He ruled that henceforth one could only become a member after attending activities for ten weeks, including self-defence and other physical training; anti-vice raids; and religious discussions. He placed a particular emphasis on the latter, because he himself had no religious credentials: he had never attended Islamic schools and could not speak Arabic. He therefore assigned new members to attend discussion groups around Solo, especially those led by jihadi instructors. One of these met on Sundays at the Muhajirin Mosque in Purwosari, Solo and was often led by Abdul Kholiq Hasyim, a teacher at a local Islamic boarding school (pesantren); former prisoners from the jihadi community were also frequently invited to speak after their release, including men like Lutfi Haidaroh alias Ubeid and Deni Suramto alias Ziyad who had been associated with the then still fugitive terrorist leader, Noordin Top.

4 IPAC interview with member of Tim Hisbah, Solo, July 2016.
5 Lutfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid and Deni Suramto had been arrested in 2004 for sheltering and withholding information on Noordin Top, a Malaysian member of Jemaah Islamiyah who had fled to Indonesia in 2001 and two years later embarked on a bombing campaign that included the 2003 Marriott bombing in Jakarta, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, the second Bali bombing in 2005 and the second bombing of the Marriott and Ritz-Carlton in Jakarta in 2009. He was killed in police operations following the 2009 attack. Ubeid and Deni were released in 2007 and 2006 respectively, only to be re-arrested in 2010 for taking part in a terrorist training camp. Ubeid was released in late 2015; Deni remained in prison as of mid-2016 with several more years to serve.
At this time, in late 2008 and 2009, two of the trending topics in the jihadi world were rejection of all who accept any law other than the word of God (a principle known as *kufur bit thagut*) and the evils of democracy. Indonesian translations of books by the Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi that discussed these ideas were very popular, not least as the 2009 elections approached. A recurring theme was that taking part in democratic elections and democratic government was tantamount to renouncing the faith and becoming an apostate or non-believer (*kafir*).

Al-Maqdisi’s books helped popularise *takfiri* thinking among the more extreme Solo groups, as did the preaching of the man who translated many of his writings, radical cleric and former prisoner Aman Abdurrahman. At this point, Aman’s popularity was increasing among jihadis but he was not yet well known among other Islamist militants like those in Tim Hisbah. His thinking had been influenced not only by al-Maqdisi but also by the radical ulama of Najd, Saudi Arabia, who argued that Muslims who committed idolatrous acts should be considered apostates or *thaghut*, literally idolators but also used in the sense of oppressors. This included governments that rejected Islamic law. Anyone working for a *thaghut* government was guilty by association, regardless of whether he or she was a civil servant, police or military. Any political ideology other than Islam, especially democracy, was considered idolatrous because it put sovereignty in the hands of the people as opposed to God.

Abdul Kholiq Hasyim, the pesantren teacher who had become close to Laskar Arafah, helped popularise these ideas in Tim Hisbah. He had taught at Pesantren Ma’had Ali Hidayaturrahman, a girls’ school affiliated to Jemaah Islamiyah in Sragen, Central Java and had come to know the thinking of Aman through the writings and translations that he had done in prison. After Aman was released from prison in 2008, he spoke at a book launching of *Agama Demokrasi* in Tawangmangu, Solo that Abdul Kholiq also attended. The two then met frequently, and Abdul Kholiq eventually adopted his *takfiri* thinking. Aman’s teaching changed Hisbah’s focus from anti-vice to anti-government. Sigit Qardhawi and his friends began to see the roots of Indonesia’s problems not in thuggery and drinking but in the Indonesian government’s refusal to apply Islamic law. In a truly Islamic government, they believed, vice would disappear anyway. Therefore, the main struggle should be against the *thaghut* government through armed jihad.

Other *takfiri* thinkers became known to Hisbah members, but it was Aman whom they most looked up to. This was clear by early 2010 when Aman agreed to be a speaker at a Hisbah event at Al Ansor Mosque, Semanggi. What started as a routine discussion turned into a huge public meeting with one source estimating the audience at some 2,000. It seemed that every militant and radical in the Solo area wanted to see and hear their idol. Some said it was the largest radical gathering ever held in Solo.

In his lecture, Aman stressed that jihad against an apostate government was a far higher priority than jihad against enemies like the US and its allies. He specifically mentioned the police, saying that by virtue of their service to a *thaghut* instrument, they were *kafir*, even if they were diligent about prayer and fasting, even if they made the hajj to Mecca. It was fully legitimate to kill, rob and humiliate them (*halal darahnya, halal hartanya dan halal kehormatannya*). Aman’s focus on the police came in the wake of a wave of arrests of men linked to a terrorist training camp in Aceh. In March 2010, not long after his Solo appearance, Aman himself was arrested in Sumedang, West Java for having helped raise funds for the camp.

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6 Aman Abdurrahman (real name: Oman Rochman) had been a salafi cleric in Jakarta but became so extreme that he was eventually expelled from the school where he taught. He was arrested in March 2004 for leading a group that accidentally caused an explosion while making bombs in Cimanggis, outside Jakarta. He was released in 2008.

