UPDATE ON
INDONESIAN PRO-ISIS PRISONERS AND
DERADICALISATION EFFORTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

Prison authorities in Indonesia have had a few small successes in managing extremist prisoners, but overall, structural problems of the prison system and inadequate staff continue to defeat efforts at deradicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation. Despite much donor funding aimed at improving prison management and capacity to handle high-risk offenders, pro-ISIS inmates continue to recruit and radicalise fellow prisoners with impunity. A few have organised terrorist actions from inside prison more than once, and former prisoners continue to show up in new terrorist plots with alarming regularity.

To the extent that there has been any progress, it has been with the help of a few convicted terrorists who themselves are anti-ISIS and who engage in ideological debates with fellow inmates. Now the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) wants to move these “cooperative” prisoners to a specialised facility in Sentul, outside Jakarta, so it can showcase a deradicalisation program that many see as ineffective. Prison authorities are convinced that the transfer will remove the only people they have on hand to help with hard-line ideologues.

Officials of the Directorate General of Corrections of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (hereafter Corrections Directorate) are trying to get a better handle on the situation, and some programs are working. A database on inmates, introduced in 2009, has become an important management tool that is being constantly refined and expanded. Prison staff are more alert to cliques developing among extremist inmates and move more quickly than in the past to separate them. Convicted terrorists are now dispersed among almost 70 prisons in the belief that this will facilitate monitoring and supervision. But the dynamics are constantly changing with a steady influx of new prisoners and release of others. In the first eleven months of 2016, some 120 terrorist suspects were arrested and charged, most of them ISIS supporters, and more than 50 terrorism offenders were released after completing their sentences.

The impediments to effective management remain overwhelming. Prisons are overcrowded and understaffed. Policy on prisons is set by Corrections Directorate at a national level but administrative control of individual prisons rests with the provincial offices of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, a built-in disconnect. Budgeting for prisons is so inadequate that prisoners depend on outside donations for decent food – and the convicted terrorists have a well-organised support network that attracts ordinary criminals into their ranks. Newly arrested prisoners awaiting trial are held in a single police facility, outside the jurisdiction of corrections, that pro-ISIS detainees have come to dominate. Information-sharing about high-risk detainees among police, prosecutors and prison officials remains weak, although all recognise the problem and are taking steps to address it. Building a tool for identifying high risk prisoners remains a work in progress, and post-release monitoring is scattershot and short-lived at best.

This report examines several cases of recruitment of criminal offenders; involvement of released prisoners in terrorist acts; and planning of terrorist operations from behind bars, with one clear lesson: prison authorities have to cut off outside communications and donations, except for food, for convicted terrorists. There is no other option for an immediate short-term fix as the more complex, long-term structural problems are tackled. The report examines why an apparently simple solution has proven so difficult to implement when the benefits are obvious, as can be seen from the case of Aman Abdurrahman, a convicted radical cleric and ISIS leader. Cutting off Aman’s access to a hand phone after police discovered his role in the January 2016 Jakarta attacks has made it easier for prison authorities to work with his followers.
II. STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS

The problems of Indonesian prisons are deep and chronic and go well beyond the issue of how to handle convicted terrorists. Corruption is rife and escapes are frequent.¹ Many prisons are in dire need of renovation. Prison staff are both inadequately trained and too few to handle high-risk prisoners – and frequently end up being intimidated by them. No deradicalisation program is going to be effective unless some of the larger issues are addressed.

A. Overcrowding

The poor physical state of the Indonesian prison infrastructure and serious overcrowding facilitates radicalization.² As of October 2016, the total number of inmates in the 477 facilities under the Correction Directorate’s control stood at 201,550. Of these, some 220 were convicted of terrorism.³ More prisoners and detainees were in police custody in often poorly constructed cells adjoining police stations; they are not reflected in the Correction Directorate’s statistics. Terrorist suspects awaiting trial are incarcerated in the detention center at Kelapa Dua, the headquarters of the police mobile brigade (Brimob) in Depok, just south of Jakarta. As of late 2016, it too was filled to overflowing with more than 150 inmates, some 37 of whom were to be transferred to regular prisons before the end of the year.

Over 300 of the prisons and detention centres overseen by Corrections had more prisoners than they could hold, with the worst – in Banjarmasin, Kalimantan – more than 600 per cent over capacity. In some, toilet areas have been turned into holding cells. The solution does not lie in simply building more prisons, but rather addressing the incentive structure that rewards police for the number of arrests leading to prosecutions, even when many of these offences are minor and probably better addressed through fines or community service. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights also benefits from having a sizeable inmate population. Every inmate means more money through subcontracting and projects, so overcrowding is beneficial up to the point that it tips over into violence.

Brawls, violence and escapes in Indonesian prison continue to be common, often sparked either by gang fighting or by inmates’ anger over reported ill-treatment. Prison infrastructure is often in such disrepair that it is not difficult for angry prisoners to knock down walls. In March 2016 violence erupted in Malabero prison, Bengkulu following a raid by the narcotics agency, resulting in five inmate deaths and the destruction of three prison blocks. The prison had a capacity of 250 and was holding 758 prisoners at the time, 70 per cent of them drug offenders; only four security officers were on duty.⁴ Eight days later, a riot broke out in Kuala Simpang prison, Banda Aceh, with inmates setting fire to administrative offices, after the prison commander suggested ending conjugal visits. At the time, the prison, with a capacity of 150, was holding 488 prisoners.⁵ On 22 April, prisoners at Banceuy prison, Bandung rioted after a prisoner died under questionable circumstances and officials said he committed suicide. The rioters managed to destroy some 30 per cent of the narcotics prison.⁶ When police went in after

¹ “At corrupt, overflowing penitentiaries, money rules,” Jakarta Post, 2 August 2016. The article notes that prisoners have to pay “transfer fees” to move from temporary accommodation when they first arrive to a permanent cell and monthly fees for electricity and water. Luxuries, like an electric fan, cost Rp.150,000 a month. The cost of a bribe to smuggle in a hand phone can be between Rp.100,000 and Rp.300,000.
³ The figures are constantly changes as prisoners are released and new arrests made. As of 1 October 2016, data from the Corrections Directorate showed 223 convicted terrorists spread across 69 prisons. (Because of time lags in entering data, it is best when using this invaluable database to use the next-to-last last month for which information is available.)
⁵ “Segera Atasi Masalah LP,” Kompas, 2 April 2016.
quelling the riot, they found many banned items, including scissors, hand phones and iron bars.

Escapes are frequent, particularly of drug offenders because they often have the cash to bribe prison guards to turn a blind eye. The combination of neglect, disrepair, overcrowding and absentee staff has given Papua province the worst record in this regard: since early 2014, more than 100 prisoners have escaped. In some cases, they have just walked out the door when no guard was on duty.

The rash of violent outbreaks in 2016 led the Corrections Directorate in June 2016 to seek an additional Rp.1.3 trillion [US$97 million] from the Indonesian parliament over and above its already sizable budget to improve the physical condition of prisons and construct new facilities. (It also asked for Rp.228 billion [$2.1 million] to pay debts going back to 2014 for electricity and food, an indication of the level of mismanagement that has characterised prison administration.)

The current draft of an amended anti-terrorism law could result in a significantly increased number of extremist inmates as the number of specific offences and the length of pre-trial detention are both increased. This will only exacerbate the problem of overcrowding. Karanganyar Prison, a new super maximum prison for the highest-risk offenders, is under construction within the penal complex on Nusakambangan, but it will only be a partial response to the problem and is not expected to be finished until 2018.

B. Understaffing

The overcrowding problem is compounded by insufficient and poorly trained staff. In Pasir Putih, a prison on Nusakambangan with one of the highest concentrations of high-risk offenders in the entire system, 220 inmates were under the supervision of seven staff at any one time. The total number of employees in the prison system is 16,500. They work morning, afternoon and night shifts with breaks, so that at any one time, only some 3,650 staff are on duty. This is about one employee for every 55 inmates, and most have little background on how to manage high-risk prisoners. Specialised training has been given to officials at some of the main prisons housing terrorist prisoners in Nusakambangan, Jakarta, Surabaya and Semarang, but it does not get at the root problem of how to recruit more and better staff and change the curriculum for their training to make it directly relevant to the problems they will face on the job. In the absence of more fundamental reforms, donor projects have little chance of being institutionalised, no matter how many “training of trainers” workshops take place.

