

UPDATE ON LOCAL ELECTION RESULTS IN WEST KALIMANTAN AND PAPUA

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I. INTRODUCTION

West Kalimantan and Papua are two of the provinces that officials had marked as potential trouble-spots among the 171 local elections taking place across Indonesia on 27 June 2018. In the end, West Kalimantan proved to be relatively peaceful, despite a hefty dose of identity politics. The election in Papua was as messy as predicted, marked by delays in delivery of ballot papers, weak electoral administration, fistfights over vote counting, and in two districts (*kabupaten*), outbreaks of deadly violence.

This update, which follows IPAC reports on pre-election dynamics in both provinces, looks at the election results and why they matter.¹

In West Kalimantan, the winner in the governor's race was Sutarmidji, the Muslim Malay candidate and former mayor of Pontianak. He decisively defeated Karolin Margaret Natasa, a Christian Dayak and daughter of the incumbent governor, Cornelis. Some post-election analyses noted the maturity of Indonesian voters in rejecting political dynasties, and Karolin certainly represented one in the making. But her defeat seems to have had less to do with her father or with Sutarmidji's good track record as mayor and more to do with the message to Muslim voters that they should only vote for a Muslim candidate: more than 80 per cent of Muslims did so. That message is a clear echo of the Islamist movement that brought down Ahok, the Jakarta governor and led to his defeat in the April 2017 election. Its use in West Kalimantan suggests that it may be a factor from now on in any races involving Muslim and non-Muslim candidates.

In Papua, almost everything that could go wrong with an election did, but the violence was linked more to the independence movement than to clan-based conflict among candidates, a source of problems in the past. The winner as expected was incumbent Lukas Enembe, who has built himself a powerful political machine in the central highlands, including by relying on the so-called "*noken system*" of proxy voting that encourages fraud. It is not clear whether Papua will ever be able to dig itself out of the electoral hole that this practice has produced.

In West Kalimantan, the fact that ethnic and religious tensions did not erupt into serious violence may have been due in part to the determined efforts of a group of NGOs and journalists to collect, investigate and clarify provocative information relating to religion or ethnicity that appeared online or through text messaging. Those efforts, noted in more detail below, could be usefully assessed, with lessons learned applied to other conflict-prone areas.

In terms of signals for the 2019 election, it is clear that the Islamist activists who want to bring down President Jokowi see the West Kalimantan result as a victory. Since three of the four parties that backed Sutarmidji (Golkar, NasDem and PKB) are in the Jokowi coalition, however, it will be harder to mobilise voters along religious lines for the presidential race. In Papua, Jokowi is hugely popular and is likely to win by a landslide regardless of who his opponent is. Lukas Enembe announced his support for Jokowi on 13 August 2018, despite his position as leader of the Papuan branch of the Demokrat Party, which is supporting Jokowi's rival, Prabowo Subianto. Enembe may switch to the NasDem party, bringing his followers with him. In the end, though, the presidential election will be won or lost in Java, Sumatra and South Sulawesi, not in the two provinces that are the focus of this update.

II. WEST KALIMANTAN: THE RESULTS

The West Kalimantan election for governor started out as what seemed to be a close race between the two strongest contenders: Sutarmidji, representing Muslim Malays, and Karolin Margaret

1 IPAC, "The West Kalimantan Election and the Impact of the Anti-Ahok Campaign," Report No.43, 21 February 2018 and "The 2018 Elections in Papua: Places and Issues to Watch," Report No.45, 31 May 2018.

Natasa, daughter of the incumbent, representing Christian Dayaks.

In the end, Sutarmidji and his running mate Ria Norsan, also a Malay Muslim, won with 51.55 per cent of the vote to 41.79 per cent for Karolin, a Catholic and her Protestant Dayak running mate, Suryadman Gidot. A third slate of Milton Crosby, a Protestant Dayak, and Boyman Harun, a Malay Muslim, got 6.65 per cent, too low even to be spoilers, since had all their votes gone to Karolin, Sutarmidji still would have won.

Interviews in Pontianak after the election suggested that voters were also happy with Sutarmidji's track record as two-term mayor of Pontianak and increasingly unhappy with the incumbent Cornelis, especially as he tried to build a dynasty through his daughter. But exit polling data showed that in fact, identity politics were overwhelmingly the determining factors.²

In terms of voters' religious backgrounds:

- 84 per cent of Muslims chose Sutarmidji-Norsan
- 90 per cent of Catholics and 79 per cent of Protestants chose Karolin (the other 21 per cent chose Milton, meaning Sutarmidji received very few Christian votes).³

In terms of ethnicity:

- 86 per cent of those identifying as Melayu and 57 per cent of those as Javanese chose Sutarmidji-Norsan
- 82 per cent of those identifying as Dayak, 100 per cent of ethnic Chinese and 29 per cent of Javanese chose Karolin-Gidot.⁴

These figures need to be put in the context of demographic data on the province. Here we reproduce a chart published in the May 2018 IPAC report:

