THE RE-EMERGENCE OF JEMA'AH ISLAMIYAH

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since 2010, Jemaah Islamiyah, the organisation responsible for the first Bali bombing, has been building a clandestine military wing while broadening its traditional base through above-ground preaching and recruitment on university campuses. It is not an immediate threat. Since 2007, it has rejected the use of violence on Indonesian soil and its leadership is strongly opposed to ISIS. The Indonesian police have also been vigilant. But the revelations of the 18 JI members arrested since 2014 suggest that the organisation should still be considered a danger. It has a solid core, a 25-year-time frame for achieving an Islamic state, and a clear, if still unrealistic sense of what it needs to do to get there. The danger is not so much that the current leadership will return to violence. It is rather that if recruitment continues, a more militant wing may split off as has happened repeatedly in JI’s long history.

The term “neo-JI” is sometimes used to describe the organisation after it recovered from near-destruction in 2007, when an armed clash with police in Poso, Central Sulawesi led to the arrest of more than 40 members, including top leaders. It has since regrouped, restructured and changed its tactics, but it is the same organisation. The new central command includes several familiar faces, and when it decided to rebuild its military unit, it called up long-inactive members for service. One of its most influential figure continues to be Abu Rusdan, JI’s public face for the last decade, even though he appears to hold no official position.

The biggest difference with the old JI is that dakwah (preaching and religious outreach) is given priority over jihad, a reflection of Abu Rusdan’s views. It is not that JI has abandoned jihad, its members say, only that if jihad operations undermine the core goal of building a base through dakwah, then they should be stopped or reassessed. The purpose of the new military wing is not to deploy it in acts of terrorism but to build a capacity for producing and using weapons in preparation for an eventual confrontation with the enemy – or bid for power. That aim may have been temporarily halted by arrests but it is not likely to go away. An unknown number of JI members, perhaps a few dozen, were sent to non-ISIS militias in Syria between 2014 and 2016 to acquire military and combat skills. There is no data on who or where they are, because as JI members generally are not involved in jihadi crimes on their return (there are a few exceptions), the wealth of data available from prosecution of pro-ISIS suspects is unavailable.

At the same time, the “new” JI is more interested than its earlier incarnation in political influence and political infiltration. Not coincidentally, it is also more interested in very local issues that matter to the community. The biggest such issue for extremist groups in late 2016 and early 2017 was whether or not to take part in demonstrations demanding the arrest and prosecution of the Jakarta governor whom hardliners accused of blasphemy. Pro-ISIS groups forbade their followers to take part on the grounds that they should not be seeking to use the institutions of a justice system that relied on man-made rather than God-given law. JI issued a directive entitled “Can Peaceful Demonstrations and the Jihad Movement Work Side by Side? (Demonstrasi Damai dan Gerakan Jihad Mungkinkah Bersanding?) The answer was yes: participation in the demonstrations was equivalent to “jihad by the pen” or waging jihad through speech. JI members were initially forbidden to take part in elections because democracy as a system was a violation of the faith, but in the end, even that ban was relaxed.

The younger JI ulama, who five years ago were arguing that the organisation needed to focus more on the end goal of building an Islamic state and build a partnership with other Muslim organisations to do so, are now in positions of greater influence. The problem is that their strategy may have been overtaken by events. It is hard to see how JI, even with the most strategic recruitment plan, could compete for influence in the general public with mass organisations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (Forum Pembela Islam, FPI) or Forum Umat Islam (FUI) that showed their clout through the numbers they were able to turn out for the 2016 Jakarta
demonstrations. If the new young professionals that JI is trying to recruit on campus want political influence, they would be better off with a wholly above-ground organisation. If they want an active jihad, they are likely to chafe at the restrictions against violence that the current leadership is imposing. That makes JI’s military wing particularly problematic, because young men given training, however rudimentary, for jihad are likely to be impatient to test their skills. The longer the “new” JI tries to steer a middle course, the more impossible its task may become.

II. WHY JI MOVED AWAY FROM VIOLENCE

The decision of JI to focus on dakwah followed a long period of decline. At its height, in mid-2001, JI had four regional divisions and a presence in five countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Australia. The Malaysia-based Mantiqi I, the most important for JI’s international connections, including to al-Qaeda, was largely destroyed in late 2001 with arrests in Singapore and Malaysia following information discovered by accident in Afghanistan.\(^1\) The arrests after the first Bali bombing decimated JI’s leadership structure. By late 2003, with the arrest of Indonesian operative Hambali and the deportation from Pakistan of young Indonesians and Malaysians active in a cell he helped create in Karachi, JI’s direct links to al-Qaeda were severed, though sporadic communication continued.\(^2\) The JI structure in Mindanao was largely smashed around the same time, though several fugitive JI members remained there. When Noordin Top, the Malaysian Mantiqi I member, broke away from JI in 2003-2004 to form his own group, he took with him some of JI’s smartest young militants.\(^3\)