7 IPAC interview with member of Tim Hisbah, Solo, July 2016.
III. HISBAH’S WAR ON THE POLICE

Sigit Qardhawi and his friends were angered by the arrest first of Aman in March 2010, then of Abu Bakar Ba‘asyir the following August, also accused of funding the Aceh camp. A few days after Ba‘asyir’s arrest, Sigit called a meeting of the Hisbah inner circle at the Al Anshor Mosque. About 50 men showed up. Sigit declared war on the police and asked those present to swear an oath that they would be prepared to die fighting. They also swore allegiance to him as commander.

Hatred of the police went back to Hisbah’s early anti-vice days when it became clear that some of gangs and social ills they were fighting had police backing. Aman’s lectures now gave them an ideological justification for making the police a target. After police arrested Aman and Ba‘asyir Hisbah leaders decided to go on the offensive.

The determination to kill police strengthened after a young Hisbah member was shot and killed by police on 19 September 2010 in Tajung Balai, Medan. Yuki Wantoro, 20, was a Christian from Tempes, Pasar Kliwon, the next neighbourhood over from Nur Rohman’s, who converted to Islam as a teenager in 2006 and joined Hisbah shortly thereafter. He was killed in a police operation to track down jihadis believed linked to the Aceh training camp who had robbed a branch of the CIMB-Niaga bank in Medan on 18 August 2010. Police claimed Yuki was involved, but Hisbah, backed by his family, said he was back in Solo on the day of the robbery arranging a new identity card. Hisbah members were furious, not only because they believed the police were lying but also because Yuki had just married a Medan woman three days before his death. It turned out to be true that Yuki was not involved in the robbery, but he was also not the pure innocent that Hisbah portrayed. He had moved to Medan in 2009 to join a group led by Sabar alias Abdi, a Medan man with extensive links to Central Java (who to this day remains on the police wanted list). Together with Sabar’s men, Yuki had taken part in several robberies to raise funds for jihad. His death, however, solidified the transformation of Tim Hisbah members from vigilantes to would-be terrorists (See Appendix 1).

A. Operations Begin

Sigit began to move forward with his war on police by selecting Hisbah members for operations. Several members, such as Nanang Irawan, Ari Budi Santoso and others were sent to train with Atok alias Roki Aprisdianto, the self-styled amir of a group called Tim Ightilayat, composed mostly of high-school students from Klaten, Central Java whose terrorist ambitions greatly exceeded their competence. The group studied with Darwo alias Mushab, who was also a student of Aman, and with Heri Sigo Samboja alias Neri, a former prisoner who had also studied with master bomb-maker Dr Azhari, killed in a 2005 shootout.

Sigit also instructed some of his followers to look for weapons that could be used in targeted assassinations and began preparing a resistance base in the hills outside Wonogiri, believing that his men should be prepared to live and fight in the jungle if their war against the police in urban

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8 These included an internet café in Medan Baru in August 2009, a BRI bank in Binjai in May 2010 and another BRI bank in Ampelas Medan in June 2010.
10 Heri Sigu Samboja, whose father had been in a JI Special Forces Unit, had been arrested before on 5 November 2004 in Bogor, West Java for assembling the bomb used in the Australian Embassy bombing. He was sentenced to seven years in prison but was out on conditional release in 2008. In 2010 he was rearrested for sheltering one of the fugitives from the Aceh camp and teaching bomb-making. He was released again in 2016. Interestingly, he is strongly anti-ISIS but his father became involved in mid-2015 in a pro-ISIS group, though he was never arrested as he committed no crime under Indonesian law. Dr Azhari, who taught bomb-making to Heri, was a Malaysian who fled to Indonesia in 2001 and worked with Noordin Top until his death in 2005 in a shootout with police outside Malang, East Java in the aftermath of the second Bali bombing.
Nur Rohman himself was never chosen to be part of a jihadi team where military skills or leadership or just self-confidence was needed. One of his friends said, “If you had to pick ten Hisbah members for an operation, Nur Rohman would have been picked last.” Indeed, as his friends were planning violence, Nur Rohman was on his honeymoon. He married Aminah, a Sundanese woman who had studied at Pesantren Al Muslimun, Magetan, a school run by the family of Ubaid, one of the brains behind the Aceh camp.

From December 2010 to early 2011, Tim Hisbah tried to conduct several bombings in Solo and Klaten. None of them did serious damage. For example on 6 December 2010, Hisbah members tried to bomb the Christ the King Church and a police post in Pasar Kliwon, Solo not far from Nur Rohman’s house. They also tried to bomb two mosques, not only because they were funded by a foundation linked to former president Soeharto and had the word “Pancasila”, the state ideology, in their name, but also because Sigit was hoping that Muslims would blame Christians for the attacks and spark communal conflict. At the end of January, working with Tim Ightilayat, they also also tried to bomb the grave of a Javanese mystic in Jatianom, Klaten. Almost all of their bombs failed to explode.