Prisons are divided into classes depending on size and facilities, and virtually all are understaffed. The prison in Porong, Surabaya, for example is Class 1, maximum security. It can hold 1,050 prisoners; in November 2016, it had some 2,020, including ten convicted terrorists, spread across eight blocks. Because of different shifts, at any one time there are only twelve officials on duty – for the entire prison. There is one official per block, with each block having up to 500 inmates. Four out of eight guard posts are manned for each shift, each post some 400 metres away from the next. It is almost impossible to monitor the movements of the ten terrorists, let alone the other inmates.

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7 “Dua Serahkan Diri, 19 Orang Masih Dikejar,” Cenderawasih Pos, 4 November 2011.
8 Escapes from police custody are equally common and police holding cells are in no less a state of disrepair. In Riau, 33 detainees escaped from the holding cells at five different police stations between July and October 2016. See “Sembilan Tahanan Polisi Kabur di Riau,” Kompas, 24 October 2016.
9 “Pemerintah Genjot Perbaikan LP/Rutan,” Kompas, 8 June 2016.
12 Sistem Database Pemasyarakatan, smslap.ditjenpas.go.id.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that extremist recruitment of criminals has taken place or that criminals have sought out extremist study groups to join. Prisoners have also smuggled in unregistered visitors. In September 2015, for example, Abdullah Umamit, a convicted terrorist and ISIS supporter from Ambon, managed to smuggle his wife into his cell. Officials only found out after she had been there for two days, and when caught, she admitted that she had stayed over in her husband’s cell several times before.

C. Radicalisation at Kelapa Dua

The Kelapa Dua detention centre has become a major headache for police and prison authorities. This became clear in October 2016 when police wanted to transfer some 135 men to regular prisons. All had already been or were about to be sentenced, and police wanted to clear out the centre to make room for more arrivals. Prison officials balked: they already had more terrorist inmates than they could handle and they had no good data on the men slated for transfer. Their reluctance was compounded by the fact that many of the detainees had come under the influence of ISIS supporters, and were more radical after a few months in Kelapa Dua than when they were when they entered.

Part of the problem is that there is no systematic counseling effort in Kelapa Dua. Until 2013, the practice had been to hold terrorist prisoners awaiting trial in Jakarta police headquarters (Polda Metro Jaya), where they were counseled by former radicals who had repented or moderated their views. These were mostly JI prisoners such as Bali bomber Ali Imron, or those arrested a few years later such as Abu Dujana and Zuhroni. The police relied on these senior leaders to try to convince the newly arrested that violence in the name of jihad on Indonesian soil was at least counterproductive, if not illegitimate. Some of the time, these discussions worked. Two cases in point are the late Joko Purwanto alias Hanzolah and Yudi Zulfahri, both of whom moderated their views after discussions with Ali Imron and Abu Dujana. Joko said he understood now that it was forbidden to wage jihad in a Muslim country that was not under attack.

After one high-profile escape in November 2012, however, the cells at Jakarta police headquarters were considered too insecure to house terrorist suspects, so the decision was taken to move all those then detained and all future detainees to Kelapa Dua. The situation is becoming more complicated as many anti-ISIS prisoners are freed. They mostly receive remissions and early release because they are cooperative with prison officials and are willing to sign loyalty oaths. This means there are fewer inside with the ability to argue persuasively against ISIS using religious arguments. If most of the new inmates are now pro-ISIS and fewer anti-ISIS supporters are getting arrested, the task of prison authorities becomes even more difficult.

13 Joko Purwanto alias Hanzolah was a former JI member who had left in 2009, unhappy that JI had abandoned jihad. He joined the terrorist training camp in Aceh in 2010 with some fellow JI defectors. While he was never involved in violence, he frequently provided shelter to fugitives who were. He was arrested in May 2010, sentenced to six years in prison, and released in 2014 after receiving several remissions. He died of a stroke in June 2016. His JI background may have made him more susceptible to Ali Imron’s counselling.

14 The prisoner was Roki Apris Dianto alias Atok, originally arrested for leading a group of high school students in Klaten into a series of failed attacks in December 2010 and January 2011. He walked out the door wearing women’s clothes, complete with face veil, that his wife had brought in with her. He was at large for a month, during which he planned a series of attacks, though he was recaptured before he had the opportunity to carry them out. He also posted statements on radical websites, taunting the police for the lack of security and corruption in the Jakarta headquarters. For more on the case, see IPAC, “Prison Problems: Planned and Unplanned Releases of Convicted Extremists in Indonesia”, Report No.2, 2 September 2013, p.13-15.
D. Lack of Post-Release Monitoring

By mid-November 2016 over 50 prisoners convicted of terrorism had been released during the year, either through conditional release (Pembebasan Bersyarat, PB) before the expiration of their sentence, or full release upon completion of their term.15

In general, those who seek conditional release are the anti-ISIS prisoners. Fajar Siddiq from Tasikmalaya, West Java is an example. In March 2013, he was arrested for helping a terrorist group acquire weapons and was later sentenced to five years. In November 2016, he was conditionally released after completing more than two-thirds of his sentence.

Pro-ISIS prisoners, by contrast, are only released after they have completed their full terms because they refuse to apply for remissions or conditional release, and because they would not receive the required recommendations if they did. On 12 November, for example, a strongly pro-ISIS prisoner named Nibras, convicted of involvement in a bank robbery to raise funds for jihad, was released after serving his full six-year term.16 (He received no additional penalty for escaping in the midst of a prison riot in 2013 and eluding recapture for a month.) Another committed pro-ISIS prisoner, Syarif Tarabubun, was released in August, also after serving his full term.17 He returned to Ambon, and while police will try to keep an eye on him there, there is no guarantee they will be able to do so.

One would think that the pro-ISIS prisoners released would be monitored more closely than the anti-ISIS ones, but it does not work that way. Those out on conditional release have to report to the Parole Office (Balai Pemasyarakatan, Bapas, another agency in dire need of more and better trained staff) once a month until their full term expires. There is no such requirement for those who have served their full term, yet these individuals are most likely to return to violence. The danger they pose is illustrated by the fact that two released prisoners were involved in terrorist acts in 2016. One was Sunakim alias Afif, released in August 2015 after serving five years of a seven-year term for taking part in a terrorist training camp in Aceh. He was killed after trying to stage a terrorist attack in Jakarta in January 2016. The second was Juhanda, arrested in 2011 for involvement in sending a series of book bombs to individuals in Jakarta. He was sentenced to three and a half years in prison and released after serving almost his full term in August 2014 (he had received three remissions). In November 2016, he was re-arrested for throwing a bomb at a church in Samarinda that killed a toddler and wounded three others.

The pro-ISIS prisoners are generally welcomed by the ISIS community after their release, because their refusal to seek early release or take part in prison programs is seen as proof of a strong ideological commitment. Their interest in undertaking violence will be fanned by the constant ISIS exhortations to conduct jihad operations (amaliyat), conveyed through general propaganda available online, through Telegram channels or through direct communication with individuals in Syria or Iraq.

III. THE CASE OF JUHANDA IN SAMARINDA

The case of Juhanda illustrates how radicalism can be reinforced in prison and how quickly a pro-ISIS prisoner can find a like-minded community once released.

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15 Ibid, pp. 2-5.
16 Nibras alias Arab, born 16 February 1988 in Bangil, Pasuruan, East Java, was arrested on 19 September 2010 for involvement in the robbery of a CIMB bank in Medan in which a guard was killed. At the time he was working with a terrorist group under the leadership of a man named Mohammad Abdi alias Sabar. Nibras was sentenced to six years and was in Tanjung Gusta prison, Medan, when a riot broke out there in July 2013. He and three other convicted terrorists escaped; he was re-arrested in Riau just over a month later.
17 For more on Syarif and the pro-ISIS network in Ambon, see IPAC, "ISIS in Ambon: The Fallout from Communal Conflict," Report No.28, 13 May 2016.
Juhanda, from Bogor, south of Jakarta, had been inducted into the Indonesian Islamic State movement (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) in December 2008, when he was 24, but it was difficult to know how strongly held his ideological convictions actually were. When he was arrested for the book bombs in April 2011, he was initially detained with the other members of the group in Jakarta police headquarters. After it was deemed insecure, however, he was transferred with eight others to the Class 1 prison in Tangerang, Banten. Like most prisons in Indonesia, Tangerang was already overcrowded with some 1,400 inmates in a facility meant for 600.18 There, Juhanda and his friends became close to a group from Bima, Sumbawa led by Abrory Ali, who was considered the leading teacher (ustadz) among the extremist prisoners. Juhanda attached himself to Abrory and Sapta, a prominent member of the terrorist group known as Ring Banten, and was mentored by both.

