

**THE DECLINE OF ISIS IN INDONESIA
AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW
CELLS**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Pro-ISIS activity in Indonesia declined in 2020, and there was mounting evidence that support for Islamic State was waning. Many factors were involved, among them effective law enforcement, the collapse of ISIS in the Middle East and the drying up of travel to Syria; defection of top leaders; and self-awareness of individuals that the costs of ISIS support outweighed the benefits. The Covid pandemic may also have played a role in discouraging travel and mass gatherings and weakening the extremist funding base.

As Indonesia looks ahead, the threat from violent extremism looks to remain manageable: nothing to undermine political stability and nothing beyond police capacity to manage. But terrorism has not gone away, and there will be ongoing efforts of small cells to regroup, recruit and regenerate with the aim of conducting jihad operations. The likelihood of arrest is not necessarily a deterrent. On the contrary, weakness can be an incentive to attack, as would-be fighters heed the slogan, “Better to be a lion for a day than a sheep for the rest of your life.”

Indonesia’s terrorists have always had a high degree of mobility and members of cells broken up through arrests or loss of leadership can easily find new allies, sometimes online, sometimes through contacts among prisoners’ families, sometimes through a trading network. Anyone who seeks to make a list of pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia needs to ensure that it is regularly updated because the roster is constantly changing. Groups disappear as fast as they form.

Many of Indonesia’s pro-ISIS groups emerged from organisations that were already committed to the use of violence in support of an Islamic state in Indonesia. These groups, many of them descendants of the old Darul Islam insurgency, predated and will outlive ISIS, but they have also seen the powerful appeal that ISIS can exert by promising control of territory, application of shari’a, war against Islam’s enemies and fulfilment of end-of-time prophecies. Even if these groups eventually return to their pre-ISIS focus, it will be with a clearer vision of the state they want, shaped by ISIS propaganda.

Regeneration remains a concern. In some areas, local initiatives have succeeded in replacing pro-ISIS leaders of extremist schools and mosques with neutral or anti-ISIS clerics. In Bima, for example, leaders of the anti-ISIS Jamaah Ansharul Syari’ah (JAS) replaced the pro-ISIS Jamaah Ansharul Daulah (JAD) in several key schools. In such cases, it takes constant nurturing and attention and sometimes significant outlay of funds to prevent backsliding, and it is always possible for radical teachers displaced from one institution to simply move to another a short distance away.

In cases where leaders or their families have decided to disengage from violent extremist groups, social pressure from within their old networks can be intense, with the women just as likely as the men to urge continued commitment to the cause. The factors that can lead individuals to re-engage are many, from fear of social ostracism to a desire for revenge to a change in local political dynamics. Despite many concerns expressed about an economic downturn leading to a rise in terrorism, there is little evidence in the past of such a correlation. Nevertheless, at least two of the groups arrested in 2020 discussed plots against mainland Chinese interests in Indonesia. They never got close to becoming operational.

These and other issues are explored here as IPAC examines some of the leading pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia and their status at the end of 2020. The groups analysed include:

- Jamaah Anshorud Daulah (JAD), once the the largest nationwide pro-ISIS coalition but largely dormant by late 2020;
- JAD-Bima as a case study in the partial success of a deradicalisation program;
- Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, MIT) in Poso, a tiny group emboldened by their own weakness;
- Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid (MAT), an example of a pro-ISIS cell formed on social media;
- several factions of Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia (DI/NII) and spin-off cells, with particular attention to Banten and Makassar;
- Firqah Abu Hamzah (FAH), a cult-like organisation whose members are showing up in other groups as its organisational structure collapses;
- Small autonomous cells, sometimes led by former members of like-minded but non-violent organisations such as Khilafatul Muslimin; and
- Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK), a Solo-based group that supports ISIS but eschews violence;

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an anti-ISIS organisation, will be the subject of a separate report; it is not included here. It is worth noting, however, that the danger from JI has not been an imminent attack, despite its dozens of Syrian-trained cadres. It has been rather the emergence of a militant splinter impatient at the leadership's avoidance of violence in its pursuit of a long-term strategy of building up an economic and political base.

The case studies in this report illustrate how many of those who have ended up in pro-ISIS cells have passed through other organisations on the way, including the Indonesian Institute for Islamic Dakwah (LDII), Khilafatul Muslimin, Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and many others. Many militants experimented with three or four organisations before settling on a pro-ISIS home. This does not mean that the organisations they passed through were gateways to terrorism. It only means that the appeal of the caliphate, or of joining end-of-time battles in Syria, was ultimately greater than anything the non-violent groups could offer.

The report concludes with recommendations to ensure that the gains made against ISIS can be sustained. These should be seen as complementing the focus on prevention in Indonesia's new "National Action Plan for Preventing Violent Extremism" released on 6 January 2021. While that plan lays out an ambitious national agenda, this report underscores that the single most important key to prevention lies in detailed knowledge of local groups, local dynamics and individual leaders.

II. THE CURRENT STATE OF ISIS SUPPORT IN INDONESIA

Three dimensions are often employed in assessing the risk from terrorist groups: capacity, opportunity and intention. On the first two counts, the picture in Indonesia is reasonably good. Capacity remains low. There has been no significant enhancement of tactics, weaponry and or operational planning capability. No one has returned from Syria with a demonstrable new skill

set that has been imparted to local groups. Many pro-ISIS groups are still practicing archery, because of a particular *hadith* (tradition of the Prophet), linking it to the end-of-time battle. No one has moved Indonesian extremists into the realm of high-tech cyber warfare. The biggest danger is still from homemade bombs, drive-by shootings and machete attacks.

But precisely because many of these cells are so rudimentary, they can pop up anywhere. In 2020, several emerged in areas that had no recent history of terrorism. Banjar Baru in South Kalimantan was one such site. It became the staging area for an attack on a police station in subdistrict Daha Selatan in Hulu Sungai Selatan district. Another area that has produced very few terrorists is Gorontalo province, on the north coast of Sulawesi, yet seven men from Pohuwato district there were arrested in November 2020 for planning attacks on police and local legislators.

Opportunity for Indonesian terrorists to act has declined dramatically since 2018 and the passage of a strengthened anti-terrorism law, leading police to conduct “preventive strikes” against suspects believed to be planning attacks. These strikes, combined with a hugely strengthened counter-terrorism police unit and enhanced surveillance capacity, including through cyber patrols, has made it more difficult for terrorists to escape detection. Covid protocols have also reduced the opportunity of extremists to conduct open gatherings, traditionally an important initial stage in recruitment.

That leaves intention. Not only are many of the pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia still committed to violence, but they sometimes grow even more committed when pushed to the wall or threatened with arrest. When all other options have been exhausted, violence can be the last resort. This is how MIT, whose members may be the most hunted men in Indonesia, has turned into the most active terrorist organisation in the country, though with less than spectacular results: for all its attacks, it caused a total of seven deaths in 2020. There are several cases of individuals only deciding to mount attacks after they were placed on the police wanted list (*daftar pencarian orang*, DPO) and may have felt they had nothing left to lose. Abu Rara, the man who stabbed then Coordinating Minister Wiranto in November 2019, is a case in point.

The decline or collapse of extremist organisations, especially if marked by internal feuding at the top or allegations of corruption, can actually increase members’ desire to find a “purer”, more militant home. This is what happened in Kampar, Riau when the local DI/NII branch degenerated into infighting and a few members decided that ISIS had to be better. Even after its loss of territory, ISIS still looked good to members of groups in Indonesia that had claimed to have already established an Islamic state or caliphate when it was patently clear they had not. The Khilafatul Muslimin organisation is one example.

Overall then, while by early 2021, capacity was low and opportunity extremely limited, there were enough groups where intent remained high to underscore the need for continued vigilance. The pro-ISIS groups still active in 2020 were not hard to identify. They all shared a few key characteristics:

1. They stressed indoctrination in the *manhaj*, or interpretation of Islam according to ISIS, mostly relying on texts by imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Aman’s *Seri Materi Tauhid* was particularly widely used; so was his translation from the Arabic of “Tauhid Curriculum” (*Muqoror Fit Tauhid*) drawn mostly from Wahhabi writings. Also popular was a tract on the ten ways a Muslim could be expelled from the faith, underscoring the *takfiri* nature of ISIS: its tendency to declare any Muslim who disagreed with its teachings as a *kafir*, or non-believer.

2. They saw *idad*, or military preparation, as essential, although the rationale changed over time. Initially it was to prepare for joining the war in Syria. Later, after travel there became too difficult, *idad* was seen as necessary for preparing attacks in Indonesia. By 2020, the rationale had broadened to include preparation for the final battle at the end of time and defence of the nucleus of an Islamic state that supporters hoped to establish at home.
3. They were constantly searching for religious scholars (*ulama*) who could provide theological guidance. As the number of men with strong religious credentials within extremist ranks dwindled, through arrests and the exodus to Syria, would-be *mujahidin* were left to find religious instruction online or ask for recommendations from friends for names of clerics whose study sessions they could join, leading to new alliances. It led some ISIS supporters to seek out popular end-of-time specialists such as Ihsan Tanjung or Zulkifli M. Ali, both of whom were hugely popular on YouTube. These clerics were not necessarily pro-ISIS but the thrust of their teachings was that the final battle at the end of time would take place in Syria and so their lectures complemented ISIS teachings.
4. All had a strong incentive to raise funds, both to cover their own operational costs and to support the wives and children of *mujahidin*, especially from their own area, who had been arrested or killed. As travel to Syria increased, finding donations and support for those who could not pay their own way was also an objective. The main source of operational funding was *infaq*, sometimes a percentage of income, paid monthly, sometimes a nominal levy on members.¹ Many groups set up charitable organisations to collect funds, ostensibly for humanitarian purposes. One of the best known was the One Thousand A Day Movement (Gerakan Seribu Sehari, GASHIBU) run out of Semarang.
5. Most of the larger pro-ISIS groups had an institutional base, either a school or a mosque and sometimes a network of schools, to serve as a center for outreach and recruitment. Several pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools) became centres of ISIS influence. The most notorious was Pesantren Ibn Mas'od (also written Ibn Mas'ud) in Bogor, associated with Aman Abdurrahman, that served as a recruitment centre for Syria between 2014 and 2017.² The government closed it down in 2017 after an ISIS supporter burned an Indonesian flag there, the first pesantren to be shut for extremist activities – although it is noteworthy that it was flag-burning rather than extremist teaching that caused its closure. The school's alumni still turn up regularly in new cells, however. By 2020, extremists were more focused on setting up schools to memorise the Qur'an (called Rumah Qur'an, RQ) to draw in new recruits.
6. All were committed to *hijra* or emigration to an area where Islamic law was applied in full. Mostly this meant the effort to reach Syria through Turkey and join Islamic State, but some 40 Indonesians tried to join the battle in Marawi, in the southern Philippines,

1 Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Wimbo Gondo Hermawan alias Abu Sayaf, Decision No.1295/Pid.Sus/2019/PN Jkt.Tim", 18 March 2020, p.11. In Riau, the *infaq* was Rp.30,000 (USD2.15) a month. In Karawang, West Java, a Jakarta suburb, the local JAD district-level office set *infaq* at between 5 and 10 per cent of members' monthly income, with 30 per cent going to the provincial branch and 70 per cent kept for use in Karawang, including military training.

2 Tom Allard, "Indonesian School a Launchpad for Child Fighters in Syria," reuters.com, 6 September 2017.

in 2017 and a few have tried to reach IS-Khorasan, the ISIS “province” in Afghanistan. As it became more difficult to reach these areas, however, would-be fighters began to support a strategy of *tamkin* (literally, “settled”), establishing a settlement in Indonesia which would apply Islamic law and serve as the destination for *hijra*.

The story of all these organisations, however, is ultimately one of failure. The next sections try to explain why.

III. JAMAAH ANSHARUD DAULAH (JAD): ALMOST DORMANT

Jamaah Ansarud Daulah (JAD), the pro-ISIS coalition founded by cleric Aman Abdurrahman in 2014, was in sharp decline, as of early 2021, although it was sometimes difficult to appreciate how far it had fallen. The problem was that police, in the immediate aftermath of terrorism arrests, frequently referred to any group with pro-ISIS sympathies as JAD even when there was no organisational link to the original coalition. Many online ISIS sympathisers also referred to themselves by the generic terms of *ansharud daulah* (supporters of Islamic State) or *ansharul khilafah* (supporters of the caliphate). The JAD responsible for both the 2016 Jakarta and 2018 Surabaya attacks, however, was by 2020 largely dormant, with much of its senior leadership in prison (see Appendices I and II).

A. JAD's Background

JAD was conceived in late October 2014 at a meeting of a small group of visitors with detained cleric Aman Abdurrahman in the penal complex of Nusakambangan, an island off the south coast of Java. All those present swore an oath of loyalty to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and agreed to found an organisation to be called JAD that would marshal the forces of Indonesian mujahidin in support of Islamic State and (more importantly as far as Aman Abdurrahman was concerned), disseminate its teachings.³ Hari Budiman, also known as Marwan or Abu Musa, a close associate of Aman Abdurrahman, was named the overall amir, with Zainal Anshori from Lamongan as the amir for East Java. By the time the first national meeting was convened in Batu, Malang, East Java in late November 2015, however, Hari had already decided to leave for Syria and Zainal had agreed to succeed him. Regional structures were set up in nine provinces – East Java, Central Java, West Java, greater Jakarta (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi known by the acronym Jabotabek), Lampung, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku – with “preparatory” structures elsewhere, including West Sumatra.

When the JAD structure was formalised at the November 2015 Malang meeting, an organogram was drawn up showing the central structure and the provincial branches, each with district sub-branches called *mudiriyah*, with *qoriah* at the sub-district level and local study circles or *halaqoh* below them. In fact, it was a much more haphazard agglomeration of cells, organisations and individuals. In many places, including large swathes of West and East Java, the JAD structure built on existing structures of Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the organisation founded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008, and these tended to be the best organised.

