ANTI-AHOK TO ANTI-JOKOWI:
ISLAMIST INFLUENCE ON INDONESIA’S 2019 ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesian Islamists are united in their short-term goal of trying to unseat incumbent president Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, in the April 2019 general election although they are unlikely to succeed. Their support for his rival, Prabowo Subianto, is conditional and half-hearted, but measures taken by the Jokowi government to try to weaken, co-opt and stigmatise them as extremists have only strengthened what otherwise would be a fragile alliance. Their fear of a Jokowi victory is much stronger than their reservations about Prabowo.

Even if they lose on 17 April, the Islamists will have made their mark on the campaign in at least three ways:

- Strengthening identity politics and support for majoritarianism
- Moving the concept of what constitutes “moderation” to the right
- Forcing Jokowi on the defensive over accusations of inequality

They have a Plan B if Jokowi wins a second term, but it is also likely to fail. They want to get as many supporters as possible elected to national and local legislatures to press an agenda of state enforcement of morality and orthodoxy. The prospects of their being able to create a significant Islamist bloc in the national People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perawakilan Rakyat, DPR) where it matters most, are not very high, but they are already looking beyond April 2019 to the next general elections in 2024. They also intend to mobilise their grassroots base in the event of a Prabowo defeat to protest against what they already see as an election system rigged against them. It will be another show of force, demanding support from the now second-term Jokowi and his vice-president, the elderly cleric Ma'ruf Amin, for new laws that reflect conservative Islamic principles.

This report documents how Indonesia’s Islamists transformed the 2016 campaign to bring down the then governor of Jakarta, known as Ahok, into an anti-Jokowi campaign and how and why the alliance fractured. It suggests that the natural fissures in the movement are sufficiently deep that Jokowi’s defensive posture is probably unnecessary, and that the tactics his supporters are using may have inadvertently given the alliance a new lease on life.

Unless the margin of a Jokowi victory is very thin, Islamist post-election protests are likely to be peaceful, but the question is whether the president will yet again move to appease the Islamist right or use an electoral victory to take a more principled stand in defence of pluralism, tolerance and protection of minority rights. There is little sign of the latter. Jokowi himself is a moderate who has the support of the vast majority of non-Muslims, but his own instincts are to avoid confrontation and conflict, and his running mate is a conservative who shares many of the Islamist views on morality.

The report is based on extensive interviews in the greater Jakarta area and East Java carried out between November 2018 and February 2019.

II. BACKGROUND: THE 212 MOVEMENT

Indonesian Islamists significantly increased their political influence in Indonesia as a result of their success in late 2016 and early 2017 in mobilising hundreds of thousands of people to bring down the then governor of Jakarta, a Chinese-Christian whom they accused of blasphemy. The governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known as Ahok, was eventually arrested and sentenced to two years in prison. The Islamist alliance to oust him became known as the “212 Movement” after a massive rally on 2 December 2016. It was in fact a merger of disparate groups, with their

determination to see Ahok behind bars masking major differences over long-term goals. The same groups, having tasted victory, now want to “give the Ahok treatment” (meng-Ahok-kan) to Jokowi in the 2019 election, but their task is much harder.

By 2017, Islamist action was not only directed at Ahok but also at Jokowi who was painted as Ahok’s protector and enabler. Resentment against Jokowi built up as one by one, the government tried to prosecute 212 leaders or punish the organisations behind the movement. Bachtiar Nasir, a Salafi leader who emerged as the public face of anti-Ahok Islamist alliance, the National Movement to Safeguard the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulama Council (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, GNPF-MUI), was accused of mishandling public donations for the rally but the charges were eventually dropped. Police accused Habib Rizieq Shihab, FPI’s founder and leader who came from a traditionalist background, with spreading pornography after his alleged sex chat with a woman activist was leaked to the Internet, leading to his self-exile to Mecca starting May 2017. The government also banned Hizbut Tahrir, a major organiser of the rallies, in May.

Rizieq’s exile provided opportunities for lesser known ustadz to emerge, including the FPI’s former spokesman, Slamet Ma’arif, who became the leader of the Brotherhood of 212 Alumni (Persaudaraan Alumni 212, PA212) in July 2017. By early 2018, the Islamist alliance had broken down. Rizieq replaced Bachtiar Nasir as head of GNPF with two men. One was Yusuf Martak, a lesser known businessman who like Rizieq was of Hadrami (Yemeni) descent and also served as treasurer of MUI. The other was al-Khaththath, the Javanese founder and head of Forum Umat Islam and a former leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). In Rizieq’s absence, new organisations emerged that carried the name of the 212 movement, but GNPF and PA212 remained its most important subsections because their leaders were very close to Rizieq and received direct instructions from him – as much as they influenced his decisions. GNPF and PA212, for instance, were in charge of the 212 Reunion rallies in December 2017 and 2018. While both organisations were dominated by FPI members, GNPF had the strategists while PA212 was seen as the enforcer.

The disagreement between traditionalists like FPI’s Rizieq and the Salafis represented by Bachtiar Nasir was both ideological and tactical. FPI wanted to get involved in practical politics in order to enact Islamic law (shari’a) through democratic means. Salafi activists like Bachtiar dreamt of a much deeper Islamisation of society that would meet their standards of doctrinal purity. Disagreements also arose between GNPF and its political party backers during the 2018 regional elections. Rizieq wanted to export Jakarta-style identity politics to other regions by pitting the coalition of “parties that defend the religious blasphemer” (PDIP, Golkar, PPP, PKB, Nasdem and Hanura) against the “pro-Islam” coalition of Gerindra and two smaller Islamist and Islam-based parties, PKS and PAN. The parties were willing to go along in North Sumatra and West Kalimantan where ethno-religious tensions ran high, but in East Java, stronghold of the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), they ignored FPI, and Gerindra and PDIP ended up supporting the same candidate.

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3 Salafi activists (haraki) refers to a strand of Salafism that pursues not only Islamic purification but also the Islamisation of society including through democratic means. More on the difference between purist and activist Salafis in Indonesia, see Noorhaidi Hasan, “Ambivalent Doctrines and Conflicts in the Salafi Movement,” in Roel Meijer. Ed. Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement, (New York, 2009), pp. 169-188.
4 See Glossary (Appendix 1) for annotated list of political parties.
It became clear that the anti-Ahok coalition would continue to fracture unless its component parts could find a common goal. The Islamist mantra that worked against Ahok in Jakarta, that Muslims must only vote for Muslim leaders, could not be used as easily against Jokowi, a practising Muslim, unless he could be portrayed as having promoted un-Islamic policies. This is what the Islamists set out to do.

III. THE “CHANGE THE PRESIDENT” (GANTI PRESIDEN) CAMPAIGN

Three grievances transformed the anti-Ahok movement into an anti-Jokowi campaign. The first was a heightened sense of injustice, fuelled by the imprisonment of Islamist leaders on controversial charges or “criminalisation of ulama” as it was more popularly known. Second was the perceived politicisation of labels like “intolerant” and “radical”, which 212 leaders believed were aimed at stigmatising dissent and providing a basis for repressive measures such as banning of Hizbut Tahrir. Third was the controversy over the large numbers of Chinese workers brought in to work on Chinese-funded infrastructure projects, especially after the enactment in March 2018 of a new presidential regulation easing restrictions on the use of foreign workers. This issue raised two concerns. It revived a deep-seated fear of the “latent threat of Communism”, a legacy of the Suharto-era purge that mobilised Muslim paramilitary groups against suspected members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Islamists also used the foreign workers issue to show that Jokowi prioritised grandiose infrastructure developments that were dependent on foreign loans over poverty alleviation and the development of Muslim-owned enterprises.

A. Growing Unhappiness with Jokowi

The transformation of 212 from an anti-Ahok to an anti-Jokowi movement happened in stages. GNPF leaders were initially open to reconciliation. At a meeting with the president on 25 June 2017, Jokowi tried to address what he thought was their paramount concern: economic inequality. He told GNPF clerics that pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) and Islamic mass organisations would be one of the main beneficiaries of his newly-introduced land redistribution program. The GNPF leaders were not impressed; they were convinced it would mostly benefit the mainstream NU as the pioneer of pesantren system. In their view, it was obvious that Jokowi saw the mammoth organisation as his primary Islamic partner. They were irritated that while Bachtiar and Rizieq were being prosecuted, Jokowi reached out to Ma'ruf Amin, a senior NU figure and MUI chairman who signed the fatwa sealing Ahok’s fate, offering him positions in

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6 Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) was originally dissolved on 8 May 2017 by an emergency decree on mass organisations (known by its Indonesian acronym as PERPPU Ormas) that became the Law on Mass Organisation in October 2017. Various organisations including FPI, Persatuan Islam and HTI itself challenged the decision and brought it to the Constitutional Court but all failed. “HTI Dinyatakan Ormas Terlarang, Pengadilan Tolak Gugatan”, bbc.com, 7 May 2018.