Figure 1: West Kalimantan by Ethnicity

Year	Dayak	Malay	Javanese	Chinese	Madurese	Bugis	Sundanese	Total
2000	1,116,651 (30%)	1,291,593 (34.7%)	387,105 (10.4%)	353,606 (9.5%)	205,091 (5.51%)	119,010 (3.2%)	45,038 (1.21%)	3,722,172
2010	2,194,009 (48.2%)	814,550 (18.5%)	427,333 (7.8%)	358,451 (9.4%)	274,869 (6%)	137,239 (3.1%)	49,504 (1.1%)	4,395,635

Source: Data from Central Bureau of Statistics (*Badan Pusat Statistik*, BPS)

In that report, we suggested that Muslim Dayaks were identifying more as Dayaks and less as Melayu but voting results seem to suggest that for this group, religion was a more potent determinant than ethnicity. This becomes clearer if we look at the five districts (*kabupaten*) that were Karolin's strongholds. With the exception of Landak, her home base which she won with 89 per cent, the percentage of Sutarmidji supporters more or less tracks with the percentage of Muslims (as per 2009 data).

2 Information provided by Djayadi Hanan of Saiful Mujadi Research Consultants, 26 July 2018.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.

Figure 2: Election results in Karolin's strongholds

<i>Districts</i>	<i>% of population by religion</i>			<i>Election Outcome</i>		
	Islam	Protestant	Catholic	Karolin-Gidot	Sutarmidji-Norsan	Milton-Harun
Landak	20.0%	0.03%	73.7%	89.02%	8.39%	2.58%
Bengkayang	31.2%	30.9%	31.1%	69.97%	26.97%	3.06%
Sanggau	29.4%	19.4%	49.8%	63.34%	26.38%	10.28%
Sekadau	37.2%	13.2%	48.2%	47.84%	31.52%	20.65%
Sintang	41.3%	24%	30.7%	44.93%	36.43%	18.64%
Singkawang City	49.2%	11.8%	38%	40.98%	57.11%	1.9%

In Landak, Karolin's home base, an 89.02 per cent victory might seem stratospheric to most candidates, but her father won the 2012 election for governor there with 92.54 per cent and Karolin herself won 96.62 per cent running against an "empty box" (i.e. running unopposed) in the 2017 election for district head (*bupati*). Sutarmidji took away some of her votes, but about half of the Muslims in Landak still voted for the ruling family.

In Bengkayang, it was expected that Karolin's running mate, who had just been re-elected *bupati* there in 2016, would produce a much stronger vote for the Karolin-Gidot slate, but while the pair did win, it was clear that Sutarmidji got most of the Muslim vote.

In the three districts/cities with the highest number of voters - Pontianak, Sambas and Kubu Raya - Sutarmidji won with 75.4 per cent, 78.5 per cent and 71.6 per cent of the vote respectively. These three areas alone accounted for half (49.97 per cent) of his total vote.

Figure 3: Election Results in Most Populous Areas

<i>District</i>	<i>% of population by religion</i>			<i>Election Outcome</i>				
	Islam	Protestant /Catholic	Buddha	Karolin-Gidot	Sutarmidji-Norsan	Milton-Harun	Valid votes	Population
Pontianak City	69.5%	6.4%	19.2%	23.06%	75.43%	1.52%	317,044	658,457
Kubu Raya	78.5%	9.8%	7.8%	23.28%	71.64%	5.09%	279,887	518,116
Sambas	84.3%	6%	9.1%	18.39%	78.47%	3.14%	289,672	513,100

The result in Pontianak, Sambas and Kubu Raya is no surprise, and Sutarmidji's strong performance as Pontianak mayor almost certainly drew the support of many non-Muslim voters. Cornelis lost in Pontianak in 2012 as well, but Karolin still received 10 per cent fewer votes than he did.

III. DIFFERENT TACTICS IN IDENTITY POLITICS

Several observers noted that Karolin had played up ethnicity (Dayak) and played down religion in hopes of attracting Muslim Dayak, while Sutarmidji, or at least his supporters, had played up religion and played down ethnicity in the hopes of attracting non-Malay Muslims, Javanese and Madurese as well as Muslim Dayak.⁵

The two slates also differed in the actors they used to mobilise voters. While Karolin was open about appealing to Dayak sentiment, the calls to Muslims to vote for a candidate of the same faith spread through social media and mosque sermons rather than the candidates themselves.

A. Exhortations to Muslims

The Idul Fitri sermon (*khutbah*) in front of the Pontianak mayor's office on 15 June 2018, with Sutarmidji in attendance, was a clear example. Broadcast live over RRI Pontianak and without ever mentioning the names of the candidates, preacher Drs. H. Hamdani stressed that Islam forbids Muslims to choose non-Muslim leaders and set forth the criteria for a person to be elected. He repeated many of the themes used in the "212 Movement" that brought down the Jakarta governor in late 2016.