On 11 March 2013 an attack on an extremist inmate in Jakarta's Salemba prison by members of an Ambonese narcotics gang called Kill Bill led to what may have been Juhanda's first exposure to ISIS. Following the attack, five of the gang members were moved to Tangerang Prison. The next day, a group called FAKSI led by a then little-known activist named Bahrumsyah, held a noisy demonstration in front of the prison, carrying an ISIS flag and demanding revenge.19 They were almost certainly in contact with friends inside. The prison director invited Bahrumsyah and a few others in to his office convey their demands. As they were meeting, sixteen of the Tangerang extremists broke out of their cells and attacked the Ambonese.

After the attack, the prestige of the terrorists in Tangerang skyrocketed. Their numbers also increased to 29 with the arrival in May 2013 of a new group led by Agung Prasetyo alias Ayas. All had been involved in terrorism in Poso and in the hacking of a currency trading website that netted thousands of dollars.20

With these reinforcements and their new status, the extremists had the confidence to go after not just the gang members but prison officials as well. They refused to attend Friday prayers at the prison mosque or take part in religious guidance programs. Part of the problem was that in the religious discussions (pengajian) run by the prison, the invited lecturers often inserted criticism of the extremists, from their understanding of jihad to the ease which which they branded government officials as kafir. Abrory and his friends retaliated by issuing a fatwa that it was against Islamic law to pray in the prison mosque because it was a mesjid dhiror, or a mosque used for anti-Islamic purposes.

Juhanda was caught up in all of this: the euphoria of the Kill Bill attack, the hardening of positions, and the regular jihadi teachings from Abrory. He had started out as relatively cooperative with prison authorities but became one of the hard-core rejectionists. It was not just that he had undergone a further process of radicalisation through his mentors in Tangerang but also that in them, he had found a new family – especially as no of his own relatives ever came to visit.

He also became very dependent on his fellow terrorist inmates economically because he had no family visits and he was too insignificant in the terrorist hierarchy to have followers who would provide supplies. It was fellow inmates who helped him out with everything from extra food to capital to set up a business inside prison, selling snacks and coffee in his block. They felt particularly sorry for him because he had sold them a story that he was an orphan and that his

18 Data from Corrections Directorate website, http://smslap.ditjenpas.go.id/. As of October 2016, the prison had 1,322 inmates; in March 2013 it had 1,481.
19 For more on Bahrumysyah and FAKSI, see IPAC, "Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia", Report No.13, 24 September 2014.
20 Agung Prasetyo (sometimes seen as Agung Prastyo) alias Ayas, born in Pasuruan, East Java on 30 January 1985, lived in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. He was arrested in Surabaya in May 2012 for illegal possession of weapons that he had purchased for training in Poso. He was sentenced to four years, eight months. While still behind bars, he was involved in a plot in January 2016 to smuggle guns out of Tangerang Prison for use in a pro-ISIS terrorist attack.
entire family – mother, father, brothers and sisters – had perished in a natural disaster when he was in elementary school, and that he had been adopted by a former maid and brought to live in Kuningan.

Convinced that he had no family and needed company or at least someone who would visit him regularly, his extremist friends also helped Juhanda find a wife. Agung Prasetyo asked his father, Supriyadi, himself a well-known extremist in Samarinda, to find someone for Juhanda. Pak Pri found a willing widow, friends in prison collected money and the wedding took place inside the prison in 2013.

The influence of Abrory and the pro-ISIS ideologues became too much for the Tangerang authorities to handle. The terrorist prisoners were having major success recruiting among the ordinary criminal offenders, who wanted both protection and access to the extremists’ supplies. By late 2013, prison officials estimated that Abrory and friends were providing regular religious instruction to as many as 50 ordinary inmates, most of them drug offenders. They decided the only solution was to move Abrory, Saptta and four others to Nusakambangan.

After Abrory’s transfer, the extremists were left without anyone with the religious credentials to provide leadership or settle disputes. Two factions emerged, one led by a Poso detainee named Naim who wanted to cooperate with prison officials and apply for conditional release. The second was led by Agung Prasetyo, who maintained the hardline position of Abrory. Friction between the two groups intensified after ISIS declared a caliphate. The hardliners led by Agung became pro-ISIS, while Naim’s group became anti-ISIS.

Juhanda stayed with Agung and became an enthusiastic ISIS supporter, but his stance led to estrangement from his wife, who had joined a study group dominated by Jemaah Islamiyah members who were strongly anti-ISIS. Juhanda got angry when she refused to swear an oath of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and threatened to kill her. In September 2014, a month after he was released, Juhanda went to meet her in Parepare, South Sulawesi. She refused to see him, afraid because of his threats. A neighbor called the police, and Juhanda was stopped and searched by a Brimob officer from the South Sulawesi provincial police and some officers from the intelligence unit of the police command in Parepare. They found an ISIS flag in his bags, which he said he had brought from the prison when he was released. After questioning, they let him go.

At the suggestion of Agung, Juhanda then decided to move to Samarinda, where he stayed with Agung’s father, Supriyadi. Pak Pri, as he was known, was an ISIS leader in East Kalimantan. During the Ambon and Poso conflicts he had been an active fund-raiser for the radical charity KOMPAK, collecting contributions from Indonesians who worked in the province’s wealthy oil and gas sector. He was close to two KOMPAK leaders convicted of terrorism, Abdullah Sunata and Mohamad Sibghotullah, and had helped hide the latter in 2011 when he was being sought by police. Caught up in the euphoria that followed the declaration of a caliphate in late June 2014, Pak Pri took an oath of allegiance and subsequently became an adviser to the Samarinda branch of Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah Islamiyah (JAKI), the Aman Abdurrahman-linked pro-ISIS group. The amir of JAKI-East Kalimantan was Joko Sugito, Pak Pri’s close friend.

The Samarinda jihadi groups also fell out along pro-and anti-ISIS lines. Pak Pri led the first. Ustadz Yunus, a former prisoner arrested for sheltering Ali Imron after the 2002 Bali bombs, led the second, and most of his followers were also former prisoners loosely affiliated with JI. They

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21 At the time, Tangerang Prison held 1,455 prisoners, of whom 1,100 were narcotics offenders.
22 “Mantan teroris ingin bunuh isterinya biar masuk surga,” simomot.com, 1 September 2014.
23 Sibghotullah was arrested in June 2011 in Kutai Kartanegara, East Kalimantan, on suspicion of involvement with the group that carried out a suicide bombing of the mosque at police headquarters in Cirebon in April 2011; he had also been involved in the terrorist training camp in Jantho, Aceh Besar in early 2010.
24 For more on founding of JAKI, see IPAC, “Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence”, Report No.25, 1 February 2016, pp.5-6.
had built their own community with a cooperative to help former prisoners. Yunus had invited Pak Pri, his former student, to join, but Pak Pri declined and the ideological rift between them deepened over time.

Pak Pri found Juhanda a job as a watchman-cleaner at the Mujahidin Mosque on Cipto Mangunkusumo Street in Loajanan Ilir, Samarinda, not far from his own house. Juhanda slept in the mosque and supplemented his income by selling fish from the Mahakam River that ran behind the mosque. He rarely interacted with others in the mosque and the neighbors knew him mostly as a fish-seller.

The mosque itself was the center of pro-ISIS activities in Samarinda and was not welcoming to outsiders. It hosted several religious study groups, with Pak Pri as the senior ustadz. It also sponsored programs that it billed as jihad training (i’d a d), ranging from sports to bomb-making. Once he immersed himself in the group’s activities, Juhanda grew even more radical. It is worth noting that much of the media reporting on the Kalimantan group referred to them as JAD or Jemaah AnsharDaulah, but this is a generic term, used for all supporters of ISIS, and does not refer to a specific group.