7 See for example, “Pengusaha Pribumi Mengeluh, Banyak Proyek Digarap Cina Padahal Pribumi Punya Kemampuan”, eramuslim.com, 5 March 2019.

8 Marcus Mietzner, “Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia”, Pacific Affairs, 2018, vol. 91, no. 2, p. 274, 278. The Chinese vs. pribumi discourse had also been an issue in the 2017 campaign for Jakarta governor. The victor, Anies Baswedan, caused an uproar when he said in his inauguration speech that “pribumi should be the master of their own homeland”, with critics accusing him of racism. The word pribumi, while literally meaning native or indigenous, is used by Islamists to mean Indonesian Muslims as opposed to ethnic Chinese Indonesians. “Dikritik Warganet, Begini Isi Transkrip Lengkap Pidato ‘Pribumi’ Anies Usai Serah Terima Jabatan”, tribunnews.com, 17 October 2017.

9 IPAC interview with Bachtiar Nasir, Jakarta, 7 November 2017.
the government.  

In fact, for Islamist elites, the more immediate concern was not economic inequality but rather inequality in access to patronage and resource distribution. According to Slamet Maarif, the PA212 leader:

Many of Jokowi’s policies in the past four years did not benefit the ummah. First he protected Ahok…and then [the government issued] the Law on Mass Organisations. We see it as divide-and-conquer-politics. He gave one organisation huge amounts of resources while abolishing another. Everyone knows which organisation is treated as the golden child…whereas we are labelled anarchist, accused of wanting to establish an Islamic state. Even in rural areas, we can feel the stigmatisation. One organisation (HTI) was banned just because [it used] the term caliphate; in fact, the caliphate did exist in Islamic history, it doesn’t mean they want to establish a new state. Why didn’t NU sit together with HTI and ask for clarification? How is that democratic? Stigmatising 212 as intolerant, anti-Pancasila, that’s not good.

Slamet feared that after the ban on HTI, Jokowi would target FPI. For the FPI leadership, the organisation’s survival was at stake – and its influence had already been hurt by Rizieq’s long absence. In April 2018, therefore, PA212 and GNPF entered another round of back-channel negotiations to ask the government to drop all charges against Rizieq and facilitate his return. But when an anonymous source suddenly leaked a photograph of the meeting to the press, FPI lost the little remaining faith they had in Jokowi; they decided it was time to find a new leader who would give them full protection.

Many Islamist leaders did not initially see Prabowo as an ideal leader because of his lack of Islamic credentials and low electability. They began to search for new candidates that were both pious and capable. They considered at least four:

- TGB Zainul Majdi, the West Nusa Tenggara governor and graduate of Cairo al-Azhar University;
- Gatot Nurmantyo, the former military chief who had been courting Islamists since the 2016 protests;
- Anies Baswedan, the new Jakarta governor, seen as a leading Islamic intellectual; and
- Ahmad Heryawan, PKS politician and former West Java governor who studied at the Saudi-funded LIPIA university in Jakarta.

Bachtiar Nasir invited three of them to “Indonesia Leaders Forum”, a YouTube talk show he created and live-streamed on 26 April and 18 May 2018. Bachtiar and his Salafi activist (haraki) colleagues felt that ulama should only support candidates over whom they had full control. It should not be the candidates pulling the strings:

I told those political parties, this whole time you’ve forced us to choose between two clowns, and you expected us to just become cheerleaders. We should determine the candidates ourselves.  

10 Mā’ruf Amin was appointed as adviser of the new Presidential Taskforce for Pancasila Education (Unit Kerja Presiden Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila) inaugurated on 27 June 2017. Jokowi also founded a new remembrance of God group (majelis zikir) called Hubbul Wathan (Love of the Motherland) to be led by Mā’ruf Amin and his conservative NU colleagues. Jokowi’s predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, had set the example for this by establishing Majelis Zikir Nurussalam, which was also mobilised in 2016 anti-Ahok protests.
11 IPAC interview with Slamet Ma’arif, Jakarta, 23 January 2019.
13 IPAC interview with Bachtiar Nasir, Jakarta, 7 November 2017.
Like Rizieq, he was disappointed that Gerindra, PKS and PAN did not listen to ulama recommendations for the June 2018 regional elections and instead selected their nominees purely on pragmatic considerations. For 2019, he wanted to make sure the ulama exerted more influence over candidate selection.

B. Mobilisation via WhatsApp

In March 2018, a new anti-Jokowi hashtag appeared on Twitter: “2019GantiPresiden” (Change the President in 2019). It was a reaction to the pro-Jokowi hashtag “#Jokowi2Periode” (Jokowi 2 terms) and quickly became popular. PKS chairman Mardani Ali Sera decided to use the name for a new social movement that would appear organic and non-partisan, filled with ordinary people who simply wanted change, much like the 212 Movement itself.

On 3 April, Mardani appeared on a popular TV show wearing a Ganti Presiden bracelet and by early May, the Ganti Presiden hashtag had out-trended the #Jokowi2periode on social media.14 Beginning in May, thousands were joining Ganti Presiden “long marches” in Jakarta, Solo, Lampung, Makassar and other cities. On the surface, it appeared like a spontaneous movement that developed rapidly and organically, but in fact the leaders relied on existing mobilisation machinery via WhatsApp networks that they had used successfully in the past – both with their parties and for the 212 Movement.

Mardani insisted that the movement had nothing to do with PKS and to prove his point, he formed in May 2018 a separate group called Volunteers for Ganti Presiden (Relawan Ganti Presiden). To be sure, not all PKS officials took part in the movement, but Mardani, who had led the 2017 campaign that secured the Jakarta governorship for Anies Baswedan and his running mate, businessman Sandiago Uno, did tap into some of the networks he had used then.15 Local legislative candidates in Sumatra, Sulawesi and other places also helped mobilise people against Jokowi. Younger and lesser known candidates were especially eager as they sought to improve their own electability by aligning with the movement.16

Another core leader was Neno Warisman, a singer-turned ustazah and former PKS politician. Neno had successfully recruited an army of women vote-getters for Anies-Sandi in 2017. Her celebrity status and thriving pilgrimage travel business helped her build a mass base; she also penetrated a vast number of majelis ta’lim (Islamic study groups), economic associations, and other types of local organisations, especially those dominated by women.

One woman activist from Neno’s East Jakarta team explained their “silent campaign” strategy as follows: first they identified the big religious study groups in the neighbourhood to be approached, then they offered Neno as guest preacher. If the majelis ta’lim members were not interested in Neno, the team would offer skill training, courtesy of Sandi’s entrepreneurship program.17 Neno’s mostly middle-aged volunteers also targeted women with a genuine mass base such as the head of the Jakarta midwives association, leaders of local co-operatives and micro-business associations. After that, Neno would add these women to her WhatsApp groups

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14 "#2019GantiPresiden Kalahkan #Jokowi2Periode", viva.co.id, 11 April 2018.
16 Interview with Rahmat, a PKS legislative candidate and coordinator of Ganti President rally in Gorontalo; Jakarta, 21 November 2018.
17 The program was called Oke Oce (One District, One Centre of Entrepreneurship). Founded by Sandi in 2016, Oke Oce combined microcredit with mentoring system in order to provide a more comprehensive assistance to small businesses. Oke Oce started out in Jakarta but Sandi had planned it to be a national "movement" with the target of recruiting 10,000 entrepreneurs in each of Indonesia’s 514 municipalities and cities. See https://okoce.me/. Many Oke Oce mentors were ustazahs who specialised in shari’a economy, which enabled the overlap between Sandi’s campaign team with the 212 movement. As of February 2019, Oke Oce claimed to have recruited 60,000 members, but the actual number might be higher. One active member in Jakarta, for instance, oversaw 800 small businesses in her residential complex that were not registered but loosely connected with Oke Oce through her. IPAC interview with Oke Oce trainer, Jakarta, December 2018.
so that they would receive regular posts including tips on how Muslim mothers could be more involved in politics. The groups then multiplied as these women recruited their extended families and friends, usually via school alumni and family WhatsApp groups. Neno subsequently built on the hundreds of WhatsApp groups to organise the Ganti Presiden rallies. Just as in 2016, when sympathy for 212 protesters grew when the police tried to stop mobilisation from outside Jakarta, the Ganti Presiden marches gained wider attention as some local governments attempted to block their events.