- Choosing a leader was an obligation for all Muslims, especially if by failing to vote, leadership could fall to a non-Muslim. Not using one's right to vote is acceptable only if the welfare of the Islamic community is not threatened, but if there is a danger that the Muslim candidate might lose if Muslims do not vote, then not voting is forbidden.
- Only Muslims fulfil the requirements to become leaders according to Islamic jurisprudence.
- Islam absolutely forbids non-Muslim leaders; this is non-negotiable. Allah forbids adultery through five verses of the Qur'an, prohibits drinking liquor through three verses, prohibits eating pork through four verses, but forbids choosing non-Muslim leaders in nineteen verses.
- One such verse is Surat Al Maidah 51.
- Muslims who choose non-Muslim leaders should be seen as having left Islam. If they choose Jews as leaders, they should be considered Jews. If they choose Christians, they should be considered Christian.
- If those who betray Islam in this fashion die, we are no longer obliged to pray over their bodies.

Because Sutarmidji was the only Muslim candidate running for governor, the *khutbah* was a direct instruction to vote for him, and similar messages went out through other mosques.

Likewise, on the day before the vote, Muslims via social media were urged to take part in a "Mass Morning Prayer" (Shalat Subuh Akbar). Thousands showed up at the Grand Mujahiddin Mosque in Pontianak at a time when campaigning was supposed to have stopped. The sermon given had no explicit political content.⁶ But as one official noted, voters would obviously connect the event with the election – why call a mass prayer on the morning before the vote if it was not intended to influence the outcome and when throughout Ramadan 2018, not a single mass morning prayer had taken place?⁷

5 IPAC interviews, Muhammad, member of West Kalimantan Election Oversight Commission (Bawaslu) and Dian Lestari of Independent Journalists Association, 26 June 2018.

6 IPAC interview with Bawaslu officer, Agung Widura, 27 June 2018.

7 IPAC interview with Akhmad Amiruddin, head of the election supervisory board for Mempawah district, 27 June 2018.

B. Karolin's Dayak Support Base

Karoline and her father, who was the head of her campaign team (*tim sukses*), were very open about promoting pro-Dayak sentiment. On 27 May 2018, Cornelis, as president of the National Dayak Adat Council (MADN), openly appealed to 118 Dayak sub-tribes in the province of West Kalimantan to support the Karolin-Gidot:

If not now, when will we have another chance to unite? Let's close ranks and hesitate no longer to ensure the victory of Karolin-Gidot slate.⁸

He claimed that the Dayak Adat Council and Dayak elders across the province were behind the slate and this should serve as guidance for all Dayaks.⁹

But it was a speech he had made a few days earlier, on 21 May, that aroused the ire of Muslim activists. They tried unsuccessfully to follow the playbook of the coalition that brought down the Jakarta governor, Ahok, in late 2016: circulate a video of the speech, raise a protest, file a police report and accuse him of blasphemy. But it was hard to make the same case. Cornelis said, among other things:

Kalimantan belongs to the Dayak. This is not me saying it. That's what experts say. [quotes two famous Indonesian anthropologists]

We Dayak have too long been colonized by [outside] kingdoms, starting with the kings of Majapahit, the kings of Sriwijaya. The worst were the Malay and Islamic kingdoms, along with the Dutch, they colonized us for centuries. So our mentality is that of slaves – not coolies, slaves...¹⁰

Muslim activists saw this as demeaning to Muslims and ethnic Malays (Melayu). A video of the speech was posted on YouTube on 5 June and on 6 June, the West Kalimantan Malay Union (POM), led by Agus Setiadi (an ethnic Bugis), filed a formal complaint with the West Kalimantan police, calling the speech blasphemous. He said it violated the 2016 law on electronic information, since it was circulated over social media, and also a 2008 law on the Elimination of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination.¹¹

In Jakarta, the United Islamic Forum (Forum Umat Islam Bersatu, FUIB), one of the Sulawesi-based components of the anti-Ahok movement, filed a criminal complaint against Cornelis on 26 June with the national police for alleged blasphemy and hate speech. Police did not pursue it, though it was not the last of the criminal complaints.¹² Over the mobile phone application Whatsapp, hardliners texted that they had “Ahokked” Karolin's father.¹³

In this context of highly charged identity politics, the team of Milton Crosby and Boyman Harun became symbolically important, proof that the two groups could work together, even if their mixed slate got few votes. Said one NGO leader:

8 “Ajak 118 Sub Suku Dayak Bersatu Menangkan Karolin-Gidot, Cornelis: Kalau Bukan Sekarang Kapan Lagi”, www.tribunpontianak.co.id, 28 May 2018.

9 Ibid.

10 Video “Islam ADALAH PENJAJAH DI INDONESIA: ungkap cornelis gubernur kalbar”, link <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THb4dOqGRYg>

11 “Soal Video Dugaan Hina Islam Dan Melayu, Persatuan Orang Melayu Laporkan Cornelis Ke Polda Kalbar”, www.kalbaronline.com, 7 June 2018.

12 On 4 July 2018, Soni Pradhana Putera, the Coordinator for Reporting to Defend Islam (Koordinator Pelaporan Bela Islam, Korlabi) reported Cornelis to police headquarters for insulting Islam. See “Dituduh Hina Umat Muslim, Gubernur Kalbar Dilaporkan ke Bareskrim”, www.suara.com, 5 July 2018.