A. Police Operations in Poso

By 2006, JI was focused almost exclusively on developing a “secure base” (qoidah aminah) in Poso that would enable it to build the nucleus of a community and expand outwards.\(^4\) The potential for recruitment in Poso was still relatively high, given the grievances left over from the conflict. Also, with high levels of unemployment, many ex-combatants had time on their hands to attend religious study sessions. JI had invested heavily in recruitment and training there since 2000, and as JI structures elsewhere crumbled, the importance of the Poso base increased, including as a source of income.\(^5\)

By 2005 JI was in dire financial straits, unable even to support the families of its own men in prison.\(^6\) The JI military wing had been reduced to a single Java-based unit led by Abu Dujana with squads (ishoba) in Solo, Semarang, Surabaya and Jakarta. To the extent there was any training in firearms, it was to provide skills for fund-raising robberies (fa’i).\(^7\) The need for cash

\(^1\) For more on these arrests, see Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, *The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*, January 2003.

\(^2\) For the role of Hambali, see Ken Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*, Jakarta, 2006. The Karachi cell was called “al-Ghuraba” and consisted mainly of the sons or younger siblings of senior JI members.

\(^3\) Noordin’s network was responsible for the bomb attacks on the JW Marriott Hotel in 2003, the Australian Embassy the following year, the second Bali bombing of 2005 and the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton hotels in 2009. See International Crisis Group, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks*, Asia Report No.114, 5 May 2005.


\(^6\) The anger of the central command was therefore understandable when Hasanuddin, the head of wakalah Poso, only delivered Rp.30 million of a promised Rp.50 million from the robbery of the district (kabupaten) government payroll in 2006. See trial dossier of Ainul Bahri alias Abu Dujana, testimony of 14 June 2007.

\(^7\) Testimony of Maulana Yusuf Wibisono, 27 March 2007, pp. 4-5.
superseded all other goals.

The beheadings of three Poso school girls in October 2005 by the local JI branch generated such outrage that police sent their top investigators, led by current national police chief Tito Karnavian, to the area. They quickly identified the perpetrators and tried for months to persuade them to surrender. Eventually they decided to move in on the neighbourhood in Poso called Tanah Runtuh where they were based. On 22 January 2007, police mounted an operation against dozens of armed militants holed up in several different houses. By the end of the day, one police officer and fourteen militants were dead.

The operation reduced JI’s credibility to a new low, especially after its leaders rejected the idea of a retaliatory attack. It also reinforced JI’s conviction that the enemy was too strong to fight, and that the focus should be on *dakwah* and education. The 2007 January clash proved to be the last use of violence by JI in Indonesia to date.

With no structure to speak of, its top leaders in prison, and disaffection and betrayal in the ranks, JI lost much of the glamour that it had once had, even for its own members. By the time Abu Dujana and Zuhroni alias Zarkasih, two of the few remaining leaders of any stature, were arrested in June 2007, JI was in serious decline but there was more to come.

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s creation of Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) in July 2008 further eroded the membership. JI and JAT briefly allowed membership in both organizations, but by 2009, individuals had to choose. Among the long-term JI stalwarts who shifted to JAT were senior commanders such as Abu Tholut, once a member of JI’s central command; well-known teachers at JI schools including Asif Abdul Madjid and Muzayin Atik; young JI intellectuals such as Lutfi Hadaeroh alias Ubaid who had earlier left JI for Noordin Top; and the late Santoso, later to become notorious as the founder of Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT). It is worth underscoring that from the time JAT was founded, Ba’asyir’s links to JI, which had frayed for some time, were severed, and he no longer had anything to do with the organisation.

### B. Regrouping Begins

At a meeting in Surabaya in 2008, remaining senior leaders chose Kudus-based Para Wijayanto as the new amir. An engineering graduate of Diponegoro University in Semarang, he was known to have good organizational skills, even if his religious knowledge was limited. He had served as head of the Central Java *wakalah* (an administrative subdivision) around early 2000 and had taken part in a short military training course in Mindanao later the same year.

The new central command (*markaziyah*) was a combination of very senior members and younger religious scholars interested in shifting JI away from violent operations to more of a focus on *dakwah*. They included Abu Fatih, then in his fifties, one of the original JI members who had led Mantiqi II from 1993 until around 2004, and younger scholars such as Bambang Sukirno and Imtihan Syafii, then in their thirties, who had joined JI as students and had been sent to Jakarta around 1998-1999 to study with established JI ulama. As a group, they had more religious knowledge than military experience.

The decision to focus on *dakwah* rather than operations (*amaliyah*) was an acknowledgment of current weakness as well as a strategic calculation for the future. JI’s recruitment in the past had been largely based on its network of some 40 boarding schools (*pesantren*), many of them satellites of al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo, the school established by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and JI’s founder, Abdullah Sungkar. But weakened as it was, JI needed a broader base and this could only

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be achieved by reaching out through public lectures (taklim). This meant a higher profile for individuals such as Abu Rusdan – who briefly succeeded Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as head of JI – and more shared platforms with non-JI preachers.