As the movement grew, other politicians claimed ownership. PKS president Sohibul Iman had anticipated these potential free-riders as early as 21 April 2018 and asked Mardani to change the hashtag to include the name of PKS's presidential candidate. The problem was that PKS had none. At the time, only PDIP and Gerindra had announced their candidates: Jokowi and Prabowo respectively. The presidential threshold policy – requiring coalition of parties nominating a president and vice president to have at least 20 per cent of seats in the DPR or 25 per cent of national votes in the previous election – meant that smaller parties like PKS could not join the race without entering a coalition. On 21 April, Sohibul Iman said the chance of PKS aligning with Gerindra was 95 per cent, but it all hinged on whether PKS would get the vice-presidential slot.

IV. IJTIMA ULAMA: ISLAMIST POLITICAL CONTRACT

As political parties were figuring out their coalition partners, Islamists did not want to be left out. On 27-29 July 2018, GNPF held the Ijtima Ulama (Gathering of Religious Scholars), a convention of the pro-212 Movement ulama, to select presidential and vice presidential candidates who supposedly fit the criteria for leadership as laid out in Islamic law. (The attempt to give Rizieq the title of Supreme Leader or Imam Besar and promote the decision of ulama as religiously binding for all Muslims was closer to the Shi’a tradition than Sunni one, an interesting development since Islamists are strongly anti-Shi’a.) It was also clearly inspired by the success of mosque-based campaigning in the 2017 Jakarta election. Gerindra, PKS, PAN and PBB were all interested in using the Ijtima as a means to test the popularity of their respective candidates. The final outcome had more to do with inter-party bargaining than Islamist pressure per se.

A. Ijtima Ulama I

The 212 Islamists wanted two things from a potential president: political protection and greater access to policy-making in order to ensure that principles of Sunni orthodoxy were upheld. The question during the Ijtima was not which candidate was more Islamic but which had a greater chance of winning and therefore of implementing their agenda. Rizieq and other GNPF leaders believed the “Ummah Coalition” (Koalisi Keumatan) that had defeated Ahok, namely Gerindra-PKS-PAN, had to remain united in order to meet the requirement of the presidential threshold. But unity was difficult when party leaders were all vying to be the vice-presidential candidate.

The political lobbying started months before the actual Ijtima. On 29 May 2018, PA212 gathered its 21 provincial branches (mostly based on FPI branches) in a national congress to discuss the 2019 election. The congress recommended five names as president: Rizieq, Prabowo, TGB Zainul Majdi (Demokrat), Zulkifli Hasan (PAN), and Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB). PKS fig-

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18 IPAC interview with a volunteer of Neno Warisman’s “Mujahidah” group, Jakarta, 8 December 2018.
20 Zulkifli Hasan was the chairman of PAN and related to Amien Rais (his daughter married Amien’s son). A former Justice Minister and constitutional law expert, Yusril Ihza Mahendra was the founding leader of the Islamist party PBB (1998-2005); in 2015 he was re-elected as PBB chairman.
ures such as Ahmad Heryawan and Hidayat Nurwahid only made the vice-president shortlist, while Gatot Nurmantyo was disqualified because PA212 leaders considered him an opportunist with one foot in 212 camp and the other in Jokowi’s. TGB officially joined Jokowi’s team in early July, so he was automatically eliminated.

Amien Rais, the PAN founder, was very much involved in the inner workings of PA212 for he also headed its advisory board. Amien unilaterally pledged PAN’s commitment to the Um-mah Coalition in April, long before PAN chairman Zulkifli Hasan made any official decision.

On 5 June, Amien and Slamet Ma’arif went to Mecca for pilgrimage (umroh) and to report the congress results to Rizieq; Prabowo joined the Mecca meeting on 6 June. A day later, the leader of PKS’s top religious body, Shura Council head Habib Salim Segaf al-Jufri, visited Rizieq separately. Whatever Prabowo and Salim discussed with Rizieq in Mecca, it seemed to bear fruit. On the last day of the Ijtima on 29 July, the 212 ulama announced their support for Prabowo on the condition that he run with either Salim al-Jufri or Ust Abdul Somad, a popular media-savvy preacher. GNPF claimed that the two figures were chosen based on an internal survey: Salim apparently had higher electability compared to Zulkifli while Somad was the most sought-after preacher at the time.

Disappointed with Ijtima recommendation, one PBB politician blamed it on PKS:

Was it the ulama who controlled the politicians or the other way around? I’d say it’s the politicians controlling ulama. I was there through the entire Ijtima. [Initially] there were a few names being discussed, including Prabowo and Yusril. But [towards the end], suddenly it was only Prabowo. PKS must have thrown in lots of money...they didn’t want Yusril to get the ulama approval; they’d rather go with Prabowo. Why? Because a cow seller cannot be friends with another cow seller, but he can certainly get along with a pig seller, because they appeal to different consumers.

PKS used the Ijtima recommendation to pressure Prabowo to accept Salim al-Jufri. PAN said it would rather choose Ust Somad than Salim, but Ust Somad rejected the offer. The disgruntled PBB took a wait-and-see approach. Zulkifli’s meeting with Jokowi on 7 August sparked rumours that PAN might switch sides. On 9 August, a day before the deadline for candidates’ registration, GNPF leader Yusuf Martak threatened to withdraw its support if Prabowo did not choose one of the ulama as his deputy. Prabowo was not only juggling between GNPF, PKS and PAN but also Partai Demokrat as Yudhoyono was pushing him to choose his son, Agus. At the very last minute, Sandiaga Uno emerged as the unlikely compromise. PKS and PAN accepted him on the condition that he withdraw from Gerindra. One Demokrat politician accused Sandi of paying $15 million each to PKS and PAN to accept his candidacy, though the Demokrat party eventually came to support Prabowo too. On 10 August, Prabowo and Sandi officially became the sole opposition slate to face Jokowi in the presidential race.

B. Jokowi’s Running Mate and Prabowo’s Political Contract

On 9 August, Jokowi announced 75-year-old Ma’ruf Amin, the man whose testimony had sent Ahok to jail, as his choice for vice-president. His supporters had been expecting the selection of the younger and more progressive Mahfud MD, the former chief justice of Constitutional Court, who indeed was Jokowi’s preference. Less than an hour before the announcement, television

23 IPAC interview with a PBB official, Jakarta, 7 February 2019.
stations were reporting that Mahfud had been chosen.

The last-minute shift to Ma’ruf was the result of a revolt from PKB and PPP, the only two Islamic parties in Jokowi’s coalition. Seeing Mahfud as a capable, attractive candidate who as vice-president would have the advantage of incumbency in 2024, PKB and PPP leaders Mu-haimin Iskandar and Romahurmuzi, both of whom were also hoping to stand for president in that election, threatened to break away and take all the NU votes with them. Jokowi, who by instinct avoids conflict, apparently thought he could not take the risk, especially if they persuaded Golkar to join them, which would have been sufficient to nominate a third slate. So after promising Mahfud the slot, Jokowi agreed to nominate Ma’ruf – who was so old that he was unlikely to be a threat to anyone in 2024. Jokowi’s body language at the announcement of his running mate that evening was that of someone deeply unhappy with the outcome.

The irony of Jokowi choosing a traditional Islamic scholar while Prabowo picked a rich businessman was not lost on the Ijtima Ulama. On 11 August, Yusuf Martak told the press that GNPF was considering the possibility of abstaining, although 212 supporters had already decided they would support anyone rather than Jokowi and quickly came back to Prabowo. GNPF then came up with a political contract that would ensure Prabowo’s commitment to its Islamist agenda. Slamet Ma’arif explained why it was important:

We cannot deny that given his [secular] background, Prabowo needed to be accompanied by someone who really understands Islam, so that his policies would be under the purview of Islam. Previously we proposed an ulama as his vice president so we could lock him in from the inside, but since it didn’t work out, we used the Integrity Pact to secure [his commitment].

Prabowo and Sandi signed the 17-point Integrity Pact on the eve of Ijtima Ulama II on 16 September 2018. The content was based on the GNPF core program, which included eradication of apostasy and “deviant” sects. At a first glance, nothing in the pact explicitly commits Prabowo to abolishing minority sects or adopting shari’ah law. It stated that Prabowo should “uphold religious values, ethics”; protect people’s “morality” from “destructive ideologies”; and “protect all religions acknowledged by the Indonesian government from blasphemy...or anything that might offend [particular groups]”. But these were all the code phrases commonly used by ultra-conservative groups to justify discrimination against minorities and restrict freedom of speech and religion.

According to Ust Ansufri Sambo, an ustadz close to Prabowo, the pact was deliberately designed to be general in order to provide flexibility for both sides:

We didn’t want it to be too specific, it’s not good...If we’d specifically asked for a law on LGBT, for instance, it would create an impression that that was all we wanted, whereas there were many other issues like usury, alcohol and adultery which should be legislated as well.

The vaguely-worded pact did allow for a wide spectrum of interpretations. Prabowo claimed that the political contract was more nationalistic than religious, citing the first point on “implementing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution purely and consistently”.