13 One message from a member of the Menteng-based group Forum Syuhada Indonesia read “Kita Ahokkan bapaknya.”

The Milton-Boyman team helped soften Karolin's Dayak-only and Sutarmidji's Islam-only narrative.¹⁴

While identity politics were paramount, there were other factors at work as well: a high level of satisfaction with Sutarmidji's performance as mayor and some reports from Pontianak sources about unhappiness with the governor's dynastic plans that may have affected Karolin's support, though according to SMRC data, Cornelis still received a 64 per cent approval rating.¹⁵

On 28 June, when the quick count results were in, one Facebook user sent around a triumphant text: "All five provinces in Kalimantan are now led by Muslim governors and deputy governors."

IV. TENSIONS BUT NO SERIOUS VIOLENCE

When various survey organizations announced their "quick counts" after the polls closed on election day, it was clear Sutarmidji had won, and there were fears of an angry Dayak reaction. Those fears mostly did not materialize, though there were a few minor incidents in Landak.

On 29 June, a mob of Karolin-Gidot supporters gathered and burned tires in Karangan Market, Landak. Some non-Dayak Muslim families sought refuge at the local military post, allegedly fearing an outbreak of violence and retaliation from Dayak groups, but this seems to have been encouraged by Muslim activist groups and they quickly returned home on 2 July.¹⁶ The next day, another group of Karolin supporter wearing red headbands, a sign of Dayak militancy, burned tires at the Ngabang terminal in Landak. They also blocked and smashed the windows of several vehicles passing through the terminal area. The protesters appeared to be directing their anger at Javanese immigrants who they believed did not vote for Karolin-Gidot.

These episodes aside, the fact that the province stayed relatively peaceful may have been due in part to a determined effort on the part of local media and civil society groups concerned about the use of social media to spread false information. Led by an NGO called Masyarakat Anti-Fitnah Indonesia (Mafindo), they set up a Hoax Crisis Center in early June, aimed at investigating, clarifying and where necessary rebutting provocative messages circulating online or via mobile phone applications, particularly those with a religious or ethnic spin.¹⁷ While any citizen could submit a screenshot of news or a website link believed to be false or misleading, Mafindo staff and others at the Center initiated most of the investigations themselves, tracking down viral hashtags and exposing untrue claims. The Center, working with the provincial communication and information office, would then circulate a corrected version of the information.¹⁸

Tensions were also defused by the loser's gracious acceptance of the results. On 9 July, after the official vote count was certified by the provincial election commission, Karolin congratulated Sutarmidji on his victory, and she and Gidot urged their supporters to work together with the new governor to build a stronger West Kalimantan.¹⁹

14 IPAC interview with Marhasak Reinaldo Sinaga, head of Mafindo, Pontianak, 26 June 2018.

15 IPAC email exchange with Djayadi Hanan, executive director of SMRC, 26 July 2018.

16 "226 Pengungsi Karangan Pulang", www.pontianakpost.co.id, 2 July 2018.

17 Other members of the Center were Community Concerned about Information (Komunitas Peduli Informasi, KOPI) and the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI).

18 "KOPI Kalbar-Mafindo Kalbar Deklarasikan Hoaks Crisis Center," Pontianak.tribunnews.com, 4 June 2018. For an example of a correction to a false report circulating on how vaccinations contain pork products, HCC came back with this: <https://turnbackhoax.id/2018/08/05/salah-bahan-vaksin-dari-darah-babi/>

19 "Pilkada Kalbar, Pasangan Karolin-Gidot Ucapkan Selamat pada Sutarmidji-Ria Norsan.", www.kompas.com, 9 July 2018.

V. PAPUA: A VERY DIFFERENT STORY

The story was very different in Papua, where the election was marked by delays, violence and well-founded allegations of fraud. The political machine of incumbent governor Lukas Enembe, powered by his support bases in the Demokrat party and the central highlands, rolled to victory as expected. In the final tally by the provincial election commission, Enembe and his running mate Klemen Tinal, the incumbent deputy governor, with 67.54 per cent of the vote to 32.45 per cent for the rival slate of John Wempi Wetipo and Habel Melkias Suwae. Despite the remoteness of many areas, the election commission recorded an unrealistically high turn-out rate of 84.44 per cent that reached 100 per cent in several areas, including the *kabupaten* of Mamberamo Tengah, where all votes went to the Enembe slate (see Appendix 2).

Enembe swept the highlands, his base. Wempi Wetipo won in only nine of Papua's 29 *kabupaten* but those nine include the coastal, migrant-dominated areas, reinforcing the coastal-highlands and migrant-indigenous divide.²⁰ The most contested *kabupaten* was Jayawijaya, where Wetipo served two terms as bupati from 2008 to 2018. He won there but the vote count had to be cancelled and rescheduled three times because of fistfights between supporters of the two candidates.