In 2009, JI created its first above-ground dakwah organization, Majelis Dakwah Umat Islam (MDUI). Its goal was to make Muslims aware of the importance of enforcing Islamic law (iqamat ud-din), and its plans were ambitious. In August 2011, an MDUI spokesman from Klanten was quoted as saying, “There are 65 places outside Java where we’re sending preachers”, citing Papua and East Nusa Tenggara among them.

Several years earlier, in response to the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006, it had formed HASI (Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia), an organization set up to aid to victims of conflict and natural disasters. Until it was officially listed by the United Nations as a terrorist organization in 2015, it was also used as a fund-raising tool to collect contributions online from supporters as well as a recruiting mechanism.

The shift to dakwah disappointed many of JI’s supporters. Kang Jaja, for example, a leader of the Darul Islam-linked organization called Ring Banten, had been recruited by JI in 2005-2006 and became the head of JI for West Java. But he and his followers decided to leave in 2009 when JI refused to take part in an initiative of nine jihadi organizations to develop a new “secure base” and training camp in Aceh. JI for its part expelled any members who joined. Its stance was met with contempt by the Aceh organizers. In a video released in February 2010, Mustaqim, one of those expelled, directly castigated JI:

To members of JI or NII but especially members of JI, don’t let yourselves be deceived. join us! Don’t just wage war with a pen, sarong, and fez [peci]. So what if you can raise hundreds of millions, even billions of rupiah for dakwah and schools? This is betrayal. If people are hungry, you give money. Give your money for jihad. Let the hungry die.

This video triggered a major debate in jihadi circles. A young JI intellectual named Elhakimi, a graduate of the salafist Institute for the Study of Islam and the Arabic Language (LIPIA) in Jakarta, answered Mustaqim’s criticism in an article entitled “Reflections on the Aceh Jihad” (Refleksi Jihad Aceh), written after the Aceh camp had been broken up by police. He said the Aceh jihad had to be seen as a total failure. A jihad could only be deemed a success if it could be sustained, if it had public support and if it had the capacity to weaken and eventually defeat the enemy. None of these conditions were met. He also criticized the organizers for seeing jihad as an end, not a means toward a broader victory for Islam. Jihad was one of those means but it should not be undertaken to the exclusion of others, such as dakwah and education.

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9 For acknowledgment of lack of public support and the need to acquire it, see interview with Abu Rusdan, “Bukan Pengecut Tapi Siasat”, An-Najah, May 2010.
11 “MDUI Klaten Selenggarakan Prodin”, Solo Pos, 12 August 2011.
12 For more on HASI see IPAC, “Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict”, IPAC Report No.6, 30 January 2014. The US Treasury Department designated HASI as a terrorism backer and imposed financial sanctions against it in September 2014; the al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the United Nations followed suit in March 2015. HASI opened an account at Bank Syariah Mandiri for on-line contributions until the bank shut it down in June 2015 after the UN’s designation. The designation was based in part on HASI’s program of sending cash and medical supplies for jihadi groups in Syria, first for Ahrar Al Syam and later for Jabhah al-Nusroh. It sent twelve of these missions between late 2012 and December 2014.
13 Transcript and translation from video produced as a tool for fund-raising for the camp by Markaz Media al-Ufuq, March 2010.
14 The article, which first appeared on elhakimi’s blog (elhakimi.wordpress.com) on 22 March 2010, was picked up by arrahmah.com and published in three parts on 8, 9, and 21 April 2010. Many other sites reproduced it, generating a huge debate in extremist circles.
III. BUILDING THE MILITARY WING

By 2010, JI decided it needed to revive its military wing as well. If its long-term aim was the establishment of an Islamic state, principles of salafi jihadism demanded that members be adequately prepared to confront any obstacles. In early 2011, the central command agreed on a new structure with two wings, one above-ground for dakwah and one secret for military affairs. To fill positions in the new structure, JI invited members who had long been inactive to come back. One man from Semarang, who had been inducted into JI in 2000 but then lapsed into inactivity after the arrest of top leaders in 2007, said he was approached by a friend in early 2010 – before the breakup of the Aceh camp – and asked to take part again in JI activities. JI paid his rent and found him a job for six months with a network of members in Lampung. He moved back to central Java in 2011, then in August 2011 was sent to Southeast Sulawesi to plant cloves and cacao on JI-owned. The fact that JI had acquired fixed assets such as land suggests that the central command was also giving thought to its long-term economic self-sufficiency.15

The new military wing was based on JI’s old organizational manual (Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyah, PUPJI) and used a territorial structure that was similar to the old one, headed by a central command.