26 IPAC interview Slamet Ma’arif, Jakarta, 23 January 2019.
28 “17 Poin Pakta Integritas Ijtima Ulama II yang Disetujui Prabowo”, tempo.co, 16 September 2018.
30 IPAC Interview with Ansufri Sambo, Bogor, 18 January 2019.
as Jakarta Charter that contained the obligation for Muslim citizens to obey Islamic law. FPI leaders believed that Prabowo knew perfectly well that the pact committed him to “encourage and give as wide an opportunity as possible for regional governments to create shari’a bylaws”.32 The other crucial aspect of the pact, as far as FPI was concerned, was Prabowo’s promise to bring Rizieq home and drop all charges against him.

C. Sandiaga Uno vs Ma’ruf Amin

Prabowo, backed by Islamists, thus ended up on a ticket with Sandi, a youngish tycoon educated in local Catholic schools and American universities, while Jokowi, backed by moderates, ended up with a conservative cleric. Both campaign organisations immediately set out to change the image of their vice-presidential candidates. The Prabowo campaign had to make Sandi more pious (and discredit Ma’ruf), while the Jokowi campaign had to make Ma’ruf more moderate.

Led by Dahnil Anzar from Muhammadiyah, the Prabowo team began crafting a new image for Sandi as pious born-again Muslim. Stories and images of Sandi’s praying, visiting the grave of NU founding fathers and doing non-mandatory fasting (puasa sunnah) began to be widely be circulated on social media. When Sandi was first announced as Prabowo’s running mate on 10 August 2018, a PKS leader dubbed him “a post-Islamist santri”, the embodiment of rising conservatism among educated middle class, though the appellation was widely ridiculed.33 To rival Ma’ruf’s expertise in the shari’a economy (particularly Islamic banking), Sandi began to portray himself as a self-made entrepreneur who understands the hardships faced by ordinary people. He set out to visit traditional markets and talk to wives and mothers about rising food prices. By late February 2019, some of his supporters on social media were comparing him to the Prophet Muhammad who was known as a pious businessman. In one video, it was suggested that a divine cloud hung over Sandi’s head to protect him from the sun, just like the special cloud sent by God to protect Muhammad when he walked through the Arabian desert.34

At the same time, Prabowo supporters in their social media postings tried to portray Ma’ruf Amin the “evil ulama” (ulama suu’) who serves the ruler’s interests instead of the ummah. For his part, Ma’ruf sought to present a more tolerant persona, even apologising to Ahok for his testimony in court (though he showed no regret for declaring Ahok a blasphemer in the first place). If the aim was to mend his image in the eyes of “Ahokers” and other minority groups in Jokowi crowd, it probably had no impact.35

The image make-over was more important for Sandi than for Ma’ruf because what mattered in the end was what the two men brought to the ticket in terms of prospective voters. Jokowi had a strong lead and already had support from the huge Nahdlatul Ulama organisation, with its unverifiable claim of 40 million followers (no one keeps membership data, and the same figure has been used for decades). The fact that Ma’ruf Amin had been the overall NU leader (rais aam) since 2015 solidified that base but it was already mostly Jokowi’s.

Prabowo, far behind in the polls, needed Sandi to reinforce his Islamist base. The organisations in his camp that had a proven capacity to mobilise were FPI, PKS and some of the components of 212 Movement, but even combined they were a fraction of what NU could turn out. The problem was that Sandi, with his eye on the election in 2024, was interested in forging a broader base and was more interested in being seen as a centrist rather than as the embodiment of pious

32 IPAC interview Slamet Ma’arif, Jakarta, 23 January 2019.
35 In fact, Ma’ruf’s statement did not reflect a deeply felt message of regret. He was only sorry that by obeying the letter of the law, the consequence was that Ahok went to prison. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p2mwDDBb_x0
success per se. His relations with the 212 movement were thus sometimes strained. He did find another constituency, however – women.

All over social media images appeared of militant Muslim women trying to shake Sandi’s hand, going door to door to try to “turn” Jokowi supporters, or defiantly posing amidst Jokowi crowds with two fingers (the Prabowo-Sandi ticket is No.2 on the ballot paper). New women’s groups emerged in Java, Bali and other provinces to support Prabowo-Sandi, including one with the unlikely name of Sexy Mothers, the Loyal Warriors of Prabowo-Sandi (Emak-Emak Semok Pejuang Andalan Prabowo-Sandi, ESPAS). There was also the Mothers’ Party for Prabowo-Sandi (Partai Emak-Emak Pendukung Prabowo Sandi, PEPES). ESPAS was linked to Gerindra’s women’s wing, but many other smaller groups were initiated by volunteers. In fact, of the 1,300 independent volunteer teams for Prabowo, the majority are composed of women. These networks could be a significant get-out-the-vote machine on election day.

If the 212 Movement reinvented Muslim political identity in majoritarian terms, it also activated women’s political agency along conservative lines: mothers must mobilise against Jokowi in order to protect their children from un-Godly communism, homosexuality and other moral threats associated with Jokowi’s camp – and only a firm leader could save them from the impending calamity.

Whatever Sandi himself thought of his image make-over, some of the 212 rank-and-file were truly convinced. The idea of Prabowo as a strongman and Sandi, the charming, pious entrepreneur as his right-hand man, embodies two trends in Indonesia: nostalgia for the Soeharto-led New Order and rising conservatism of the middle class. As one Jakarta-based female activist put it:

Actually it’s not Prabowo who is our main consideration, it’s Sandi, because his Islamic aura really shines through. Prabowo doesn’t seem very Islamic, he’s more into Javanese traditional beliefs (kejawen)...But Sandi is not just young and successful, he also has a strong Islamic quality, he fasts every Monday and Thursday, he’s never missed his midnight (tahajjud) prayer...We still support Prabowo because Indonesia cannot possibly be led by a civilian, [we need] a military general, he understands war strategies. So from Prabowo we get the strategic mind, from Sandi the Islamic quality.

Ultimately for the Islamists, it is better to have a nominally Muslim leader who listens to them than an Islamic scholar – Ma’ruf – who has betrayed them.

V. FPI’S LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS

As the Prabowo campaign saw FPI as a mobilisation machine that it could use to good effect, the FPI leadership began to think seriously about how it could translate its increased political clout into seats in the DPR – even with Rizieq in exile. The 212 Movement had helped make FPI respectable, turning it from a group of white-robed thugs into a legitimate opposition. Public awareness of FPI jumped from 40 per cent in 2004 to 60 per cent in 2016, and 22 per cent of those polled supported its agenda. The number of FPI sympathisers grew noticeably larger

36 Unlike Prabowo and other Gerindra leaders, Sandi never visited Rizieq in Mecca, nor did he try to court FPI by visiting its headquarters or attend its anniversary event, which his former colleague Anies Baswedan did. Sandi kept hardline Islamists at an arm’s length but occasionally expressed rhetorical support. For example he spoke up for PA212 leader, Slamet Ma’arif, when he was prosecuted in January 2019 for alleged campaign violations.
38 IPAC interview with a woman activist of Srikandi Forum Syahada Indonesia, Jakarta, 22 January 2019.
after Rizieq became the icon of anti-Ahok rallies – and so did FPI’s political aspirations.

A. FPI’s Transformation

FPI members say the organisation has gone through three phases. From its emergence in 1998 to early 2000s, the group was mostly known for anti-vice raids called “sweepings”: ransacking night clubs, alcohol shops and prostitution sites. Researchers also have documented FPI’s racketeering activities in cooperation with security forces. But to its loyal members, FPI chose a campaign against vice and social ills as its niche because the existing organisations like NU and Muhammadiyah had only focused on education and social services. Someone, they said, had to do the “dirty work”. Once Jakarta-based, it soon developed a nationwide organisation.

Things started to change in mid-2000s as dozens – if not hundreds – of FPI rank-and-file were arrested and convicted mostly for violent anti-vice activity, though they were mostly given slap-on-the-wrist sentences. Even Rizieq himself served brief stints in 2003 and 2008. FPI then entered a second phase: adding brains to the brawn. Its leaders disciplined the thugs, known as the laskar (army), gave them religious training and deployed them more frequently as volunteers at disaster sites while gradually decreasing the anti-vice raids, except during Ramadhan. The entry of more highly educated members, notably former human rights activist Munarman in mid-2000s, enabled FPI to conduct higher-level policy advocacy. In addition to mobilising street protests, FPI members took part in parliamentary hearings to support the controversial anti-pornography bill in 2008, lobbied against a presidential regulation on alcohol sales that they deemed too lax in 2012, and pushed for numerous bylaws related to morality policing.