Throughout 2015 and 2016, ISIS leaders issued a series of exhortations to supporters to wage war at home as it became increasingly difficult to get to Syria. More and more Indonesians who tried to emigrate found themselves stranded along the Turkish border or caught by Turkish authorities. By late 2016, more than 300 Syria-bound Indonesians had been deported, mostly from Turkey but some from Malaysia and other countries, and more than 60 were also stopped from leaving via Jakarta’s Soekarno-Hatta Airport.

These exhortations led several ISIS supporters to decide to undertake attacks in Indonesia. In quick succession there was a suicide bombing in Solo in July 2016 that killed only the bomber; an attack at a church in Medan in August that also failed; and the stabbing of police in Tangerang in October – not to mention the first ISIS attack in Malaysia in June and the much more serious bombing in Davao, in the southern Philippines, in September.

Juhanda and the Samarinda group were inspired to act. Beginning in September 2016 Joko Sugito, Juhanda and a few others had bought materials for bomb-making including fertilizer, sulphur and charcoal. They made several bombs, with lightable fuses instead of electronic detonators, but made no decision about when to use them.

On 13 November 2016 around 9:00, Juhanda came back from the market and passed the Oikumene Church, just a few hundred metres from the mosque where he worked. He saw that the church was packed, and suddenly remembered what ISIS leaders had said: When the door for hijrah [to Syria] is closed, open the door to jihad!” He decided on the spot to act, especially since the bombs were ready. He went back to get a bomb and attached a fuse, then rode back to the church on his motorcycle. His plan was to drive the motorcycle into the middle of the church, then blow himself, the motorcycle and the congregants up together. He stopped his bike in the churchyard, and holding the bomb between his thighs, lit the fuse. Then his bike began to tilt as though it was going to fall over and Juhanda by reflex tried to steady it with his legs. The bomb fell from his thighs and it rolled toward some children playing. He tried to take it back but before he could do so, it exploded. Four children were seriously burned, including one toddler who later died. Juhanda himself was slightly wounded but managed to escape. He was later caught as he tried to cross the river.

After the bombing, the local community, working with the government, took control of the

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25 The speech by the late ISIS spokesman al-Adnani in May 2016 is one example. For the full text, see https://pietervanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/al-hayat-that-they-live-by-proof.pdf. Indonesian ISIS members in 2016 increasingly spread the word that the faithful need not travel long distances to wage war, it was enough to undertake operations in Indonesia.

26 This is a paraphrase of one sentence in the Adnani speech noted above.
Mujahidin Mosque and immediately changed the name to “Reconciliation Mosque” (Masjid Al Islah). The new mosque board forbade the pro-ISIS group to continue meeting there.  

IV. RADICALISATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

Radicalisation of criminal offenders by pro-ISIS inmates continues to be a nightmare for both police and prison officials. From 2010 to 2016, at least 18 former criminal offenders were involved in terrorism cases in Indonesia, and most had been radicalized in prison. Three cases of radicalisation show the different ways that ordinary criminals can be recruited: through prowess in inter-prison fights; through the desire for access to better food; and through the appeal of a close-knit community.

A. Koswara alias Jack

The case of Koswara, a former marijuana dealer, illustrates how victories by terrorist inmates in prison brawls can draw criminal offenders to their side. Koswara was arrested in March 2015 for helping send Indonesians to Syria to join ISIS. Born in Tasikmalaya, he had been sentenced to five and a half years in 2006 on drug charges and was sent to Cipinang Prison in Jakarta. The former street vendor was frequently bullied by the gangs there. Of these, the most feared was Gang Arek, composed mostly of thugs from East and Central Java. When Koswara first came to Cipinang, Gang Arek was at the height of its powers.

In July 2007 a fight over money broke out between the terrorist prisoners and Gang Arek in which the gang leader, Cak Monte, was stabbed to death. The status of the terrorists rose dramatically as a result. Not only did extortion from the gangs stop but several ordinary criminals sought to join the extremist pengajian as a form of protection. Koswara was one. He became very studious and devout under the guidance of Ustadz Adung, former caretaker amir of Jemaah Islamiyah. He also benefited from the donations that streamed into Cipinang for the terrorist prisoners.

Koswara steadily became more radical. In 2010 another fight between terrorists and ordinary criminals erupted. Koswara took part, and was then moved to Tangerang prison as a security measure. There he met Abdul Rauf, one of the Bali bombers (who later died in Iraq fighting with ISIS) and began studying with him. When Koswara was released in 2010, Ustadz Adung arranged a marriage for him with a woman from a good JI school. The marriage drew him further into extremist circles.

Koswara began to attend religious study sessions at Mesjid Ramadhan, a well-known radical mosque in Bekasi. As the Syria conflict deepened and ISIS emerged, many of the

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28 The criminal offenders include Fauzan, Fadlun alias Lun and Irwanto alias Iwan, all involved in the May 2011 attack on police bank guards in Palu; Kalman, a former motorcycle thief working for MIT; Hilman Djayakusumah, Nanang Rudianto, Ahmad Buseari alias Kapten and Badarudin Sulaeman, former drug offenders recruited by Bali bomber Imam Samudra and later killed by police, allegedly while plotting a third Bali attack; Yadi Al Hasan, from the group involved in the Cirebon police mosque bombing, previously convicted of assault; Sigit Qardhawi, Ari Budi Santoso and Ibadurrahman, all linked to Tim Hisbah, Solo [these three NOT radicalized in prison]; Priyo Hadi Utomo, Herly Isfranko and Kowara, described in this section; Toro bin Masjud, a drug offender in Tangerang; Aidin Suryana, a motorcycle thief from Malang recruited into JAKI; Roni JokTaTo, a convicted murderer; Sarwo alias Awo, a former motorcycle thief and Rudi Haruna, a former drug offender.
29 The actual stabbing was done by a member of a rival gang, mostly ethnic Batak, but the terrorists had joined forces with the Batak against Gang Arek.
30 Sunarto alias Adung was arrested in June 2004 for concealing information about the whereabouts of terrorist fugitive Noordin M. Top. He was sentenced to seven years and released in 2009.
31 For the story of how Mesjid Ramadhan was taken back from extremists, see IPAC, “Countering Violent Extremism: Need for a Rethink”, Report No.11, 30 June 2014, pp.9-12.
mosque activists, including Koswara, became strong supporters. He took part in the pro-ISIS demonstration led by Bahrumsyah in central Jakarta on 16 March 2014. He also swore a loyalty oath to al-Baghdadi in a mass pledging ceremony in the mosque on the campus of the State Islamic University in Ciputat, south Jakarta, in early July 2014. Around November 2014 he was assigned by Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois (on death row in Nusakambangan) to help send fighters to Syria by purchasing tickets and arranging contact persons on the Turkish-Syrian border. He managed to help several groups leave before he was arrested in March 2015.

B. Herly Isfranko alias Hamzah

Herly Isfranko was arrested on 20 January 2016 for involvement in terrorism in Poso. Herly, born in Palembang in 19 September 1979, was a convicted murderer who had served his 20-year sentence, shortened through regular remissions, in Permisan prison, Nusakambangan. He was released in August 2015. For the duration of his incarceration, he was known as a “lost child” by prison staff, a term for someone never visited by his family, with no one to bring him food, cigarettes, a cell phone or other extras that most other inmates receive. In other prisons, even “lost children” can secure these goods, if not from relatives than from other inmates through their own use of force, persuasion or money. But this was difficult to do in Permisan, because the prisoners there were by and large those who had committed the most serious crimes with the longest sentences, so they were difficult to intimidate. Herly had to rely on what the prison provided, which was bad rice that often smelled like the sack it had been stored in or had sand mixed in. The “vegetables” served with it were often mostly water.32

Tired of the bad food, Herly began meeting with the terrorists, because they had access to more and better supplies. Islamic charities such as (Infaq Dakwah Center, IDC), Azzam Dakwah Center, ADC) and GASHIBU routinely sent aid to the prisons for the “mujahidin” and monthly stipends to their families as well. In 2011, when he began attending their study groups, the prisoners who were most active in the pengajian were Syaiful Anam alias Brekele, a JI member convicted in connection with crimes in Poso. The terrorists welcomed Herly’s participation, because for them, he was the ideal recruit: anyone convicted of murder was seen as having the guts for violence and could easily be mobilized for jihad.