Despite the magnitude of Enembe's win, Wempi Wetipo filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, which began hearing the case on 26 July. The petition had no chance of success and was indeed later rejected, but it did contain one interesting statistic: Wempi claimed that of 9,922 polling places in the province, 2,109 in sixteen districts used the "noken system", a term that covers a wide range of proxy voting practices where frequently, one official or elder is allowed to vote on behalf of everyone else.²¹ It is this practice that produces the 100 per cent turnout statistics. It also produces areas where there is not even a pretence of voting. In Tangma subdistrict of Tolikara, an NGO leader alleged that a few village leaders and the subdistrict head met in Wamena, Jayawijaya district to determine the outcome.²²

The "noken system" has been repeatedly endorsed by judicial decisions and various regulations at the national and provincial levels even though it clearly violates the principle of one person, one vote. Regulation No.10/2017 of the Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) states that the practice has been accepted "in the interests of respecting and honouring the cultural values of the Papuan people particularly in undertaking elections through a system of agreement or acclamation."²³ There is no reason, however, that Papuans should be denied the right to vote individually, and Papuans themselves have taken issue with the practice – the head of the local election commission in Yalimo *kabupaten*, for example, said the *noken* system should be rejected on the grounds that it violates the constitutional rights of citizens.²⁴

Wempi Wetipo's complaint to the Constitutional Court about the *noken* system had at least one fatal flaw. He alleged systematic and massive fraud in all the districts that used it except the

20 Wempi Wetipo won in Jayapura city, Jayapura kabupaten, Supiori, Sarmi, Biak Numfor, Merauke, Jayawijaya, Intan Jaya and Asmat.

21 "Permohonon Pembatalan Keputusan Pemilihan Umum Provinsi Papua Nomor 91/PL.03.1/91/Kpt/Prov/VII/201", submitted by the legal team of Wempi Wetipo and Habel Suwae the Constitutional Court, 11 July 2018. For more on the *noken* system, see IPAC, "Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble", Report No. 3, 9 October 2013, p.11-13 and "Open to Manipulation: The 2014 Elections in Papua", Report No.14, 10 December 2014, p.4-5.

22 "Masyarakat Dari 10 Desa Distrik Tangman Kabupaten Yahukimo Tidak Menyalurkan Hak Pilihnya Secara Bebas", note from Theo Hesegeg, June 2018.

23 Article 32, Peraturan KPU No. 10 Tahun 2017 tentang Ketentuan Khusus Dalam Pemilihan Gubernur Dan Wakil Gubernur Aceh, Bupati Dan Wakil Bupati, Dan/Atau Walikota Dan Wakil Walikota Di Wilayah Aceh, Pemilihan Gubernur Dan Wakil Gubernur Pada Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, Papua Dan Papua Barat.

24 "KPU Yalimo Tolak Sistem Noken", Cenderawasih Pos, 26 March 2018.

two where he won – Jayawijaya and Intan Jaya.²⁵

A. *Delays and Disruptions*

Many areas in Papua suffered delays because of late arrival of ballot papers or other supplies, administrative disputes or in the case of two districts, violence.

In three *kabupaten* in the central highlands, Tolikara, Deiyai and Yahukimo, there were problems delivering supplies – in the first two, because of too few planes and in the third, because of bad weather.²⁶

The Paniai *bupati*'s race was an interesting case because election commissions at the provincial and kabupaten levels could not agree on whether one or two candidate slates were running. The incumbent *bupati*, Hengky Kayame, who also chairs the executive board of the Hanura party's provincial branch, had been declared bankrupt by a Makassar civil court in early 2018 after failure to repay a debt. On 7 June, the district election commission, KPU Paniai, said he could not run, since being bankrupt (*pailit*) is an automatic disqualifier to stand as a candidate. They also disqualified three other slates, leaving only one – Meki Nawipa, a pilot for the private airline company Susi Air, and Oktavianus Gobay – to “run against an empty box”, i.e. to run unopposed.²⁷

Nevertheless, the election supervisory body, Panwaslu, in Paniai recommended that Hengky be allowed to run. Student groups mounted protests, alleging that a few Panwaslu members, who were supposed to be neutral, were actually on Hengky's campaign team.²⁸ On 24 June, the provincial KPU confirmed that Hengky could run, basing its decision on the Panwaslu recommendation. The provincial commission also took over the running of the election, sacked five district commissioners and managed to hold the election for governor one day late. The election for *bupati*, however, only went ahead on 25 July.²⁹ Fearing trouble, police deployed over 1,000 personnel for an election involving 100,843 registered voters. Meki won in a landslide with 70.5 per cent of the vote against Hengky's 29.5 per cent.³⁰

B. *The “Empty Boxes”*

IPAC's May 2018 report noted that there were three *kabupaten* – Jayawijaya, Puncak and Mamberamo – in which the disqualification of other candidates led to a single slate running unopposed. On the ballot papers, this meant that the slate ran against an “empty box”. Voters could tick the empty box as a protest vote, and in the city of Makassar, South Sulawesi, the “empty box” actually won, as more than 50 per cent of voters rejected the nephew of Vice-President Jusuf Kalla.

In Papua, the “empty box” served as a protest vote in a few areas, but mostly the single slates just underscored the complete shambles of the electoral process. In Jayawijaya, for example, where John Richard Banua ran unopposed, there was a 100 per cent turnout of registered voters – odd even if it had been a real contest, given that Jayawijaya contains many remote areas that are difficult to reach, but doubly odd with only one candidate slate. Only four of the 40 subdistricts

25 These facts emerged in the rebuttal to Wempi Wetipo's petition filed by Enembe's lawyers. See “Jawaban Termohon terhadap Perkara Nomor 48/PHP.GUB-XVV2018 yang dimohonkan oleh Wempi Wetipo, S.H, M.H. dan Habel M. Suwae sebagai Pasangan Calon Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur Papua Tahun 2018,” Nomor Urut 2, 31 July 2018.