The result of all this activity was no casualties and many arrests of Hisbah members. In May 2011, police tracked down and killed Sigit Qardhawi and his second-in-command Hendro Yunanto, in a shootout in the middle of an alleyway in Sanggrahan, Grogol, Kabupaten Sukoharjo.

B. Hisbah after Sigit’s Death

After Sigit’s death, a long-term Hisbah member, Agus Junaidi, took over the leadership, aided by Joko Samiyono, a member who had just been released from prison after serving time in connection with Kipli’s death. Agus supervised Hisbah members in Solo urban areas around Semanggi, Pasar Kliwon and Sangkrah, while Joko was in charge of the members in North Solo around Mojosongo and Karanganyar up through Bekonang. Religious affairs were the responsibility of Abdul Kholiq Hasyim who had left his old school and set up a new pesantren called Al Furqon in Karanganyar. Its santris were largely drawn from Hisbah ranks.

Hisbah was beset by many internal problems after Sigit’s death, however. Agus Junaidi turned out to be a weak leader and had no experience running an organisation. He was better known as one of the muhsinin or wealthy donors who frequently supported Hisbah members and their activities. At the same time, the concept of jihad fardiyah or individual jihad had become very popular in the aftermath of the Aceh debacle. Its basic premise was that individuals did not have to await a command from the amir of an organisation but could act on their own, since jihad was considered the obligation of all Muslims. From 2011, acting on this concept, many Hisbah members have become involved in terrorist plots without any direction or in some cases knowledge of the Hisbah command structure.

- In September 2011, two members, Andri Kurniawan and Dian Kuncung, helped Ahmad Yosepha Hayat bomb an evangelical church in Kepunton Solo.
- In August 2012, Bayu Setiono, a Hisbah member from Cemani, Solo was arrested for helping arrange false license plates for motorcycles used by two Darul Islam members, Farhan Mujahid and a friend, in fatal attacks on police in the Solo area.
- In September 2012, Anggri Pamungkas and Fajar, both from Hisbah, were involved

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11 “Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans”, op.cit. Hisbah members saw the At Taawun Mosque in Delanggu, Klaten and Baitul Makmur Mosque in Solo as masjid dhior, or mosques used for anti-Islamic purposes, because of the Pancasila link.
in planning attacks on police in Solo and Jakarta together with a Darul Islam splinter group based in Beji, Depok, outside Jakarta. They were arrested after a bomb went off prematurely in Beji, killing one of the bomb-makers. Both Anggri and Fajar were working with Hisbah member Badri Hartono who had set up his own group called Al-Qaeda Indonesia (AQI); the Jakarta men had sent two cadres to study bomb-making with him.

- In October 2012, Abu Hanifah, a Hisbah member who under the name of Salman al-Farisi had taken part in the fight with the Gondes gang, was arrested together with some Hisbah members from Mosojosongo and a few men from outside Solo who met each other through Facebook. They wanted to attack American interests in Indonesia, although plans never got beyond the discussion stage.\(^\text{12}\)

Nur Rohman was not involved in any of these actions. His friends were reluctant to bring him in, not just because he did not seem like he was tough enough and had no useful skills but also because they were disappointed in him more generally. “Everyone else was busy trying to conduct operations, while he was becoming a *thaght*,” said one.\(^\text{13}\) This was a reference to the fact that in 2012, Nur Rohman had become the head of his neighborhood (*rukun tetangga*, RT), and fellow Hisbah members were not happy. For them, becoming an RT head was like joining the government, because while RT heads were not civil service, they were still the lowest rung of the Indonesian administration.\(^\text{14}\)

If Nur Rohman was not considered a useful Hisbah member, he was seen as a diligent RT head by his neighbours, not just in terms of taking care of administrative matters for residents such as getting them the needed letters for identity cards and birth certificates, but also in organising village clean-ups. Sangkrah, Nur Rohman’s neighborhood, was crossed by four rivers that cut through Solo and in the rainy season, floods were common, with debris from the rivers washing up in the kampung.

### IV. NUR ROHMAN, ISIS AND BAHRUM NAIM

Since 2013, all the Islamist activists in Solo were talking about the conflict in Syria. Many were attracted by the end-of-time prophecies and believed that the final battle between Islam and its enemies would take place there. They saw the Arab Spring as one of many developments that indicated the end of time was near. The fall of several dictators was a sign that the era of authoritarianism, *mulkan jabariyyan*, was over, to be followed by the emergence of a new caliphate that would follow the ways of the Prophet, *khilafah ala minhajin l nubuwwah*. The victories of ISIS forces in Iraq and Syria were proof that the prophecies were coming true. Nur Rohman and other Hisbah members were caught up in this euphoria.