<table>
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<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>Markaziyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall commander</td>
<td>Amir</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Division</td>
<td>Mantiqi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brigade</td>
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<td>Khodimah/Qodimah</td>
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<td>Battalion</td>
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<td>Tholiah</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Platoon</td>
<td>Qirdas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squad</td>
<td>Fi’ah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cell</td>
<td>Thoifah</td>
<td>Ribabah</td>
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If before JI had four mantiqi across five countries, this time it had only one bithonah covering Indonesia from Sumatra to Nusa Tenggara Barat. This was further divided into two khodimah (sometimes spelled qodimah), structurally equivalent to the old wakalah. The western region covered Cepu, Semarang, Salatiga and Klaten in central Java through West Java and Sumatra. The eastern region included Bojonegoro, Boyolali and Sukoharjo in Central Java eastward through East Java to Lombok and Sumbawa.

Below the khodimah were three smaller units, the isobah at the subdistrict level, the rodibah at the village or municipal ward level, and the qobhisoh at a neighbourhood level. The smallest unit was the ribabah, formerly the thoifah.

For security reasons, the leaders of each level used a closed cell structure. Members of the central command only communicated with bithonah leaders via courier, likewise there was little face-to-face communication between bithonah leaders and their subordinates. The identities of the amir and members of the central command were kept secret from most members.

In addition to the “fighters” of its military wing, JI also had “reserve forces”, divided into five “Nature Lover” (Pecinta Alam) units, so that they could conduct fitness training under the cover of enjoying nature walks.16

15 Verdict of the East Jakarta District Court in case of Noor Chandra Pindariza, Decision Number 238/ Pid.SUS/2015/PN.Jkt. Tim, 8 July 2015.

16 Verdict of the East Jakarta District Court in case of Badawi Rohman, Decision Number 1103/ Pid.SUS/2014/PN.Jkt.Tim, 19 March 2015.
Many JI members called back into service were assigned to the military wing. One was Dwi Gunawan. Arrested on 15 May 2014, he said during his trial that he had been inducted into JI in 1998 and had been active in a fi‘ah in Semarang until around 2007 when arrests had effectively put an end to activities. He was called up again in 2010. He understood that JI was trying to build its military strength through purchasing and producing firearms as well as collecting a supply of explosives so that it would eventually have the military strength to establish an Islamic state.\(^{17}\)

### A. Ustadz Batar Returns

When Dwi was reactivated, he learned that the overall head of the bitohonah was Muhammad Khairul Anam, referred to in the organization as Bravo but far more commonly known as Ustadz (teacher) Batar. A Magelang native, Ust. Batar was a senior member from a blue-blood JI family; his father had been a JI cleric. His younger brother, Joko alias Luluk, who had trained in Mindanao, had been arrested in 2003 in connection with the discovery of a major JI weapons depot in Sri Rejeki, Semarang.

Ust. Batar, a graduate of JI’s Mahad Aly school in Solo, had been a combatant in Ambon with other JI fighters during the communal conflict of the immediate post-Soeharto years. He had helped found the Mujadid Pesantren in Tehoru, West Ceram and became its director; he was also involved in several bombings in Ambon in 2003. After a deadly attack on a Brimob post in Loki, West Ceram, in which he was marginally involved, he fled to Java and for the next few years lived quietly in his hometown.

In 2010, Ust. Batar was invited by the central command to return to JI. A year later, he was appointed head of the bitohonah and began intensive rebuilding. Among the first people he tapped were Suyata alias Salim, better known as Jimi, and Trimo, also known as Faris. Jimi also had a classic JI background. Born in Gunung Kidul, central Java, he had been inducted into JI in 1998, aged 23. In 2000, he was sent with 20 others to Mindanao for training at JI’s Camp Hudaibiyah. The batch, known as KHD-II, included former JI acting amir Zuohonri alias Zarkasih and many others who went on to play leading roles. The training was two years; Jimi stayed on for another three.\(^{18}\) In 2005, he was summoned back and immediately sent by Abu Dujana to Poso, where he stayed at the nerve center of JI’s activities there, Pesantren al-Amanah. In May 2005, he was involved in the Tentena market bombing that killed 22 people and was put on the police wanted list. He fled back to the Gunung Kidul area and laid low, avoiding any contact with JI members, until 2010 when he was called back to service by an operative close to Ust. Batar. In 2011 he was made head of mobilisation, directly under Batar, a position he held until his arrest.

The background of Trimo is still unclear, but he shared responsibility with Suyata for the military training of new or newly active members.