The 2016 Islamist mobilisation brought FPI to its third phase. It increased the group’s political confidence, to the point that some of the activists wanted to go beyond being just a “street parliament”. Some in FPI had long dreamt of establishing a political party but it had always been seen as too costly with little chance of success. After 2016, the political base was stronger, but it was hard to envision a party going anywhere when its most charismatic leader was in exile and other figures were facing legal charges. Instead it came up with a short-cut to political power. First, FPI turned PA212 and GNPF into its political wing while shielding its core structure from direct political involvement to avoid “criminalisation”. Then it signed the pact with Prabowo. But that was not going to be enough because a president has limited powers of law-making, even assuming Prabowo won, which was not a given. They knew they needed more allies in DPR as well, which is why they had been adamant about maintaining the Ummah Coalition.

But this time, FPI also wanted to have its own members sitting in the legislature. It was just a matter of choosing which party to back. They could trust Prabowo personally but not Gerindra, a secular-nationalist party largely financed in the past by Prabowo’s Christian brother, Hashim Dodjohadikusumo. So in July 2018, FPI encouraged dozens of its cadres to become legislative candidates at both the national and provincial levels in the three Islamic parties that it thought would support Prabowo-Sandi: PKS, PAN and PBB. All welcomed the 212 activists with open arms, hoping, or maybe deluding themselves, that the 212 brand would save their shrinking

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40 Based on IPAC interview with Slamet Ma’arif, Jakarta, 23 January 2019; and with two other FPI officials on 15 January 2019 and 1 March 2018.
42 FPI has no official membership figures; different leaders give estimates from seven to fourteen million, although the actual number is likely much lower. By the time the anti-Ahok movement began, FPI had 21 provincial branches; 17 of those had lower level branches in cities. Those branch numbers remained unchanged after 2016. IPAC interview with Slamet Ma’arif, Jakarta, 23 January 2019.
electability. The fate of some of the hardliners who registered as legislative candidates in July 2018 showed the gap between hope and reality:

- Bernard Abdul Jabbar, standing as a PBB candidate for the Jakarta legislature, is a former Catholic missionary who converted to Islam while studying Arabic at the Saudi-funded LIPIA in late 1990s. Jabbar is the leader of Forum Umat Islam (FUI), one of the groups that incited violence against Ahmadi community between 2005 and 2008. In late 2018, Bernard was too busy organising the 212 Reunion to campaign, and then he was hospitalised for a stroke.

- Habib Novel Bamukmin, also standing as a PBB candidate for the Jakarta legislature, is the former FPI secretary general who was convicted in 2015 after he led an anti-Ahok demonstration that turned violent. Novel’s main campaign platform was to support Governor Anies Baswedan’s policies of closing “immoral” entertainment places and stopping a controversial land reclamation project.

- Habib Muchsin Alatas, standing as a PBB candidate for the DPR, was the former head of FPI. His wife is also a PBB candidate for the East Java provincial legislature. Muchsin had no mass base and therefore little chance of being elected, whereas his wife had been named in the scandal surrounding Habib Riziq as the best friend of his alleged mistress, lowering her own electability.

- Ahmad Buchory Muslim, a PAN candidate for the DPR, is a lesser known preacher in Bekasi and member of PA212 board. A graduate of the modernist Hidayatullah school, Buchory joined FPI in early 2000s and then shifted to Parmusi, a very small Islamic organisation with no political clout.

Not only did some of the candidates themselves have problems, but their choice of party was also problematic. Many FPI members and 212 activists chose to join PBB, which is much smaller than PKS and PAN, because they thought they could get much bigger roles than in PKS, which was already packed with religious scholars, or in PAN, which boasted celebrities and Amien Rais’ family sitting in important positions. It turned out to be a major miscalculation.

B. FPI vs. PBB

PBB’s U-turn to Jokowi on 27 January 2019 disrupted FPI’s doomed plan to enter parliament, though it was not totally unexpected. PBB was created in 1998 by former activists of Masyumi, Indonesia’s oldest Islamist party. By 2018, however, ideology was the least of its concerns. The party was struggling to stay alive: it got less than 2 per cent of national votes in two consecutive elections, and it almost failed to take part in the 2019 elections due to administrative problems.

At first, PBB, like other Islamic parties, had hoped to get spillover votes from the 212 sympathisers. In early 2017, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, the founder of PBB, had started to court 212 supporters, seeing them as a way to resurrect the party and turn it into a vehicle for his own political ambitions. He offered his services as legal counsel to Rizieq and various GNPF leaders who were being prosecuted, and even to HTI after it was disbanded by the government in May 2017. Yusril publicly invited FPI and HTI members to register as legislative candidates with PBB. To return the favour, FPI sent reinforcements when PBB leaders mobilised a protest to demand that PBB be allowed to compete in 2019 – they believed the General Election Commission (KPU) unfairly disqualified them for a minor administrative error which they had tried to correct. HTI
leader Ismail Yusanto also instructed all HTI members – who used to disdain democracy and elections – to go all out for PBB in 2019. But no amount of support from these mass organisations could match what a victorious president could do to hand out ministerial posts and other benefits to members of his coalition.

PBB was disappointed at Ijtima decision, which in its view only benefited Gerindra and PKS, and Gerindra for its part showed no interest in PBB. Nevertheless, PBB still drew up a vote-sharing agreement with Gerindra, PKS and PAN as a condition for its entering the coalition. PBB apparently sought a coalition model in which each member party would be assigned distinct territorial bases; it also demanded that the stronger parties help the weaker ones. After failing to get Rizieq and Prabowo to agree to the pact, Yusril defected. On 4 November 2018 he announced his new position as the legal adviser to the Jokowi-Ma’ruf campaign. His announcement split PBB in two: the Yusril faction supporting Jokowi and the pro-Ijtima faction behind Prabowo led by MS Ka’ban. In the end, Yusril got more votes at the party congress in January 2019, and PBB officially became part of pro-Jokowi coalition.

On 28 January, Rizieq instructed all FPI cadres to withdraw from PBB, but only Habib Muchsin Alatas did so. The others merely told their followers to shift their votes to either PKS, PAN or Gerindra. Those who had joined the latter had not got much out of it either. The Ulama Commando for Prabowo-Sandi Victory (Kopassandi) is a case in point. It was initiated by al-Khattathath of FUI, Ansufri Sambo and firebrands from the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) to mobilise conservative preachers around the country to intensify mosque-based campaigning. Prabowo and his team attended the Kopassandi declaration in Jakarta on November 2018, which attracted less than 50 people. As of March 2019, Kopassandi’s branches were largely under-resourced that they told their followers to make campaign banners from used flour sacks and left-over paint.

In any case, the Islamists were already preparing for a Prabowo defeat, complaining that the election system was biased. One Kopassandi leader said that they had not planned any 212-style mobilisation before the election but were planning to do so afterwards. Another 212 figure who served as Prabowo’s campaign spokesperson, Haikal Hassan, even instructed supporters from all over Indonesia to come to Jakarta if Prabowo loses, besiege the KPU office and intimidate it into releasing all its data.

VI. THE SALAFI POLICY AGENDA

As all the maneuvering was taking place within the Islamist parties, the Salafi activists led by Bachtir Nasir, who had played a leading role in the 2016 anti-Ahok campaign and the beginnings of GPNF, were hedging their bets. After his expulsion from GNPF in January 2018, Bachtir Nasir turned to the Council for Young Indonesian Intellectuals and Islamic Scholars (Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia, MIUMI), a group of ultra-puritans and hardliners, to campaign for greater state enforcement of a conservative interpretation of Islamic moral norms. On 29 January 2018, MIUMI released an official statement in which Bachtir Nasir essentially

49 A WhatsApp message was circulated by Kopassandi leader in early March 2019 that says: “Let’s make banners from used flour sacks, paints, markers, etc. Do not wait for banners from the headquarters, we are the warriors of change. God’s willing Prabowo and Sandi will win.”
51 IPAC interview with a Kopassandi leader, Jakarta, January 2019.
52 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a_zcN-2B278
told Muslims not to abstain from voting but refrained from recommending any candidate. Instead, he told his followers to stay away from parties and candidates whose policy platform runs counter to the interests of the Muslim community (*ummah*). He ended his speech with one clear message: “Do not vote for parties that support the anti-sexual violence bill” – by which he meant Gerindra and possibly PAN.53

The fact that this bill could become such a huge issue speaks volumes for the priorities of the conservative Muslim community. The bill had first been proposed in 2016 by PDIP, PKB and PAN (although PAN later denied it) and was supported by Gerindra. It was initiated by the National Commission on Violence against Women because of the alarming increase in sexual abuse reports. The bill aimed to protect victims and witnesses of sexual harassment, which was not fully covered by the existing penal code that defined rape as “immoral act” rather than criminal offence – and thus victims were often blamed and even forced to marry the rapists. The academic draft of the bill – every draft law in Indonesia must be accompanied by an academic analysis – defined sexual violence as any form of assault inflicted upon someone’s “body, sexual drive and/or reproductive function…that made the [victim] incapable of giving his/her consent freely due to imbalance in power and/or gender relations…”54

MIUMI and its affiliate AILA (Indonesian Family Alliance), opposed the anti-sexual violence bill, just as they had rejected a bill on gender equality that eventually died because of Islamist opposition. They rejected the idea of “sexual consent” in the bill, suggesting it was akin to legalising consent-based adultery and homosexuality. They alleged that the proposed law was based on liberal feminist tenets rather than religious and moral codes. Their counter-proposal to the sexual violence bill was to outlaw extra-marital sex, homosexuality and other types of “sexual deviation”.