By joining the terrorists, Herly not only got better food and a handphone but also the equivalent of a new family. Slowly he was willing to take on the views of his radical brothers as his own and began to call prison officials kafir. He became less and less cooperative.

When the euphoria of the conflict in Syria reached the prison in 2014, Brekele and others declared their support for ISIS and Herly joined them in swearing allegiance to al-Baghdadi. Shortly thereafter he married a woman from Tangerang who was part of the extremist community, and the bonds with the terrorists grew closer.

In August 2015 Herly was released. A month later he was contacted by Hendro Fernando, a friend of Brekele’s, who invited him to meet. Hendro passed on a message from Brekele asking Herly to deliver hundreds of bullets to Palu for MIT and Santoso. In November, Herly, accompanied by another friend of Brekele’s, left for Palu by boat and made the delivery. He stayed a few weeks in Palu before returning to Jakarta in December 2015. He was arrested there in January 2016 after the terrorist attacks.

32 This was not a deliberate effort to deprive prisoners of decent food but the result of the paltry amount allocated in prison budgets for food. In 2016 the allocation per prisoner was only Rp.15,500 [$1.16] per day for three meals – which does not buy quality food. As a comparison, a civil servant who works eight hours receives a food allocation of Rp.30–35,000 for one meal.
C. Priyo Hadi Purnomo alias Ananda

Priyo Hadi Purnomo was arrested in June 2016 for planning a terrorist action on 17 Ramadhan in Surabaya. The Tuban native was a recidivist: he was first arrested for fraud in 2006 and sentenced to fourteen months. With remissions, he was released in 2007, then rearrested in 2007 on a narcotics charge and sentenced to ten years, of which he served seven. He was sent to Porong Prison in Surabaya.

Priyowas not a “lost child”. His family made regular visits. He was also well-off, compared to other prisoners. He never touched the prison rice because he could afford to buy better food from the prison canteen. In 2012, he used his money to open a little restaurant inside the prison, together with Nurdin, a terrorist prisoner from Ambon. Through Nurdin, Priyo became interested in religion and wanted to learn more. He began attending mosque regularly and became close to two men in particular. One was Maulana Wibisono, a JI prisoner, arrested in 2007 in Poso. The other was Sibghotullah, the former KOMPAK fighter arrested for participation in the 2010 terrorist training camp in Aceh. Both were considered to be religious scholars, and Priyo decided to study with them.

Prison officials were aware of Priyo’s radicalisation and moved him to Madiun Prison in 2012, thinking that if he were cut off from the supplies he enjoyed in Porong, he might drop his new beliefs. But it was the religious knowledge and not the extra food that he craved, and the move did not stop his communication with his friends in Porong. He continued to take part in discussions via hand phone.

He became more radical after his release in 2014 and his marriage to Umu Syifa, former wife of Syarif Tarabubun, a prisoner with particularly extremist views. Umu Syifa herself was a religious teacher (ustazah) who frequently led discussions among extremist women. She herself was a committed supporter of ISIS, so between her and Sibghotullah, Priyo too became an ISIS follower.

Some time after his release, Priyo moved to Ambon to his wife’s neighbourhood, where he was active in a pro-ISIS group. In early 2016, he returned to Surabaya with the intention of undertaking a jihad operation there. He carried partially prepared home-made bombs that he had made in Ambon after studying with men who had fought in the communal conflict there; he also used instructions that Bahrun Naim had posted on his website. Once in Surabaya, he sought out members of ISIS in East Java through a private Telegram chat group called Warung Kopi. He eventually met three: Fery Novendi and Befri Rahmawan alias Ust. Jefri, as well as Sali alias Abah, Sibgho’s father-in-law. They planned to attack on 17 Ramadhan, as instructed by ISIS spokesman Muhammad Al Adnani, who had urged that the forces of Islamic State make Ramadan 2016 the “month of calamity.” Before they could do anything, however, they were all arrested.

V. EFFORTS TO PREVENT RADICALISATION

Prison authorities knew they had a problem with the recruitment of ordinary criminals and tried to manage it by moving the troublemakers to different prisons. Between 2011 and 2016, officials at Porong Prison moved thirteen radicalized criminal offenders, including Priyo Hadi Utomo. Twelve moderated their behaviour after they were moved. Frasmi, serving a ten-year sentence for murder, was one. In Porong, he had become very close to Syarif Tarabubun, a strong

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33 Ummu Syifa and Syarif had had domestic troubles, and she sought a divorce. Before the divorce went through, she married again, this time to a prisoner in KelapaDua. A verbal fight broke out between Syarif and the new husband over the phone, and the new husband divorced UmmuSyifa, leaving her free to marry Priyo.
ISIS promoter. In August 2012, as soon as prison officials detected his closeness to Syarif, they moved him to Madiun Prison. He then appeared to drop his radical stance.

The move had actually been an effort to cut Frasmi off from the extra funding he enjoyed as part of Syarif’s circle, as well as to separate him from his mentor, since both factors had been involved in his radicalisation. In Madiun he had no access to either, especially because he had no hand phone. At that point, there were no other radicals in the prison and he began attending the regular prison religious discussions led by moderates from Nahdlatul Ulama.

Other prisoners followed the same path after being cut off from their mentors. The one hold-out was Priyo, who was also moved to Madiun. He had not been drawn to the radicals for extra supplies, since he had his own source of money; he had access to a phone; and his investment in the prison food stall meant that he had regular business to discuss with his partners and so kept in touch with the radicals. His marriage to Syarif Tarabubuan’s ex-wife also helped keep him firmly in the radical camp.

The Corrections Directorate took another initiative to spread newly convicted terrorism offenders around prisons across Indonesia, rather than concentrating them in one place. The aim was to ensure that prisoners were held far from their own strongholds, limiting visits and restricting the ability of any one individual to exert influence. They tried to keep the maximum number of extremists held in any one prison to three, so that it was relatively easy for officials to monitor them and the potential for building a base in prison was limited. In 2015, two important pro-ISIS prisoners, Joko Jihad and Ust. Yasin, were moved with one other convicted terrorist from Semarang to Pekalongan Prison. Every move they make is watched by officials, and the two seem to have moderated their stance. Joko Jihad, a recidivist, has even agreed to take part in a prison counseling program and Ust. Yasin, due for release before the end of December 2016, has shown some openness to cooperation, although it is not clear if the apparent change is genuine. Both would be candidates for close monitoring after release.

Spreading the prisoners around makes visits difficult not only for families but for the Islamist charities that bring in aid and reduces access to supplies, especially for the less well-known inmates. One example is Idam Khalid, a prisoner arrested in Poso for supporting MIT who was moved to Atambua, West Timor, in May 2016. Never an important player, he has become a “lost child” because he is no longer visited by his family or the radical charities, but this time, there is no extremist network to come to his aid.

Extremist prisoners understand that being moved to distant prisons weakens their influence and makes their life more difficult. However, there are also prisoners who create trouble in the hope they will be moved to join other ISIS supporters. Galih Satria Aji, an inmate from Magetan, East Java was one. He was first detained in Kelapa Dua and then moved to Garut, West Java. There he deliberately incited a disturbance, hoping that bad behaviour would get him moved back to East Java to be near extremist friends and family. In the end, he was transferred, but only to another prison in West Java. After one year, he was moved to Pasuruan, East Java, but as the only extremist in the prison, he was unhappy. He tried to create trouble again around June 2016 by sending around a note to his friends saying that he had been tortured, urging them to spread the story and organise a march on the prison. The next day he picked a fight with a prison guard to give some substance to the story, then waited for the mass protest on his behalf. It never happened. It turned out one of the people who had received his message checked its veracity with the prison. Word went out that Galih was making up stories and instead of being sympathetic, his friends became annoyed and many stopped visiting him altogether.

34 Some jihadis equate being in prison to an emergency situation, in which what normally is considered forbidden (haram) can be permitted.