Under Ust. Batar’s leadership, JI was able to rebuild its military strength which had basically collapsed after 2007. The number of recruits grew sharply. In 2015, police estimated that JI had about 1,000 members. Each member was expected to contribute 5 per cent of his income and turn it over to the local leader (qoid) at monthly meetings. This generally amounted to around Rp.60,000, so that per month, the total income from dues alone was around Rp.60 million (US$4,500). JI also had at least one charitable foundation in Semarang, Yayasan Abdurrahman bin Auf, which received donations and alms; a store that sold CCTV cameras; and productive

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17 Verdict of the East Jakarta District Court in the case of Dwi Gunawan alias Danag alias Wijaya alias Wiranto, Decision No. 1104/Pid.Sus/2014/PN.JKT.TIM, 9 March 2015.
18 In his testimony, Jimi says he left for Mindanao "around 1999" but from the names of the others in his group, it is clear he was part of KHD-II that departed in 2000.
land in Magetan, East Java; Bantul, Central Java; and Kolaka, Southeast Sulawesi.19

Ust. Batar was also mindful of the welfare of the JI leadership. Everyone in an executive position received mukafaah (a monthly salary) from Rp.500,000 to Rp.2 million (US$37 to $150). Badawi Rohman, for example, received Rp.500,000 a month plus an addition Rp.300,000 for operational expenses.20 A few also were given an official car – Jimi had an Isuzu Panther. Lower-ranking officials were loaned motorcycles.

Batar also ensured that the military training went relatively smoothly. Each JI member was required to undergo physical training such as running, self-defence, swimming, archery and horse-riding. In April 2014 in Bantul, the western region held a training course for assembling and disassembling an M-16, though only one real gun was available for the course. Every member had to be able to run 10-15 km, swim a few dozen meters, master a few martial arts and know how to use a knife and sword. Members also were required to do training at home, with periodic checks by their immediate commander, in one of three skills: knife-throwing; shooting an airsoft gun; or using a blowpipe.21

Beginning in 2012, JI also began to focus on amassing arms and weapons. Partly because it was getting increasingly difficult to obtain guns on the black market, JI, relying heavily on the skills of Mindanao-trained members, built a backyard machine shop with a lathe in the village of Trucuk, Klaten, Central Java for producing home-made firearms and knives. The “factory” aimed to modify pellet and air soft guns to enable them to fire real bullets. Some of the Mindanao alumni had once worked in a similar factory belonging to the MILF and were hoping to reproduce it. By the time Jimi was arrested, the Trucuk shop had produced 35 guns that could fire 8 mm pellets. Each qodimah was instructed to find at least one bunker for weapons and explosives storage, with JI providing the funds for land purchase and construction.22

Jimi and Batar also reportedly planned to buy a few boats in East Kalimantan to facilitate transport in and out of Mindanao for military training and weapons purchases.23

B. Jihad in Syria

When the conflict in Syria erupted in 2011, JI became one of the most active jihadi organizations collecting funds to help what it saw as Sunni victims of a Shi’a tyrant. To raise funds and send aid, it worked through HASI. The usual method was to hold public rallies or lectures (tabligh akbar) in solidarity with Syria with donations collected at the end. Between 2012 and the end of 2013, JI organized some 60 rallies and discussions in several cities with the help of an affiliate, SyamOrganizer. While it is not clear how much money was raised in total, the take from one event could be huge: a fund-raiser in Bandar Lampung in November 2013 raised Rp. 130 million.

At the same time, JI’s military wing saw the conflict Syria as an opportunity for members to acquire combat experience and more in-depth military training. Around July 2013, Para Wijayanto ordered Ust. Batar to select cadres for Syria. Batar then asked Jimi to take charge of arrangements, with all accommodation costs paid by JI. In August 2013 JI sent its first five men into Latakia, Syria: Dwi Gunawan from Semarang; Iwan from Sidoarjo, East Java; Hasan from

19 Verdict of East Jakarta District Court in case of Badawi Rohman, Decision Number 1103/ Pid.SUS/2014/ PN.Jkt.Tim, 19 March 2015, p.26 and Verdict in case of Noor Chandra Pindariza, op.cit., p.21.
20 Verdict in case of Badawi Rohman, op.cit.
21 Verdict of East Jakarta District Court in case of Suyata alias Jimi, Decision Number 1106/Pid.SUS/2014/PN.Jkt.Tim, 11 March 2015, pp.31-33.
22 Ibid. p.33
23 IPAC interview with one of the prosecutors who handled cases of JI members arrested in Klaten in 2014, November 2016.
Yogyakarta; Yasin alias Hamzah from West Java; and Malvin from Jakarta. It is not clear which militia they joined, but they only stayed a month. In late 2013, at least one other person named Ilham from Surabaya left for Syria and stayed a month, but he may have been part of a larger batch.

While there they learned how to assemble and disassemble an AK47 and an FN pistol; studied the workings of an M-60 rifle and hand grenades; and learned how to shoot an AK-47 from a standing, squatting and prone position. They also did guard duty on the border with Turkey for three days under the guidance of one Abu Muhammad from Aleppo. On their return, they were debriefed by Ust. Batar at a hotel in Puncak, Bogor.

For several months, JI stopped sending anyone. Then in 2014, JI sent two senior figures, Ustadz Dipo Azhar and Adi Suryana alias Qital to assess the situation. They concluded that ISIS was deviant in several respects and decided to henceforth send cadres only to Jabhat al-Nusrah. It is unclear how many men had received training by early 2017 but JI’s mission was clearly to send people for short, intensive training courses, not unlike the special courses offered by its training academy in Mindanao in 1999-2000, with the aim of building skills that could eventually be used at home.