If Salafi activists have been trying to shift the understanding of what it means to be a moderate to the right, they also have been trying to define a new Islamist-nationalist vision. MIUMI has been organising nationwide seminars and *tabligh akbar* (mass religious meeting) entitled “the integration of Islamic and nationalistic values”. Through their expanding school networks, Salafi activists have begun to promote a historical revisionism that portrays Muslim heroes as the main contributors to national independence. The corollary is that non-Muslims must show their gratitude by allowing Muslims to have the greater share of power in Indonesia’s democracy. Since the classic Islamist mantra of “Islam is the solution” has been widely stigmatised as anti-nationalist, they wish to turn the tables by instilling the belief in the next generation of Indonesian Muslims that those who are not pro-Islamist are not true nationalists.

**VII. JOKOWI’S RESPONSE**

Prabowo and his Islamist backers have successfully forced Jokowi on the defensive. As the 17 April election loomed ever closer, Jokowi was repeatedly trying to prove that he was not anti-Islamic, in part by promoting his own line of “Islam as personal piety” as against the 212 Movement’s “Islam as political identity”. He also found himself repeatedly trying to show that his policies have helped those in need, a response to accusations from his rivals that they have spurred greater economic inequality. The question was why the president should seemingly feel so insecure when all the polls showed him with a commanding lead.

53 His statement could be read as *de facto* support for PKS, but it was unlikely that the Salafis could swing enough votes toward PKS to affect the election outcome.

54 As it turned out, one of the biggest proponents of the bill was Prabowo’s niece, Rahayu Saraswati Djojohadikusumo, an elected Gerindra representative. For a full text of the draft bill, see http://www.dpr.go.id/doksileg/proses2/RJ2-20161111-040327-4431.pdf
To undercut Prabowo’s ultraconservative backers, the Jokowi government had a five-pronged strategy:

- Shore up support from NU
- Poach celebrity preachers as a way of appealing to young voters
- Demonstrate personal piety rather than defend minority rights
- Do everything possible to show concern for the poor
- Get the police involved in the campaign

None of this involved articulating a new vision of Islam and the state or going on the offensive against Islamist intolerance. Rather the Jokowi team seemed to be letting their rivals set the agenda.

A. Jokowi’s Islamic Turn: from NU to Hijrah

Jokowi already had some top NU leaders in his camp, but after the anti-Ahok rallies, it was clear the base was not solid, and he needed to reinforce it. He had only begun to systematically approach Islamic organisations after he was confronted with the sheer magnitude of the 2016 mobilisation. After failing to bring Muhammadiyah on board, he focused more on NU, extending patronage to both its board members (the structural NU) and pesantren leaders (the cultural NU). Throughout 2017 and 2018, Jokowi visited almost all major NU pesantrens in East Java, Central Java and especially the Islamist stronghold of West Java that he lost to Prabowo in 2014. He managed to channel barokah (NU code phrase for material assistance) in the form of funding pesantren construction, setting up skill-training centres for pesantren students (santri) and establishing micro-finance banks for the surrounding communities. Ma’ruf Amin may have been foisted on a reluctant Jokowi in August 2018, but he was immediately put to use reinforcing the NU base. NU still had its own hardline clerics, such as those in Madura and Jakarta, who preferred Prabowo but by March 2019, NU members were far more united in their support for Jokowi than they had been in 2014.

NU’s alignment to Jokowi was partly transactional, but its opposition to the Islamists behind Prabowo was deeply ideological. Many in NU genuinely believe that the main threat to Indonesia comes from what they call “transnational Islam”: “Wahhabis” (the term NU leaders use for all Salafis, regardless of whether they have Saudi links); the Muslim Brotherhood, in which they include PKS; and Hizbut Tahrir. Despite some fundamental differences among the three groups, NU leaders see all of them as takfiri radicals whose ultimate objective is to destroy the existing nation-state and establish a global caliphate. The transnational extremists, so the NU narrative goes, successfully destroyed Syria by infiltrating Arab Spring opposition movements to create chaos, and now they were trying to apply the same strategy in Indonesia by piggy-backing on Prabowo campaign. The invocation of such an existential threat helped mobilise NU resistance against the hardliners.57

55 Mietzner, ”Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism”, op. cit. Before the 4 November 2016 (411) rally, Jokowi visited both NU and Muhammadiyah leaders as the bastion of moderate Islam in Indonesia, hoping that they would stop their members from participating, but the result was far from satisfying. The NU chairman only half-heartedly listened because Jokowi apparently forgot to offer “barokah” (NU code phrase for material assistance), while in Muhammadiyah, the conservative wing prevailed and pushed the organisation to support the rally.


57 For instance, in a video that went viral in February 2019, one NU activist in North Sumatra stood up and challenged a 212 preacher who called Islam Nusantara a deviant belief. The video inspired NU youths elsewhere to expose the perceived intellectual shallowness and bigotry of Islamists.
Jokowi’s team apparently calculated that NU moderates could serve as a proxy for Jokowi on religious issues, and that anything its leaders said that reflected a tolerant, pluralist and nationalist Islam would be understood by his base as reflecting the president’s views. Jokowi himself could thus avoid taking any public stand in defence of minority rights. He gave his full support, for example, when the NU National Meeting in February 2019 formulated an inclusivist definition of “infidel” (kafir), arguing that non-Muslims should not be considered second-class citizens. But by aligning himself so closely with NU, Jokowi risked alienating moderate Muslims in other organisations like Muhammadiyah or in parts of the country that saw NU as overly Java-centric.

The second prong of the campaign strategy was to win the hearts of young, urban Muslims, including by bringing popular, media-savvy clerics on board or adopting their tactics. Many of these younger Muslims had supported 212 and now supported Prabowo-Sandi. Jokowi tried to borrow the symbolism of Hijrah, a hip Islamic revivalist movement that started out in Bandung, West Java – and led by an Acehnese ustaz – but spread nationally through social media.\footnote{Quinton Temby, “Shariah, Dakwah and Rock ‘n Roll: Pemuda Hijrah in Bandung”, newmandala.org, 30 June 2019.} Hijrah originally refers to Prophet Muhammad’s emigration from Mecca to build an Islamic polity in Medina, and the Hijrah Movement reinvented its meaning as spiritual transformation, offering pop culture-themed preaching to former punks, drug addicts and disaffected youth. Jokowi, in his speech at the Indonesian Millennial Movement Congress, in November 2018, introduced his own concept of hijrah as a shift from hate speech to truth, from pessimism to optimism, from consumptive to productive behaviors, and from disunity to unity.\footnote{“Jokowi Ajak Milenial Hijrah ke Ujaran Kebenaran”, tempo.co, 13 November 2019.} The youth congress had been organised by a Muhammadiyah-affiliated NGO and Jokowi’s appearance was a calculated effort to reach out to young, urban Muslims – a constituency that he may already have lost.\footnote{The polls suggest that his strongest base remained the rural, older voters (aged 25-49) while Prabowo was more competitive amongst urban, younger population (aged 17-24). “Jokowi Set for Comfortable Victory in April Presidential Election”, roymorgan.com, 1 March 2019. Another pollster further shows that Prabowo enjoyed more support from social media users while Jokowi’s electability was higher amongst non-Internet users. See http://indikator.co.id/uploads/20190115094013.Materi_Rilis_Pilpres_dan_Medsos_Januari_2019.pdf} Jokowi’s team also recruited – or at least neutralised – celebrity preachers previously associated with 212, particularly a cleric named Abdul Somad, an ethnic Malay from Riau who had 8 million followers on Instagram. To approach them, Jokowi reportedly enlisted the help of renowned Islamic teachers who were part of the shari’a economic program in the National Economic and Industry Committee (KEIN).\footnote{IPAC interview with an official of the Presidential Staff Office, 8 February 2019.} For instance, Somad had said that a political leader must be able to lead a prayer (sholat); so the pro-Jokowi ustazs confronted him with evidence that Prabowo was not a practicing Muslim, let alone eligible to lead prayers. The strategy seemed effective. In November 2018, Somad declared his neutrality in the election for fear of being implicated in spreading hoax and hate speech – perhaps because the police seemed to be increasingly targeting religious teachers from Prabowo’s camp on hate speech and defamation charges.\footnote{“UAS Ikut-ikutan Netral di Pilpres 2019/”, eramuslim.com, 13 November 2018.} In February 2019, Somad visited NU’s top spiritual leader, Habib Lutfi bin Yahya, and pledged allegiance to NU’s Sufi order – which some interpreted as obedience to NU’s political choice as well.\footnote{“Ustaz Somad Bertemu Habib Lutfi dan Baiat Tarekat Qodiriyah”, viva.co.id, 10 February 2019.}