³ The history of JAD came out in full at Zainal Anshori's trial in July 2018. “Sidang pertama, Jaksa ungkap sejarah terbentuknya JAD hadirkan Zainal Anshori,” merdeka.com, 24 July 2018. Aman Abdurrahman led the meeting. Others present in addition to Zainal Anshori were M. Fachri, founder and administrator of the almustaqbal website (he later died of natural causes in prison); Ust. Khairul Anam, then head of JAT for West Java; and Hari Budiman alias Marwan. Additional history on JAD East Java can be found in IPAC, “The Surabaya Bombings and the Future of ISIS in Indonesia,” Report No.51, 18 October 2018.

In some cases local groups simply switched from their pre-ISIS identity – Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Padang and Bukittinggi); FPI (Lamongan, East Java); DI/NII (parts of Bandung) – to JAD, dropping their old organisational identity.

At the time of the 2015 Malang meeting, JAD was believed to have some 2,000 members or sympathisers, though since it never had clear criteria for membership, it is impossible to know for sure. Evidence produced in court at JAD trials can help, since suspects are often asked to describe the structure and membership of their own branches, but that testimony tends to be a snapshot at the moment of arrest that can be out of date two weeks later. Numbers were constantly changing, and the turnover in leadership was constant.⁴

B. JAD's Current Status

By mid-2018, the central leadership was in disarray, funds were short, and local leaders were taking decisions on their own. There was still a commitment to a common *manhaj* or basic tenets of the faith; to the idea of a universal Muslim government that applied Islamic law in full; and to the Islamic end-of-time prophecies that foretold a final victory for Islam over its enemies in Sham (Greater Syria).

But no functioning central structure remained, and many local branches seemed to have been completely dismantled. As of early 2021, the provincial branches in East Java, West Java, Lampung, greater Jakarta and Maluku were all inactive, frozen by widespread arrests. Parts of the Central Java, South Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara branches were still functioning but quietly, though a police raid on the Makassar JAD branch in early January 2021 may have temporarily halted activities there. No significant JAD plots emerged in 2020 and Detachment 88 had only made twelve JAD arrests by the end of year, suggesting that members were lying very low indeed – or that the police considered other targets more of a threat. Of the more than 200 terrorist suspects arrested in 2020, more than half were affiliated with pro-ISIS cells that had no connection to either JAD or MIT.

Table 1: Comparing Arrests in 2019 and 2020

No	Organisation	2019	2020	Ideological Stance
1	JAD	112	12	Pro-ISIS
2	MIT	22	23	Pro-ISIS
3	Other ISIS supporters	160	134	Pro-ISIS
Total Pro-ISIS arrests		294	169	Pro-ISIS
4.	Jemaah Islamiyah	26	63	Anti-ISIS
Total Arrests		320	232	

4 After Zainal Anshori, JAD's overall amir, was arrested in March 2017, his successor, Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah took over for only three months before his own arrest. After a leadership vacuum of several months, Mushola, a former terrorist prisoner from Cirebon, succeeded as amir in December 2017, appointed to the post by Zainal Anshori (who had apparently resumed some of the functions of amir from prison). Mushola, who had only been released from prison the previous October, was then arrested in the Philippines in March 2018 and as of 2020 remained in military custody there. Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, Verdict in the case of Syamsul Arifin alias Abu Umar, Decision No.2022/Pid.Sus/2018/PN Jkt.Br, 14 March 2019.

Some of these cells emerged in response to a more repressive environment after the passage in 2018 of a strengthened anti-terrorism law (Law No.5/2018) that broadened the definition of terrorism and allowed for “preventive strikes” by Detachment 88. The retreat to “individual jihad” (*jihad fardiyah*), or formation of small cells, has been a classic extremist response to a police crackdown: the idea that a small group of people or even a single individual, acting independently but sharing a common goal with others, can be more effective and safer in a tight security environment than operating from a hierarchically structured organization. This way, if one cell if one is exposed, the others can still conduct attacks.⁵

At the same time, police in several areas were successfully working with detained JAD leaders to convince them to disengage. Two prisoners from West Java who three years ago seemed the embodiment of hardline ideologues ended up pulling back from ISIS in 2020 and then using their influence to convince others to do the same. In Tasikmalaya, a former ISIS supporter set up a pesantren to act as a kind of halfway house for newly released prisoners who had moderated their views, to ensure that their change in attitude would be reinforced as they returned to their old communities. In Bima, the institutions that JAD once controlled had been taken over in part or wholly by the non-violent Jamaah Ansharul Syariah (JAS).

The need for vigilance, however, remained.

- Many local *halaqoh*, the study circles that were the building blocks of JAD, were composed of friends and family members who met regularly before ISIS came into existence and would continue to do after JAD’s demise, Covid restrictions notwithstanding.
- As face-to-face meetings become more difficult, some JAD members have turned increasingly to the Internet to organise discussions or new pro-ISIS cells. Even though police cyber-patrols have become very proficient, some of this online organising can still escape detection.
- Of the hundreds of JAD leaders in prison, many – especially those arrested in “preventive strikes” – received short sentences of two or three years and will be out very quickly. Some 250 men and women were expected to be released in 2021. While most will not return to violence, even a handful could alter the threat situation. While some of the most notorious JAD-linked schools have either been closed down, there are always others available as a refuge or place to rebuild. Police need to be particularly alert to the emergence of new institutional bases for JAD that take the form of schools for memorization of the Qur’an, aimed at children, or pesantrens run by newly released prisoners that aim at propagating ISIS teachings.
- The gains made by police through a combination of religious discussions and assistance to families have to be sustained and resourced, even officials responsible for these programs are promoted and transferred. If a family is hurting economically, it is vulnerable to pressures to re-engage by the promise of assistance from extremist charities.

JAD built its organisation on the extremist infrastructure that had preceded it, and no one should doubt that parts of that infrastructure remain.

⁵ Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, “The Jihadi Experiences: The main arenas of operation for individual jihad”, *Inspire*, Issue 8, 2011, pp 18-19.

IV. BIMA: DISENGAGEMENT SUCCESSES AND LURKING DANGERS

The JAD branch in Bima, a city and surrounding district on the island of Sumbawa, east of Lombok, in West Nusa Tenggara province, is an example of JAD's decline. Once one of the most active branches of JAD, it had all the ingredients for an extremist stronghold: a long history of extremist activity; a critical mass of prisoners and ex-prisoners, many of them with equally committed sisters and wives; charismatic preachers; schools and mosques that could serve as institutional bases; and enough fighters killed by police to keep the revenge motive high. In 2016-2017, the JAD branch in the neighborhood of Penato'i, in Bima city, was one of the most hardcore in Indonesia. But it steadily weakened throughout 2019 and 2020, and the radical study sessions that used to fire up the youth of Penato'i have all but disappeared.

A. Bima's Extremist Past

Understanding Bima's extremist past, which goes back at least to the 1950s, is critical to judging its potential for post-ISIS regeneration. JAD was only the latest of the organisations that have found Bima to be a source of committed *mujahidin*, some of whom are already second or third-generation militants.

In November 1957, Islamists from Bima threw grenades in Jakarta at Indonesia's first president, Soekarno. The incident killed eleven and injured more than 30.⁶ In the late 1970s, a religious teacher from Bima, Abdul Qadir Baraja, a Darul Islam leader and founder of the organisation Khilafatul Muslimin (see below, Section X), was arrested for the first time for plotting to attack police stations in Sumatra.⁷ Bima men were also involved in a notorious incident in Talangsari, Lampung in 1989 when a new generation of Darul Islam (DI) fighters aimed to use a radical pesantren to launch an uprising. Among the many arrested was M Abdul Gani, father of JAD-Bima leader Ust. Abrory Ali.⁸

Bima's militants gravitated to Jemaah Islamiyah in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Abrory was one of several who went to JI schools and later joined the fighting in Maluku. On his return, in 2003-4, he founded the pesantren Umar bin Khattab (UBK) that became one of Bima's radical nerve centres.⁹ Meanwhile, another extremist community emerged around the Istiqomah Mosque in the Penato'i neighborhood of Bima city, some 30 kilometers from UBK. It was led by Ruri Alexander Rumatarai, better known as Iskandar or Abu Qutaibah, a Biman who had grown up in Jakarta and become a devoted follower of Aman Abdurrahman. In 2004, Iskandar returned to Bima and began propagating Aman's ideas.

The groups around Abrory and Iskandar came together under Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the organization that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir started in 2008. Ba'asyir himself led an oath-

6 Audrey Kahin, *Pemberontakan ke Integrasi: Sumatera Barat dan Politik di Indonesia 1926-1998*, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2005, p. 317.

7 At the time Baraja was head of a Darul Islam territorial command known as KW8, covering Lampung province. After three years in prison, he became a teacher at Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, Solo. In the mid-1980s, he was convicted of supplying explosives used in the 21 January 1985 bombing of the Borobodur temple in Central Java. International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," Asia Report No.92, 22 February 2005.

8 Ibid, p. 18. Gani was sentenced to eight years in prison. When he returned to Bima, he became president of the local chapter of Baraja's organisation, Khilafatul Mujahidin. He also sent his son to a JI school, al-Muttaqien in Jepara, Central Java.

9 UBK was one of many schools founded by alumni of JI pesantrens that became satellite schools for propagating salafi jihadist ideology. One of the teachers Abrory recruited was Mujadid al-Haq alias Ukbah..

taking ceremony at UBK for some 60 men, including Abrory, in January 2010. Abrory then became one of the first to sign up for training in Poso in 2011, when Santoso, then head of JAT's military wing there, began a series of training courses for JAT members around the country.¹⁰

On 30 June 2011, Syakban, a UBK student, stabbed a police officer at a post near the school. Abrory knew a police raid would follow and encouraged UBK staff and students to prepare weapons. A teacher accidentally killed himself on 11 July trying to deactivate a bomb, and after a two-day standoff, police entered the school grounds. Several UBK teachers and students, eventually including Abrory, were arrested. Abrory was sentenced to life in prison in 2012 and Iskandar took charge of JAT.

For the next two years, Bima extremists focused on getting to Poso for training, but they were also among the early supporters of ISIS in Indonesia, swearing allegiance to al-Baghdadi on 20 July 2014 at the Istiqomah mosque. The oath-taking led to a split in JAT, in Bima as elsewhere, with the pro-ISIS faction becoming part of Aman Abdurrahman's JAD and the anti-ISIS faction joining JAS. Bima families on the pro side were among those trying to get to Syria to join Islamic state, while those left behind were convinced that their oath obliged them to wage war at home.¹¹ The period between 2014 and 2017 saw an uptick in attacks or planned attacks on police and quick retaliation.¹²

B. Why JAD-Bima Lost Ground

JAD lost ground because of arrests; the drying up of funds; and a systematic challenge to pro-ISIS dakwah through dissemination of anti-ISIS teachings, with the help of former prisoners. A few clerics are still preaching the ISIS line but lack the charisma of their imprisoned colleagues. Many of the institutions that helped spread extremist doctrine are now under the control of JAS, the anti-ISIS splinter of JAT.¹³ Many former prisoners have declared their allegiance to the Indonesian state and are now engaged in a range of economic activities. The question is how sustainable these changes are, given Bima's history and the activities of the small but committed core of extremists that remains.

Arrests by Detachment 88 have been a major factor in the decline, starting with the arrest of Iskandar alias Abu Qutaiba in June 2017. The November 2019 arrest of Muhammad Zaidon, Iskandar's successor as head of JAD in Penato'i, deepened the unraveling.

10 See more in International Crisis Group, "How Indonesian Extremist Regroup", Asia Report No 228, 16 July 2012, p.12-14

11 Five departed for Syria in 2014: Hadi alias Boxer (Iskandar's brother-in-law), left late 2014, died on 9 April 2015; Gunawan alias Abu Aiman, left late 2014, died in May 2015; Sahal, left 2014, died in 2015; Abduh, left 2014, fate unclear; and Reza Pahlevi. Others who left from Bima were Hamidah binti Alwi Awad, wife of Andi Makbul and her son, Muhammad Adam, then 25, left mid-2015; Fadly, his wife Nadiya Rayhan, and his son, Mushab, left Feb 2016; Nuratik, born in Bima and her husband from South Sulawesi, left February 2016. In 2017, Iskandar tried to send five more men to Syria via Istanbul, Turkey after receiving Rp.76.5 million for tickets sent by Munawar Kholil, a JAD contact in Syria, but in the end, they decided to cancel the tickets because travel was too difficult. Iskandar also tried and failed to send two Bima men, Ahmad Sukri and Jazman, to Marawi in May 2017. They got as far as Manila but were turned back by immigration because they could not speak English and had no booking. Had they succeeded, Iskandar had eleven more ready to send.

12 On 18 August 2014, extremists killed the Ambalawi police head, Abu Salam; on 15 February 2016, the police shot dead one of the suspected perpetrators. On 17 June 2017, police arrested three men for a bomb plot against Woha police station and on 11 September 2017, militants shot two Bima police officers in the city. In a subsequent shootout with the police on 30-31 October 2019, 12 were arrested and two were killed.

13 When Abu Bakar Ba'asyir declared his support for ISIS in 2014, many JAT members broke away and founded Jamaah Anshorul Syariah (JAS) under Mohammed Akhwan.