In 2014 JI began to actively campaign against ISIS as an organization that too quickly condemned anyone who refused to join as a kafir or non-believer. Even more vocal against ISIS than JI was a group linked to Jamaah Ansyarul Syariah (JAS) that had formed in Cipinang prison around former JI member Lutfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid in the years 2013 to 2016 (he was released in May 2016). From behind bars, and with the encouragement of prison officials and police, they had made their own anti-ISIS website, www.muqawamah.net on which they regularly posted Jabhat al-Nusrah propaganda against al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State. The JAS group included several former JI leaders who had supported Noordin Top in 2004-2009. The common position against ISIS did not lead to any organisational alliance, however – JI and JAS stayed apart, largely because of personality differences.

IV. EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

It was not just the military wing that was active. Sometime in 2014, police obtained a powerpoint presentation of the 2013 year end report for JI’s education division, which was kept completely separate from the military wing. The organogram for the division showed the extent to which hierarchical Indonesian bureaucratic structures, titles and pecking orders (not to mention acro-
nyms) could permeate even the most anti-government institutions. The division had 24 education coordinators who collectively reported to seven heads of section, five in the western region, two in the east. There were regional coordinators for general training and specialised training.

The presenter reported that 95 per cent of the regions were successfully holding monthly meetings in the western region, once every three months in the east. They had reached 1,988 male university students and 962 females during the year. (This probably means these students had attended at least one JI-led discussion; it does not imply membership.) As of December, the division had an income of Rp.369,000,000 ($27,700) but had spent Rp.403,024,000 (US$36,300) leaving them in the red. For 2014, it estimated its financial needs at Rp.20,000,000 (US$1,500) a month.

The most interesting part of the plan related to professions targeted for recruitment. The presentation listed achievements for 2013 and goals for 2014. The first 20 of 38 professions listed were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROFESSION</th>
<th>Achieved 2013</th>
<th>TARGET 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Doctor</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Nurse</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Midwife</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Pharmacist</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Information tech</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Chemical technology</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7  Machinist</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8  Electrical technology</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9  Metallurgy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Industrial technology</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Nuclear technology</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Civil engineering</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Publishing</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Communications Sci</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Journalism</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Law graduates</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Practicing lawyers</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Paralegals</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Agriculture grads</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Agricultural experts</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recruiters, working in a wide range of tertiary institutes including secular universities, were also looking for Arabic, English and Mandarin speakers. The impression left by the report, as no doubt intended by the presenter, was of an active, dynamic organisation focused mostly on Java that had a clear sense of purpose.

It is not clear from the report how the old network of JI pesantrens fit into the new structure, and it would be a useful focus of future research. Some of the schools went over to JAT in 2009 (and JAS after 2014); others took a more salafist stance. More generally, with JI’s transformation to a half-open structure, it was no longer so important for security reasons to keep everything in-house. Long before the 2010 restructuring, the leadership recognised that if JI were to build a real mass base, it would need to recruit from a wider pool.

29 “Laporan Akhir Tahun 2013 Dit Tar”, powerpoint presentation.
V. ARRESTS

Police had continued to monitor JI even as it receded into the background and more violent groups emerged. In May 2014, Detachment 88 raided the homemade arms factory in Klaten and arrested nine JI members who were running it. (See Appendix 1.) They also arrested Jimi. This set in train a series of events that led to the death in custody of a JI member, Siyono; a demand for greater accountability of Detachment 88; and a rethinking by the JI leadership of its stance on ISIS.

A. The Death of Siyono

JI’s central command immediately sent out an order deactivating all members linked to Jimi, including Ust. Batar as head of the bithonah, and all of his staff. Ust. Batar was replaced with a man named Ishak from Pekalongan and Jimi with a man named Siyono. One task of Siyono was to protect anyone who had had contact with Jimi and anything belonging to JI that had not already been seized, including weapons.

Ust. Batar himself hid in Ponorogo, East Java for a year. In December 2015, someone in JI contacted him to ask if he was willing to become active again. He said yes. But before he could do anything, he was arrested by police, together with three former staff of the bithonah, including another of Batar’s brothers. A direct consequence of these arrests was information leading to the arrest of Siyono, Jimi’s replacement, on 8 March 2016. Two days later, he was dead, having bled to death in police custody.

It remains unclear exactly what happened. The police gave a detailed chronology, saying that Siyono on 10 March was being taken around in a police vehicle to point out the whereabouts of another senior JI member, Tomi Giri, in Wonogiri district, Central Java. Because he had seemed cooperative, Siyono was not handcuffed, and there was only one officer in the car with him in addition to the driver. Around 12:30pm, while on the road between Klaten and Prambanan, Siyono suddenly attacked the officer and tried to seize his gun. He also hit the driver around the head, causing him to temporarily lose control of the car, which veered off the road and hit a post. The officer appears to have hit Siyono against the car or used a blunt object to subdue him. Police said he died from his head hitting the window frame of the vehicle. A separate autopsy said part of his chest bone pierced his heart. The discrepancy in reports was never resolved.