35 When officials did a routine check to look for hand phones, Galih refused to let his room be searched and threatened a guard. Other prisoners got angry with him and beat him up. Galih had been involved in terrorist training in Poso.
VI. IMPACT OF AMAN ABDURRAHMAN’S ISOLATION

A new dynamic has emerged among pro-ISIS prisoners following the isolation of their leaders in the aftermath of the January 2016 attack in Jakarta. Before, they were a relatively united group, rejecting remissions and conditional release, refusing to pray in the prison mosque, and forbidding participation in prison counseling programs. This unity was the direct result of the influence of ISIS ideologues such as Aman Abdurrahman, Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir who could control their followers not only in Nusakambangan but in other prisons as well through instructions and fatwa disseminated via hand phone. Leaders like Aman became the go-to authorities to settle any differences among pro-ISIS prisoners before they could erupt into more serious conflict.

The situation changed after January. Abdurrahman and Rois were both involved in plans for the attack: Aman had given orders to a former prisoner known as Abu Gar to take action in Jakarta, and Rois had arranged the financing and some contacts. After years of letting them communicate freely, the government finally decided to put both men as well as three others –Ba’asyir, Ust. Abrory from Bima and Hari Kuncoro – in isolation cells in Pasir Putih Prison. On 16 April 2016, Ba’asyir was moved to a cell in Gunung Sindur, a new maximum security prison in Bogor, just south of Jakarta, but he remained cut off from regular communication and interaction with others. None of these men were allowed to communicate with other inmates, and their only visitors were their immediate families – and even then no physical contact was allowed. They had to talk through a glass wall.

Among other things, this meant that they could no longer issue fatwas and Aman Abdurrahman in particular could no longer lead religious discussions via hand phone. His translations of ISIS propaganda and other material no longer appeared on his website, www.millahibrahim.net or other radical chat forums. The ideological hold he had over his followers began to weaken, meaning it was harder to keep disputes in check.

In Pasir Putih, for example, a dispute broke out among ISIS supporters over who would fill the position of amir after Ba’asyir was moved to Gunung Sindur. Beben Khairul Rizal appointed himself to the job, since he had become the ISIS coordinator in the prison after Ba’asyir’s transfer. Ba’asyir would convey his instructions to the young prisoner from Bima who had been moved to Bogor as his personal assistant; the assistant would then call Beben who would relay them to the others. Beben was supported in his bid to become amir by Zulkifli Lubis, Mushola, Arief Budiman and others.

But his bid did not go over well with other ISIS supporters, led by Roki Apris Dianto and Yusuf Rizaldi, who believed that the amir should be chosen through discussion and consensus. Not coincidentally, they both wanted the job. They accused Beben of being power hungry, whereas in fact he lacked the necessary leadership qualities and religious knowledge. Whoever held the position of amir had power, not only because his instructions had to be obeyed but because he also controlled supplies coming in from outside and got the largest share. He also had his choice of women: “If he wants to marry anyone, it’s easy”.

The dispute resulted in a cold war between Beben and Zulkifli Lubis on the one hand and Beben’s challengers on the other. The latter refused to follow his orders and rarely attended the religious meetings (taklim) called by Zulkifli. This was due not only to Zulkifli’s association

36 Hari Kuncoro was arrested in June 2011. He had been a fugitive since 2003 when he fled to Mindanao and joined his brother-in-law, Bali bomber Dulmatin. After years with first the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), then the Abu Sayyaf Group, he returned to Java with Umar Patek in 2009. He received a six-year sentence and was released on 20 March 2016 after serving most of it, so he only had about a month in isolation.

37 Zulkifli Lubis alias Abu Irhab was arrested in May 2011 for selling a gun to the group responsible for the Cirebon police mosque bombing; Arief Budiman and Mushola were part of the same group.

38 IPAC interview with former inmate, Jakarta, October 2016.
with Beben but to an issue with his second wife that caused Zulkifli’s credibility to plummet. She wore a face veil (cadar) when she visited him in prison, but when she was on her own, she reportedly liked to go with friends to band concerts in Cilacap without even wearing a headscarf, earning the nickname of “reggae child”. Zulkifli was criticized by the other ISIS inmates for not controlling her better. Then he sent her off to Syria with their child and took a third wife, earning even more criticism. It was said he arranged the departure of the second so he would be free to enjoy life with the third.\(^{39}\)

One result of the dispute was that some of Beben’s challengers lost their access to extra food. Roki was one. Without his share of the ISIS supplies, he was forced to fall back on the prison food. He became more and more resentful and began talking of trying to escape. No one else wanted to join him in the effort, however, so he began to press for a transfer to a prison on Java. His desire to move increased after he saw Agus Widarto alias Agus Nangka, another convicted terrorist, get himself transferred from Pasir Putih to Kendal, Central Java, in late July 2016. But to be moved, Roki would have to meet several conditions, including being willing to take part in prison programs, which he had always rejected, and sign an oath of loyalty to the Indonesian republic. Taking part in the counseling programs was not that much of a leap for Roki, and he agreed to meet with BNPT officials involved in a deradicalisation program. It was much harder for him to sign the loyalty oath because it would destroy his standing with fellow ISIS supporters, who considered nationalism as equivalent to rejecting Islam. In the end he was never moved because prison authorities feared he would try to escape again.

VII. DIRECTING JIHAD FROM PRISON: THE CASE OF BREKELE

Some of the convicted terrorists not only refuse to take part in prison programs – they also direct terrorist operations from inside. The Jakarta attacks in January 2016 were initiated by prisoners in Kembang Kuning prison, Nusakambangan after communication with Indonesian ISIS fighter Abu Jandal, then in Syria.\(^{40}\)

Another prisoner, Syaiful Anam alias Mujadid alias Brekele alias Abu Khataf, has now been involved in directing two terrorist plots in collaboration with men from Katibah Nusantara, the Indonesian-led military unit in ISIS.\(^{41}\) In the first, the contact in Syria was Bahrumsyah, and Brekele was involved in two tasks: arranging to get supplies, including bullets, to Santoso in Poso, and helping smuggle guns out of Tangerang Prison for use in an operation in the Jakarta area.\(^{42}\) Police intercepted both before any damage could be done.

Brekele served as an intermediary between Bahrumsyah in Syria and a friend of Bahrumsyah’s named HendroFernando, who was also a regular visitor to Nusakambangan to visit Abu Bakar

\(^{39}\) IPAC interview with former inmate, Jakarta, October 2016.

\(^{40}\) For details, see IPAC, “ISIS in Ambon: The Fallout from Communal Conflict,” Report No.28, 13 May 2016, p.8. Abu Jandal reportedly ordered Aman Abdurrahman, the detained cleric who serves as ideological leader of the largest pro-ISIS coalition in Indonesia, Jamaah Ansyrul Khilafah Indonesia, to undertake an attack. In November 2015, Aman conveyed that order to a visitor, former prisoner Nazaruddin Mochtar alias Abu Gar, then told Abu Gar to work out the details with another inmate, Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, on death row for his role in the Australian embassy attacks. This was not the first time Rois had been involved in directing jihad operations from prison. In 2009, when he was in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison, he had helped Noordin Top find a suicide bomber for the attacks on the Ritz Carlton and Marriott hotels.

\(^{41}\) Brekele, originally from Lampung, is serving eight years in prison for involvement in terrorist attacks in Poso, including the 2005 attack on the Tentena market that killed 22. He was arrested in March 2007.

\(^{42}\) The broad outlines of the Tangerang plot are described in IPAC, “Disunity among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence”, op.cit, but Brekele’s role was not yet clear when the report was published. It turns out that Agung Prasetyo, one of the Tangerang inmates (who also befriended Juhanda), contacted Brekele and asked him to send someone to pick up the guns that Agung and his friends had secured from a gun storage room inside the prison. Brekele sent Herly alias Hamzah (see Section IV) who had been imprisoned with him in Permisan Prison.
In the course of those visits, Hendro came to know Brekele and developed a friendship with him.

Between July 2015 and January 2016, Hendro used his personal bank account to receive almost Rp.1 billion [about $75,000] from Bahrumsyah, but it was Brekele who decided who would be paid, how much and for what. Some of the money was sent to the Philippines. For example between July and October 2015, Brekele directed Hendro to send nine transfers together totalling Rp.140 million [about $10,500] to a bank account in central Mindanao to purchase arms for Poso. The account belonged to the Filipina wife of an old friend of Brekele’s from Poso, Syaifudin Ibrahim alias Ibrahim Alialias Sucipto. Brekele also ordered Hendro to help pay the expenses of individuals who wanted to leave for Syria.