26 “Penundaan Pemungutan Suara Paling Banyak Terjadi di Papua,” cnn.indonesia.com, 30 June 2018.

27 Meki is the first member of the Mee ethnic group to qualify as a pilot.

28 “Didesak PAW Panwaslu Paniai,” *Bintang Papua*, 22 June 2018.

29 The Paniai KPU has a long history of problems. In 2014, five members were dismissed for having changed the vote count in the legislative elections. See “Alihkan Suara, Lima Komisioner KPU Paniai Dipecat,” www.jpnn.com, 24 February 2014.

30 “Pilkada Paniai 2018: Raih Suara di 3 Distrik, Meki-Okto Menang Telak,” www.suarapapua.com, 28 July 2018.

registered any votes for the empty box but 1,768 such votes were cast in Wamena, the district capital, presumably representing the supporters of some of the disqualified candidates.³¹

In Puncak, the single slate, headed by Enembe ally Willem Wandik, received 90.1 per cent of the vote, with 14,813 going to the empty box – a fairly sizeable protest under the circumstances. (In the governor’s race, Lukas Enembe did even better than Wandik, garnering 93 per cent of the vote according to the official tally.)

And in Mamberamo Tengah, another remote area with a 100 per cent turnout, the “empty box” won 13.3 per cent of the vote to Ricky Ham Pagawak’s 86.70 per cent.³² This was also the district where Lukas Enembe won 100 per cent of the vote for governor.

C. Violence

Many had feared election-linked violence in Papua, but the concern was that it would come as it had in the past from contending candidates and their supporters, often armed with bow and arrows. As it turned out, however, deadly violence was restricted to two *kabupaten*, Nduga and Puncak Jaya, and the attacks were linked to pro-independence groups. They further complicated the conduct of an election that was already in serious difficulty.

- On 16 June 2018, gunmen opened fire on a TNI patrol vehicle in Tirengeri village, Yambi subdistrict, Puncak Jaya. Three soldiers were wounded.
- On 22 June, a Demonim Air plane was hit by gunfire at the end of the runway of the airport in Kenyam, capital of *kabupaten* Nduga. The co-pilot, Irena Nur Fadila, 25, was hurt in the ankle from a ricocheting bullet and the plane was damaged, but seventeen passengers and the rest of the crew were unharmed.
- On 25 June, at the same airport, gunmen opened fire on Tigana’s Twin Otter plane carrying the electoral supplies and fifteen Brimob members. Pilot Ahmad Kamil, 27, was wounded in the back.³³ Three civilians were subsequently killed as security forces fired back and the perpetrators fled. A married couple from Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi were killed, the husband by gunfire, the wife by a knife wound to the head. Their 6-year-old son was stabbed but survived. Another trader from Sulawesi, Zaenal Abidin, was fatally shot.
- On 26 June, two groups of fighters, about 20 men each, entered Kenyam and occupied the former subdistrict military command, no longer in use; the next day (election day) they raised the independence flag. The police suggested that certain parties were using armed groups in the service of their own narrow political interests, but this was denied in a statement issued on 27 June by Ekianys Kogoya, regional commander of the Free Papua Movement’s armed forces:

All actions that we conduct are purely the work of the West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB). We have no connection with any party involved in the election for governor. All forms of election are the work of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, NKRI) to colonise the Papuan people. The airplane shootings from 22-25 July and the flag-raising

31 The total number of votes for the empty box was 2,271 out of 262,283 legitimate ballots. In addition to the votes in Wamena, this included 239 votes in Silo Karno Doga *distrik*; 199 in Wouma *distrik*; and 65 in Hubikiak *distrik*. A *distrik* in Papua is equivalent to a *kecamatan* elsewhere in Indonesia.

32 “Lawan Kotak Kosong, Ha-Nas Raih Suara 86,70 Persen”, www.papuasatu.com, 9 July 2018.

33 “Pesawat yang Bawa Logistik Pilkada Papua Ditembak, Pilot Luka”, www.detiknews.com, 25 June 2018.

are purely to resist the NKRI system.³⁴

- On 27 June, armed groups in Torere subdistrict, Puncak Jaya shot at police escorting ballot boxes being transported by speedboat. Two police and the Torere subdistrict head were killed.
- On 4 July, police operations began in Alguru, a cluster of four villages across the river from Kenyam, Nduga where the gunmen involved in the the airport shootings were believed to be hiding. Police fired from a helicopter, causing panic on the ground but no civilian casualties, according to the Nduga bupati, who said he had asked the police and military to desist from any further air attacks.³⁵ The military said it was not involved in the operations.³⁶
- On 18 July, the regional command of the National Liberation Army of West Papua (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat), the armed wing of the Free Papua Organisation, issued a statement that the Alguru attack had killed two of its fighters.³⁷ The statement raised the question of who the Nduga attackers actually were. Local sources said the men were a new, younger, more militant splinter of the old Kelly Kwalik group and very difficult to control.