Siyono’s death sparked widespread public outrage and served as a pretext for rights groups as well as Islamists to demand greater accountability of Detachment 88, including by trying to insert a provision in a new draft anti-terrorism bill that would force the counter-terrorism police to answer to a civilian oversight commission. The provision appears to have been dropped in the latest version of the bill, but Siyono’s death contributed to concerns about excessive use of force by the unit.

B. Post-Siyono Considerations

The arrests of JI members and Siyono’s death had a direct impact on JI’s attitude toward ISIS. As they perceived it, their anti-ISIS stance had been exploited by the government, which arrested their friends and then used their writings to develop a counter-narrative to ISIS. They complained that BNPT even used former prisoners such as Abu Tholut to campaign against ISIS,

32 As a result of the outcry, police eventually demoted but did not dismiss the two officers involved, though they were forced to leave Detachment 88.
harassing him if he did not take part. It was time to move away from the anti-ISIS focus toward more pressing issues, one of which, in their view, was Shi‘ism.

The “new” JI gave a far higher priority to anti-Shi‘a teachings than the old, thanks in part to the influence of Farid Okbah. Farid, a former JI member who had briefly trained in Afghanistan and who still is very close to the ulama in JI’s dawwah wing, is Indonesia’s foremost anti-Shi‘a ideologue. In the post-Siyono reassessment, JI leaders concluded that they had allowed the anti-Shi‘a agenda to be swamped by the anti-ISIS efforts.

Following Farid, they believed that the Shi‘a community had a strategy to turn the world into a single Shi‘a state and Indonesia was part of the plan. He said the grand design had begun in 1979 with the Iranian revolution. Now there were four key Shi‘a states, Iran, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. By 2020, the Shi‘a plan to control Bahrain and Kuwait as well as Indonesia, which would become the key propagator of Shi‘ism in Southeast Asia. Some leading JI members subscribe to Farid’s warning that the Shi‘a are planning an armed revolution in Indonesia, as evidenced by the February 2015 assault on the al-Zikra Mosque in Sentul, Bogor. The mosque, where well-known cleric Arifin Ilham holds lectures and religious discussions, was attacked by a small group of Shi‘a militants after it displayed a number of anti-Shi‘a banners.

JI’s aversion to violence would evaporate if a Sunni-Shi‘a conflict were to break out in Indonesia – an eventuality that would have seemed absurd until very recently but is no longer unthinkable, though still unlikely. JI almost certainly would not try to provoke it, but they would be quick to join the Sunni side if one erupted.

VI. LOOKING FORWARD: JI IN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY?

The arrest of 18 JI members since 2014 exposed hundreds of members and probably succeeded in temporarily halting the program to amass weapons and build up a fighting force. Ust. Batar will likely receive a stiff sentence and remain behind bars for years to come. But JI is nothing if not resilient, and the partnership of Para Wijayanto as amir and Batar as military commander brought it back to life remarkably quickly. It helped that it had such a depth of members to draw on, and that even though the organisational activities had ceased in many areas, the social networks remained intact. If that partnership represents “neo-JI”, then a “neo-neo-JI” will not be far behind.

JI has a bigger problem than finding weapons, however. It is hard to see how its hybrid identity – half open, half clandestine – gets it very far. It has lost any distinguishing ideological characteristics. In the mid-90s, it was JI’s existence as a secret organisation (tanzim sirri) and its commitment to training through a rigorous military academy that distinguished it from all other jihadist organisations in the region. Without an active jihad, it is little different from militant salafist organisations like HASMI in Bogor. And while it may have had some success on university campuses, many better-resourced hardline dawwah organisations got there first. For a while, its strongly anti-ISIS stance from a jihadi perspective helped set it apart, but the de facto alliance this seemed to create with BNPT made it problematic.

33 Abu Tholut – who no longer identifies with JI or JAT but is close to the anti-ISIS group around Ubeid -- maintained there was nothing wrong with cooperating with BNPT to point out the ways in which ISIS was deviant. He said there was nothing different between what he was doing now and the activities of Afghan veterans from Indonesia who were invited by the United Nations or the US government to talk about fighting the Soviet Union. If people were going to criticize him, they should also be criticizing the Afghan alumni. See https://www.kiblat.net/2016/06/27/wawancara-abu-tholut-bersama-bnpt-hadapi-isis-di-mana-salahnya.
34 “Wawancara Ustadz Farid Ahmad Okbah Terkait Penyerangan Masjid Az Zikra Sentul”, Kiblat TV, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ezr8C0Nag
36 Ibid.
Elhakimi’s call in *Refleksi Jihad Aceh* for a grand coalition of pro-shari’ah organisations each working at what it does best may represent the idealism of a young JI member, but it ignores the rivalries and jealousies that beset attempts at alliance-building. On its own, JI has only its impressive historical roots and family networks. Above-ground JI does not have the masses of FPI, the political connections of FUI, or a distinct message like Hizbut Tahrir. Below-ground JI prepares for a future military confrontation while warning recruits against any action.