Table 2: Arrest of JAD and MIT Members from Bima, West Nusa Tenggara

Year	Arrested in Bima	Killed in Bima	Arrested in Poso	Killed in Poso
2015	2	0	8	1
2016	3	1	3 (1 man, 2 women)	1
2017	13	3 + 1 died in custody		1
2018	0	0	0	0
2019	12	0	3 (2 men, 1 woman)	0
2020	1	0	0	1

JAD was also weakened by the systematic police and local government effort to challenge pro-ISIS propaganda and religious outreach (*dakwah*) with the assistance of prisoners and former prisoners such as Mujadidul Haq alias Ukbah, a former UBK teacher, and Kamaluddin, once a close associate of Aman Abdurrahman. Ukbah is credited with convincing more than two-thirds of Bima's ISIS supporters to change their views, according to another ex-prisoner.¹⁴ They included teachers at three pesantren in Bima once known as pro-ISIS hubs: UBK; Pesantren al-Madinah; and Abu Bakar Asshidiq Quranic House, although control of the latter was still contested in 2020.¹⁵ Many former followers of Iskandar at the Istiqomah mosque in Penato'i also turned away from ISIS.

As radical activities waned, so did JAD's income.¹⁶ It lost a major donor with the arrest in 2018 of a businessman from Bekasi, originally from Padang, named Armaedi alias Abu Mufid and income from *infaq* declined. Aid to families from extremist charities was a way of keeping them tied to the extremist network. At its height, JAD-Bima had a charity called Khatibah, which collected funds for travel to Poso, Marawi, and Syria (*hijra*), as well as for aid to wives and children of imprisoned or killed fighters. Beginning in 2017, this charity was gradually replaced by another called Fastabiqul Khoirot-Uma Nami (Our Home), managed by a former prisoner named Rio Adiputra.¹⁷ As of late 2020, this charity was still distributing aid to 36 families of jihadists for immediate necessities and Rio himself maintained relations with extremist charities in Java, such as GASHIBU.¹⁸

14 IPAC interview with former prisoner, Jakarta, 5 January 2021. Ukbah had started out as an enthusiastic ISIS supporter but revoked his pledge of loyalty a year later after repeated phone calls from Lutfi Haedaroh alias Ubaid, his close friend and former classmate at a JI school, who was deeply opposed to ISIS. These conversations could only have taken place with the encouragement of the police, as Ubaid himself was in prison at the time on terrorism charges (he was released in 2016). Ubaid arranged to send anti-ISIS books and materials to Ukbah that among other things stressed the danger of shedding Muslim blood in attacks. He also encouraged Ukbah to undertake anti-ISIS *dakwah* in Bima, sending him Rp.2 million a month as incentive to do so.

15 In 2020, Abu Bakar Asshidiq Quranic House, set up as a school for children to learn Arabic and read the Qur'an, was providing free education to children of JAD prisoners, with several unreconstructed ex-prisoners as teachers.[#] A few disengaged former prisoners, led by Ust. Gunawan, a former UBK teacher, wanted to insert more moderate materials into the school while helping it to get accreditation as an educational institution. Gunawan took the plan for consideration to the national counter-terrorism agency, BNPT, which was willing to consider it but only on the condition that the advisory board be members of the local police and military. This would immediately kill any hope its being seen as independent, so the plans, as of January 2021, remained on hold.

16 Mosque-goers make mandatory donations of Rp.1,000-2,000 per day, amounting to around Rp.8 million [around USD \$560] per month.

17 The name "Fastabiqul Khairat" or "competition to do good" is taken from Surat al-Maidah, verse 48.

18 IPAC interview with ex-JAD commander, Bima, 12 December 2020.

The government's response was Tim Sinergitas, a BNPT-led multi-agency assistance program for "cooperative" families and former prisoners. The team's data was not always up-to-date or accurate, however, and the definition of "cooperative" was sometimes subjective, meaning that some families were declared ineligible because they were considered still hardline, when in fact they had already begun to disengage. Grants were mostly limited to the Penato'i neighbourhood and were rarely followed up or evaluated.¹⁹

Bima is an important test of whether deradicalisation and disengagement programs can work, against a history which suggests that a fourth generation of militants could already be in the works. It is also worth noting, as will be seen in the next section, that four of the remaining eleven MIT fighters at the end of 2020 were from Bima.

V. MIT: ATTACKING FROM WEAKNESS

Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) was the most active of the pro-ISIS groups in Indonesia during 2020 (see Appendix III for list of incidents). The tiny insurgency carried out six attacks during the year, killing seven civilians. To paraphrase the comments of a colleague working on Central Asia, "If this is the worst Indonesia has to worry about, it's in pretty good shape." In a machete attack in Palolo subdistrict, Sigi, Central Sulawesi on 27 November 2020, the group killed four civilians from a transmigrant village and caused the displacement of hundreds of others. MIT is one of the few extremist organisations in Indonesia that has actively sought to exploit the Covid pandemic, arguing that Covid was the "army of Allah" sent to help mujahidin fight their enemies and that they should strike while the enemy was weak.²⁰

MIT's high level of activity is evidence not of increased strength but of serious weakness, even though it has shown a phoenix-like capacity for rising from the ashes.²¹ As of early 2021, it was reportedly down to eleven combatants, though in the past, its numbers have sometimes been underestimated (its losses in 2019-20 to deaths and arrests totalled 26).²² In terms of firearms, it was reportedly down to one rifle, one pistol and a few hundred bullets by January 2021, which may explain why several of their attacks have been with machetes. It also may explain why police remain such a top target, because a successful attack could not only fell an enemy but gain access to a weapon.

A. Background to MIT

MIT was founded in 2012 by Santoso, a former JI member, as the outgrowth of his role as head of the military wing of JAT, a position he had held since 2009.²³ Following the failure in early

19 IPAC interview with ex-JAD commander, Bima, 12 December 2020.

20 IPAC, "COVID-19 and ISIS in Indonesia", Short Briefing No.1, 2 April 2020.

21 Operation Tinombala is a joint police-military operation launched in Central Sulawesi on 10 January 2016 aiming to eliminate MIT as a terrorist threat. Tinombala was launched in January 2016, replacing Operation Camar Maleo, a police operation that had failed to capture MIT leader Santoso. Since Santoso's death on 18 July 2016, Operation Tinombala operation has been extended every six months although the number of troops deployed has been reduced significantly since late 2019. For more on Tinombala, see IPAC, "Update on the Indonesian Military's Influence," Report No 26, 11 March 2016, p.5.

22 Police in December 2020 named the eleven as Ali Kalora, Qatar alias Farel, Askar alias Jaid, Abu Alim alias Ambo, Nae alias Galuh, Khairul alias Irul, Jaka Ramadhan alias Ikrima, Alvin alias Adam, Rukli, Suhardin alias Hasan Pranata and Ahmad Gazali. "Operasi Satgas Tinombala Kemungkinan Akan Diperpanjang oleh Polri," *tribunnews.com*, 8 December 2020.

23 See International Crisis Group, "How Indonesian Extremists Regroup", Asia Report No.228, 16 July 2012, p.6.

2010 of plans for a regional terrorist training camp in Aceh, Santoso and some of the Javanese involved in the camp discussed the possibility of turning Poso into an alternative centre. Throughout 2011, Santoso held training sessions for would-be fighters from all over Indonesia, illustrating both the scope of his contacts and why the Poso project became so important to extremists from other organisations. After he broke with JAT in 2012, he continued to work with “alumni” of his training sessions, mostly in Java and Bima, to look for money, recruits and arms and mounted a number of poorly planned and executed attacks. In July 2014, he was one of the first Indonesians to publicly declare his loyalty to al-Baghdadi and in November 2015, he released a video declaring MIT to be the army of ISIS in Indonesia. He was killed in a military operation in July 2016 and succeeded by Ali Kalora. In November 2010, when Kalora’s fighters had dwindled to less than ten, central Sulawesi’s capital, Palu, was hit by a major earthquake and tsunami. MIT used the steady stream of humanitarian volunteers to Palu as a cover to get new recruits to Poso from Java, Maluku and elsewhere. It managed briefly to get its forces back to double digit strength, only to lose them again as it tried to mount attacks and triggered security operations in response.

MIT has always depended heavily on fighters and other support from Bima: between 2012 and 2014, at least 27 Bima men trained in Poso.²⁴ Connections to Java, first through JI, then through JAT, kept the relationship going, as the extremist preachers at the Istiqomah mosque taught that jihad was an obligation of all Muslims (*fardhu ‘ain*), and the only place in Indonesia where there was a jihad to join was Poso. Women from Bima went to Poso too, as wives of fighters but with the sense that marriage was a way to contribute to the struggle. While several of the women have been described, including by IPAC, as combatants, they were trained to handle firearms for self-defence and were not involved in *amaliyah* (jihad operations).²⁵

B. MIT since 2018

Since 2018, the small band of fighters has been moving constantly in the hilly jungle around the districts of Poso, Parigi Moutong and Sigi to avoid detection by the combined police-military forces of Operation Tinombala. Ali Kalora, the nominal leader of the group since the death of founder and commander Santoso in July 2016, is from a village in North Poso Pesisir and knows the area well. His men and their families are short of food and supplies, though assistance to MIT is still seen as an obligation for other extremist groups. In August 2020, security forces

24 Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, “Verdict in the case of Salman alias Nasi Kuning, Decision No.239/Pid/Sus/2015/PN.Jkt.Tim, 15 July 2015, p. 6; Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, Verdict in the case of Ramadhan Ulhaq alias Deni, Decision No775/PID.SUS/2015/PN.Jkt.Tim”, 16 December 2015, p.8-11; trial dossier of Solihin alias Farhan alias Untung, p.5-6.

25 One of them was Jumiatur alias Umi Delima. In 2012, when she was an 18-year-old student at the al-Madinah pesantren in Bima, she was asked by her Arabic teacher there if she was interested in marrying Santoso as his second wife. She said yes and in a matter of weeks, the teacher accompanied her to Poso for the wedding. In December 2014, another woman from Bima, Umi Nurmi, arrived as the wife of MIT leader Basri alias Bagong. Jumiatur was arrested shortly after Santoso’s death in July 2016, Umi Nurmi two months later. Both had been trained in the use of firearms by their husbands in case of the need for self-defence; they were not combatants in the sense of being active participants in operations. In September 2018, a third Bima woman, Wahyuningsih, went to Poso to marry her classmate from Al-Madinah pesantren who by then had become a top MIT leader, Busron alias Qatar. All of these women were tried and given relatively lenient sentences. Jumiatur’s story, however, did not end with Santoso’s death or her release in November 2018. She attempted to escape to Poso three times to meet her young daughter, Delima, but all were thwarted. Worried that her attempts could harm the network, JAD decided to arrange to marry her to Asrak, an ex-JAD prisoner from Dompu. They married by proxy in early 2019, but the villagers in Jumiatur’s neighborhood regarded the marriage as invalid. They remarried in person on 29 April 2019 at the Istiqomah mosque with local military officers as the witnesses. In May 2019, Asrak was rearrested for his involvement in JAD activities.

arrested Koswara, a former prisoner, and Sahran Riri, a deportee from Turkey, who had become an important donor for MIT.

A huge blow for MIT was the arrest in September 2020 of Sutomo alias Ustadz Yasin, a former prisoner and the director of two pesantrens in the Poso area, one for boys in Morowali, one for girls in Poso city. Yasin, originally from Semarang and one of the first JI clerics to go to Poso in 2000, was a two-time recidivist. After his second release, in 2016, he immediately returned to extremist preaching and recruiting, including in prisons, with seemingly little attention from local police.²⁶

By the time he was re-arrested in 2020, his school had become a top source of recruits for MIT.²⁷ He was also a major donor, providing Rp.20 to 30 million per month via GASHIBU. The money was transferred via the bank account of his wife, Mei Ekowati, with some going to general support for the pesantrens but a major portion earmarked for aid to families of MIT supporters. Even before his arrest, his wife's account was frozen because of indications that the funds included MIT support. GASHIBU was placed on Indonesia's official list of suspected terrorist organisations in 2020.²⁸

Desperate for food and supplies, MIT sent two of its fighters down from the jungle in November to see what they could glean. The movements of the two, Azis Arifin alias Azis and Wahid alias Bojes, were detected by police, however, and they were killed in an encounter on 17 November. Not only did MIT lose two of its remaining men, but it also lost one of its two remaining pistols.

MIT was now so weak that it had nothing to lose by attacking. Its attacks, however, were different in character than those of JAD. MIT appears to have calculated that by upping the level of brutality used, especially beheadings, it could serve several objectives. First, it could so terrify local farmers that they would think twice before reporting them to Tinombala forces. MIT was convinced that some of these farmers, on whom they depended for supplies, had been recruited as spies and it was determined to teach informers a lesson. Second, they may have hoped that by targeting a Christian group, as in Sigi, they could trigger a low another communal conflict. Third, they could get international publicity and prove to the world that the only territorially-based jihad in Indonesia was still active.

The strategic vision did not come from Ali Kalora but from a Bima native, Busron alias Qatar alias Farel, who had joined MIT in 2014. He had become MIT's most respected leader, with two qualities that others in the group lacked. One was his ability to think ahead, a result, perhaps, of his having studied strategy with the late Daeng Koro, a legendary member of Darul Islam-Makassar and former Poso combatant who was killed by police in 2015. He also had religious credentials that many of the others lacked, having studied at Pesantren Al Madinah in Bima in 2013.

26 Yasin was arrested first in January 2007 after an armed clash between police and JI supporters in the streets of Poso. He received a five-year sentence but was out early, but he had successfully recruited many ordinary criminals in Palu prison, with particular success among convicted motorcycle thieves whose skills he saw as potentially useful for both transport and fund-raising. He was arrested again in 2012 and released in 2016.

27 Most of the MIT members from Poso currently on the police wanted list were Yasin's students, including Khoirul Amin alias Irul, Rukli and Suhardin alias Hasan Prata. Some of those killed fighting for MIT in 2020 were also Yasin's students from the Darul Anshor pesantren. They included Muis Fahreni alias Abdullah, Darwin Gobel, Azis Arifin alias Azis and Wahid alias Aan alias Bojes.