After discovering the involvement of Brekele and the pro-ISIS prisoners in Tangerang, the police decided to formally investigate them again on new charges. The plan is to wait until their current terms expire and then immediately press the new charges, before they are released. Brekele, however, has shown no signs of letting up, and it is clear that as long as he has access to a telephone and visitors, he will be busy plotting new actions. (CCTV cameras in prisons can help act as a check only if they are turned on, kept in repair, and constantly monitored – which is often not the case.)

In January 2016, just days after Hendro Fernando was arrested, Brekele was moved from Permisan Prison to the holding cells of the West Jakarta police command so he could serve as a witness in Hendro’s investigation and subsequent trial. From there he was in touch with a pro-ISIS cleric named Abu Nusaibah. Together they were reportedly planning several attacks and also hoped to exploit the huge demonstrations against Jakarta’s governor whom Islamist groups accused of blasphemy. Abu Nusaibah was arrested on 18 November 2016.

Individuals like Brekele, with a history of directing operations from prison, need to be treated differently than other prisoners. At a minimum, they need extra tight supervision, a strictly enforced ban on mobile phones and other communication devices, and limitations on visitors – in short, the limited isolation imposed on Aman Abdurrahman and Rois after their links to the Jakarta attacks became clear. Prison authorities should have a system that triggers an immediate change in monitoring and control if it becomes clear that an inmate has engaged in criminal actions. Despite a protocol developed for handling high risk prisoners, such a system is not in place.

VIII. PRISON-BASED PROGRAMS

Despite much donor funding and some limited civil society initiatives, there are few effective deradicalisation or disengagement programs in Indonesian prisons, if effectiveness is measured

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43 Hendro knew Bahrumsyah because both had been members of a pro-shari’ah advocacy organization called FAKSI. Hendro is also the son-in-law of an aide to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir named Hasyim Abdullah who lives not far from Nusakambangan and made frequent visits there.

44 For more on the Indonesia-Philippine connection, see IPAC, “Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia”, Report No.33, 25 October 2016.

45 Jakarta’s governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, is an ethnic Chinese Christian who has been the target of hardline Muslim groups since he first ran for deputy governor in 2012. Those groups have argued on the basis of a Qur’anic verse that only Muslims should be allowed to govern fellow Muslims. The governor questioned the use of that verse by his opponents in a public meeting in late September and was accused of blasphemy by the hardliners, who then filed a formal police complaint. When the police did not immediately charge him, the hardliners organized a massive rally on 4 November 2016 that was attended by an estimated 150,000 people from all over Indonesia, financed in part by Ahok’s political opponents. That protest helped force the government’s hand, and he was formally charged with blasphemy – but not imprisoned – on 16 November. Not satisfied, the hardliners organized an even bigger demonstration, in the form of outdoor Friday prayers, on 2 December 2016. Pro-ISIS extremists have discussed online how to exploit the tensions for their own purposes.
by the number of prisoners who decide to turn away from violence as a result of having taken part in such a program. Many prisoners make that decision on their own, for family reasons or unhappiness with leaders, but it is hard to make the case that it has been due to BNPT efforts. In their presentations to international meetings, BNPT staff often claim that they have hundreds of cases of successful deradicalisation. They arrive at that figure by taking the total number of prisoners released and subtracting the number of recidivists. But not only is there no justification in most cases for assuming a causal connection between participation in a BNPT program and the inmate's decision-making process, but in the absence of a post-release monitoring system, there is no way of knowing that a prisoner has rejoined his old networks until or unless he is arrested for a new crime.

Umar Patek, one of the most high-profile prisoners to have become a model prisoner, was irritated in May 2015 when BNPT claimed responsibility for his good behavior after he took part in a flag-raising ceremony at Porong Prison in Surabaya.\(^{46}\) For prison officials in Porong, their claim negated their own efforts at guidance. “The cow gives the milk, but the goat gets the name,” said one prison official, quoting an old Javanese adage.\(^{47}\) Umar himself said he had changed his views after long discussions first with a few officers from Detachment 88, then with prison officials. He considered at least one of the latter to be a close friend, to the point that he felt bereft when the man was transferred to a new job. He denied that BNPT played any role.\(^{48}\)

A. Assessing Radicalisation

BNPT has several programs in prison, of which two absorb most of its efforts. The first, which began in 2015, is aimed at trying to determine levels of radicalization among prisoners.\(^{49}\) Psychology professor Hamdi Muluk visits prisons about once a month, often taking with him religious scholars. They sit with prisoners who are willing to take part — the pro-ISIS prisoners stay away — and have a discussion designed to elicit attitudes on doctrine and practice. They are trying in this way to develop a survey instrument that can be used in assessing who is hard-core and who is open to influence from others. The discussions are popular with the inmates because every participant receives a cash contribution at the end, but as far as prison authorities are concerned, they bring about little change in prisoner behaviour.

The second BNPT program is aimed at helping cooperative prisoners get extra income by setting up businesses aimed at fellow inmates, such as foodstalls or handphone repair. No pro-ISIS prisoners take part.

Prof. Hamdi Muluk’s project is one of several attempts to design an assessment instrument that would enable the government to make decisions about prisoner placement and better assess the risk of individuals returning to violence once released. The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) is also working with the Corrections Directorate to develop a survey that would assess aggressiveness, history of violence in the family, involvement in terrorism, attitudes toward terrorism, and level of commitment to violent ideologies. UNICRI has involved several local consultants from different disciplines from psychology to religion, and has produced a questionnaire with 50 questions. The responses are then quantified and evaluated to produce a measurement of risk. The first testing of the questionnaire on 30 inmates showed that it was useful in assessing very high or very low levels of risk was but was less successful in drawing out some of the nuances of those in the middle.

\(^{47}\) IPAC interview, prison official, Jakarta, September 2016.
\(^{48}\) IPAC interview, prison official, Jakarta, September 2016.
Other organizations are also trying to develop assessment tools, including the Indonesia Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI). The ISPI questionnaire, still in development, has 20 questions more directed at assessing ideological commitment and understanding. In a first test, the results of interviews with 25 inmates conducted from October 2015 to January 2016 were quantified and the prisoners divided into five categories: reject violence, beginning to have doubts about using violence, conditionally committed to the use of violence, committed, and strongly committed. All those who tested as strongly committed to violence were ISIS supporters.

There is also an initiative by YPP (Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian) to develop an “Instrument for Handling Terrorist Prisoners”. It closely resembles a profiling project that was undertaken by Search for Common Ground in 2013 and 2014 in which prison officials were asked to fill in personal data on prisoners from family background to the individual’s plans for what he or she would do after release. The analysis of data in this case is qualitative, not quantitative.

The problem with all these efforts is that so far, they have not produced what prison officials want: a simple diagnostic tool with a few easy questions. The complicated questionnaires produced by psychologists are sometimes as difficult for the questioners to comprehend as for the prisoners to answer.

B. Other Projects

Other projects funded by international donors directly through Corrections or through NGOs are aimed at training corrections officials, improving prison intelligence gathering and information management, developing a more systematic plan for handling high-risk inmates, improving post-release monitoring and working directly with prisoners and their families.

Most of these respond to clear needs, but they will not in themselves bring about change without fundamental reforms elsewhere in the system. For example, in 2015 one donor funded a handbook entitled Standards for the Prevention of Security Disturbances in Prisons and Detention Centers and then supported ongoing training of prison officials so that they understood proper procedures for everything from searching visitors to controlling communications. Clearly, setting uniform standards that are understood across all prisons is a desirable goal and well worth doing. But if many terrorist prisoners continue to have access to cell phones, something is not working. One factor is the quantity and quality of prison staff, which will probably only change with a Minister of Law and Human Rights who is herself or himself interested in reform and a shake-up in how bureaucrats are appointed, evaluated and paid.

The Corrections Directorate with donor help is now paying much more attention than in the past to visitors received by high-risk inmates, with software that will allow authorities at a glance to determine whether individuals have made multiple visits to different prisons and possibly identify what networks they belong to. This would be an extension of the highly successful database project set up by the Asia Foundation in 2009 that is now operative across all Indonesian prisons. It records basic bio and biometric data on all inmates as well as what crime they committed, helps keep track of who is due for remissions and release, allows authorities to see at a glance who is detained in what cell and is now moving to keep track of prison activities and visitors. The database has transformed prison management, so much so that the government has allocated funds in its own budget so that it is no longer dependent on donors – proof that it is in the interests of officials to sustain.