This is exactly the kind of situation that produces dissent and splintering. The real danger of “neo-JI” is that just as Darul Islam gave way to JI and JI gave way to Noordin, the current JI could give rise to a more militant splinter that could be more professional in its organisation, training and recruitment than anything Indonesian extremism has to offer today.
**APPENDIX I: JI MEMBERS ARRESTED SINCE 2014**

**Note:** All of those listed are Javanese, as far as we know. Most were already involved in JI in the early 2000s. Court verdicts are now mostly available on line, with a summary of all the testimony. See for example: [https://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/pengadilan/pn-jakarta-timur/direktori/pidana-khusus/terorisme/](https://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id/pengadilan/pn-jakarta-timur/direktori/pidana-khusus/terorisme/) Going through the on-line list of cases, however, it is clear that many narcotics cases have been mis-entered as terrorism, which also obviously affects the accuracy of aggregate statistics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date, Place of Birth</th>
<th>Circumstances of Arrest</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J1</td>
<td>Abdul Rofiq</td>
<td>4/5/1971 Kudus</td>
<td>Arrested 15 May 2014 in Trucuk, Klaten in connection with discovery of JI arms factory.</td>
<td>5 yrs as of 3/2015</td>
<td>Inducted into JI in 1999 in Kudus by Taufik Ahmad alias Abu Arina. Inactive from 2003, following Bali bomb arrests, to May 2013 when the old Kudus cell reassembled. Rofiq knew how to work a lathe so was assigned to the Klaten factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2</td>
<td>Badawi Rohman alias Tomi</td>
<td>25/10/69 Semarang</td>
<td>Arrested 15 May 2014 in Trucuk, Klaten in connection with discovery of JI arms factory. Took active role in recruitment after Zarkasih arrested in 2007, involved in obtaining arms, including a pistol that belonged to Dulmatin so that the factory could make replicas.</td>
<td>7 yrs as of 7/2015</td>
<td>Inducted into JI in 1998 by Hadi Surya at Ponpes Baitussalam, Semarang. Served as assistant to Hadi's successor as head of JI-Semarang. Assisted Zarkasih whenever he visited.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<p>| J6  | Indraji Idham Wijaya | 10/3/1987 Banyumas | Arrested 19 Dec 2015 in Magersari, Mojokerto, East Java, accused of making guns for JI and false KTPs (same case as Ust Batar) | Worked as masseur |
| J8  | Joko Purwanto alias Galih Setiawan | 22/1/1977 Klaten | Arrested 14 May 2014 in Bareng, Klaten Utara, Central Java on suspicion of involvement in JI arms factory. | 4 yrs 10 mos as of 3/2015 | Inducted into JI in 2008 by Ust. Memet in Ngawen, Klaten, worked in service division, helped find locations for meetings and provide transport as necessary. Reported to Jimi. |
| J11 | Murjianto alias Bambang alias Ujang | 24/10/78 Boyolali | Arrested 2/2/17 for being part of logistics team of neo-JI | | Raised rabbits, occasional catering |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>DOB</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Arrested Date</th>
<th>Arrested Reason</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Other Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JI14</td>
<td>Siyono</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Klaten</td>
<td>8 March 2016</td>
<td>KILLED 10 March 2016 after a struggle in a police car while being taken around to point out whereabouts of another senior JI member.</td>
<td></td>
<td>In JI 2001. Received two firearms for JI training, Aug 2014. Replaced Jimi after his arrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI16</td>
<td>Tatak Lusiantoro alias Awang</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Temanggung, Tembarak, Solo</td>
<td>7 March 2016</td>
<td>Temanggung, Solo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Awang is the son of Moh Zahri whose house was destroyed in a police siege in September 2009 as one of the Jakarta hotel bombers, Ibrohim, was hiding out there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI17</td>
<td>Teguh Prambanan alias Basuki</td>
<td>22/10/71</td>
<td>Boyolali</td>
<td>19 Dec 2015</td>
<td>in Magersari, Mojokerto, East Java, accused of making guns for JI</td>
<td></td>
<td>Awang is the son of Moh Zahri whose house was destroyed in a police siege in September 2009 as one of the Jakarta hotel bombers, Ibrohim, was hiding out there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JI18</td>
<td>Winarno alias Putro alias Darmo</td>
<td>22/10/71</td>
<td>Boyolali</td>
<td>2 Feb 2017</td>
<td>for being part of logistics team of “neo-JI.”</td>
<td></td>
<td>Awang is the son of Moh Zahri whose house was destroyed in a police siege in September 2009 as one of the Jakarta hotel bombers, Ibrohim, was hiding out there.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

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