B. Personal Piety and the Social Media War

In an attempt to counter rumours that he lacked Islamic commitment, on 18 December 2018, Jokowi’s official social media accounts published a picture of him leading prayers during a visit to NU pesantrens in Jombang, East Java. This came a few days after La Nyalla Mattalitti, an East

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60 The polls suggest that his strongest base remained the rural, older voters (aged 25-49) while Prabowo was more competitive amongst urban, younger population (aged 17-24). “Jokowi Set for Comfortable Victory in April Presidential Election”, roymorgan.com, 1 March 2019. Another pollster further shows that Prabowo enjoyed more support from social media users while Jokowi’s electability was higher amongst non-Internet users. See http://indikator.co.id/uploads/20190115094013.Materi_Rilis_Pilpres_dan_Medsos_Januari_2019.pdf
61 IPAC interview with an official of the Presidential Staff Office, 8 February 2019.
63 “Ustaz Somad Bertemu Habib Lutfi dan Baiat Tarekat Qodiriyah”, viva.co.id, 10 February 2019.
Javanese politician and defector from the Prabowo camp, challenged Prabowo to recite Qur'an and lead prayer. Then on 25 December, Jokowi supporters took a video of Prabowo dancing at a family Christmas party – that was originally posted by his niece – and tried to turn it into a smear campaign. (They were apparently unconcerned that they were using the exact same tactics as FPI had used to bring down Ahok.)

Pro-Jokowi social media accounts sent around the video with suggestions that Prabowo joined a Christian religious ceremony. The hashtags Prabowo's Christmas Dance (#JogetNatal- Prabowo) and Prabowo's Liar Coalition (#KoalisiPrabohong) were promoted side by side with pro-Jokowi hashtags like Jokowi's Islamness is Clear (#JelasIslamnya). Jokowi supporters also posted videos showing that Sandi did not correctly perform ablution before prayers. In January 2019, another personal attack on Prabowo's religiosity appeared in a highly trending hashtag: “Where did Prabowo perform the Friday prayer?” (Prabowo sholat Jumat di mana?), which insinuated that he rarely prayed.

Jokowi and his supporters might have hoped that by beating Prabowo at his own game, the debate could finally shift to a more substantive debate over programs and policies. Instead it only further deepened identity politics and xenophobia on both sides. For example, mirroring the widely-spread hoax that Jokowi was born to Chinese-Communist parents, a black campaign emerged in 2017 – and was still spreading as of early 2019 – that portrayed Prabowo's father as Chinese. The old rumors that Prabowo's Paris-based fashion designer son was a homosexual supporting gay marriage continued to be shared as well. Even in official campaigns, Jokowi's team did not hesitate to brand Prabowo and Sandi as nominal Muslims or even allies of Christians, just because they graduated from Christian schools.

Nothing illustrates the government's overreaction to anti-Islamic criticism more than the controversy over the proposed release of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, pro-ISIS cleric and former head of the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah. On 19 January 2019, in an attempt to deflect criticisms that Jokowi “criminalised” ulama, Yusril Ihza Mahendra, his newly appointed legal counsel from PBB, announced that Jokowi had decided on the early release of Ba'asyir. Backing up Yusril's statement, Jokowi said that he was motivated by humanitarian reasons, because Ba'asyir was old and ill and had served two-thirds of his term. This would have been the only prisoner to whom Jokowi had ever shown humanitarian concern, and it was clearly an attempt to curry favour with conservatives. But it was also illegal, since Ba'asyir had refused to sign an oath of loyalty to the Indonesian government. A huge backlash erupted on social media, with Jokowi supporters threatening to abstain if he proceeded with the release. The government eventually backtracked, reportedly following the result of an internal survey that to go ahead could decrease Jokowi's electability by 4 per cent. It would also have gained him exactly zero votes from

70 For example, during a political rally in the East Javanese town of Jombang in December 2018, PPP chairman Romahurmuziy mentioned that while he was campaigning alongside Prabowo in 2014, he had never seen him praying or fasting. He also compared Prabowo and Sandi's Christian and western education track records with Jokowi's public school background. While it was aimed to prove Jokowi's Islamic and nationalist credentials, it clearly illustrated how the 212 managed to trap Jokowi in a vicious cycle of heavily sectarian competition.
71 The release thereby violated Regulation 99 of 2012 from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights which stipulates that amnesty cannot be granted to terrorist convicts without signing the loyalty oath.
Prabowo supporters who saw exactly for what it was – a political ploy that had nothing to do with showing compassion for elderly terrorists.

C. Inequality

The 212 Movement’s focus on inequality forced Jokowi to address the charges that his neo-liberal policies benefited the rich – but in fact he had far more to show than the Prabowo team in terms of accomplishments. From the time he was the mayor of the Central Javanese city of Solo until he became Jakarta governor, Jokowi was known for his pro-poor social programs such as his “health cards” and “smart cards.” After he became president, his government focused more on a “new developmentalist” program that emphasised massive infrastructure development and gave less priority specifically to poverty alleviation.

The 212 Movement redefined inequality in ethno-religious terms. It claimed that Jokowi’s infrastructure projects mostly benefited foreign investors and all the foreign workers (read, Chinese) that they brought in. Once built, they argued, only the upper middle class could enjoy the exorbitantly-priced toll roads, while the poor would have to share the burden of repaying foreign loans accrued by Jokowi. They also argued that Jokowi’s policies increased the wealth disparity between the mostly Chinese and non-Muslim rich and the poor pribumi, even though statistically, inequality had decreased since Jokowi took office.

Jokowi’s team realised he was vulnerable on the inequality issue when the Islamists made it their focus after Ahok was convicted and they were searching for new issues to focus on. In April 2017, his government launched a new Economic Equality Policy consisting of three pillars: land reform and redistribution, vocational training and affordable housing. Jokowi made a point of singling out Islamic institutions as an important target of the policy. In his April 2018 speech, Jokowi echoed the 212’s slogan of “ummah-centric economy” (ekonomi ummat) before launching a pesantren-based minimart chain called Ummart – a competitor to the booming “212 Mart.”

As part of his land certification program, in May 2018, Jokowi asserted his commitment to expedite certification for mosques and pesantren because they were often built on Islamic endowment properties (tanah wakaf) with no formal documents. In October, he promised to build vocational training centres in 1,000 pesantrens in 2019 and another 1,000 each year if he was re-elected. As part of the affordable housing project, the government built 275 low-cost flats throughout 2018, including 100 dormitory buildings for students and santri. In his address to NU National Meeting in February 2019, he boasted the new Islamic Micro-Endowment Banks (Bank Wakaf Mikro) that he had established at 44 pesantrens across Indonesia – an extension of his existing microcredit program.

It was the Islamists who had forced the agenda, despite a large dose of hypocrisy. This was underscored in the exchange during the second televised presidential debate on 17 February when Prabowo tried to suggested that Jokowi’s policy of land titling was only a short-term measure
and that to ensure prosperity for all, land had to be controlled by the state. Jokowi responded by pointing out Prabowo’s own massive landholdings in Aceh and Kalimantan.

D. Politicisation of the Security Forces

From the beginning, 212 sympathisers had seen the police as their enemy and the military as their friend, and this perception carried through to the presidential campaign. As far as pro-212 voters were concerned, it was the police chiefs of Central Java and other provinces who had blocked bus companies from bringing anti-Ahok protestors to Jakarta, and it was also the police who had prosecuted Rizieq and other GNPF activists. By contrast, the former armed forces commander Gatot Nurmantyo was so friendly to them that his photo was put side by side with Islamist leaders in one of the 212 rally posters.

By mid-2018, the police were once again being accused of bias because of two developments: the banning of Ganti Presiden rallies in several cities and the systematic campaign against the politicisation of places of worship.

In Riau, the police stopped Neno Warisman from leaving the airport because she apparently had not secured an official permit for a demonstration, and the same reason was used by the East Java police to stop a Ganti Presiden music concert led by retired pop singer Ahmad Dhani. In Bangka Belitung province, a similar rally was banned due to its alleged potential for “disrupting public order”.