28 This list, called Daftar Terduga Teroris dan Organisasi Teroris (DTTO) is compiled in accordance with Law No.9/2013 on anti-terrorist financing. Once an organisation is on the list, its assets can be frozen by the Financial Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre (Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan, PPATK).

VI. THE DI/NII CELLS

Many Indonesian ISIS supporters have been drawn from a complicated network known as Darul Islam (DI) or DI/NII that has its roots in a series of regional rebellions in the 1950s and that gave rise to dozens of militant splinters, including Jemaah Islamiyah.²⁹ As arrests in 2020 show, DI still exerts a powerful pull in parts of Indonesia, especially West Java, Banten and South Sulawesi but also in many parts of Sumatra. All DI factions have in common the goal of an Islamic state in Indonesia, and for some, ISIS became a natural extension of that aspiration.³⁰

In this section we look at the different ways that groups with a DI/NII background were dealing with the changed ISIS environment in 2020.

- Several members of one of the most extreme of the DI/NII splinters, Ring Banten, seemed to be undergoing a process of disengagement, suggesting ISIS was losing its appeal. Given the group's history, the question was whether and how the steps toward disengagement could be sustained.
- At the same time, a non-ISIS group linked to one well-known Ring Banten family moved toward setting up a new violent splinter, hoping to use anger at the government, the Covid pandemic, and the perceived imminent end of the world to spark social unrest. Its members were all arrested in mid-2020 before they could act, but their plans were an indication that violent extremism from DI/NII-linked groups may continue to pose a problem.
- DI-Makassar went over to ISIS in 2014 and became JAD-Makassar. A 6 January 2021 police raid on a JAD-Makassar meeting led to two deaths and the arrest of some 20 members. This sweep may freeze JAD activities, at least temporarily, but the group has a high potential for regeneration and resumption of links to Poso and Mindanao.
- A DI/NII group in Belawan, North Sumatra formed a pro-ISIS group that lasted only two years. The arrest of its members in 2019 almost certainly has put an end to its activities, but its trajectory, including its joining forces with pro-ISIS cells of ex DI/NII members in Riau and Aceh, shows how easily a small group in one area can build alliances with like-minded individuals elsewhere.

The fundamental lesson is this: No matter what happens to ISIS, DI/NII has roots too deep to eradicate. It will likely continue to form the basis of extremist cells in Indonesia for generations to come, and its relatively brief intersection with ISIS may leave a legacy of a more extreme ideology than its original DI approach.

29 The network began as a struggle to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII) in the late 1940s, turned into a series of regional rebellions in the 1950s in West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh and elsewhere, and later split into many factions. For a detailed history, see Solahudin, *The Roots of Indonesian Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah*, New South Wales: University of New South Wales Press, 2013 and International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," Asia Report No.92, 22 February 2005.

30 Aceh, where a Darul Islam movement under Daud Beureueh also existed had a different trajectory, with the more militant DI members breaking off and forming the ethno-nationalist independence movement, Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM). A few pro-ISIS cells emerged in Aceh but they were anomalous.

A. *Ring Banten*

Ring Banten, an old splinter of the West Java command of Darul Islam, was involved in every major phase of Indonesia's extremist trajectory from the eruption of conflict in Ambon in 1999 to the 2016 Jakarta attack. As of early 2021, however, it seemed to be dormant, its members no longer active in support of ISIS, but still angry at government crackdowns.

Since they first broke away from Darul Islam in 2000, angered by the passivity of the DI leadership after the Ambon conflict erupted, Ring Banten members defined themselves as the *mujahidin* who put older leaders to shame. Their members fought in Poso, took part in the 2002 Bali bombs and were the field operatives for the 2004 Australian embassy bombing under Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois, now under death sentence as a result. They joined the abortive training camp in Aceh in 2010; the founder, Kang Jaja, was killed by police trying to flee in the aftermath of that debacle. In the excitement after the caliphate was announced at the start of Ramadhan in 2014, Rois from prison swore loyalty to al-Baghdadi and with Aman Abdurrahman, helped organise JAD on a national basis. This ensured that the JAD branch set up in Banten, which closely coordinated with JAD headquarters in Lamongan, East Java, was largely built around a Ring Banten base.³¹

From prison Rois helped plan the botched 2016 JAD attack in Jakarta, then worked with Suryadi Mas'ood, a senior Makassar JAD operative with extensive connections in Mindanao, to purchase arms and open channels for training Indonesians with the Abu Sayyaf Group in Basilan. (Suryadi had belatedly realised that almost no one in JAD actually knew how to use firearms, and one of the few good nearby places for instruction and combat experience was Mindanao.) Rois sent his younger brother, Adi Jihadi, to train with Isnilon Hapilon's forces on Basilan in June 2016, though the training only lasted eight days before Philippines military operations brought it to an unexpected end. Adi returned to Indonesia where he was arrested in March 2017 and later sentenced to six years in prison. He will be out in 2023.

Most members of this once-feared group have reportedly disengaged from ISIS, including Adi Jihadi who reportedly signed an oath of loyalty to the Indonesian state. Even Rois has softened his stance somewhat after a stroke he suffered in October 2019. He reportedly made no objection when Adi Jihadi signed the loyalty oath, though he himself still refuses to do so. There were no arrests of JAD-Banten in 2020.

JAD-Banten may be moribund, but Ring Banten's members appeared in another group as well: a violent splinter of JI led by one member of a top family.

B. *The Imarudin splinter*

The Imarudin splinter, though non-ISIS, is included here because it shows how Ring Banten could give rise to two very different groups, one JAD-linked, one not. Imarudin, the leader who was arrested in May 2020, comes from an illustrious Ring Banten family. He is the younger brother of Heri Hafidzin, an Islamic teacher peripherally linked to the 2002 Bali bombing and still active in DI circles.³²

31 Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in the case of Andri Oktavia, No..540/Pid. Sus/2019/PN.Jkt.Br", 8 August 2019. The deputy amir of JAD-Banten, for example, was Ook Oktavia, whose son, Andri, was a convicted Bali bomber.

32 In 2002, Heri introduced his friend Imam Samudra to a trio of young men from Ring Banten who robbed a gold store in Serang, Banten and then went on to help out with the bombings. Heri was a business partner of Kang Jaja, Ring Banten's founder, in a courier/package delivery company but they fell out, and Heri then set up

In 2013, Imarudin decided to join JI, then under the leadership of Para Widjayanto. He was given a responsible role as finance officer for JI's directorate of education and recruitment. As a successful businessman himself in his family's courier company, he was both an important donor and a model of how a profitable company could be used in support of the cause. (Having a means of transporting supplies is always useful.)

Imarudin had always been an enthusiastic supporter of jihad and like many in JI, chafed at its policy of inaction that had been in place since 2007.³³ In 2017, he requested and received permission from JI to go to Syria, but he was stopped in Bangkok and sent back. His desire to conduct jihad only increased, however, and he encouraged his brothers – who had also joined JI – and all the staff of his courier company to undertake physical fitness training so that they would be ready to fight when the time came.

In July 2019, Para Wijayanto was arrested, and almost immediately, the discipline in JI began to break down. Imarudin was one of many in JI who were angry that there had not been greater resistance to Para's arrest. He began to think more seriously about jihad but also became obsessed with end-of-time prophecies. He regularly followed the lectures of Ust. Zulkifli Ali on Youtube, a popular lecturer on the apocalypse, and became more and more convinced that 2020 was the year that the Imam Mahdi, the Islamic messiah, would return. These were based in part on numeric calculations but also on his conviction that the growing military and economic domination of China was an indication that the end of the world was near. He was convinced that forces of Dajjal, the Islamic Antichrist, would be Chinese.

He told his brothers and his employees to prepare for war, with a focus on weakening the enemy by attacking its economic heart.³⁴ He planned to mount a series of attacks on Chinese investments and Chinese workers in Indonesia, reasoning that if they were successful, the Chinese military would send troops to Indonesia, and all Muslims would rise up against them.³⁵

In 2020, Imarudin asked Juher, a JI member and former employee of his company who was based in Surabaya, to look for guns and ammunition that could be used in this effort and gave him Rp. 175 million (about USD\$12,400) to purchase them. He also instructed his younger brother Jamaludin to study how to make bombs and then asked him and a few others to undertake a survey of Chinese workers in the Cilegon area of Banten.

Imarudin was able to buy two pistols and an SS1 rifle, together with ammunition, from an acquaintance in the air force in Malang, East Java. He got the weapons just as the first cases of the Corona pandemic were acknowledged in Indonesia, convincing him that this was another sign that the end of the world was near. He also saw it as perfect timing to mount his economic war because an economic downturn could lead to social unrest.

None of his plans came to fruition, however, because police were already on the trail. Juher

a new courier company with his brothers. As of 2020, he was spending most of his time running his pesantren. For more on Heri and Ring Banten, see International Crisis Group, "Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing," Asia Report No.92, pp.27-29.

33 For background on why JI pulled back from violence in 2007, see IPAC, "The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah," Report No. 36, 27 April 2017.

34 Jordanian scholar Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi developed the idea of *jihad tamkin* which rejects the notion of indiscriminate terror attacks (i.e. bombing public facilities) and suggests a more strategic approach to control territory governed under Islamic law. Aman Abdurrahman translated and popularised Maqdisi's ideas in Indonesia.

35 Private communication to IPAC, Jakarta, December 2020.

was arrested first on 23 April 2020, followed by three of Imarudin's brothers – Hasanudin, Jamaludin and Ali Muhammad Amin – at the end of April and finally Imarudin on 30 May.

C. JAD-Makassar and links to Mindanao

On 6 January 2021, two men were killed and 18 members of JAD-Makassar were arrested for pro-ISIS activities. The raid drew attention to the complex links between DI-Makassar (the organisational “parent” of the local JAD branch) and a wide range of different extremist networks in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, going back to the mid-1990s. JAD-Makassar may have been broken up, at least temporarily, as a result of the raid, but those links are ongoing, as described below. One of the men killed, M. Rizaldy, and one of the women arrested were related to the Indonesian family involved in the 27 January 2019 suicide bombings at Our Lady of Mt Carmel Cathedral in Jolo in the southern Philippines. Both had reportedly been providing financial donations to surviving members of the family fighting with the Abu Sayyaf Group.³⁶

Most of those arrested on 6 January had joined JAD in 2015 under the auspices of the late Ust. Mohammed Basri, a cleric who ran Pesantren ar-Ridho, a school for Qur'an memorization in Sudiang, Makassar. Basri himself was arrested in April 2015 and died of illness in prison in 2018. But before joining JAD, he had overseen a Darul Islam branch that had been active since the early 2000s in sending fighters to Ambon and Poso; facilitating transit to Mindanao to train, fight and purchase arms; and helping set up a DI branch in Tawau, Sabah (Malaysia). Basri himself was never involved in military operations but he provided support to those who were and ensured that any *mujahid* fleeing police could find refuge at his school.³⁷ After Basri

³⁶ The bombers were a couple from Gowa, Makassar, Rullie Rian Zeka and Ulfah Handayani. Rizaldy was Ulfah's brother. Ulfah had brought three of her children to Mindanao via Sabah just days before the January 2019 bombing (Rullie had been there since August 2017). One was a teenager, Rezky Fantasia better known as Cici. Cici was married to Andi Baso, a member of JAD East Kalimantan who had fled to Sabah, Malaysia via Makassar in 2016, after an explosion in Samarinda, East Kalimantan in November 2016 implicated the JAD branch there. When Ulfah brought her children to Sabah, it was Andi Baso who helped arrange their travel. He married Cici, then 16, days after their arrival and accompanied the family to Mindanao in January 2019. After the Jolo bombing on 27 January, he eventually joined the Abu Sayyaf faction of the late Hajan Sawadjaan on Jolo island. Cici for the most part stayed in town with her younger sister Aisyah but occasionally went to the front to be with her husband, as other women did. Ahmed, her younger brother, aged 12 in 2020, was adopted by ASG commander Mundi Sawadjaan, nephew of Hajan and became a child soldier. Rizaldy, Cici's uncle, had been providing some financial support for Cici and Andi but also urging them to return or at least to send Aisyah back. Andi Baso was killed in a military operation on Jolo in late September 2020. Cici was arrested on 10 October 2020 by Philippine police. At age 17, she was then pregnant and gave birth to a baby boy on 10 January 2021. She remained in police custody in Mindanao as of early 2021. Her older sister, Ainun Pretty Amalia, was arrested in Makassar in the same raid in which Rizaldy was killed.

³⁷ A detailed profile on Basri was prepared by the Indonesian Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI) in 2015 but never published. It notes that Basri, born in Sidrap, South Sulawesi in 1965, trained in Afghanistan in the 1980s and continued his studies in Pakistan at one of the schools in the Wifaqul Madaris network in Pakistan where he received the equivalent of a master's degree in Islamic studies. He returned to Indonesia in 1994 and settled in Jakarta where he ran a Salafy study group. When the Ambon and Poso conflicts broke out, Basri helped raise funds, provide humanitarian assistance and send fighters. He also worked closely with Ring Banten and another DI group run by Abu Umar. In 2002 Basri returned to Makassar to live, settling close to the ar-Ridho mosque in Sudiang where he opened his school in 2004. From 2005 until 2013, he gave refuge to Syamsudin HG alias Abu Uswah, mastermind of several attacks, including the attempted bombing in 2012 of a campaign rally for Syahrul Yasin Limpo, then running for governor of South Sulawesi. The candidate survived, but the attack put police on the trail of Abu Uswah. He was killed in an operation near the ar-Ridho mosque in January 2013. From 2014 onwards, Basri became a devoted ISIS supporter and helped send several groups to Syria, working with a Jakarta-based colleague, Amin Mude. Several of those who left were killed, including Basri's

joined JAD in 2015, his prestige, together with an enabling environment of many sympathetic local organisations, turned Makassar into a pro-ISIS stronghold.