#### A. Bahrun Naim Makes the Case for ISIS

In the beginning, Tim Hisbah supported all jihadi groups in Syria, but in the end, members gravitated to ISIS. This was due in large part to the influence of Abdul Kholiq who had become a committed ISIS supporter. ISIS was also supported by respected scholars who were close to Hisbah including Ustadz Azzam, Ustadz Ade Zarkasih and Ustadz Afief Abdul Madjid, all

\(^{12}\) Given the lack of deep religious knowledge among Hisbah members, it is worth noting that Agus Anton Figian from Jember, East Java decided to join Abu Hanifah largely because he was from Solo, and in his view, that automatically meant he was religiously trained. See trial dossier of Agus Anton Figian, North Jakarta District Court, June 2013.

\(^{13}\) IPAC interview with member of Tim Hisbah, Solo, July 2016.

\(^{14}\) Indonesian villages are divided into RW (*rukun warga*), then further into RTs, which amount to household clusters. Sangkrah, where Nur Rohman lived, had 13 RWs and 58 RTs; his own RT contained 60 families.
teachers at Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's pesantren in Ngurki who had sworn allegiance to al-Baghdadi.\(^\text{15}\)

The person who exerted the most influence over Nur Rohman, however, in terms of his support for ISIS was Bahrun Naim. Nur Rohman had many discussions with Naim, a former Hizbut Tahrir member who was promoting ISIS when very few others in Indonesia understood its implications. Since 2013 Naim had been in communication with Indonesian ISIS fighters in Syria. Eventually he was entrusted by them to facilitate the travel of other Indonesians who wanted to join. It was Naim's influence that turned Nur Rohman into a passionate ISIS supporter.

Nur Rohman became close to Naim in 2014 after he was invited by his old friend Iwan Al Basyir to help with a project that involved modifying air soft guns to turn them into real weapons. Naim wanted to make the bullets used in the “toy” guns as fast as those in genuine firearms by replacing the gas used in the first with battery-powered electricity. The project also involved replacing the barrel of the airsoft guns with stronger homemade versions and substituting buckshot for the airsoft bullets. He had recruited Iwan for the job, and Iwan brought in Nur Rohman. The first test of the adapted guns was successful: buckshot fired from a distance of 15 m penetrated a wooden table to a depth of five cm.

While they were embarked on the modification experiment, Nur Rohman became close to Ibadurrahman alias Ibad. Naim had known Ibad, the son of an old JI activist, since they were children, though Ibad was a few years younger. Ibad himself had been in the jihadi world since he was in junior high school. In 2012, for example, he had joined the group of Badri Hartono – Hisbah member turned amir of his own group – and had studied how to make bombs.\(^\text{16}\)

When Badri and his friends were arrested, Ibad ran away and hid in Mojosongo, Solo. He was protected by Hisbah members, including Abu Hanifah. Abu Hanifah thought Ibad knew how to make bombs – wishful thinking -- and invited him to Madiun to teach some of his new followers.

When Abu Hanifah was arrested in late October 2012, Ibad initially hid at Abdul Kholiq's pesantren in Karanganyar. Pretending to be a student, he also frequently took part in Hisbah sweepings. He was arrested in late 2012 with Abdul Kholiq because he was involved in a sweeping at a café in Sragen which seems to have been an excuse for stealing mobile phones as much as stopping vice. He was in prison for almost two months, then returned to his parents' house after his release in early 2013. While back in Semanggi, he met Bahrun Naim again. Naim was impressed with Ibad's alleged bomb-making skills and invited him to take part in the airsoft gun project.

Naim stopped the project in June 2014, however, after two sets of arrests in 2014, first of JI members in Klaten in May who were building a workshop to produce homemade guns, and then of ISIS supporters Arif Tuban and friends in May in Jakarta.\(^\text{17}\) Bahrum Naim was most concerned about what Arif Tuban might reveal to the police, because he had met Arif in Solo around April 2014 to talk about jihad operations in Indonesia as well as about sending more Indonesians to Syria and had agreed to help.

Nur Rohman did not understand why the airsoft project had been stopped, but he and other supporters were ecstatic about the ISIS victories in June, capped by the declaration of the establishment of Islamic State and the proclamation of Abu Bakar Al Baghdady as caliph. This proved

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\(^{15}\) Afief Abdul Madjid left for Syria in December 2013, took part in a short one-month training course, then returned to Indonesia where he became an ISIS promoter and recruiter. He was later arrested in August 2014 and accused of having raised funds for the Aceh training camp in 2010. He was sentenced to four years on terrorism charges in June 2015.

\(^{16}\) Badri Hartono, born in Laweyan, Solo in 1967, had initially been a JI member (1991-2000), went to Ambon to fight with Laskar Jihad, then helped the JI splinter group led by Noordin Top around 2004-5, joined Hisbah at some point around 2011, trained with Santoso in Poso in 2012, then led his own group that he called Al-Aqida Indonesia (AQI) that planned to bomb police posts in Solo. He was arrested in September 2012 and sentenced to ten years in prison in 2013.