The operations and the violence in Kenyam more generally led hundreds to flee, some into the surrounding swamp, others to Asmat and Timika. Non-Papuan migrants and indigenous Papuans generally were accommodated in different shelters. Some 140 Torajans fled to Timika, some moving in with relatives, others staying in the Toraja Association (Ikatan Keluarga Toraja) house in Timika. Many Papuans stayed in churches in Asmat; others made their way to Wamena.

In his petition to the Constitutional Court, Wempi Wetipo accused the bupati of Nduga of campaigning for Lukas Enembe and promising the people of Nduga that Lukas would bring independence.³⁸ (This is probably the basis for the police suggestion that certain political interests were involved in the armed attacks.) From the timing and targeting of these attacks, it is clear that the fighters were challenging the electoral process, and that rejection of the Indonesian state in parts of the central highlands remains strong enough to support a small but virulent new armed splinter.

D. Lukas Enembe and the 2019 Election

On 13 August 2018, the newly re-elected Lukas Enembe announced his support for Jokowi in the 2019 election, sparking a flurry of speculation that he would leave the Demokrat Party. That party, founded by former President Yudhoyono, formally joined the alliance backing Jokowi opponent Prabowo Subianto on 10 August. Enembe, ever the practical politician, knows how popular Jokowi is in Papua. It would be in his interest to support him, even if there were not corruption charges hanging over his head that could be quietly dropped in a political deal.³⁹

34 Statement of Ekianus Kogoya, Commander of KODAP III, Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat Ndugama, quoted in “Kota Genyam Bintang Fajar Berkibar dan PILKADA Tidak Dilaksanakan Akibat TPNPB vs TNI POLRI Baku Tembak”, tpnpnews.wordpress.com, 27 June 2018.

35 “Bupati: Masyarakat Bilang Jangan Keluar Kenyam, Kalau Bapak Keluar Kami Bisa Diperlakukan Tidak Baik”, www.suarapapua.com, 12 July 2018.

36 “Kodam Cenderawasih dan Polda Papua Bantah Isu Operasi Militer di Nduga”, www.haipapua.com, 12 July 2018.

37 “TPNPB Umumkan Dua Anggotanya Tewas Dalam Serangan di Nduga, Papua”, 19 July 2018.

38 “Sengketa Pilkada, Bupati Nduga Disebut Janjikan Papua Merdeka”, cnnindonesia.com, 26 July 2018. See also Saleh & Partners, “Permohonan Pembatalan Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum Provinsi Papua Nomor 91/PL.03.1/91/Kpt/Prov/VII/2018”, 19 July 2018. This was a revised petition – the first, dated 11 July 2018, included Jayawijaya and Intan Jaya along with the other districts where the *noken* system was used.

39 For background on the corruption charges and their political implications, see IPAC, “The 2018 Local Elections in Papua: Places and Issues to Watch,” IPAC Report No.45, 31 May 2018, p.3.

Enembe has hinted that he is ready to move to NasDem, a party in the Jokowi coalition. The head of his campaign team, the bupati of Jayapura, is a NasDem leader, and Enembe's wife is one of the party's legislative candidates. Enembe's supporters would likely follow him in a shift of party allegiance, transforming NasDem overnight into one of the province's strongest parties.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The local elections in Indonesia on 27 June generally went smoothly and were evidence of the strength of Indonesia's electoral democracy and the sustained interest of its voters in taking part in it. The two provinces described here are special cases but they are ones that need some concentrated attention from Jakarta. Even if violence was averted this time round in West Kalimantan, the pressure to identify with a single religion or single ethnicity does not bode well for communal harmony in the future. The new governor and his team need to go out of their way to build bridges to Christian Dayak communities.

Papua is a daunting morass of problems but making a concerted effort to improve local elections is one of many ways forward. This depends on getting a better head count through the national census, scheduled for 2020, and then using those results to clean up voter rolls and end the *noken* system. Many in the Papuan political elite, however, will not be happy to see it go.