In January 2015, euphoria in Makassar over the caliphate was such that the local branch of Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) organised a huge rally of support. A JAD leader from West Java, a senior FPI official and Ust. Basri were speakers, and it concluded with a mass pledge of loyalty to al-Baghdadi. Many of the newly pledged then drove around the city waving ISIS flags.³⁸ A second mass oath-taking sponsored by FPI took place a few months later, also with a senior official from FPI central present. The meetings were cited in December 2020 by the Jokowi government as proof of FPI support for ISIS, although the context in early 2015 was very different. Around the country there were bai'at ceremonies as Indonesians welcomed the new caliphate, many not understanding its implications, and there were few efforts to stop them. In Makassar, there was little evidence of cooperation between FPI-Makassar and JAD-Makassar in operations. There was some crossover, though, from FPI to ISIS, and one of those who reportedly made the leap was Rizaldy, the man with the link to the Jolo bombers.

Like Ring Banten, the roots of support for an Islamic state and for formal application of Islamic law, combined with a history of resentment of control from Java, run deep in Makassar. The January 2021 raid against JAD-Makassar will disrupt JAD activities, but the seeds of regeneration have already been planted.

D. Anshor Daulah Al Makassari(ADM), a JAD-Makassar splinter

This small Makassar-based group is an example of how several ISIS supporters who got to know each other at JAD-Makassar meetings ultimately decided they wanted more autonomy and went off on their own. They had no pre-ISIS affiliation to a radical group. One member lived only a few hundred metres from Ust. Basri's school, Pesantren Ar-Ridho, and frequently attended Basri's lectures, but that was the extent of his connection.

The new group that called itself ADM began meeting on their own in early 2018 and undertaking regular training sessions in fitness, self-defence and archery. They believed, however, that they could only meet the terms of their oath to al-Baghdadi by carrying out an attack and became obsessed with finding an appropriate target. They eventually settled on a plan involving the execution of a high school teacher who seemed to show Shi'a sympathies on his Facebook page. One of the members had been a student at the school where the teacher taught, and knew that he had coffee in a particular foodstall every Saturday morning. When they did a survey and he did not show up, they looked for another site for an attack. They saw that he had posted a notice on Facebook that he was selling his car, and they decided to pose as buyers. Then it turned out that the notice was old and the car almost certainly long since sold. It became clear that no one in the group had the slightest idea how to plan or carry out an attack, and long before there was any serious danger to the teacher, the key members were arrested. After trials in late 2019, most got relatively short sentences of three years and four months or less; the amir received four.

ADM is typical of dozens of small cells of under fifteen people that ISIS inspired to action. When the arrested men are released from prison in a few years, the danger is not so much that the whole group reassembles, but that one or two who still want to prove themselves worthy members of ISIS will be recruited by a new organisation.

own son, who died in Syria in March 2015. A month later, Basri was arrested.

38 ISPI profile, op.cit.

E. The Muslim Nasution group in Belawan, North Sumatra

This group is typical of many small NII groups that transformed themselves into autonomous ISIS cells. It lasted two years, collapsing shortly after one of its founding members, Muslim Nasution, blew himself up at the Medan police command on 13 November 2019. In the aftermath almost all members of the group were either arrested (28 men) or killed (2).

The group emerged out of a split in a local DI/NII branch occasioned by the declaration of Islamic State. One faction took a passive stance, waiting to see if the new caliphate could extend its reach to Indonesia. The second faction was more action-oriented. It consisted of three *halaqah* or study circles, in the Belawan area with a total of some 30 people, led by Ustad Yanto, a local fisherman with no advanced religious training, and a man named Salman as amir.³⁹ Its members became committed to either joining the new state in Syria or actively working on its behalf in Indonesia. Inspired by ISIS videos that became instructional material for the study groups, Ust. Yanto's followers began rudimentary fitness training as well as preparation of arrows, slingshots and bombs, which they practiced detonating in a fishpond.

They had a vague idea of using these weapons in connection with the April 2019 presidential election, after defeated candidate Prabowo Subianto urged his supporters to protest the results. In May, when the protests reached a peak, Salman took a group of members armed with the slingshots and arrows to the election oversight committee in Medan (Bawaslu), in the hope that if a riot erupted, they could exploit the chaos to attack police. No unrest took place, however, so they just went home.

These men were neither well-off nor well-educated, though several members had studied in Aceh at the pesantren of a well-known cleric, Abu Nuh. Everyone wished to go to Syria, but no one had a passport or the means to pay for one. Group members followed social media closely enough to know that when al-Baghdadi was killed in October 2019, they needed to renew their vows to his successor, which they did. Avenging al-Baghdadi's death then became the motive for the suicide bombing at the police station, in which the bomber, Muslim Nasution, was the only one who died. Immediately after his death, police rounded up almost all the remaining members of the group under the 2018 anti-terrorism law. Those arrested were on trial as of 2020 and mostly light sentences of between three and four years had begun to be handed down.

F. Anshor Daulah SP II in Kampar, Riau

The remnants of the Belawan group then became linked to a pro-ISIS group in Kampar, Riau. The Riau group grew out of a DI/NII branch that was wracked by internal feuding. The branch was part of the main DI/NII structure headed by DI founder Kartosoewirjo's son, Tahmid. It had an administrative structure paralleling that of the government with "ministers", "governors", and district and subdistrict heads, but did little more than have meetings focused on religious instruction and DI's history. The Riau branch was not involved in violence. For participants, its main problem was that it was boring.

As the feuding intensified in October 2016, a few members decided that they had had enough and turned to ISIS instead. Some 15 members began watching ISIS videos and

³⁹ The halaqah were in Sicanang; Uni Kampung, Belawan; and Hamparan Perak. It is worth noting that one of the first major terrorist assaults on police was carried out in Hamparan Perak on 22 September 2010 when several men linked to an extremist training camp in Aceh that police had broken up earlier that year attacked the local police station, killing three officers.

discussing tracts by Aman Abdurrahman; eventually they pledged loyalty to al-Baghdadi.⁴⁰ They began to organise regular study sessions, swimming lessons and training in archery and knife-throwing. There was some restructuring in 2017 as a few new members joined and others departed (including two who could not swim). In 2018, a separate pro-ISIS group was formed by seven disgruntled DI/NII members – also from Kampar but from a different sub-district. The two groups joined forces in February 2020.

The problem was that they had no one with serious religious credentials in the group, a major shortcoming. Eventually, a contact referred them to Abu Nuh, the same Acehese cleric that the Belawan group had found. In August 2018, three members of the group went up to his pesantren in Aceh Besar to check him out. The Riau team quickly decided that he was insufficiently militant, but there was another option. They had befriended an Acehese at Abu Nuh's pesantren named Azzumar alias Maulana. He recommended that they all move over to a teacher more committed to jihad, an Acehese named Muhammed Aulia. Aulia had been deported from Turkey in March 2016 and returned to his pesantren in Jambo Montasik, Aceh to teach. His commitment to ISIS was strong; he also supervised jihad training at the school for ISIS sympathisers. The Riau men wanted to study with him. The problem was that he was still committed to hijra, especially as he had heard from contacts in Turkey that there were channels now open to travel to “Khorasan”, the ISIS province in Afghanistan.⁴¹ Just after Maulana and a few of the Riau members took part in a training session at his school and came back fired up with a desire to fight, Aulia left Aceh with his family. In June, his followers got word that they all had been arrested in Bangkok, trying to get to Afghanistan.⁴²

The Riau group was again left without a teacher, but it was still expanding its network. Returning from Aceh, Maulana and his Riau friends had stopped off to see the ISIS supporters in Belawan, North Sumatra described in the previous section. Maulana knew them because they had all attended Abu Nuh's pesantren together. When Muslim Nasution blew himself up at the Medan police station and a few of the Belawan members were desperate to escape the coming crackdown, they contacted their Riau friends and asked for protection. The Riau group helped them find a place to stay in Pekanbaru but this made them more concerned for their own safety. It also may have made them more determined to undertake a jihad action while they still could. In May 2020, three of the members started making a bomb at their house in Kampar. They were planning on targeting churches in Pekanbaru that many Chinese attended, on the grounds that the Chinese government was persecuting Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. They found an instruction video on how to construct TATP bombs but failed to build any that worked. On 21 June 2020, Maulana and two others were arrested. Most of the others in the group were arrested in August 2020.

The story of the Riau group illustrates an important phenomenon that has characterised many crackdowns – the formation of new alliances as individuals fleeing arrest seek shelter with contacts of friends or relatives in different towns. The new alliances can then be further strengthened as their families run into one another visiting relatives in prison. Not everyone will be involved in jihad. It is worth noting that of the 20 to 25 ex-DI/NII people eventually involved in the Riau network, only five were actually involved in operational planning.

40 The faction in Pekanbaru was associated with Tahmid Basuki Rahmat, son of DI founder Sekarmadji Kartosoewirjo.

41 For the full story of Aulia and the links to Khorasan, see IPAC, “Learning from Extremists in West Sumatra,” 28 February 2020, Report No.62, p.10.

42 Aulia was arrested on return to Indonesia and was eventually tried and sentenced to five years in prison (convicted on 17 June 2020).

VII. FIRQAH ABU HAMZAH (FAH)

This once tightly knit group, concentrated in Jakarta and its suburbs but stretching into Sumatra, was moribund by 2020 but its members were still turning up as participants in other extremist cells. It was an example of how religious study groups left leaderless can drift into more radical circles, looking for spiritual guidance.

Abu Hamzah, the eponymous founder, had led FAH for decades like a cult, banning members from praying or marrying outside the group and branding anyone who challenged him as apostate.⁴³ Mainstream Muslims considered him deviant for practices such as banning the haj to Mecca on the grounds that the Saudi government was *kafir* and declaring that Friday prayers were not obligatory. (A long derogatory tract about him appeared online around 2011, listing all of his alleged shortcomings.⁴⁴) There was no suggestion, however, that he endorsed violence. At its pre-ISIS height, the group had some 3,000 members, men and women, who spent much of their time in intensive religious study of the Qur'an and selected hadith, as well as in business pursuits.⁴⁵

Abu Hamzah, however, became fascinated with ISIS and was one of the early Indonesian nationals to travel to Syria in 2013. He ordered all his followers to try and emigrate (hijra) and said the caliphate was more important than he was.⁴⁶ Local leaders from Medan, Lampung and Pekanbaru were among those who joined him; others were either stopped en route by Indonesian police or caught and deported from Turkey.

The steady stream of departures wreaked havoc on what little structure of FAH remained. In one group in Cikarang, south of Jakarta, the leadership changed every four or five months as more left for Syria. There was also dissension in the ranks, as not all FAH members approved of ISIS and with no strong leader at the top any longer, there was nothing to prevent grievances and frustrations from coming to the surface. By 2015, FAH was down to only a few hundred followers, and many were looking for other study sessions to join.⁴⁷ It was at this point that a few violent cells emerged. In May 2019, a former FAH member, Endang alias Pak Jenggot, was arrested in Cibinong for making a TATP bomb that he planned to use to create chaos during the post-election protests in Jakarta. And just before Indonesia's Independence Day celebrations on 17 August 2020, police arrested Agus Riyanto, FAH's amir for the Jakarta metropolitan region, and a dozen others in what was billed as a "preventive strike" because members of the group had been boasting on social media of planned attacks.

As of 2020, it was not clear whether Abu Hamzah was alive or dead in Syria, but he had long since ceased to have any control over FAH.

43 For more on Abu Hamzah's background, see "Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and the Risk of More Violence," Report No.25, 2 February 2016.

44 Jafar Medan, "Selamat Tinggal Firqoh Abu Hamzah," posted on 15 December 2011, <http://cuappapcuap.blogspot.com/2011/12/selamat-tinggal-firqoh-abu-hamzah.html>.

45 East Jakarta District Court, Witness testimony of Ningsih Lestari in trial of Agustningsih alias Nining, No.223/PID.SUS/2017/PN.JKT.TIM, 26 July 2017, pp.11-12.

46 Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in case of Sugiyanto alias Abu Faris alias Abu Salman bin Mustofa, Decision No.1113/Pid-Sus/2018/PN. Jkt. Brt," 25 September 2018.

47 Testimony of Ningsih Lestari (See footnote 45). In 2015 a long tract appeared online, purportedly from 23 men and women from FAH branches in Tegal, Brebes, Cirebon and Pekalongan who had decided to leave the organization. It listed all of the ways that FAH tried to control its members and some of the religious debates within the organization. While IPAC has not been able to verify the authors' association with FAH, it was posted before the explosion of fake news and "hoaxes" designed to discredit specific groups. See karawangberitawhid.wordpress.com, 22 July 2015.

VIII. EXTREMIST NETWORKING ONLINE: MUHAJIRIN ANSHAR TAUHID (MAT)

Muhajirin Anshar Tauhid (MAT) is typical of the many pro-ISIS cells that emerged on encrypted social media platforms as the 2018 anti-terrorism law went into effect and direct face-to-face meetings became more dangerous. The good news is that the cyber-patrol in Detachment 88 has become increasingly skilled in detecting online groups and it is much harder for these cells to operate for long without coming to its attention. Between 21 April 2020 and 4 January 2021, the cyber unit removed more than 11,000 accounts on Facebook, Instagram and Telegram.⁴⁸ The bad news is that with more would-be terrorists relying on online recruitment, a few will always be able to escape detection, such as the group whose bomb flattened a neighbourhood in Sibolga, North Sumatra in March 2019.⁴⁹ In MAT's case, they had been followed closely from the beginning, and between June and September 2020, more than a dozen members were arrested. They had been planning to set up an Islamic community in Bima and launch attacks against the police there.

A. Background to MAT

MAT began as a WhatsApp chat group called Ghuraba in 2020. Its members were drawn from across the radical spectrum, including FPI, Salafy and various pro-ISIS groups. With some 200 members, they debated issues such as the legitimacy of celebrating the Prophet's birthday (Maulid), visiting graves and ISIS. Clear divisions emerged. FPI members, for example, who tended to be traditionalist, strongly defended Maulid and were attacked by Salafy and ISIS supporters. On the other hand, when they discussed ISIS, FPI and Salafy members united against supporters of Islamic State. It became clear in these debates who supported which stream.