\(^{17}\) For more on Arif Tuban and his extensive connections to different Indonesian jihadi groups, see IPAC, "Indonesia's Lamongan Network: How East Java, Poso and Syria Are Linked", Report No.18, 15 April 2015.
to Nur Rohman and his friends that the prophecies about the return of the caliphate were true and the end of time was approaching. In July, shortly after the declaration, he and many other Hisbah members went to Mesjid Baitul Makmur to swear their allegiance to al-Baghdadi.

After the oath, more and more discussions about ISIS took place across Solo, especially after it became known that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir had also sworn allegiance. These discussions also took place online, with new forums set up on the encrypted messaging service Telegram. One of these was JDK, short for Jaisyul Daulah Khilafah (army of the caliphate) that was managed by Ibad and one of his friends, Eko Jangkung -- a friend and neighbor of Nur Rohman. Nur Rohman joined the forum, and like others in it, believed that everything said by ISIS was true and anything negative was a lie. They accepted the mantra repeated every hour on the forum, “the government of the caliphate has never been defeated and is never wrong” (it is catchier in Indonesian: *Daulah Khilafah gak pernah kalah dan Daulah Khilafah gak pernah salah*).

**B. Attack Plans**

In January 2015, Bahrun Naim left for Syria, but he stayed in touch with his friends in Solo. Several months after he arrived, he began to have intensive discussions with Ibad. They agreed to set up a division for explosives and electronics within the JDK forum, but with limited access: only people invited by Naim or Ibad could take part. It was deliberately set up as a virtual study centre for field engineering, in the hope that members would learn not only how to make bombs but how to use them effectively. It also provided instruction in money laundering, online purchases using stolen credit card numbers, and how to choose the right vehicles for car bombings. Bahrun Naim (who had no practical knowledge of explosives himself) was the mentor; the members included Ibad and his friends, including Arif Hidayatullah, who had been one class behind Bahrun Naim at the Al Islam high school in Solo. Nur Rohman himself was not involved.

In July 2015 Bahrun Naim urged members of the division to undertake an operation and asked Ibad to lead it. He also asked Ibad to recruit more people for the team and transferred funds for the operation. Ibad then brought in other Hisbah friends including Syaifudin alias Udin and Yus Karman, a former drug offender. They bought explosives and put together crude bombs, as per instructions sent by Naim over Telegram. The plan was to target three places on 17 August: a police post, a church in Solo to avenge the destruction of a mosque in Tolikara, Papua a month earlier; and a temple to avenge the violence of Buddhists against Muslims in Myanmar. Police discovered the plot, however, and Ibad was arrested on 12 August, just five days before the target date. Nur Rohman only found out about the plans after Ibad was taken into custody, when his Hisbah friends, including Udin asked him for help finding a place to hide. Nur Rohman brought Udin to Sleman, Yogyakarta, where he was arrested on 25 August.

**C. Bahrun Naim Tries to Direct Nur Rohman**

Nur Rohman began to panic after Udin’s arrest and he initially planned to flee too. He resigned as RT head and then disappeared with a high school student named Andika, a Hisbah member whom he had recruited. Unknown to Nur Rohman, however, Andika earlier had been recruited by Ibad for his operations team, only to withdraw because Ibad had become angry with him for not buying the right materials to make the bomb. Nur Rohman and Andika found a mosque in Karang Asem where they laid low.

In early September the two left to hide in Bekasi, where they stayed with Arif Hidayatullah.

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18 Trial dossier of Ibadurrahman, East Jakarta District Court, June 2016.
Arif had escaped arrest because Ibad had not involved him in the plans for the 17 August bombings. That same month, Bahrun Naim contacted Arif via Telegram and asked him to intensify his study of bomb-making. He also asked him to work with Nur Rohman and Andika to continue Ibad’s failed bombing plans – and sent him money to do so.

In October 2015 Bahrun ordered Nur Rohman to go to Batam, off the coast of Singapore, to meet a Uighur coming from Malaysia on a boat full of undocumented migrant workers returning to Indonesia. Bahrun’s plan was for the Uighur, who was using the alias “Ali”, to become a suicide bomber for an attack on the police. “Ali” very clearly had no such intentions and had such difficulty communicating with the Indonesians that he had to rely on Google Translate on his smart phone. He nevertheless came with Nur Rohman to Bekasi, where Bahrun’s team discussed attacking the headquarters of paramilitary police, Brimob, in Kelapa Dua, as well as top police officials including police chief Badrodin Haiti and then Jakarta police commander Tito Karnavian. Bahrun suggested that the team carry out random attacks on foreigners who lived in Menteng. Arif Hidayatullah suggested that they plan to kill the Jakarta governor. The team started to survey various places and prepare bombs accordingly.