Like every project, however, the input of data depends on staff and there are often lapses. For example, despite the procedures spelled out in the handbook above that the identification of

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50 See Leopold Sudaryono, “How an Electronic Database is Dramatically Reforming Indonesia’s Prisons”, asiafoundation.org, 3 April 2013.
every visitor should be recorded, the standard practice in many prisons is that if a group comes to visit, only one member has to produce an ID.

NGOs have been involved in a number of projects aimed at working directly with prisoners, released prisoners and their families. The Indonesian Alliance for Peace (Aliansi Indonesia Damai, AIDA) has a program to bring the victims of terrorist bombings into a dialogue with convicted terrorists. These meetings have often been very emotional and have ended in reconciliation between bomber and victim, but so far they have only involved anti-ISIS inmates. The Corrections Directorate is planning to expand this nationally.

Yayasan Prastasi Perdaimian (YPP) has been working with prisoners to try to contain the influence of extremist teaching through building libraries in a few prisons with books that challenge key tenets and then bringing in experienced ustadz to hold discussions with inmates. It is also helping families of prisoners and released prisoners with small-scale loans and business expertise. Search for Common Ground has been helping released prisoners reintegrate into communities.

In June 2016, a coalition of NGOs working on deradicalisation and counter-terrorism issues was formed. Called C-Save in English (Civil Society Against Violent Extremism) and Mantra in Indonesian (Masyakarat Sipil Anti Radikalisme Pro-Kekerasan), the concept was to bring together NGOs working on similar issues to exchange ideas, coordinate efforts, be in communication with similar groups abroad and collaborate with the government, educational institutions and the media in trying to address violent extremism. Some 20 organisations initially expressed interest, but by late 2016, it was already beginning to be beset by internal disputes.

IX. THE ONGOING ISSUES AT SENTUL

The prison facility at Sentul, south of Jakarta, remains controversial. The complex has 49 cells that can hold a maximum of 147 inmates. The model was a rehabilitation centre set up by the National Narcotics Agency (Badan Narkotika Nasional, BNN) for drug addicts. The Sentul prison has been empty since construction was completed in 2014 because of inter-agency differences over how it should be used.

Corrections from the beginning wanted it as a facility for the most intransigent extremists. BNPT, which has its main office nearby, wanted to use it as a Deradicalisation Centre to showcase its cooperative prisoners. Said one prison official:

> It may be nice for BNPT but it’s no good for us if the cooperative prisoners are all moved to Sentul and we’re left with the hardcore. Isn’t the task of BNPT to deradicalise the ISIS extremists? If the inmates are already not so radical, why are they being deradicalised?

Eventually senior officials at Corrections gave in and agreed to the BNPT plan. But according to a 1995 law, prisoner rehabilitation programs can only take place under the auspices of officially-designated prisons, and a “deradicalisation centre” did not count. In early 2016, therefore, BNPT and the Corrections Directorate signed an MOU to turn the new centre into a Class Iib prison. In May 2016, Corrections assigned personnel to the site.

On 21 November 2016, the two agencies finally reached an agreement that the “cooperative” extremist inmates, all of them anti-ISIS, would be moved to Sentul. The hardcore would eventually be transferred to the Karanganyar prison that is being built on Nusakambangan. Not long after the agreement was signed, BNPT sent a request for 55 of the cooperative prisoners to be transferred to Sentul.

\[51\] Discussion with prison officials at the Corrections Directorate, Jakarta, November 2016.
The news came as a shock to the heads of prisons, who had not been kept abreast of the plans. They felt that their job dealing with pro-ISIS prisoners would be made much more difficult, and that BNPT was taking the more moderate prisoners so that it could claim unwarranted credit for their deradicalisation. In fact, many felt BNPT contributed very little while they did all the hard work of trying to run programs on a day to day basis. The prison officers made their unhappiness known to the head of Corrections. He in turn went back to BNPT, saying the transfer request would go forward under three conditions. The prisoners would be those with light sentences who were due for imminent conditional release; who were cooperative; and who themselves agreed to the transfer. No transfer would be made against the will of the prisoner involved.

In this way, responsibility for conditional release would rest with BNPT, taking one administrative burden off prison heads. Too often delays from Detachment 88 and BNPT in providing the necessary approvals for conditional release have created pressure on prison authorities from prisoners who complain that after having met all their obligations, officials are stalling on their release. This compromise appears to clear the way for the transfer, and the first prisoners are expected to be moved in early 2017.

X. GEOGRAPHIC CLUSTERS

One aspect of the extremist prisoner population that needs more attention is the existence of geographic clusters among inmates that have the potential to become reconstituted centers of radical activity once prisoners are released.

Poso is an obvious case, given all the arrests that were made around Santoso and MIT. As of late 2016, some 58 inmates and detainees came from Poso or nearby areas. (Many more had trained in Poso or assisted MIT but from home bases in Java or elsewhere.) This means that in the coming years, many will be released and go back to an environment where there are issues of revenge for the deaths or arrests of relatives, a history of conflict and hostility toward the state. To understand how quickly new cells could emerge, one only has to see how easy it was for Ba’asyir’s Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) to reactivate the old radical network in late 2010 after it had been dormant for four years.

This means that in addition to any programs aimed generically at extremist prisoners, Corrections, BNPT and the police need to be thinking in terms of a preventive strategy that takes into consideration not just the Poso prisoners but the existing support networks; recent releases and local political dynamics in Poso and central Sulawesi. They need to identify families that have disengaged from violence but have standing in the community who can work with newly released prisoners. They also need to think through where temptations to re-engage will come from. MIT may be on its last legs, but unless some serious thought goes into a long-term preventive strategy, new cells will be rising from the Poso ashes in no time.\(^{52}\) Regular follow-up on released prisoners is also critical.

The same is true for Bima, Sumbawa in West Nusa Tenggara province. As of late 2016, 34 extremist detainees and convicted terrorists came from Bima, almost all of whom also had been involved with MIT in Poso. They are not held together in the same prison, but unless some groundwork is done in the community, they could easily regroup after release. Local civil society organizations could usefully develop a community prevention strategy that works with the families of the 34 and others already released, focuses on education for the children and

\(^{52}\) Any effort at drafting such a strategy, particularly if it involves skill-training or job creation, should study the mistakes of the past, where large sums of local government money were wasted on ineffectual employment projects because no one bothered to do research on the local labor market or the released combatants’ skills. See Dave McRae, “Reintegration and localized conflict: promoting police-combatant communication,” World Bank Policy Brief, September 2009.
takes measures against hardline control of local mosques. Both Bima and Poso have seen a high number of deaths of suspected terrorists in police operations, meaning grievances against the state are high, making government programs more difficult.

Similar clusters could focus on specific areas of West Java, East Java, Lampung and Aceh.

XI. CONCLUSIONS

The ongoing difficulties of managing extremists in prisons suggest that for all the downsides, there is probably no alternative to isolating the most hardline extremist prisons in one or two facilities with specially trained staff so that controls on visitors, communications and outside donations can be strictly enforced. The problem is to correctly identify who those prisoners are, because the danger of keeping the most extreme together is that their extremism is reinforced. This underscores the urgent need for a simple, practical assessment instrument with questions that are understood by officials as well as by prisoners.

The transfer of cooperative prisoners to Sentul should be independently evaluated after one year, to see what impact it had on the prisoners; on the prisons they left; and on BNPT programming. It will also be useful to analyse why some of the 55 prisoners agree to be transferred and why others elect to stay behind.

Finally, a better donor coordination mechanism is badly needed for work on counter-terrorism and deradicalisation. Too often, the donors are driven by domestic programs that allocate huge sums of money that then need to be spent by counter-terrorism programs abroad. One result is sometimes a determination to go it alone, without adequate consultation with other bilateral programs that may have similar plans and grantees. Other problems are the granting of large sums to institutions that do not have adequate absorptive capacity; attempts to impose models used elsewhere for which there is no buy-in by Indonesian recipients; and the tendency to work out programs with senior officials in Jakarta who then fail to consult with the lower-level officials charged with implementation.

Management of Indonesian extremists is improving but the problems remain enormous.
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

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