Eventually ISIS supporters from different cities got to know one another online and agreed to form a new WA group called *istithla qitaly* or "preparation for battle". Members felt more comfortable with one another than they did with the larger group. The new group had some 30 members from across the country, including from Aceh, North Sumatra, Banten, Bandung, Cirebon Brebes, Poso, Bima and Ambon. They discussed the importance of forming a jihad group and discussed the selection of an amir. Eventually Handri Firmansyah alias Abu Haura from Cirebon was chosen, with Wahid Artanto alias Abu Asyad, 25, a fried snack seller, from Bima as his deputy. They had not chosen a name but discussed a number of preparatory steps needed for jihad.

B. MAT in 2020

In April 2020 several members got cold feet and left the group. Some of them formed a new WA group with the name Al Kahfi. This time they vetted members more carefully. Each member had to swear an oath called *mubahala* that they were not *jasus* or intel and if they were, they were ready to be struck dead by disaster. Each member had to send the text of this oath to Handri Firmansyah.

The group then began to discuss finding a territory to establish a settled community or *tamkin*. There were three possibilities, Java, Poso and Bima. The first two were rejected on the grounds

48 Data provided by Indonesian National Police by text in response to IPAC query, 5 January 2021. The total included 10,369 Facebook accounts; 1,160 Instagram accounts; and 47 Telegram accounts.

49 The Sibolga group began with a query posted in a Facebook chat by someone looking for help making a bomb. For more on the case, see IPAC, "The Ongoing Problem of Pro-ISIS Cells in Indonesia," Report No.56, 29 April 2019, p.9.

that both had too many security forces on the ground, so they chose Bima. They reasoned that there were many ISIS supporters there and there were mountainous areas that could become the basecamp for their movement. They then decided they needed a name, and eventually settled on Muhajirin Anshor Tauhid (MAT). As a security measure to avoid detection by intelligence, they erased the old group from WhatsApp and repeatedly started a new one. In a period of three months, they created 15 groups, each with a new name.

The members agreed on a division of labour. One person was appointed treasurer, one was assigned to look for firearms, another to survey Bima. They got word that a gun was for sale in Bima for Rp.8 million, which gave them a new boost of enthusiasm. They collected the money and sent it via the application Truemoney used by Alfamart, a national minimarket chain. But they only managed to raise Rp.5 million. While waiting for the gun, they held a meeting online to discuss plans for Bima, from military training to possible targets for attacks. For the latter, they agreed on the Bima police station, the paramilitary police (Brimob) command and the district military headquarters. Then they conducted online surveys of each proposed target using Google Maps.

Detachment 88's cyberpatrol was following them, however, and before anyone was able to leave for Bima, police started making arrests, starting with Egit Ramadhan alias Abu Obak, aged 20, in Bima on 8 June 2020.⁵⁰ Over the next week, eleven members were arrested, including the amir, Abu Haura and his deputy, Abu Asyad. A smaller group tried to hang on by starting a group with a new name, "Kejujuran Dalam Beragama" (Honesty in Practicing Religion), but its members, too, were caught in August and September 2020.

MAT emerged from nowhere and disappeared without a trace following the arrests, but it follows in a long line of similar Facebook or Telegram groups that rise and fall too quickly for anyone to notice. It is worth noting that these online groups frequently involve women because it is possible for them to get into the spirit of jihad without having to worry about whether they are accompanied by spouses or male relatives. One of the groups caught in 2019, however, involved two women professionals, both officers in the North Maluku police force.⁵¹

IX. INDEPENDENT PRO-ISIS GROUPS AND CROSSOVERS

Across Indonesia, pro-ISIS cells have emerged side by side with larger coalitions like JAD. They range in size from less than ten to several hundred members. Some emerge from a small group of family and friends: neighbours, fellow traders at a market, classmates at a university, often fellow participants in a religious study group. Many have a very short life span.

It is particularly important to look at organisations that have become occasional pathways to ISIS. Two of these are Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, LDII, and Khilafatul Muslimin, the non-violent, pro-caliphate organisation founded by the Bima activist Abdul Qadir Baraja in 1997. Both had characteristics that may have made ISIS an attractive option. LDII, like FAH, had cult-like characteristics, requiring a bai'at and total obedience to the leader and regarding anyone outside the group as an infidel. At the same time, it was pro-government and lacked the spice of clandestine resistance that ISIS could give its members. KM saw itself as the caliphate,

50 "Polda NTB Perketat Pengamanan Pasca Penangkapan Teroris di Bima", regional.kompas.com, 26 August 2020 and "Densus 88 Tangkap Teroris di Banten dan NTB, Berniat Serang Kantor Polisi, kumparan.com, 25 August 2020.

51 For details, see IPAC, "Extremist Women Behind Bars in Indonesia," Report No.68, 21 September 2020, pp.25-26.

but what a poor shadow of the group that could take over Mosul with thousands of armed fighters. What is surprising is not that some members of these two organisations joined but that they were not accompanied by many more.

A. *Zulfiqar Rahman and former members of LDII*

In April 2020, Detachment 88 arrested a group of ISIS supporters led by Zulfiqar Rahman who were planning to set up a territorial base in Maluku in which they could apply Islamic law in full. This idea of building a settlement to serve as the nucleus of a larger Islamic polity was in line with the *tamkin* strategy of al-Maqdisi and Aman Abdurrahman (see above).⁵² They chose Maluku, hoping to reignite communal conflict so that in the chaos, they could seize an area to implement their plan. They had carried out surveys in Ceram to choose a desirable site and had selected nearby Pulau Manipa as their logistical base. They had also assembled some homemade weapons including rocket-propelled grenades, guns and explosives. They had also discussed how they might benefit from the Covid pandemic: if it created social unrest in Jakarta, they could consider launching attacks on the ethnic Chinese.

Zulfiqar and most of his followers had come from an organisation called the Indonesian Institute of Islamic Outreach (Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia, LDII). LDII, also known as Islam Jamaah, was like FAH known for its exclusivity and cult-like characteristics. It required members to swear a bai'at and considered anyone outside the group as *kafir*. In its long history going back to 1972, it had never used violence. Indeed, it had always supported the government in power, including as a partner of Golkar during the late New Order of President Suharto. It even had an affiliate that worked with the police as a civilian auxiliary called Senkom Mitra Polri. One of those arrested with Zulfiqar was a manager of Senkom Mitra Polri in Sidoarjo, East Java.

The crossover from LDII to ISIS was made possible by an internal dispute within the organisation, stemming from a fraudulent investment scheme that had led to significant financial losses for many members.⁵³ In the midst of the leadership's failure to deal with the fraud, a reform movement emerged within LDII led by young Saudi-educated ulama. These young scholars became increasingly influenced by Salafy thought to the point that they began to see many aspects of LDII as deviant. They were especially troubled by the LDII practice of declaring anyone outside the organisation to be a *kafir* and the requirement that members had to swear allegiance to the group's imam. These scholars began to argue for change, winning much support, especially from those who dismayed by the way senior leaders in LDII had handled the fraud. The problem was that any changes in key tenets of the organisation had to be approved by the senior leadership who almost by definition were resistant to change. Disaffection increased, and eventually the reformists themselves split in two. One group left LDII altogether and formed a new group called Forum Ruju' Ilal Haq (FRIH). In 2012, one of its members, Adam Amrullah,

52 It has also been adopted in a different form as JI's long-term strategy, as evidenced by the depositions of many of the senior JI officials arrested since July 2019.

53 The scheme began in 1998 when the State Electricity Board, PLN, wanted to collect outstanding payments due from many large companies. PLN allowed a third company, CV Rory Persada, under the leadership of an LDII member named Mariyoso, to effectively loan it the amount by collecting money from investors, many of whom were also from LDII. The investors were promised a 25 per cent return per month, PLN would get large back bills paid, and the company would be able to keep the fines imposed on the companies for late payments. The amounts invested were not small. One member from Solo invested the equivalent of more than a million dollars. The problem was that it was all a giant fraud, and the first criminal report from a disgruntled LDII member was filed with the police in 2001. Other police reports followed and in 2005, Mariyoso was officially put on the police wanted list. The case remained unresolved in 2014, when the fissures in LDII deepened. See "Investasi Bodong Jemaah LDII 14 Tahun Tidak Diusut," Tempo.co, 18 September 2014.

became increasingly close to extremists at a radical mosque in South Bekasi.⁵⁴ The second group, led by the Saudi-trained alumni, wanted to work for change from within, but the leadership declared them non-active and effectively expelled them. Zulfiqar Rahman and others left LDII as a result and turned increasingly to Salafy teachings.⁵⁵

ISIS emerged as the rift within LDII was widening and caught the interest of discontents like Zulfiqar. It was not as big a jump as it may have seemed. Like LDII, ISIS considered those outside the group as *kafir* and also required a *bai'at*. It believed that those who refused to swear allegiance would die in a state of ignorance rendering them the same as non-believers. ISIS also banned democracy, and this resonated with LDII dissidents. For them, the failure of the reform movement lay in part in the old guard's reliance on majority rule in its decision-making, religious considerations notwithstanding. Zulfiqar and friends found ISIS attractive because it tried to apply Islam in its purest form, just as the first generation of Wahabis had done in what became Saudi Arabia.

As the internal rift within LDII has continued to deepen, the concern is that more dissidents could be drawn to extreme alternatives. Before his arrest, Zulfiqar intensified these recruitment efforts, inviting former colleagues to discussions and debates on social media.

B. *Ex-Khilafatul Muslimin (KM)*

Several pro-ISIS cells have emerged from the organisation called Khilafatul Muslimin, founded by Bima native Abdul Qadir Baraja with its headquarters in Lampung. Two cells composed of ex-KM members emerged in 2019. On 23 September 2019, police arrested a pro-ISIS cell in Bekasi led by Fazri Pahlawan alias Abu Zee. Abu Zee and three others were ex-KM, although the cell drew in many other men and women. (Fazri was active in arranging marriages within the group). In November 2019 police arrested a pro-ISIS cell in Lampung led by Rifky Montazeri, also an ex-KM member.

The declaration of a caliphate by Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi posed an existential problem for KM, which claimed it had established the caliphate in 1997 with Baraja as caliph. Initially Baraja had welcomed the June 2014 declaration with a statement that read:

The news which has made the Muslim world so happy has constricted the chests of the kafir and hypocrites. On 1 Ramadhan, the Islamic Caliphate was declared by our brothers in Syria. The mujahidin of Islamic State have proved their intentions with clear action. His spokesman, Abu Muhammad al-Adnany, may Allah protect him, announced the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and installed Sheikh Ibrahim ibn Awwad (Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) as caliph and took his pledge. It is right that we as Muslim feel happiness and give thanks for this news.⁵⁶

But many KM members were confused, because now there appeared to be two caliphs, Baraja and al-Baghdadi, and there was a hadith (tradition of the Prophet) that said this was forbidden. If there were two caliphs, the newer claimant should be killed.⁵⁷

54 Adam was arrested in 2012 on the dubious charge of defaming Senkom, the police auxiliary that represented the LDII mainstream. For more on his case, see IPAC, "Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink", IPAC Report No.11, 30 June 2014, pp.10-11.

55 Private communication to IPAC, Jakarta 15 November 2020.

56 "Khilafatul Muslimin Indonesia Dukung Deklarasi Khilafah Islamiyyah," www.panjimas.com, 4 July 2014.

57 IPAC interview with former KM member, Jakarta, January 2021.

Baraja tried to quiet his followers by telling them that he would negotiate with ISIS, convinced that al-Baghdadi would acknowledge his prior right, cede the caliphate to him and happily join forces under Baraja's command. He sent a letter to al-Baghdadi, suggesting they have a dialogue, but there was no response. Baraja then contacted a number of other pro-ISIS leaders in Indonesia, including Abu Husna, and invited them to discuss the issue. In 2015 or 2016, Ust. Hadi Salam, KM's amir for Java, met with Abu Husna at Pesantren Ukhwan Islamiyah in Pekayon, and invited him and his followers to pledge loyalty to Baraja as he was caliph first. Abu Husna refused. He told Ust. Hadi that KM's caliphate was imaginary because it controlled no territory. Hadi Salam responded that it did too, and the proof was that there was a management structure from the national to the subdistrict level. Abu Husna said if it was true, why had KM not applied Islamic law? This silenced Ust. Hadi.

The notion that KM was only an imaginary caliphate unable to apply shari'a sparked a debate among ISIS supporters within KM, much of it on social media. It convinced some KM members, including Abu Zee and Saheh Rodriko to leave and give their allegiance instead to the "real" caliph.

X. JAMA'AH ANSHARUL KHILAFAH (JAK): PRO-ISIS, ANTI-VIOLENCE

Jamaah Ansharul Khilafah (JAK, formerly Khatibul Iman), led by Abdurrahman bin Thoyib alias Abu Husna, is the mostly non-violent face of ISIS that operates primarily in the Solo, Central Java area. As JAD has weakened there, JAK has grown stronger, focusing on dakwah rather than jihad. It has mostly been left alone by the police. Until stricter Covid regulations were in place, it conducted routine meetings (*taklim*) in various mosques around Solo, relying on print and social media for additional outreach. It has set up centres for memorizing the Qur'an and has been active in fund-raising and undertaking humanitarian efforts, including disaster relief aid and providing food and free medical services to the poor. In this, it is very much following the JI model, not surprisingly since JAK's top leaders – Abu Husna, Ayyas, Sarwo Edi Nugroho and others – are all JI alumni. Indeed, there are suggestions that JAK was set up after an agreement between Abu Husna and JI that a new organisation was needed to channel the aspirations of ISIS supporters within JI to keep them from turning violent.⁵⁸ Some ISIS members have also accused JAK leaders like Abu Husna and Ayyas of being *jasus* or state intelligence agents, since all the JAK members arrested between 2015 and 2018 had had direct contact with these two men, but neither was arrested and both have been free to preach to this day.