An operation planned for the end of December 2015 failed, in part because of a dispute between Arif Hidayatullah on one side and Nur Rohman and Andika on the other. In December 2015, the latter two returned to Solo and hid out in Baiturrahman Mosque, Karang Asem. They told another Hisbah friend, Nur Prakoso, that one reason for the split was that Arif Hidayatullah was too loose-lipped and had divulged secrets. They invited Nur Prakoso to join them in undertaking the delayed jihadi operation, with three home-made bombs that they had brought to Solo, but he declined. On 23 December, police arrested Arif Hidayatullah and “Ali”, then moved on to Solo where they picked up Nur Prakoso and Andika six days later. Nur Rohman himself escaped with the three bombs.

When the bombs exploded on Jalan Thamrin in January 2016, police suspected that Nur Rohman’s group was responsible because of what they thought was a link to Bahrun Naim. But it slowly became clear that there were no links to either and that the attack was the handiwork of another group entirely.19

V. NUR ROHMAN’S LAST JIHAD

Nur Rohman then seemed to vanish from the face of the earth. There was no trace of him for the next six months, but it turned out he was hiding in plain sight – at his brother’s house in Klaten. It was only after the Solo bombing that police put the pieces together.

A. The Solo Bomb

On 5 July 2016, a man rode a motocycle into the Solo municipal police station. A police provost, Bambang Adi Cahyanto, tried to stop him but the driver forced his way in. When Bambang chased him, the man suddenly detonated a bomb strapped to his body. He died instantly. Bambang was injured in his eye and face. From the identity card found in the dead man’s pocket, it became clear that the bomber was Nur Rohman. He seemed to have done little planning. While he apparently had hoped to blow himself up in the midst of the officers’ morning roll call, he arrived twenty minutes early. He made no attempt to disguise his license plate or his identity.

A few hours after the bombing, an audio recording of Nur Rohman began circulating on the Internet. In his last words to fellow ISIS supporters he said, “Don’t live like a sheep in the land of

the kafir but live and die like a lion. Run after them, put pressure on them, hit them in their own headquarters, follow them into their own camp...."

Bahrun Naim was furious at the ridicule on social media that followed Nur Rohman’s death. He strongly denied that this was the act of a rank amateur and claimed that the police had covered up the real number of victims. He said he had intelligence that four police were killed and one wounded. He also denied a police statement that Nur Rohman was carrying a low explosive bomb, even though it left his body intact, did not do serious damage to his motorcycle and did not even damage a nearby flowerpot. Naim claimed on Facebook that it was a high explosive bomb composed of RDX and HMTD, and sent shrapnel flying for 50 meters.\(^\text{20}\)

To counter all the negative commentary, ISIS supporters also began circulating stories about how pure a mujahid Nur Rohman was and about the dreams he had before embarking on his jihad operation. “One night that he was in a beautiful garden. The garden gave off rays of light but it was not at all hot, not like the rays of the sun or a lamp. The next night, he dreamed that he was approached by many beautiful women that he had never met before. He was embarrassed because he did not have the slightest desire to marry again.”\(^\text{21}\)

Nur Rohman was such a failure, it seems, that his colleagues even had to fabricate his dreams.

B. Mopping Up

As all eyes were focused on the killing of Indonesia’s most wanted terrorist, Santoso, by an elite army unit in Poso, Central Sulawesi, counter-terrorism police were tracking down known associates of Nur Rohman and discovering where he had hidden and who had helped him. On 23 July, they made five arrests in Tulung, Klaten, including Nur Rohman’s elder brother, Agus Suharyanto.

It turned out that after the arrest of Arif Hidayatullah and friends in December 2015, Nur Rohman had fled to Tulung where he stayed for almost six months at Agus’s house and worked with him on a poultry farm. Nur Rohman used the name Bayu and pretended to be somewhat unbalanced, not able to hold a conversation. If asked a question, he would answer with a non-sequitur. No one suspected he was a fugitive.

A series of developments beginning in late May finally persuaded him to come out of hiding. First, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani issued an audio exhortation to all followers to launch attacks during Ramadan to make it a “month of calamity everywhere for non-believers”.\(^\text{22}\) Nur Rohman took the message to heart. Without telling anyone where he was going, he left the farm, and a few weeks later, appeared in Solo.

In the meantime, on 23 June, ISIS released a video in Indonesian called “The Solid Structure” (Bangunan Yang Kokoh) in which an Indonesian, a Filipino and a Malaysian each urge attacks in their respective countries. After it was released, one Indonesian with ISIS in Syria wrote on Telegram of his being mocked by other ISIS fighters. They pointed out that Indonesian mujahidin talked a lot but rarely did anything. Indonesia had the highest level of pro-ISIS activity on social media outside the Arab world, they said, but in terms of attacks, it was far below Bangladesh and the Philippines, which had very little social media presence at all. That meant that the online and messaging campaign of Indonesian ISIS supporters had failed.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^\text{20}\) Bahrun Naim, “Beberapa Kebohongan Polkis Terkait Amaliah Solo”, circulated on Telegram, 10 July 2016.
\(^\text{22}\) “Islamic State calls for attacks on the West during Ramadan in audio message”, Reuters, 22 May 2016.
Nur Rohman was reportedly struck by these comments; he was said to be tired of hiding and wanted to be more active, especially against the police. Toward the end of Ramadan, he stopped by his house to see his wife and child. His wife, far from welcoming him, reportedly said to him, “Why did you come home? Your task is not finished.” Days later he detonated his bomb.