Efforts of the police to ban pro-Prabowo meetings in mosques became a sore point. The police, in cooperation with the Communication Forum of Inter-religious Communities (FKUB), put up thousands of banners that said “Refuse the Use of Places of Worship for Political Campaigning and Propagation of Hoaxes, Ethno-religious Sentiment (SARA) and Radicalism”.

Prabowo supporters perceived the mention of radicalism in the same breath as “political campaign” as tendentious, even more so because the banners were more often seen at mosques than at churches or temples. The Prabowo camp invented a new social media tagline to discredit police neutrality: “the referees have become players.”

On 3 March 2019, the attack on police neutrality took a serious turn when an anonymous Twitter handler called @Opposite6890 uploaded so-called evidence that the National Police had formed a special cyber army called “Alumni Sambhar”. Powered by an Android application called Sambhar, the police chief allegedly mobilised 100 police officers in each district (Polsek) to produce and spread hoaxes against Prabowo and positive advertisements for Jokowi. It further claimed to have tracked the IP address of Sambhar, which supposedly pointed to the location of National Police headquarters. The police have vehemently denied all accusations.

Again, the question was why go to these lengths, unless the Jokowi team felt seriously insecure going into the final weeks of the campaign and did not believe its own polling that it had a secure lead.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of whether the 212 Movement can marshal enough voters to pull off an upset, and it likely cannot, it has already succeeded in setting the agenda for the campaign and perhaps

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82 “Apakah Polisi Tak Netral Menangani Deklarasi #2019GantiPresiden?”, tirto.id, 26 August 2018.
85 “Pemiliknya Diburu Polisi, Ini Cuitan-cuitan Akun @opposite6890”, tempo.co, 12 March 2019.
86 “Identitas Teridentifikasi, Polri Buru Pemilik Akun @opposite6890”, tempo.co, 11 March 2019.
the legislative agenda to follow. Jokowi learned his lesson from the anti-Ahok campaign that he ignored Islamist mobilisation at his peril; he had to respond to the Islamist challenge that he was anti-Islam. He could have done so by articulating a vision of Indonesia in which all citizens were equal, rather than the majoritarian view that Muslims were more equal than others, and a vision of Islam that was respectful of all faiths. Instead he chose to emphasise his personal piety, use a variety of repressive tactics against Islamist rallies and clerics; and let NU leaders serve as a proxy for his own moderate views. If he wins a second term, he needs to do more than hide behind NU. Through his choices for ministers of education, justice and religious affairs, he needs to set the country on a course in which majoritarianism is challenged from kindergarten on up – because that is where the Islamists start. The worst thing he could do is assign responsibility for handling religious issues to Ma’ruf Amin.

The Islamists may not have the votes this time round to form a significant bloc in the DPR but they have signaled their intention of using democratic institutions to increase their political clout. In a way, it shows the strength of Indonesian democracy that everyone from Islamist to labor unionists sees elections as the key to power. But if the Islamists’ ultimate goal is anti-democratic, then political parties need to be wary of bringing them on board in the hope of short-term gains.

Finally, Jokowi and his campaign team need to avoid the temptation of blurring the distinction between Islamists and violent extremists, as some in NU are wont to do. One characteristic of radical Islam in Indonesia is that there is very little overlap between politically active conservatives and those who support violent jihad. They are ideologically at odds, see each other as heretics or worse, and recruit from different pools. The Islamists are right to feel aggrieved at being equated with terrorists, and the Jokowi government does not need to go to such lengths to reject their brand of intolerance.

The worst legacy of the Islamists from the anti-Ahok campaign and the 2019 presidential race is the rise in identity politics, making race and religion more important than citizenship. In addition to building roads and bridges, this is what Jokowi must challenge in his second term, if indeed he wins.
APPENDIX I: GLOSSARY

AILA The Family Love Alliance (Aliansi Cinta Keluarga), an ultra-conservative women group dedicated to protecting family values and opposing gender equality and sexual minority rights

DPR People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)

DPRD Regional People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah)

ESPAS Sexy Mothers, the Loyal Warriors of Prabowo-Sandi (Emak-Emak Semok Pejuang Andalan Prabowo-Sandi), a women volunteers group for the campaign of Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno

FKUB Communication Forum of Inter-Religious Communities (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama), a forum for inter-faith community leaders under the auspices of local governments and the Ministry of Religious Affairs

FPI Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam), an Islamist group specialising in anti-vice operations that became an initiator of anti-Ahok movement; founded by Habib Rizieq Shihab and led by traditionalist Sunni clerics of Hadrami (Yemeni) descent

FUI Islamic Umma Forum (Forum Umat Islam), an Islamist advocacy group led by Mohammed al-Khaththath that works for the application of Islamic law, conservative Islamic moral norms, and prosecution of “deviant” sects. Khaththath is a former leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia

GERINDRA The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya), a political party founded by Prabowo Subianto after he left Golkar in 2008

GNPF-MUI/GNPF National Movement to Safeguard the the Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council (Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa MUI), later renamed the National Movement to Safeguard the Fatwa of Ulama (GNPF), an alliance of several Islamist groups that aimed to bring down Jakarta governor Ahok in 2016 and evolved into anti-Jokowi movement

Golkar The Golkar Party / Party of Functional Groups (Partai Golongan Karya), a nationalist political party founded by former President Suharto as a vehicle to gain political control during the authoritarian New Order. After his downfall in 1998, civilian activists took over the party leadership

Hanura The People's Conscience Party (Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat), a nationalist party established in 2006 by Gen (ret.) Wiranto, former commander of the Indonesian armed forces and since 2016 Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs

HTI Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, the Indonesian branch of a transnational organisation committed to the restoration of the caliphate (but deeply opposed to the ISIS version)

KEIN National Economic and Industry Committee (Komite Ekonomi dan Industri Nasional), an economic think tank under the presidential office formed by Jokowi government
KOPPASANDI  The Ulama Commando for Prabowo-Sandi Victory (Komando Ulama Pemenangan Prabowo-Sandi), a group formed by al-Khaththath, the leaders of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and other Islamist organisations to mobilise mosque-based campaigning for Prabowo and Sandi

KPU  General Election Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum), the body that organises national and local elections in Indonesia

LIPIA  Islamic and Arabic College of Indonesia (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab), a higher learning institute founded in 1980 with Saudi financial support. LIPIA has expanded its branches to Aceh, Padang, Medan and Surabaya

MIUMI  Council for Young Indonesian Intellectuals and Islamic Scholars (Majelis Intelektual dan Ulama Muda Indonesia), an ultra-conservative group aimed to counter liberal Islam and Islamise Indonesia society in accordance with puritan doctrines

MMI  Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), an above-ground shari'a advocacy group founded in 2000 by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the former leader of Jemaah Islamiyah terrorist organisation

MUI  Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), a fatwa-making body first established by the Suharto government to legitimise state policies in Islamic terms. It has gradually become more conservative and more politically powerful

Nasdem  The National Democrat Party (Partai Nasional Demokrat), a political party founded in 2011 by Indonesian media mogul Surya Paloh

NU  Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Islamic mass organisation established in 1926 to defend local traditional Islamic practices from the puritan campaign of the Saudi Arabian-based Wahhabis; it is known internationally as the champion of Islamic pluralism in Indonesia.

PA212  The Brotherhood of 212 Alums (Persaudaraan Alumni 212), a group formed by FPI and other Islamists to mobilise against the prosecution of 212 leaders by the Jokowi government; it also serves as the enforcer of GNPF strategies

PAN  The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional), an Islam-based political party formed in 1998 by pro-democracy activists including Amien Rais, then the leader of Muhammadiyah. Despite being open to all religions and races, it is heavily dependent on its Muhammadiyah roots.

PBB  The Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang), an Islam-based political party created in 1998 by former activists of Masyumi Party, Indonesia's oldest Islamist party banned by Sukarno in 1960

PDIP  The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), a nationalist party founded in 1999 by Megawati, daughter of Sukarno, after she was forced out of the Indonesian Democratic Party by Suharto government
| PEPEM Mothers’ Party for Prabowo-Sandi (Partai Emak-Emak Pendukung Prabowo Sandi), a women volunteers group for the campaign of Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno |
| PKB The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa), an Islam-based political party founded in 1998 by NU leaders, most notably Abdurrahman Wahid, a humanist who became the 4th president of Indonesia |
| PKS The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), an Islamist party established in 1998 by former activists of Jamaah Tarbiyah, a religious movement modelled after the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. By 2010, PKS made a pragmatic decision to move beyond a narrowly Islamist agenda, declaring itself anew as a moderately Islamic party that accepts non-Muslim members |
| PPP The United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), an Islam-based party formed in 1973 as a [forced] merger of several Islamic parties; after Reformasi, PPP openly declared its goal as upholding shari’a while conforming to Pancasila, the state ideology |
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