A. JAK Background

JAK was established in 2015 – only days after Abu Husna was released from prison – and was originally known as Khatibatul Iman.⁵⁹ That name was soon dropped, however, and leaders

⁵⁸ The exact nature of relations between JI and JAK needs to be explored further, because there are also reports of a meeting between Abu Husna and two senior JI figures, Bambang Sukirno and Abu Husna's brother, Abu Fatih. The two men reportedly tried to persuade Abu Husna to drop his support for ISIS, but he refused. (It is also possible that there were differences among senior JI figures in how to position themselves vis-à-vis Abu Husna.)

⁵⁹ Abu Husna had been arrested in 2008 in Malaysia trying to leave for Syria on a false passport, reportedly to pursue graduate studies in Islam. He was deported, then arrested on arrival, tried and sentenced to nine years in prison and released in August 2015. See IPAC, "Support for 'Islamic State' in Indonesian Prisons", Report No.15, 19 January 2015, pp.4-9.

soon began referring to themselves by the generic terms *jemaah anshorul daulah* and *jamaah ansharul khilafah*. The latter name prevailed.

From the beginning, JAK's main base was in the Solo-Yogyakarta area – Abu Husna had graduated from al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki outside Solo, taught there from 1984 to 1995 and had several businesses in the area. Shortly after Khatibatul Iman was set up, however, an individual named Abdul Karim alias Abu Jundi persuaded Abu Husna to let him recruit new members in Sumatra with the aim, he said during his trial, of encouraging them to go to Syria or carrying out jihad in Indonesia. (Given Abu Husna's ban on violence, it is not clear what Abu Jundi was actually doing.) He claimed to have recruited and trained men in Jambi, Riau and West Sumatra, held bomb-making sessions at his house and encouraged the targeting of Shi'a. Some of those recruited went on to form their own pro-ISIS groups in Riau and Jambi and were subsequently arrested.

B. JAK in 2020

Several factors were behind JAK's dynamism in 2020. First, its ulama were filling the void left by the arrest of well-known pro-ISIS clerics such as Aman Abdurrahman, Iskandar alias Abu Qutaibah, Khairul Anam and others. In any pro-ISIS group, religious credentials are essential for leadership, but because of arrests and stricter control of communications between detained ulama and their followers, most groups now lack leaders who can provide guidance on Islamic law.⁶⁰ JAK clerics by 2020 were becoming the go-to sources for religious guidance, including for JAD members.

Second, not a single JAK member was arrested in 2019 or 2020, suggesting a deliberate decision on the part of the police to let the group operate. While discouraging jihad at home, however, JAK facilitated its members who wanted to join the fighting in Syria. After it became almost impossible to cross the border from Turkey into Syria, JAK became focused solely on dakwah, and JAK members who wanted to wage jihad had to leave the organisation. Unhappiness with this decision led several to leave JAK and try to act on their own.⁶¹ This is the danger of JAK recruitment, that newcomers may defect to more militant organisations.

A third factor has been JAK's mosque-based study sessions in the Solo area that are open to the general public combined with its humanitarian and educational programs. These programs stand in contrast to the exclusivism of most pro-ISIS activities. The humanitarian programs include Baitul Mal Al Muqin, a charity to help the poor, and the Al Muqin Peduli Corona

⁶⁰ Before 2018, it used to be possible for clerics to communicate with followers on the outside or even to hold religious study sessions via speakerphone. This situation changed with the transfer of most JAD ideologues to super-maximum security prisons with one person to a cell and generally strict enforcement of a ban on cell phones. The prisoners can only communicate with their immediate families.

⁶¹ One such group arrested in 2018 included four men who had tried to go to Syria. Syafii and Saefulloh alias Abu Ramdani alias Saiful had left for Syria in 2016 but were caught in Turkey and deported. Ghaniy Ridhianto had wanted to take his whole family to Syria but failed. After their return, they joined what they understood to be JAD-Yogyakarta under Ust. Arif Suryanto alias Teddy, an ex-JI member. In fact it was JAK and Ust. Arif formed a slightly larger group, planning to make a bomb that could be used against Christians, Shi'a or police. It is curious that Ghaniy and several other members of his group identified themselves as JAD members but belonging to a faction that did not agree with jihad operations. They therefore decided to leave this "faction" and join with another JAD group that they saw as more amenable to their outlook. See Direktori Putusan Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, "Verdict in case of Maryanto alias Temeng". No.437/Pid.Sus/2019/PN.Jkt.Br, 30 May 2019, p. 21. The "faction" they joined was led by Muhamad Sibghotullah, a recidivist who had been released in August 2017 after his second arrest and was arrested for the third time in July 2018. He has since reportedly moderated his views and is due for release in July 2021.

program to distribute masks and disinfectant. On the educational front, JAK has established a number of elementary schools known as Islam Tabarok, focused on helping young children memorise the Qur'an. These programs have attracted families outside the immediate JAK circle who are then invited to join JAK religious study gatherings.⁶²

JAK's reluctance to use violence and more restricted application of *pengkafiran* (declaring fellow Muslims to be infidels for failing to uphold the faith) has led more militant groups to dismiss it as a fake. One of these groups is led by Huzaifah, former member of the Azzam Dakwah Centre and the son-in-law of Abu Ghar (former amir of JAD-Ambon and one of the longstanding associates of Aman Abdurrahman). In the eyes of Huzaifah and his friends, JAK members are failing to be sufficiently strict about branding all security forces and government employees as *kafir* and says they should heed the warning in the Qur'an: "Whoever refused to brand a *kafir* as a *kafir* is himself a *kafir*."⁶³

The last JAK-linked arrests took place in August 2018 and consisted of six men in the Yogyakarta area who were frustrated by Abu Husna's ban on *amaliyah*, or jihad operations and decided to go off on their own.

C. The Possible Role of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

The ambiguous position of JAK in relation to JI and other groups in Solo raised the question about whether former JI leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir might try to bring them together after his release from prison on 8 January 2021.

The danger was not that the 82-year-old cleric would somehow ignite a new wave of terrorism, as many in the international media seemed to fear. It was rather that he would use his prestige as elder statesman of the radical movement to unify the often-feuding pro-Shari'a groups in Solo in support of exclusivist Islamist regulations and policies. In this he seemed likely to fill the void left by the death from Covid in December 2020 of Ust. Mu'inidillah Basri, a former PKS activist and leading pro-Shari'ah advocate who was sometimes inaccurately portrayed as an ISIS supporter.⁶⁴ Ust. Mu'in had been head of the Syari'ah Council of Solo City (Dewan Syariat Kota Solo, DSKS) that included members of anti-ISIS groups such as JI and JAS, as well as members of the many Islamist militias operating in the Solo area. After Ba'asyir returned home, he received visits from DSKS delegations, acknowledging the high respect in which he was held across the Islamist spectrum, both pro- and anti-ISIS. His family, however, was determined to prevent him from communicating with any groups committed to violence.

62 The religious study sessions resemble Salafy meetings. There is no reference to Islamic State. Promising participants, however, are invited to join smaller, closed study sessions (*taklim khusus*) in the homes of members where clerics lead discussions on ISIS teachings. These invitees are chosen for their ideological commitment and a "safe" family background – i.e. no one with relatives in the security forces would be welcome. Only after attending these sessions and understanding the ISIS approach to the faith are individuals invited to swear allegiance to ISIS and join JAK. This process closely follows the old JI recruitment model, where anyone who aspired to membership had to pass through several stages of study before reaching *tamhish*, the final stage, where the chosen few would swear a *bai'at* to the JI amir.

63 IPAC Interview with former prisoner, Jakarta, 12 November 2020.

64 During the lead-up to the 2019 presidential election, Ust. Mu'in had been a key figure in the "success team" in Solo of Jokowi rival Prabowo Subianto (this alone was evidence that he was not an ISIS supporter because no one who would take part in an election campaign.) But Ust. Mu'in's brother, the late Abu Walid, had been a leading Indonesian ISIS fighter in Syria, and pro-Jokowi police tried to paint Mu'in as having the same persuasions. Tainting the success team as linked to terrorism by extension would discredit Prabowo.

XI. CONCLUSIONS

While the case studies demonstrate that ISIS support is declining, they also show how easy it is for new cells to form. The trigger may be loss of leaders, through arrests, bureaucratic infighting, or hijra to places outside Indonesia; it may be the collapse of organisations like JAD that leaves members adrift, looking for a new institutional home; or it may be a chance encounter at a mosque or lecture. Cells may also form as individuals search for material on the Internet and become attracted to pro-ISIS videos and other propaganda.

Indonesian police have increasingly used preventive strikes, and this may be one factor in the low level of terrorist activity in 2020, though there are clearly other possible causal factors.⁶⁵ The challenge, though, is not just to arrest and imprison the perpetrators or would-be perpetrators of violent crime but to understand how to prevent recruitment and regeneration – the goal of Indonesia's new Action Plan. Some steps the government might consider include the following:

1. Map out where known extremists, convicted terrorists and ex-prisoners send their own children to school and pre-school, and ensure that the teachers, including women teachers, and teaching materials have been thoroughly vetted. All extremist groups like to start indoctrination young. The JAD branches in Bima and Makassar show the popularity of Quranic memorisation schools for children, especially when they claim to offer new techniques. Ensuring that there are low-cost, non-extremist options of such schools to promote within known extremist neighbourhoods might be one option for local authorities to consider.
2. Ensure that local officials assigned to work on prevention of terrorism and radicalisation are required to read the verdicts in at least five local cases of violent extremism. Recent verdicts are easily available online from the Supreme Court database. They are not very long, and they are full of valuable information to help authorities get a feel for the kind of cases prevalent in their area and for a factual grounding in how radicalisation takes place.
3. Make sure local authorities are aware of lectures, webinars and other events in their area related to end-of-time prophecies. There is nothing criminal about lectures on the coming apocalypse but the intense interest in it on the part of ISIS supporters means that these lectures and webinars can be a place to meet, find online friends and perhaps recruit.
4. Find religious scholars with legitimacy in the extremist community who can explain how one is released from a *bai'at*. Many ISIS supporters believe they are committed to obey their oaths of allegiance to al-Baghdadi and his successor; it would be useful to ensure that arguments to the contrary get wide dissemination.
5. Understand the dynamics of militant splinters. If members of organisations such as JAD swore to wage war on behalf of Islamic State, and the cells they were part of are now inactive, there is going to be a strong incentive to find satisfaction elsewhere. Keeping tabs on where members of dormant organisations have gone will be important. This holds for JAD branches; JI branches that have held back from violence; and DI/NII

⁶⁵ Among other possible factors: the arrest of so many individuals in 2018 that there were not many left to arrest by 2020; a new focus on non-ISIS prisoners with particular attention to JI; self-awareness from cost-benefit analyses on the part of ISIS supporters that there was little to gain from continued ISIS allegiance.

branches with an aging leadership. Cult-like groups, such as FAH, that have lost their leaders may also be ripe for producing splinters.

6. Understand how corruption can taint extremists and PVE programs alike. Many extremist organisations pride themselves on being purer than the government, so evidence of corruption or embezzlement within extremist charities can be a powerful tool for discrediting them. Likewise, however, officials implementing the National Action Plan need to ensure full transparency about budgeting and expenditures for programs and ensure they are open to independent evaluation.
7. Continue to do everything possible to avoid deaths of suspects in police operations. Vengeance is a far more powerful motive for undertaking terrorist attacks than any other and explains why police are still so often the target of attacks. It means police need to make an extra effort, especially in places like Poso, to capture suspects alive and undertake a serious lessons learned analysis if any suspect is killed in operations. At the same time, as some of the police working with detained terrorists have found, exposure to kind, pious police officers willing to engage in informed religious discussions can be a useful first step toward disengagement. It can create major cognitive dissonance for extremists who have seen police as the No.1 enemy. If they are willing to concede that maybe not all are oppressors, it can be the first wedge in dismantling other principles of their ISIS doctrine.
8. Ensure that there is an incentive structure within the police that rewards successful efforts at disengagement through promotions or opportunities at officer training school.
9. Continue international cooperation aimed at capacity-building programs for Detachment 88; these programs have clearly produced demonstrable results in improving surveillance and investigative skills.
10. Intensify efforts to recruit more women for all aspects of the law enforcement and prevention effort, with the goal of improving analysis of women's religious study networks, business operations, online discussions and aspirations vis-a-vis violent extremist groups.