VI. CONCLUSION

One could reasonably ask why Bahrun Naim keeps returning to Hisbah members for operations when first, they have failed so many times, and second, those arrested generally have “sung”.

One possibility is that from his Syria base, Bahrun does not have to worry about consequences. He can keep trying to use the inexperienced recruits from Solo until one of them manages to do something right. He does not have the organisational loyalty that a person from JI or JAT might have, unwilling to take certain risks for fear of damaging the organisation or weakening the leadership. Through Telegram and other social media, he can exhort, instruct and manipulate to his heart’s content without any accountability.

A second possibility is that for his purposes, Hisbah may be the perfect network – amorphous, fluid and mostly young. In Solo its members are part of a broader coalition of militant Islamists that occasionally unite, as in the fight against the Gondes gang or in demonstrations against Detachment 88, but just as frequently go their own ways. Hisbah members have drifted into other organisations, so that a contact with one person in Solo can lead (and has led in the past) to like-minded groups in Cirebon, Poso, Medan, Bekasi, Jakarta and elsewhere. And by now, as is clear from Appendix 1, so many Hisbah members have been arrested that the prison links have undoubtedly widened the network.

At some point, however, one would think that Bahrun Naim and others in ISIS would grow tired of failure and decide to sponsor more serious training for would-be terrorists. If and when that happens, Tim Hisbah will still be a logical source of recruits.

One final point is worth noting. Tim Hisbah seems to have found a highly successful formula for recruiting eager, if inexperienced would-be terrorists. Pick a fight with a gang and win; use the victory to bring in young thugs and others ready for action; expose them to radical preachers to instill religious fervour; then offer them a chance to defend the faith. It worked in Solo; it has also worked in prisons, where on several occasions, jihadi groups have taken on gang members and won, bringing many of the latter into the extremist fold. It suggests that prevention strategies to consider in places like Solo, Surabaya and Jakarta might draw on lessons learned elsewhere about reducing gang violence.

24 IPAC interview with source close to Nur Rohman family, Solo, July 2016.
25 This is a true story, confirmed by an IPAC interview in Solo with a source close to the Nur Rohman family, but it also was picked up by Bahrun Naim and inserted into his web posting entitled Mimpiku indah sang ksatria mujahid (“The beautiful dream of a holy warrior”) as if these were words that Nur Rohman’s wife was speaking to him in his dream.
26 These groups include Front Pembela Islam, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Front Pemuda Islam-Surakarta, Laskar Umat Islam Surakarta, Front Jihad Islam, Forum
### APPENDIX I: HISBAH MEMBERS IN CUSTODY AND RELEASED