APPENDIX I



APPENDIX II

2018 WEST KALIMANTAN VOTING RESULTS BY KABUPATEN/KOTA COMPARED TO 2012

No	District/ City	Cornelis-Christiandy (victors 2012)		Karolin Natasa – Suryadman Gidot (2018)		Sutardmidji – Ria Norsan (victors 2018)		Milton Crosby- Boyman Harun (2018)	
		Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%
1.	Sambas	56,552	22.95%	53,264	18.39%	227,315	78.47%	9,093	3.14%
2.	Mempawah	46,579	42.38%	38,717	29.32%	89,773	67.98%	3,561	2.70%
3.	Sanggau	173,127	73.19%	151,450	63.34%	63,080	26.38%	24,568	10.28%
4.	Ketapang	111,034	51.87%	87,241	38.48%	125,140	55.19%	14,366	6.34%
5.	Sintang	120,906	56.30%	98,166	44.93%	79,591	36.43%	40,735	18.64%
6.	Kapuas Hulu	54,573	42.41%	59,204	45.87%	63,814	49.44%	6,051	4.69%
7.	Bengkayang	83,138	74.42%	87,365	69.97%	33,682	26.97%	3,817	3.06%
8.	Landak	213,758	92.54%	218,968	89.02%	20,634	8.39%	6,361	2.59%
9.	Sekadau	66,144	62.98%	52,087	47.84%	34,316	31.52%	22,480	20.65%
10.	Melawi	64,446	53.12%	50,152	38.63%	64,581	49.74%	15,099	11.63%
11.	Kayong Utara	11,504	27.96%	9,679	17.33%	40,944	73.31%	5,231	9.37%
12.	Kubu Raya	84,603	36.85%	65,155	23.28%	200,484	71.63%	14,248	5.09%
13.	Pontianak City	90,447	34.38%	73,100	23.06%	239,135	75.43%	4,809	1.52%
14.	Singkawang City	48,374	49.92%	37,330	40.98%	52,023	57.11%	1,732	1.90%
	Total	1,225,185	52.10%	1,081,878	41.79%	1,334,512	51.55%	172,151	6.65%

APPENDIX III

2018 PAPUA VOTING RESULTS BY KABUPATEN/KOTA COMPARED TO 2013

[Note that in 2013, Lukas Enembe was running against five other slates. Also note the huge increases in number of voters in some of the central highland districts between 2013 and 2018, suggesting inflation of voter rolls. Tolikara, Nduga and Jayawijaya stand out. Finally, note that the percentages for Enembe and Wetipo in 2018 do not always add up to 100 per cent because of a small number of invalid ballots.]

No	District/City	Lukas Enembe – Klemen Tinal (victors 2013)		Total voters (2013)	Lukas Enembe – Klemen Tinal (victors 2018)		John Wempi Wetipo – Habel Suwae (2018)		Total voters (2018)
		Votes	%		Votes	%	Votes	%	
1.	Asmat	5,711	13.24%	43,123	20,116	32.25%	41,758	66.94%	62,384
2.	Biak Numfor	10,159	20.62%	49,259	26,823	44.91%	31,648	52.98%	59,732
3.	Boven Digoel	5,411	22.39%	24,166	11,389	63.85%	6,056	33.95%	17,836
4.	Deiyai	9,666	20.58%	46,960	54,173	88.81%	6,826	11.19%	60,999
5.	Dogiyai	37,124	46.79%	79,343	67,561	76.57%	20,981	23.43%	89,543
6.	Intan Jaya	32,120	52.29%	61,421	24,774	30.17%	57,156	69.61%	82,110
7.	Jayapura	19,736	28.48%	69,294	25,971	41.82%	34,546	55.63%	62,101
8.	Jayawijaya	121,769	66.03%	184,425	105,696	40.08%	157,736	59.81%	263,729
9.	Keerom	3,780	16.16%	23,388	17,607	61.51%	10,474	36.59%	28,623
10.	Kepulauan Yapen	10,821	21.62%	50,046	31,050	55.54%	23,048	41.22%	55,909
11.	Jayapura City	26,534	17.46%	151,946	65,201	45.59%	75,724	52.95%	143,009
12.	Lanny Jaya	95,681	82.13%	116,502	147,880	79.33%	37,702	20.22%	186,414
13.	Mamberamo Raya	5,452	36.33%	15,005	12,760	67.30%	6,062	31.97%	18,961
14.	Mamberamao Tengah	22,753	77.88%	29,216	33,271	100%	0	0.00%	33,271
15.	Mappi	6,602	19.76%	33,407	26,786	68.56%	11,122	28.47%	39,068
16.	Merauke	12,014	16.49%	72,845	38,819	47.94%	39,694	49.02%	80,974
17.	Mimika	75,655	51.17%	147,846	117,371	58.65%	61,441	30.70%	200,135
18.	Nabire	16,017	15.45%	103,701	79,149	55.78%	61,872	43.61%	141,890
19.	Nduga	25,301	46.56%	54,336	62,814	66.67%	31,402	33.33%	94,216
20.	Paniai	13,378	14.43%	92,698	81,932	80.97%	19,211	18.99%	101,189
21.	Pegunungan Bintang	28,739	37.04%	77,592	68,782	71.01%	27,659	28.56%	96,859
22.	Puncak	83,574	71.17%	117,427	146,783	92.70%	11,557	7.30%	158,340
23.	Puncak Jaya	141,017	99.55%	141,657	159,377	88.33%	21,053	11.67%	180,430
24.	Sarmi	2,316	16.80%	13,785	6,023	41.48%	8,017	55.21%	14,521
25.	Supiori	3,026	38.16%	7,930	4,269	41.99%	5,778	56.84%	10,166
26.	Tolikara	161,879	94.41%	171,470	180,156	80.76%	42,359	18.99%	223,077
27.	Waropen	2,160	12.72%	16,981	15,008	50.92%	14,263	48.39%	29,476
28.	Yahukimo	164,683	63.78%	258,202	229,012	78.57%	60,805	20.86%	291,491
29.	Yalimo	56,579	84.67%	66,820	77,986	32.25%	6,058	7.21%	84,048
	Total results	1,199,657	51.69%	2,320,791	1,939,539	66.64%	932,008	32.02%	2,910,501

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