APPENDIX I: LIST OF MAJOR JAD ATTACKS

Date	Plots/attacks	Fatalities caused by JAD	Arrested	Killed by police
31 Dec 2015	Plot to bomb Bandung pendopo New Year's Eve		3	
14 Jan 2016	Attacks in central Jakarta (Bom Thamrin)	5 (inc. 2 bombers)	19	2
13 Nov 2016	Oikumene church explosion, Samarinda, East Kalimantan	1 child	8	0
25 Dec 2016	Incident at Jatiluhur Dam, West Java		2	2
27 Feb 2017	Failed pressure cooker bomb, Cicendo, West Java		5	1
8 Apr 2017	Police attack and shootout in Tuban, East Java		1	6
24 May 2017	Kampung Melayu terminal bombing	3 police, 2 bombers	13	
11 Sept 2017	Killing of 2 police in Bima	2		
31 Oct 2017	Shootout in Gunung Mawu Rite, Bima		5	2
13 May 2018	Surabaya church bombings and police attack	18 killed (6 bombers, 15 civ)		
13 May 2018	Sidoarjo premature explosion	3 family members of bomber		1
14 May 2018	Surabaya police station attack	4 bombers dead		
	Aftermath of 13-14 May		23	3
24 Aug 2018	Shooting of 2 police in Cirebon	2	9	2
4 Apr 2019	Attack on police in West Bandung	0	7	1

APPENDIX II: Partial List of Top JAD Leaders Arrested

No.	Name	Position	Arrest Date and Sentence	Due for Release	Deportee/Returnee
1	Abdul Hakim Munabari alias Abu Imad	JAD Malang, East Java	2015, 3 yrs	Released Mar 2018	x
2	Abdul Kahfi alias Abu Thalha	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Pasuruan, JAD East Java	2018, 2 yrs 6 mos	Released Nov 2020	
3	Abdul Manaf alias Aiman	Caretaker amir of JAD-Tegal	2019, 4 yrs	May 2023	
4	Abdurrahman Hamidan alias Abu Asbal	JAD member, liaison in 2015 btw Santoso and Rois in Nusakambangan, helped run safehouse in Turkey.	1 Feb 2017	Feb 2022	x
5	Achmad Romadlan Deny bin Riin Aminullah alias Azzam	Amir JAD Central Java 2017-18; amir of Azzam Dakwah Center (ADC)	2018, 4 yrs	Sept 2022	
6	Achmad Supriyanto	Financial link to Syria and Philippines	2017, 6 yrs, 3 mos	Mar 2023	
7	Adi Jihadi alias Abu Daffa	Purchasing weapons in Mindanao, training with Isnilon Hapilon.	2017, 6 yrs	Mar 2023	
8	Adi Wardana	Treasurer, JAD Lampung	2018, 2 yr	Aug 2020	
9	Agung Firmansyah alias Agung Brownis alias Abu Aiman	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Cirebon, JAD-West Java	2017, 4 yrs	Dec 2021	
10	Agus Satrio Widodo alias Abu Haidar	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Jombang, JAD East Java	2018, 8 yrs	May 2026	
11	Ahmad Junaedi Alias Jun alias Abu Salman	<i>mudiriyah</i> Malang, JAD East Java	2015, 3 yrs	Released, Mar 2018	x
12	Ahmad Muhaemin alias Abu Yakub Alias Ali bin Judun	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Tegal, JAD Central Java	2019, 4 yrs	2023	
13	Ali Hamka alias Abu Ibrahim alias Abu Musa alias Abu Isa Bin Haji Sulaiman	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Indramayu, JAD West Java	2016, 4 yrs	Released Jan 2020	
14	Ali Makhmudin alias Lulu alias Abdurohman	Member of JAD Tegal, Central Java, involved in 2016 Jakarta bombings	2016, 8 yrs	Jan 2022	
15	Aman Abdurrahman	Founder and advisor of JAD	2017, death sentence		
16	Arom Uni Maian alias Ustad Arom bin Uhi	Amir, JAD Banten	2018, 4 yrs	Jun 2022	
17	Baharudin Ahmad alias Mus'ab alias Abu Umar alias Abu Muqotil	Religious mentor of JAD Bima, fundraiser and motivator for 2017 police attack	2017, 10 yrs	November 2027	

18	Danir Syahir bin Abu Solekhan	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Central Lampung, JAD-Lampung	2018, 2 yrs 6 mos	Feb 2021	
19	Dede Yusuf alias Bondan	<i>mudiriyah</i> Bekasi, JAD-JABOTABEK,	2019, 9 yrs	2028	
20	Dodi Suridi alias Ibnu Irsyad alias Yayan alias Dodi Dabiq	<i>mudiriyah</i> Cirebon, JAD West Java, involved in 2016 Jakarta bombings	2016, 10 yrs	January 2026	
21	Eky Yudistira Wijayanto alias Rafly alias Darto	<i>mudiriyah</i> Bekasi JAD-JABOTABEK	2019, 8 yrs		
22	Faisal Tatawalat alias Abu Nabila bin Abdullah Wahid	Former Amir, JAD Ambon	2018, 3 yrs	June 2021	
23	Fauzan Mubarak alias Abdul Zatil alias Abu Abir	Amir, JAD Central Java	2017, 6 yrs	Jun 2023	
24	Gilang Taufiq alias Abu Salma alias Abdulloh alias Abu Abdillah	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Tasikmalaya, JAD West Java	2018, 4 yrs 6 mos	2022	
25	Hari Setiawan alias Hanafi alias Abu Zufar	head of military wing JAD East Java, amir of <i>mudiriyah</i> Madura, JAD-East Java	2019, 4 yrs, 6 mos	2023	
26	Helmi Muhamad Alamudi alias Abu Royan	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Malang, JAD East Java	2015, 3 yrs 6 mos	Released, October 2018	x
27	Heru Komarudin alias Abu Azam alias Haekal alias irwansyah bin Djaenudin	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Bekasi, JAD Jabotabek	2018, 2 yrs 8 mos		
28	Imam Fahrudin alias Abu Zulfa bin Muhasa	Amir, JAD East Kalimantan 2016-2018	2018, 2 yrs, 6 months	Feb 2021	
29	Isa Abdullah Azzam alias Isa alias Azzam Bin Ali Hamka	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Indramayu, 2016, JAD West Java	2018, 3 yrs	August 2021	
30	Isnaeni Ramdhoni alias Isnaini Ramdhoni bin Totok Suharto alias Doni	Mentor of bomb-making, <i>Mudiriyah</i> Probolinggo, JAD East Java	2018, 3 yrs 4 mos	Oct 2021	Recidivist
31	Iswahyudi alias Zidan alias Abu Essenza	Coordinator <i>halaqah</i> Bekasi	2018, 3 yrs 6 months	2021	
32	Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois alias Hendi alias Agam	Perpetrator of Australian embassy bombing; Aceh training camp	2004, Death sentence		
33	Joko Sugito alias Abu Adam alias Abu Sarah bin Dimun	Amir, JAD East Kalimantan 2014-2016	2016, 7 yrs	Nov 2023	
34	Khairul Anam	Amir-JAD West Java 2015- 2016	2017, 3 yrs, 6 mos	Released Feb 2020	x
35	Kiki Rizky alias Abu Ukasah bin Abdul Kadir	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Malang, JAD East java	2017, 2 yrs 8 mos	Released, Jan 2020	x
36	Koswara Ibnu Abdillah alias Enkos Koswara alias Jack alias Abu Hanifah alias Abu Kembar alias Abu Ahmad	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Bekasi, JAD Jabotabek	2020		recidivist

37	Lutfi Satriana Alias Nanang Alias Goper	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Blitar, JAD-East Java	2018, 3 yrs	Aug 2021	
38	May Yusral alias Umar Al Farouq Alias Da May	Amir, JAD West Sumatera	2018, 4 yrs	Aug 2022	x
39	Muhammad Basri bin Laeba alias Abu Saif	JAD Makassar	2015, 8 yrs	Died 2018 (illness)	
40	Muhammad Fajrin Selan alias Fajrun alias Abu Fatimah Alias	Amir, JAD South Sulawesi	2016, 5 yrs	January 2021	
41	Muhammad Fatwa	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Probolinggo, JAD East Java	2018, 4 yrs	May 2022	
42	Muhammad Iqbal alias Kiki	Religious mentor of JAD Bandung, <i>DISEN-GAGED</i>	2017, 9 yrs	June 2026	Recidivist
43	Muhammad Mustaqim alias Risky Maulana alias Abu Raysa	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Bogor, JAD-West Java	2018, 2 yrs		x
44	Muhammad Zaedon	Amir, JAD-Bima	2019		
45	Mukhlis Zainudin	Amir, JAD-West Sumatera	2020		
46	Muslih Afifi Affandi alias Abu Neil	Amir <i>qoriyah</i> East Bandung, JAD-Bandung, head of as-Sunnah, Cileunyi	2017, 7 yrs	June 2024	
47	Ricky Perkasa Yuda	Treasurer, JAD Jabotabek	2018, 4 yrs	Aug 2022	
48	Rido Ramdan bin Tatang Sumantri	Provided funding for JAD Tasikmalaya	2018, 2 yrs 6 mos		
49	Ridwan Lestaluhu alias Edo	Amir, JAD Ambon	2020		Recidivist
50	Ridwan Sungkar alias Iwan alias Abu Bilal alias Ewok	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Malang, JAD-East Java. Went to Syria for several months	2015, 4 yrs	Released, Apr 2019	x
51	Rijal Dzurrahman	Deputy amir, JAD-Bandung	2016, 5 yrs	Dec 2021	
52	Romelan alias M Romly alias Romli bin Gusrom	Amir JAD East Java 2015-2016	2016, 3 yrs	Released, Feb 2019	
53	Rulianto	Amir, JAD-Medan 2015-2019 ⁶⁶	2018		
54	Sahlan Riry	JAD-Ambon	2020		x
55	Said Laisouw alias Aco alias Abu Haykal	Amir JAD Ambon 2014-2016; briefly, amir, JAD- Maluku	2018, 5 yrs	Jun 2023	Recidivist
56	Saiful Muhtohir alias Abu Gar	Amir, JAD-Maluku	2016, 9 yrs	Feb 2025	

66 JAD Medan never really operated as a functioning branch, and most pro-ISIS activity in Medan took place outside the JAD structure.

57	Shalihin alias Solihin alias Abu Faizah alias Abu Syamil Basayef bin Malhali	Former Amir, JAD-Lampung	2019, 8 yrs 8 mos		
58	Suherman alias Eman alias Herman alias Abu Zahra	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Brebes, JAD Central Java, involved in Cirebon police shooting	2017, Death sentence		
59	Suparman alias Maher bin Nyarita	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Cirebon, JAD West Java; additional charge for 2018 Mako Brimob riot	2017, 5 yrs	Aug 2022	
60	Suryadi Mas'oeed	Most extensive Mindanao experience in JAD; purchased arms, arranged training with ASG	2017, 10 yrs 6 mos	Mar 2027	Recidivist, deportee
61	Sutrisno bin Kamit alias Pak Tris	Amir, <i>mudiriyah</i> Mojokerto, JAD-East Java	2018, 4 yrs	May 2022	
62	Syahril Rigi	JAD Ambon	2020		
63	Syahrul Munif, S.H. Alias Abu Jihan Bin H. Masykur.	<i>Mudiriyah</i> Malang, JAD East Java.	2017, 3 yrs	Feb 2023	x
64	Syamsul Arifin	Amir East Java, 2017-2018	2018, 10 yrs	May 2028	
65	Teguh Dwi Wibowo alias Abu Wahid	Amir, <i>mudiriyah</i> Pamulang, JAD-JABOTABEK	2018, 3 yrs		
66	Ujang Saepurohman alias Ghafari alias Ghifari alias Iwan alias Abu Dinda	Amir JAD Lampung	2018, 3 yrs 6 months	Dec 2021	x
67	Wimbo Gondo Hermawan bin Teguh alias Abu Sayaf alias Abu Zufar	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Karawang 2015-2019, JAD-JABOTABEK	2019, 5 yrs	April 2024	
68	Yadi Al-Hasan alias Abu Arqom	Amir JAD-JABOTABEK, 2015-16	2017, 4 yrs, 8 mos	Jan 2022	Recidivist, deportee
69	Yusuf Firdaus alias Bunting	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Cirebon, 2019, JAD-West Java	October 2019, detained		
70	Zainal Anshori	Amir JAD East Java, Amir JAD 2015-2017	2017, 7 yrs	May 2022	
71	Zami'in Bin Romdi	Amir <i>mudiriyah</i> Kendal, JAD Central	2017, 5 yrs	June 2022	

APPENDIX III: MIT ACTIVITY IN 2019-20

No.	ATTACK/PLOTS/CLASHES IN 2019	Fatalities caused by terrorists	Arrested	Killed by police
1	MIT clash with police, Kilo village, Poso Pesisir Utara, 3 March 2019		1	1
2	MIT clash with police, Marete village, Sausu, Parigi Mouton, 21 March 2019		1	3
3	Attack on local farmer, Kawende village, Poso Pesisir Utara, 19 April 2019	1		
4	Father-son killed in Tanah Lanto village, Torue, Poso Pesisir Utara, throats cut, almost beheaded, 25 June 2019	2		
5	3 farmers from Balinggi, Kab Parigi Moutong (I Wayan Astika, 70; Simon Taliko, 50; and Cangklung, 45) beheaded by MIT, 13 Sept 2019	3		
6	MIT clash with police in Salubanga village, Sausu, Parigi Mouton 13 December 2019	1		
ATTACK/PLOTS/CLASHES in 2020				
7	MIT kidnapped and beheaded cacao farmer, Daeng Tapo, in Kilo village, Poso Pesisir Utara, 8 April 2020. Suspected of helping police.	1		
8	Police from Operasi Tinombala shot a civilian, Qidam Mofance, 20, in Tambarana Village, 10 April 2020			1
9	MIT attack on police in front of Bank Mandiri Syariah Gebangrejo, Poso, 15 April 2020, 2 killed, including Darwin Gobel, just released from prison. Massive turnout for funeral.			2
10	MIT attack on Papa Ajeng, local farmer in Kilo village, 19 April 2020. Suspected of helping police.	1		
11	MIT clash with police, 25 April 2020 in Desa Kilo, Kec Poso Pesisir Utara, Poso			1
12	Tinombala operation police shot 2 civilians by mistake in Kilo, Poso Pesisir Utara, 2 June 2020			2
13	MIT attack on farmer, Agus Balumba 45, in Sangginora, Poso Pesisir Selatan, 8 Aug 2020, by group led by Ali Kalora and Qatar; hacked with machete.	1		
14	MIT clash with police in Bolano Barat village, Parigi Mouton, 17 Nov 2020			2
15	MIT attack on Christian family in Lemban Tongoa, Kec. Palolo, Kab. Sigi, 27 Nov 2020	4		

INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website is www.understandingconflict.org.

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