#### A. HISBAH MEMBERS IN CUSTODY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Arrested</th>
<th>Accused of Planning Explosions in Ten Places Linked to Foreign Consulates/Embassies (Never Got Close to Operational). Took Bai'at to ISIS 2 July 2014</th>
<th>University Educated; Trained in Poso; Trained Others in Solo; Led Anti-Vice Raids Against Village Drunks. Held Military Training in Madiun, East Java</th>
<th>Released</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I 1</td>
<td>Achmad Widodo alias Abu Hanifah alias Salam al-Farisi</td>
<td>5 June 82 Pati</td>
<td>27/10/2012, in Mojosongo, Jebres, Solo.</td>
<td>Accused of Planning Explosions in Ten Places Linked to Foreign Consulates/Embassies (Never Got Close to Operational). Took Bai'at to ISIS 2 July 2014</td>
<td>University Educated; Trained in Poso; Trained Others in Solo; Led Anti-Vice Raids Against Village Drunks. Held Military Training in Madiun, East Java</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Abu Hanifah group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I 5</td>
<td>Badri Hartono</td>
<td>18 May 67 Laweyan, Solo</td>
<td>Arrested 22/9/2012 for Being Amir of His Own Small Group, Known as “Al-Qaeda Indone-sia” (AQI). Helped Urwah and Noordin Top; Planned to Bomb Police Posts in Solo; Went to Poso 4/2012 for Training with Santoso, Sent Other Members There.</td>
<td>Parakeet Seller; Attended Muslim Schools; Teacher Training at Universitas Sebe-lasMaret but Did Not Graduate; Worked as Batik Printer, Later Employed at a Mu-hammadiyah School. Went to Ambon 2000 with Laskar Jihad; Went to Aceh as Tsunami Volunteer for 2½ Months</td>
<td>II, MMI, Noordin Top, Hisbah, AQI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Groups</td>
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<td>I 7</td>
<td>Harun Nur Rosyid, Harun Nurosyid alias Zulfikar</td>
<td>6 May 88 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested 27/10/2012 in Mojosongo, Jebres, Solo; police seized bomb-making material from bengkel. Helped Abu Hanifah with training; ran a repair shop for gas stoves.</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Abu Hanifah group</td>
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<tr>
<td>I 8</td>
<td>Ibadur Rahman alias Ibad</td>
<td>25 Nov 96 Sukoharjo, Solo</td>
<td>Arrested 12/8/2015 in plot to bomb police post, church and Chinese temple, funded from Bahrun Naim with ISIS in Syria.</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Bahrun Naim</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>I 9</td>
<td>Ikhsan Adriyanto, Ibadur Nurosyid alias Ibad</td>
<td>5 June 89 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested December 2012 for helping hide Roki Aprisdianto (below) after his escape and making bombs placed at Pasar Kliwon police station in Solo which did not explode.</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Ightilayat, Tim Ightilayat</td>
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<tr>
<td>I 10</td>
<td>Rizky Gunawan alias Udin</td>
<td>6 Oct 87 Kisoran, North Sumatra</td>
<td>Arrested 3 May 2012 in Gambir Station, Jakarta. Took part in Poso training May 2011; major internet fraud, raised billions of rupiah with Cahya Fitrayanti. Help hide Tim Hisbah members.</td>
<td>Sabar's group, Medan, MIT, Tim Hisbah</td>
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<td>I 12</td>
<td>Sugianto, Giyanto alias Gento</td>
<td>10 Feb 80 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested 12/8/2015 for plot to bomb 3 places in Solo with funds from Syria, Same case as Ibadur Rahman and Yus Karman</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Bahrun Naim</td>
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<tr>
<td>I 13</td>
<td>Syafrudin al-Fahmi alias Udin</td>
<td>25 Aug 94 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested Yogyakarta, 25/8/2015, for plot to bomb 3 places in Solo with funds from Syria, part of Ibadur Rahman network</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Bahrun Naim</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>I 14</td>
<td>Tony Anggara, Thoni Anggara, Toni Anggara</td>
<td>26 July 88 Semanggi, Solo</td>
<td>Arrested December 2012 for helping hide Roki Aprisdianto (below) after his escape and making bombs placed at Pasar Kliwon police station in Solo which did not explode.</td>
<td>Kebab seller</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### B. HISBAH MEMBERS CONVICTED OF TERRORISM AND RELEASED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date of Arrest</th>
<th>Charges/Activities</th>
<th>Location/Group</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agus Sunyoto (alias Gaplek)</td>
<td>30 Aug 85 Karanganyar Solo</td>
<td>19/9/2010</td>
<td>CIMB bank robbery, Medan 8/2010. Also involved in several other robberies 2009-2010. Escaped during prison riot 11 July 2013, recaptured 22/8/13, RELEASED March 2016</td>
<td>Tidak lulus Darus Syahadah. Recaptured in Riau together with fugitive from Medan, Ridwan alias Ismail alias Ridwan Cina, also accused of involvement in Aceh training camp.</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Sabar's group, Medan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Andri Kuriniawan (alias Hendrik)</td>
<td>24 Oct 86, Wonogiri, Central Java</td>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>Having housed Hayat, Solo suicide bomber, before the sept 2011 bombing. Released from Cibinong Prison Oct 2015</td>
<td>Fled to Medan, joined Sabar’s group, after Solo bombing</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Sabar’s group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Arifin Nur Haryanto,</td>
<td>5 Oct 80 Solo</td>
<td>15/4/2011</td>
<td>Cirebon mosque bombing. Accused of helping find weapons, ammunition</td>
<td>Head of OSIS in SMA, head of ranting muhimmadiyah, had a HP counter that went bankrupt, sold pulsa keliling</td>
<td>Cirebon group, Tim Hisbah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Details</td>
<td>Education/Occupation</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Fajar Novianto</td>
<td>28 Nov 94 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested 21/9/2012 in Solo for hiding explosives. 2 yrs as of 29/11/2012 (tried as minor). released 2013</td>
<td>In class 3 of senior high school.</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, AQI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Hari Budiarto</td>
<td>18 Juli 79 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested Jl. Lawu Timur, Mojosongo, Jebres, Solo 27/10/2012, for helping Abu Hanifah with training. released late 2015</td>
<td>Lulusan SMP</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah, Abu Hanifah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nanang Irawan alias Nang Ndut.</td>
<td>8 Dec 81, Sukoharjo, Solo</td>
<td>Arrested in Madiun 21/10/2011 for involvement in cirebon mosque bombing 4/2011. Also involved in Klaten group.</td>
<td>Joined pengajian in Purwosari led by Abdul Kholiq Hasyim and that led him to join Hisbah</td>
<td>Tim Hisbah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sugimin</td>
<td>20 Feb 68 Solo</td>
<td>Arrested December 2012 for helping hide Roki Aprisdimanto (above) after his escape. RELEASED 1/4/2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tim Hisbah</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

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